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This dissertation analyses Chinese engagement with the core norms regulating 
technical global internet governance, namely those related to: US government 
authority, privatized governance, multi-stakeholder governance, and state actors’ 
authority. It seeks to determine if China has been a norm-maker or norm-taker 
towards these norms, and whether it wants to – or can – reshape internet 
governance. To answer these questions, a qualitative analysis of historical and 
contemporary Chinese state and non-state actor engagement with core internet 
governance norms in domestic Chinese internet governance and across key global 
and regional internet governance organizations is conducted. The roles China has 
adopted towards these norms are analysed across their lifecycles and described 
using the dissertation’s own synthesized framework of four potential roles: norm-
entrepreneur, norm-taker, norm-maker and norm-supporter. Explanations of 
Chinese, and other actors’, behaviour within internet governance, and predictions 
about future behaviour, are guided by a rationalist, multi-causal theoretical 
perspective loosely based on liberal international relations theory. The 
dissertation argues that China has largely been a norm-taker at the global level of 
internet governance, but more of a norm-maker at the regional and domestic 
levels. It has also attempted to establish a norm of greater government authority 
within internet governance. The roles China has adopted suggests that it does 
want to change some aspects of the current internet governance regime, seeking 
to remove US government authority and limit non-state actor authority over the 
technical internet but is otherwise satisfied with the multi-stakeholder character of 
internet governance and the authority of non-state actors below the global level. 
China is nevertheless unable to implement the changes that it wishes to make, 
because other states and non-state actors do not share its interests sufficiently, and 
because China does not have the material power or ideational appeal necessary to 
impose its preferences in this area. 
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Over the past few decades the People's Republic of China (China) has steadily 
improved its relative power position within the international system. Rapid and 
sustained economic growth has propelled it to a leading position in the global 
economy and contributed to the strengthening of China’s diplomatic influence 
and strategic capabilities. Concurrently, China’s pragmatic and generally non-
confrontational approach to foreign policy in the post-Mao era has improved its 
foreign relations and accelerated Chinese integration into regional and global 
society. The rise of China in the international system and within international 
society has come with a corresponding increase in attention paid to China’s 
potential impact on contemporary international relations. An intriguing aspect of 
China’s rise is the question of what it will do with its reclaimed great power 
status; a question eloquently framed by James Reilly (2011, p. 71) who asked: 
 
“As China emerges as a global power, is it more likely to accommodate 
itself to the existing systems and norms; or will the Chinese government 
insist that the international system be reshaped more in its own image and 
reflecting China’s own national interests?” 
 
The answer to this question is important to contemporary global politics because 
of China's growing relative power and influence, which may motivate or facilitate 
Chinese attempts at restructuring elements of the international order that the 
Chinese government or people are dissatisfied with (Buzan 2010; Ross & Zhu 
2008, ch. 12). The consequences of China’s rise affects fundamental issues in 
international relations, such as whether a looming power transition between the 
United States (US) and China will trigger global conflict, or whether China will 
seek to overturn the contemporary liberal world order (Foot 2006; Ikenberry 
2008; Shambaugh 2013, ch. 7). However, it also touches upon more narrowly 
defined, specific issues. China’s increasing influence on the world stage means 
that it is critical to the success of global governance processes across a variety of 
specific issue areas as diverse as climate change, development aid, global trade 
governance, and global peacekeeping (Gao 2011a; Gu, Humphrey & Messner 
2008; Hurrell & Sengupta 2012; Li 2011; Reilly 2011). As one core element of its 
rising global power, China's current and potential ability to reshape the structure 
of global governance, as well as its desire to do so, is an important aspect of 
understanding the significance and implications of its rise (Legro 2007; Wang & 
Rosenau 2009). 
 
Mirroring the modern resurgence of China, the internet has become an 
increasingly important technology over the past few decades. From its humble 
beginnings as an experimental research network, the internet has grown into the 
most significant extant information and communication technology, and is 
increasingly important in virtually all aspects of human interaction – from private, 
interpersonal communication through to the conduct of high politics amongst 
great powers (Diamond 2010; DiMaggio et al. 2001; Farrell 2012; Keohane & 
Nye Jr 1998; Lessig 1999). The internet’s centrality to global telecommunications 
renders it a significant factor in the protection of national security, the operation 
of the global economy, and within many other issues in contemporary 
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international relations (Ball 2011; Chadwick & Howard 2010; Lindsay 2013; Vu 
2011). The internet exerts a wide-ranging influence over global politics, yet its 
technological characteristics are shaped by, and its global reach and continued 
operation depend upon, the global governance of its technical architecture. The 
conduct of technical global internet governance (internet governance) is thus an 
important element of modern international relations. 
 
This dissertation aims to contribute to the literature on China’s rise and its 
implications for international relations by examining Chinese engagement with 
this specific aspect of world politics: the global governance of the technical 
internet. It does not focus on the details of Chinese policy towards the technical 
internet, but instead aims to develop an understanding of China’s broader role in 
the governance of the global internet and its preferences towards the conduct of 
that governance. Specifically, it aims to answer two related questions: 'Has China 
been a norm-maker or a norm-taker in internet governance?'; and 'If it wants to, 
can it reshape the structure of internet governance?'. To answer these questions, 
the dissertation analyses the roles China has adopted towards four core norms that 
either regulate the conduct of internet governance or influence its future 
evolution. Three of these norms are historically and currently dominant in 
regulating the conduct of internet governance, while the fourth is an emerging 
norm that challenges the current structure of internet governance. These three 
core norms are: (1) the norm of US government supervisory authority over 
internet governance (the US authority norm); (2) the norm of non-state actors 
enjoying authority over internet governance (the privatized governance norm); 
and, (3) the norm of multiple stakeholder rights to participate in internet 
governance (the multi-stakeholder governance norm). The one emerging norm 
examined by the dissertation is the norm of sovereign state authority over the 
internet’s global governance (the state authority norm). 
 
China's engagement with core internet governance norms is a significant topic for 
a few key reasons. As noted, China is a rising great power with the potential to 
reshape global politics and the conduct of global governance. Similarly, the 
internet is a politically influential technology, and its global governance is, 
therefore, an important issue area. Aside from the internet’s general significance, 
however, the technical internet’s global governance is shaped by some unusual 
norms which reflect US predominance in world politics, and embody liberal, 
democratic ideals (Drezner 2004; Mueller, Mathiason & Klein 2007). This makes 
China's engagement with this issue area of particular relevance to the implications 
of China's rise, as it provides an opportunity to explore Chinese engagement with 
emerging global governance norms that do not necessarily reflect the preferences 
of the Chinese state or its government. Finally, little existing research addresses 
this topic, thus examining it contributes to the development of empirical literature 
on China, the internet and global governance.  
 
Overall, the dissertation contributes to knowledge in three ways. Firstly, it 
contributes to empirical knowledge about Chinese engagement with internet 
governance through its original research on this subject, which centers on a 
detailed analysis of Chinese involvement with key internet governance 
organizations at the global level and at the Asia-Pacific regional level, in 
particular the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the Internet Corporation 
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for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and its subsidiary bodies and related 
regional organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Network Information Centre 
(APNIC), and with United Nations-sponsored organizations such as the World 
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) and the Internet Governance Forum 
(IGF) and related bodies. Secondly, it contributes to knowledge of Chinese roles 
towards core internet governance norms, and to our understanding of China’s 
preferences towards, and capacity to reform, contemporary internet governance. 
This greater understanding is provided by theoretically-informed analysis of both 
the dissertation’s own original research and pre-existing empirical knowledge of 
China and technical internet governance. Thirdly, the dissertation contributes to 
knowledge by providing a modest theoretical improvement to the frameworks 
used to describe state roles towards global governance norms. It develops a set of 
four potential state roles towards these norms: norm-entrepreneur, norm-maker, 
norm-supporter and norm-taker. This is done by reviewing the norm-maker/norm-
taker framework and its related literature, identifying innovations within this 
body of literature, and then using this knowledge to synthesize a new framework 
that is structured around Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm lifecycle model 
(norm lifecycle model). 
 
This theoretical contribution also constitutes the first of the dissertation's three 
broad sets of arguments; that is, the first argument made by the dissertation is that 
its synthesized suite of four potential state political roles towards global 
governance norms is a modest improvement to existing approaches. This is 
because it more accurately describes state behavior by acknowledging the roles 
states adopt in the process of global governance norms’ lifecycles, in contrast to 
the more outcome-oriented focus of existing approaches. The second set of 
arguments relate to the political roles China has adopted towards core internet 
governance norms across the lifecycle of these norms. At the global level, China 
has been norm-taker, but it has also been a norm-entrepreneur and norm-maker at 
lower regional and domestic levels of internet governance – with its roles varying 
across sub-issues in internet governance and across different governance levels.  
The third set of arguments relate to the theoretical factors that have caused 
China's historical and contemporary roles towards core internet governance 
norms, which are argued to have arisen from Chinese actors’ pursuit of their 
material and ideational interests, and by material and ideational structural factors 
that have alternately facilitated or constrained this pursuit. 
 
To answer its two primary research questions, the dissertation develops a 
methodology comprised of three separate, but related, components – a multi-
causal theoretical perspective, a framework for understanding normative change 
in global governance, and a framework for describing state roles towards global 
governance norms. The dissertation’s theoretical perspective is rationalist and 
multi-causal, deriving from liberal international relations theory but 
supplemented by insights from realist and constructivist schools. It frames global 
politics as a bottom-up, interest-driven process conducted by primarily rational 
state and non-state actors – who derive their interests both from power and 
survival concerns as well as ideational beliefs and values – operating in an 
environment in which the global distribution of material power and ideational 
beliefs facilitates or constrains their behavior. This theoretical perspective is used 
by the dissertation to explain state and other actors’ behavior, as well as the 
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structural factors that facilitate or constrain these actors’ behavioural choices. As 
a result, it fundamentally shapes the remainder of the dissertation’s methodology, 
its substantive analysis, and its ultimate conclusions. 
 
As its second methodological component, the dissertation employs the norm 
lifecycle model to describe normative change in global governance. This 
conceives of global governance norms as arising from the actions of norm 
entrepreneurs that persuade or coerce others into accepting behavioural standards. 
When a sufficient number are accepted in this manner, a tipping point is reached 
and norms begin to ‘cascade’ through international society, achieving greater 
acceptance and potentially internalizing or acquiring a ‘taken for granted’ quality 
that makes conformity to them an unconscious action. Over time, new norms 
arise from new ideas or from the advocacy of newly empowered norm-
entrepreneurs, and the process begins again. Use of the norm lifecycle model is 
supplemented by Acharya’s (2004) localization concept, which explains how 
norms internalize within existing normative frameworks – being rejected, 
subordinated to, or becoming dominant over existing norms in a given setting. 
The dissertation uses the norm lifecycle model to explain how core internet 
governance norms arose, how they influence different aspects of internet 
governance, and to assess whether they have permeated domestic Chinese 
internet governance or Chinese actors’ beliefs.  
 
The norm lifecycle model also shapes the dissertation’s third methodological 
component, influencing its synthesis of a framework for describing state roles 
towards global governance norms. This framework adds process-oriented roles to 
the more outcome-oriented norm-maker/norm-taker framework, which generally 
designates states as norm-makers or norm-takers based on whether or not they 
have the requisite material power to persuade or coerce other states into accepting 
norms. The dissertation supplements this approach by incorporating a process-
oriented role of norm-entrepreneur into the framework, recognizing that states 
may be as-yet-unsuccessful norm-makers. It also proposes a fourth role of norm-
supporter, to acknowledge that states may actively oppose the norm-
entrepreneurship of others. The dissertation argues that the inclusion of these two 
additional roles to the norm-maker/taker framework, and the framework’s 
reformulation as a suite of four potential political roles that are explicitly linked 
to the norm lifecycle model, are a more accurate yet still acceptably parsimonious 
method of describing state engagement with global governance norms. This 
framework is used to guide analysis of, and describe, the roles China has adopted 
towards core internet governance norms. 
 
The dissertation’s methodology is used to analyze the development of core 
internet governance norms and the roles China has adopted towards them, but 
qualitative documentary analysis is the primary method by which the dissertation 
generates data on, and a narrative for, the internet governance regime and China’s 
involvement with it. Basic numerical data on China’s involvement in internet 
governance organizations is also provided where possible. Similarly, the 
identification of facts relevant to the dissertation’s analysis is guided by the 
structured approaches within the norm-maker/norm-taker and compliance 
literatures – which identify both the sub-national and international or 
transnational actions and statements of state and non-state actors as important. As 
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a result, the dissertation analyses Chinese engagement with internet governance 
across the domestic, regional and global levels, and across three stakeholder 
groups of the Chinese government, private sector and civil society. It analyses the 
conduct of domestic Chinese internet governance and Chinese participation in 
internet governance organizations at both the global and regional levels.  
 
Given this approach, it is important to note that in the categorization of Chinese 
actors, serious doubt can be cast on the independence of Chinese private sector 
and civil society actors from the Chinese government. This is due to China's 
status as an authoritarian one-party state and the history of its domestic state-
society structure, which grants the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) a strong 
influence both within Chinese organizations and over the political lives of 
individuals that represent them (Saich 2004, ch. 5, 8, 9; Yang 2003; Zhang 2003, 
p. 3, 4, 12). Despite this ambiguity, the dissertation analyses the empirical 
engagement of the Chinese government, private sector and civil society with 
internet governance as if these actors were relatively unambiguous categories. 
This is done to enable a more nuanced determination of China's engagement with 
core internet governance norms. Nevertheless, the dissertation recognizes that the 
independence of some nominally non-state Chinese actors is debatable and 
acknowledges this in its final analysis and ultimate conclusions. 
 
In its specific response to its research questions, the dissertation argues that China 
has been a norm-taker in relation to the US authority norm but has become a 
clearly dissatisfied one since 2001. Unsurprisingly, there is no evidence that 
Chinese actors have internalized this norm and it does not directly influence 
domestic Chinese internet governance. A range of materially and ideationally 
derived interests in gaining access to the internet are posited as the primary driver 
of China's norm-taker role towards the US authority norm. These interests 
include: gaining internet access, advancing China's scientific, technological and 
economic development, improving China's international reputation, and, 
facilitating Chinese computer scientists' open access to information. Structural 
factors also constrain China's ability to advance any alternative to the US 
authority norm, namely, US (and Western) control of global telecommunications, 
China's general relative power position, and ideational structural constraints 
arising from China's illiberal political reputation. China's continuing norm-taker 
role is due to an enduring interest in internet access and structural constraints 
preventing it from abolishing this norm. 
 
A more complex set of roles has been adopted by China in relation to the 
privatized governance norm. At the global level, and similarly to the US authority 
norm, China had been a norm-taker in relation to the norm within internet 
protocol and domain name system governance, but became a clearly dissatisfied 
one in 2001. Yet unlike Chinese opposition to the US government authority, 
China is more accepting of non-state actor authority in this context – especially 
with respect to Chinese non-state actors. China's norm-taker status is due to 
similar factors to those guiding China's norm-taker role towards the US authority 
norm; the primary difference being that Chinese non-state actors' interests do not 
align with the Chinese government here, with the privatized governance norm in 
this context being in their material – and arguably their ideational – interests. 
Conversely, in relation to internet standards governance, China has been a norm-
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taker and almost entirely internalized the privatized governance norm's 
application to this governance issue. China's norm-taker status towards the norm 
in internet standards governance is argued to result from the Chinese government 
having no strong preference towards the norm in this context, and arguably 
having accepted its appropriateness. For Chinese non-state actors, the privatized 
governance norm is in their material interests, and arguably in their ideational 
interests as well. 
 
At the regional level, China has been a norm-entrepreneur – and eventually a 
norm-maker – in relation to non-state actor authority in internet protocol system 
governance, and a norm-taker with respect to domain name system governance, 
having internalized the appropriateness of the norm in these contexts. The same 
theoretical factors explain China's various roles towards the privatized 
governance norm in regional internet protocol and domain name system 
governance. For the Chinese government, it simply does not have a strong 
preference towards how this governance is conducted at the regional level, 
although structural factors also constrain Beijing here. For Chinese non-state 
actors, non-state actor authority is in their material interests, and arguably in their 
ideational interests as well. Domestically, China has been both a norm-
entrepreneur and eventually a norm-maker in regard to the privatized governance 
norm in domestic internet protocol system and domain name system governance 
– although it has localized non-state actor authority to China’s domestic 
circumstances by subordinating non-state actor authority to that of the Chinese 
government. In these roles, China has been reasonably satisfied. Domestically, 
China's satisfaction results from the privatized governance norm being in the 
material interests of both the Chinese government and non-state actors – at least 
in its weakened, localized form.  
 
China roles towards the multi-stakeholder governance norm are less complex. At 
the global level, China has been a norm-taker. At the regional level, China has 
been a norm-entrepreneur and later a norm-maker in relation to internet protocol 
system governance, and a norm-taker in regard to domain name system 
governance. Domestically, China has been a norm-entrepreneur and then a norm-
maker. In relation to multi-stakeholder governance, the various roles adopted by 
China at the global, regional and domestic levels are explained according to the 
same set of factors. This is because the different roles China has adopted towards 
multi-stakeholder governance result primarily from differences in the timing of 
Chinese engagement with internet governance, rather than due to shifting interest 
assessments and changing structural conditions. Both the Chinese government 
and Chinese non-state actors consider the multi-stakeholder governance norm to 
be in their material and ideational interests. The sustained level of support for 
multi-stakeholder governance from the (albeit unenthusiastic) Chinese 
government, and from Chinese non-state actors, suggest that China has 
internalized this norm to a substantial degree.  
 
Due to Chinese dissatisfaction with the US government authority and the 
privatized governance norm in global level internet protocol and domain name 
system governance, China has attempted to replace and/or weaken these norms 
via implementation of the state authority norm. However, its lack of success in 
triggering the state authority norm’s global tipping point means that it can only be 
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described as a norm-entrepreneur, despite its success in establishing the norm in 
domestic Chinese internet governance. China's norm-entrepreneur role in regards 
to the state authority norm is due to the Chinese government's clear material and 
ideational interest in strong state authority over internet governance, which 
became a higher priority for Beijing as circumstances changed. Once China 
secured internet access, the major inhibitor of Chinese resistance to US 
government and non-state actor authority was removed, allowing Beijing to 
advance its interest in greater state authority. Similarly, China's growing relative 
material power, and better knowledge of other states' beliefs about the US 
authority and state authority norms, facilitated its norm-entrepreneurship. 
Nevertheless, China's ongoing relative material weakness precludes Chinese 
success in securing the establishment of greater state authority above the national 
level. 
 
Although seeking to provide a thorough response to its research questions, there 
are a number of limitations to the dissertation. The author’s imperfect knowledge 
of the Chinese language inhibits the dissertation’s analysis of both domestic 
Chinese internet governance and existing Chinese language research on this topic. 
In addition, despite a relatively comprehensive examination of Chinese 
engagement with many internet governance organizations, some do not have 
publicly available records or maintain only partially reliable records – limiting the 
depth of the dissertation’s analysis. Similarly, the dissertation does not analyse 
Chinese engagement with all relevant organizations, instead focusing upon those 
it identifies as the most significant. Further insight could be gained from a more 
extensive analysis of Chinese participation in global and regional level 
organizations, and from Chinese participation in multi-lateral or bilateral internet 
governance processes. The dissertation also narrowly focuses its analysis upon 
Chinese engagement with four core internet governance norms, ignoring others 
that are less associated with authority – such as norms related to accountability or 
transparency – and overlooking specific Chinese policy preferences towards 
technical internet governance issues. Further studies could thus enhance the 
breadth of our knowledge on China and technical internet governance. 
 
The dissertation’s response to its research questions is presented across thirteen 
distinct chapters, of which this introduction constitutes the first. A literature 
review is provided in the next chapter and it illustrates the current gap in the 
literature on Chinese engagement with internet governance. Chapter 2 provides a 
narrow review that concentrates solely on the literature on China and technical 
internet governance, with a view to justifying the dissertation’s focus. It argues 
that existing literature does not examine this topic in sufficient empirical detail 
and does not expressly analyse Chinese engagement with internet governance’s 
broader normative framework. A broader review of theoretical and 
methodological issues is conducted within chapter 3, the dissertation’s 
methodology chapter. This is done to ensure the reader can better understand the 
justifications for the dissertation’s selection of its methodological approach – as 
briefly introduced above.  
 
Subsequently, chapter 4 provides important background information on the 
technical internet and its governance, defining internet governance, analyzing its 
history and outlining the structure of the contemporary internet governance 
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regime. Chapter 5 follows with a substantive analysis of core internet governance 
norms, which identifies them and outlines their lifecycles. It draws upon the 
preceding chapters’ analysis to identify the four core internet governance norms 
the dissertation examines Chinese engagement with. Although existing studies of, 
and commentary on, internet governance norms guides the dissertation’s 
conception of the internet governance regime’s normative structure, the four core 
norms identified in this chapter represent the author’s own perception of which 
norms are the most critical to the overarching character of contemporary internet 
governance: namely, norms related to US government authority, privatized 
governance, multi-stakeholder governance, and general state actor authority.  
 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 then present the dissertation’s empirical analysis of Chinese 
engagement with internet governance, with Chinese actors categorized as falling 
within one of three stakeholder groups of the government, private sector and civil 
society. Chapter 6 analyzes domestic Chinese internet governance, considering 
how its historical development and contemporary conduct indicates Chinese 
relationships with core internet governance norms. Chapter 7 then examines 
Chinese engagement with the central administrative organizations within the 
internet governance regime, particularly those related to the IETF and ICANN 
across the global and regional levels. Chapter 8 then completes the dissertation’s 
empirically-oriented analysis of Chinese engagement with internet governance by 
analyzing the involvement of Chinese actors in prominent global or regional level 
organizations that contribute to internet governance policy or which shape the 
evolution of its conduct, such as the WSIS and IGF.  
 
Following this, chapters 9, 10, 11 and 12 provide direct theoretical analysis of 
China’s roles towards the four core internet governance norms identified by the 
dissertation, with each chapter focusing on China’s roles towards a single one of 
these norms across their lifecycles. These chapters also engage in analysis and 
argument related to the theoretical factors that have shaped China’s various roles 
towards each of these four core internet governance norms. Chapter 13 then 
concludes the dissertation. It briefly summarizes its scope and structure, then 
provides a more detailed summary of its primary arguments. Chapter 13 itself 
concludes with discussion of the dissertation’s overall significance, contributions 
and limitations. Finally, following this concluding chapter, a series of six 
Appendices are presented which contain the raw data that constitutes much of the 
dissertation’s original research and upon which much of its analysis is based. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
This literature review examines existing research on Chinese engagement with 
internet governance, highlighting two notable deficiencies in the literature that 
justifies the dissertation's own research focus. In asserting these two gaps in the 
literature, the dissertation is limiting its claims to research that has focused on 
China's involvement in the global governance of the technical internet – as 
defined by the dissertation in chapter 4. While beyond the scope of the 
dissertation, a casual search quickly reveals that there is a large body of literature 
that touches upon China's engagement with other, non-technical, aspects of global 
internet governance and domestic Chinese internet governance. The first 
deficiency the literature review notes are empirical gaps in research on this issue. 
In particular, the review illustrates that China's engagement with internet 
governance has generally received intermittent and fragmented attention. There 
are a few studies which engage in relatively detailed examination of some aspects 
of Chinese involvement in internet governance, but many studies have either had 
a narrow focus, have not provided a detailed empirical account of Chinese 
involvement, or have now become somewhat dated. In part, this relative paucity 
of attention given to Chinese engagement with the global governance of the 
technical internet justifies the dissertation's focus.  
 
However, it is the second deficiency in the literature that provides the stronger 
justification for the dissertation's focus. That is, the review argues that there are 
no existing studies on China's engagement with internet governance that have 
engaged in an in-depth analysis of China's interaction with the core global 
governance norms that regulate the technical internet. As the below review 
demonstrates, while this issue is frequently touched upon implicitly in the 
existing literature, and there are a number of studies which directly consider it, no 
existing studies approach the issue with a view to providing a systematic and in-
depth analysis of China's relationship with core internet governance norms. This 
is a significant gap in the literature because, as noted in the introduction, the 
technical internet's core global governance norms are novel and controversial 
elements of contemporary global governance. China's engagement with these 
norms is particularly interesting given these norms privilege the US and liberal 
values, contrasted with the Chinese state's rising global power and illiberal 
domestic political structure. This chapter's review of the extant literature on this 
subject is divided in two sections. The first considers the English language 
literature in substantial detail, while the second provides a somewhat briefer 
examination of the Chinese language literature.  
 
a. English Literature 
 
The earliest studies of China's engagement with internet governance are largely 
focused on technical details related to Chinese interconnection with foreign 
computer networks and the emerging internet protocol system (IPS), or Chinese 
participation in the emerging domain name system (DNS) (see, for example: 
Cullen & Choy 1999; Harwit & Clark 2001; Mueller & Tan 1997, ch. 5; Tan 
1999; Zheng 1994). These studies briefly consider Chinese interaction with the 
then emerging US authority and privatized governance norms, but internet 
    10 
 
governance norms are not the focus of these studies; in part, this is because such 
norms were at an early emergent stage of their lifecycle at this time. Hughes and 
Ermert's (2003, ch. 6) examination of China's early engagement with internet 
governance organizations is perhaps the first scholarly analysis focused 
specifically on the politics surrounding China's engagement with internet 
governance organizations. Hughes and Ermert do implicitly consider China's 
engagement with US government authority and non-state actor authority, but this 
analysis is limited in detail, and in the relatively fast-moving world of internet 
governance is now somewhat dated. Xue's (2004b) study of Chinese language 
domain names includes a brief analysis of Chinese participation in internet 
standards and domain name governance organizations, and thus indirectly touches 
upon internet governance norms, but it is limited both in the detail provided 
regarding China's participation in these organizations, and by the relative age of 
the publication. Conversely, Hu's (2005) contribution to an edited book on 
internet governance provides a detailed outline of the Chinese government's 
position regarding the US authority and privatized governance norms and the 
merits of an alternative equal state authority norm, but is both now relatively 
dated and provides little empirical detail on the history of China's engagement 
with these norms. 
 
More recent studies of China's involvement with internet governance 
organizations have a stronger focus on analysis of China's engagement with core 
internet governance norms, perhaps because such norms are better established by 
the mid-2000s. Nevertheless, they do not engage in detailed empirical analysis. 
Tso's (2008) study of Chinese computer scientists’ participation in domestic and 
global internet governance engages in a relatively detailed analysis of China's 
participation in internet governance organizations, and includes implicit 
assessment of China's position towards non-state actor authority and multi-
stakeholder governance, but it has a relatively narrow focus upon a few specific 
organizations and upon Chinese computer scientists. Herold (2011) considers 
Chinese engagement with US government authority through China's interaction 
with ICANN, concluding that the Chinese government is opposed to this norm, 
but not investigating the matter in great detail. Liu (2012) examines the extent to 
which China has been able to influence the structure of the internet governance 
regime. As part of this examination, Chinese involvement with ICANN is briefly 
considered. Liu highlights Chinese opposition to the US authority and privatized 
governance norms, as well as China's advocacy for an equal state authority norm. 
While Liu does focus specifically on China, empirically this review of Chinese 
involvement is brief.  
 
Similarly, Mueller (2011) explores Chinese engagement with ICANN and other 
internet governance organizations as part of a broader discussion of Chinese 
engagement with internet governance. Like Liu, Mueller notes China's efforts to 
advance state primacy and equality within these organizations, but such 
examination is still relatively brief. Part of the reason for both Liu and Mueller's 
limited empirical depth is that these studies have a broader focus than just 
technical internet governance – as defined by the dissertation. Arsenne (2012) 
conducts a similar examination of Chinese engagement with internet governance 
organizations, considering Chinese involvement with ICANN and Chinese 
policies towards the multi-stakeholder governance norm. She concludes that the 
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Chinese government opposes this norm, but does not provide a detailed empirical 
examination of Chinese engagement. Similarly, Negro (2014) examines the 
geopolitical context of China's engagement with DNS governance, noting in 
particular Chinese opposition to US government authority; however, as with other 
studies, this book chapter is limited in the depth of its empirical analysis. 
Conversely, the Asia Internet History Project, which provides a broad-ranging 
examination of East Asia's engagement with the internet, touches upon China's 
participation in the internet's development and governance but does so without 
considering the global governance norms that underpin it (InternetHistory.asia 
2014).  
 
Another study by He and the dissertation's author, Galloway, considers Chinese 
engagement with the multi-stakeholder governance through examining Chinese 
involvement in a few core internet governance organizations (Galloway & He 
2014). This study is based in part of research conducted for this dissertation, and 
thus reflects the author's aim to provide a more empirically detailed exploration 
of Chinese engagement with core internet governance norms. However, like other 
studies, its journal article format renders it narrowly focused on the multi-
stakeholder governance norm and a few core organizations. Beyond these studies 
with an implicit or explicit focus on China's engagement internet governance 
organizations and norms, a larger and more generalized body of research exists 
which has touched upon China’s engagement with internet governance 
organizations and the core internet governance norms guiding them, but simply 
asserts Chinese opposition to existing norms without examining these claims in 
detail (see, for example: DeNardis & Raymond 2013; Larsen 2003; Malcolm 
2008, ch. 5-6; Mueller 2010, ch. 6; Rogers 2006, pp. 30-2; Shtern 2009, p. 74, 
114, 130; Winfield & Mendoza 2008, p. 86). In addition, while these existing 
studies identify China's policy positions towards core internet governance norms, 
they do not explicitly focus on the extent to which China has accepted the 
regime's core governance norms or provide detailed empirical analysis of Chinese 
behavior at the global and domestic levels to illustrate their arguments.  
 
With respect to the literature on China's engagement with specific governance 
issues of internet governance, a similar pattern of limited empirical detail exists. 
A number of scholars have examined China's engagement with internet standards 
governance. This research has predominantly focused on Chinese involvement 
with a specific technical standard, the internet protocol (IP) version six (IPv6). 
Yoshimatsu (2007) considers Sino-Japanese cooperation in IPv6 deployment, as 
well as in two global standards-setting organizations. DeNardis (2006; 2009b), in 
two detailed studies of global IPv6 development and deployment efforts, touches 
upon China’s IPv6 development strategies. A few other authors also briefly 
consider this issue (Li et al. 2003; Werbach 2008; Zhao 2010). China's activity in 
the development of this new technical standard has been addressed in relative 
detail by a number of scholars, but these scholars have not extended their analysis 
to the political ramifications of this activity, save in the case of DeNardis (2009b, 
pp. 205-6) who only briefly considers China in a broader argument about state 
preferences towards transnational standards-setting practices. The previously 
mentioned studies by Tso (2008) and Xue (2004b) have considered Chinese 
involvement with other internet standards related to multilingualization of domain 
names. However, in general there has only been a limited degree of empirical 
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analysis of Chinese engagement with the IETF – the body that governs internet 
standards – and no substantial consideration of Chinese engagement with the 
privatized governance norm's operation in this area (IETF 2012). 
 
Of all areas of internet governance this dissertation addresses, Chinese 
involvement in the administration of the internet protocol system has received 
probably the least amount of empirical consideration; no studies explicitly focus 
on this issue, although early technically-oriented studies do examine the earlier 
years of China's involvement in this issue, and later textbooks on Chinese internet 
law briefly consider the interplay between the IPS and China's domestic internet 
(Shao 2012, p. 30; Xue 2010, p. 26). In regards to China’s involvement in DNS 
governance, a few studies stand out for the attention given to China and the level 
of detail that they provide. Tso (2008) offers a reasonably detailed examination of 
China’s position on the sub-issue of domain name multilingualization. Similarly, 
Xue (2004b) considers in some depth the Chinese position on multilingualization 
and the history of the development of Chinese domain names. Park (2008), in her 
PhD dissertation, considers the political economy of country-code top-level 
domains (ccTLDs). This exploration includes a detailed look at China’s ccTLD 
and the political concerns that China has regarding ICANN’s role in the 
governance of them. Similarly, Negro (2014) engages in a brief but broad 
consideration of China's interaction with DNS governance in his book chapter. 
These works provide the highest level of empirical detail regarding China’s view 
of, and engagement with, DNS governance – but they do not provide an in-depth, 
overall analysis of China's participation in DNS governance. 
 
Aside from this, there are a number of studies that examine China's interaction 
with the dispute resolution system for domain names (Chik 2008; He & Song 
2010; Soo 2004; Xue 2004a, 2004b; Zhao 2009). Of these, Chik, He and Song, 
and Zhao all consider the degree to which Chinese practice corresponds with that 
at the global level. Thus, there is a relatively large number of existing works 
related to this specific issue of DNS governance. Overall, however, the existing 
literature on China's engagement with internet governance constitutes a 
patchwork of studies that together provide a relatively high level of empirical 
detail regarding China's engagement in internet governance, but many of these 
individual studies either have a very narrow focus, suffer from a lack of analytical 
depth, or have now become somewhat outdated. More importantly, there are no 
detailed and systematic studies of the role that China has adopted towards the 
core governance norms regulating the technical internet, and those studies which 
do consider this issue directly frequently do not justify their conclusions with a 
sufficient degree of empirical evidence. Thus, the dissertation argues that further 
research is needed to improve our understanding of this issue. 
 
b. Chinese Literature 
 
Prior to discussing the Chinese language literature on Chinese engagement with 
technical internet governance, two preliminary points should be noted. Firstly, the 
depth of this literature review is limited by difficulty in obtaining access to the 
full range of Chinese language academic literature; thus, the dissertation does not 
claim that this literature review is exhaustive despite review of a large number of 
Chinese language scholarly works. In this respect, to locate sources relevant to 
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the literature the dissertation has drawn on the China National Knowledge 
Infrastructure database to identify relevant journal articles. Secondly, the 
dissertation's author does not claim native speaker fluency in Mandarin Chinese 
and – while confident that this literature review accurately reflects the content of 
the works reviewed – this operates as a second barrier in asserting a 
comprehensive review of the relevant Chinese language literature. These limiting 
factors aside, this review of Chinese literature argues that the Chinese language 
literature on China's engagement with core internet governance norms displays 
the same relative paucity of empirical depth as that of the English language 
literature. 
 
Empirically, only a few Chinese scholars examine China's engagement with core 
internet governance organizations, and most do so very briefly. Run and Han 
(2005) briefly note the involvement of a Chinese computer scientist, Hu Qiheng, 
in the WSIS' Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) as part of a 
broader discussion of the regime itself. Liu (2012) briefly mentions the Chinese 
government's advocacy for equal state authority and United Nations (UN) 
prominence in internet governance in an article discussing the regime's core 
structure, norms and actors. Yang and He (2011) touch upon China's involvement 
in one internet governance organization, the Internet Governance Forum. No 
academic articles appear to discuss Chinese involvement in technical standards 
development within the IETF.  
 
However, unlike the English language literature, two Chinese scholars consider 
China's engagement with the IPS. Hu (2009), explicitly addresses China's 
incorporation into the global IPS in an article that focuses on Chinese law related 
to IPS and DNS operation within China. Xie (2005) quickly summarizes the 
operation of China's domestic IPS and its relation to the global distribution of IP 
addresses and autonomous system numbers. Wang (2010) notes Chinese 
involvement in the development of internationalized domain names (IDN) within 
ICANN. Similarly, Liu and Zhang (2009) touch upon China's involvement in 
ICANN's IDN development process. Huang (2007) notes the linkages between 
ICANN's and China's domain name dispute resolution processes, as do both Liu 
(2008) and Tang (2010). 
 
On the issue of China's engagement with the core internet governance norms, the 
Chinese language literature is generally silent, with a few brief mentions in the 
articles listed above of the Chinese government's stated opposition to the US 
authority and privatized governance norms. Thus, Chinese scholars have engaged 
with this issue to some degree, but these studies are focused on justifying Chinese 
preferences rather than examining the pattern of Chinese behavior towards 
existing norms. Much like the English language literature, there is a lack of 
empirical depth in the Chinese language literature's analysis of Chinese 
engagement with core internet governance norms. This is somewhat surprising, 
given the reasonably large body of Chinese language academic literature related 
to internet governance more generally. It may be that dominance of the English 
language in internet governance activities, or political issues surrounding the 
internet in China, create barriers to this type of research by Chinese scholars. 
Regardless, there is a gap within both the English and Chinese language literature 
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on Chinese engagement with internet governance and with its core governance 
norms that the dissertation aims to fill. 
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3. Methodology & Methods 
 
With the previous chapter identifying a gap in the literature on Chinese 
engagement with internet governance, the dissertation now presents its 
methodology and methods – the tools with which it analyses China’s engagement 
with core internet governance norms. This methodology is composed of three 
elements. The first provides a framework for understanding state and other actors’ 
behavior in global politics, as well as the structural factors that affect this 
behaviour. This theoretical perspective is rationalist and multi-causal, and based 
on liberal international relations theory, but complemented by insights from 
realist and constructivist schools. The second element is a framework for 
understanding normative change in global governance. It is based primarily on 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm lifecycle model, supplemented by 
Acharya’s (2004) conception of norm localization. The dissertation’s third 
methodological element is a suite of four potential state political roles towards 
global governance norms: norm-entrepreneur, norm-supporter, norm-maker and 
norm-taker. It is synthesized from existing approaches in the norm-maker/norm-
taker literature and structured around the norm lifecycle model. The dissertation 
argues that it is a modest improvement on the dyadic norm-maker/norm-taker 
framework, as it more accurately describes state relationships with global 
governance norms as they evolve. This chapter also outlines the dissertation’s 
methods, by which it identifies relevant data sources and the means by which they 
are analysed. These are, respectively a structured identification of data sources 
guided by frameworks from the compliance literature in international law, and 
qualitative documentary analysis supported by some basic quantitative analysis. 
 
a. A Multi-Causal Theoretical Perspective 
 
The first element of the dissertation’s methodology is its multi-causal theoretical 
perspective, which is developed from general international relations theory. This 
is used to identify the motivations for state and non-state actors’ behaviour, as 
well as the structural factors that affect the general operation of the international 
system and international society. It adopts the basic assumptions of liberal 
international relations theory, complemented by insights from realist and 
constructivist approaches to understanding world politics; an inclusive approach 
to analysis – if not theory-building – acknowledged as appropriate by 
international relations scholars across the spectrum of theoretical paradigms 
(Fearon 1998, pp. 295-7; Hudson 2007, p. 6; Slaughter 1994, p. 731; Waltz 1996, 
p. 54; Wendt 1992, p. 396). As stated by prominent realist theoretician Waltz 
(1996, p. 56): “Much is included in an analysis; little in a theory. Theories are 
sparse in formulation and beautifully simple. Reality is complex and often ugly”. 
Reflecting this, the dissertation argues that the assumptions of each of the three 
most prominent international relations paradigms have relevance in explaining 
the dynamics of global politics. Such a multi-causal perspective is particularly 
appropriate in the context of internet governance – an area of global governance 
involving a large variety of state and non-state actors operating across global, 
regional and domestic levels of political organization. 
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The foundation of the dissertation's multi-causal theoretical perspective is 
Moravcsik's (1997, pp. 516-21) restatement of liberal international relations 
theory, which reduces liberal theory to three core assumptions. Firstly, that the 
primary actors in politics – both domestic and global – are predominantly rational 
individuals, or collective groups of individuals, seeking to advance or protect 
their interests. Secondly, that states and other organizations represent a subset of 
their domestic or internal societies, and they act in pursuit of the interests of 
changing coalitions of these actors. Thirdly, that state behavior is explicable as 
attempts by the state to achieve or protect their interests and constrained, if at all, 
by the countervailing interest-driven behavior of other states or transnational 
actors. While liberalism is often criticized for its perceived idealism, Moravcsik's 
conception is an explanatory theory rather than a normative one in that it 
theorizes “how states do behave rather than how they should behave” (Slaughter 
1994, p. 728).  
 
As an explanatory theory, its acknowledgement of the relevance of non-state 
actors to domestic and global politics renders it appropriate to the dissertation's 
analysis. As demonstrated in the next chapter, internet governance involves – and 
has been designed to explicitly accommodate – non-state actor participation. In 
addition, the dissertation's study of core internet governance norms involves 
explanations of how such norms evolve from, and subsequently influence, 
domestic society. Liberalism's capacity to incorporate multiple actors and levels 
into analysis renders it the most appropriate foundation for the dissertation's 
theoretical perspective. Likewise, liberalism's conception of politics as interest-
driven competition and compromise enables it to provide convincing explanations 
for a broad range of political behavior – from how domestic US politics 
influenced the development of core internet governance norms, to why China was 
initially willing to accept the US authority norm. 
 
However, while liberal assumptions ground the dissertation's theoretical 
perspective, it also draws on insights from realist and constructivist paradigms of 
international relations. In relation to realist theory, two core assumptions guide 
this paradigm, both of which ultimately privilege power as the primary causal 
factor in global politics. One is that human nature drives actors to privilege 
survival and power maximization, and thus power concerns motivate actor 
behavior (Morgenthau 1950, pp. 4-15; Rose 1998, p. 146). The other is that the 
world is anarchic – without a dominant central authority – and thus states, the 
actors with the most power, are the most significant actors in world politics. 
Because of this anarchy, and because human nature includes both a survival 
instinct and the potential to act in a predatory manner, all states must act to 
maximize their power or face elimination from the system. For these reasons, the 
desire for power and the maintenance of that power are the primary factors 
driving state behavior (Mearsheimer 2003; Waltz 1979; 1990, pp. 30-3).  
 
The realist perspective is too narrow, however, to be the foundation of the 
dissertation's theoretical perspective. Its primary focus on states limits its 
usefulness in the context of internet governance. Similarly, its emphasis on 
human instincts and anarchy as the primary causal factors in state behavior is 
inadequate for explaining the complexities of state behavior towards core internet 
governance norms, particularly as internet governance is not an explicitly 
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security-related issue area. However, the dissertation does accept the realist 
assumption that survival and power maximisation instincts can drive interest 
formation, but it does not accept that these are always dominant in motivating 
behaviour. For example, power as a motivation satisfactorily explains why the US 
government asserted ultimate authority over internet governance, but less 
satisfactorily explains why it then invested non-state and/or non-US actors with 
authority. The dissertation also accepts the assumption that anarchy and material 
power distribution motivates state behaviour, and facilitates or constrains state 
strategies in the advancement or protection of their interests. 
 
The dissertation also incorporates some of the insights of constructivist 
international relations theory. Constructivism emphasizes the political importance 
of ideas, identities, perceptions of reality and the process of social interaction 
itself (Guzzini 2000, pp. 159-60; Hopf 1998, p. 176). Constructivism assumes 
that the subjective ideas and past experiences underpinning an actor's identity 
shapes their perception of reality, and their own determination of their interests, 
by providing the social meaning necessary for these interests to be implied (Hopf 
1998, p. 175; Wendt 1992, pp. 396-8). For example, cyber-libertarian ideas and a 
history of democracy within the US shaped US beliefs about the proper structure 
of internet governance, leading to both the privatized governance and multi-
stakeholder governance norms. Constructivism also posits that ideas and their 
global distribution structure global politics just as material power distribution 
does – motivating, facilitating or constraining behaviour. For example, Wendt 
highlights how US military power is threatening to Cuba and not Canada – 
despite their relatively similar material structural positions – because of political 
and cultural differences that shape these states' perceptions of political reality 
(LeoGrande 1998, p. 68; Wendt 1992, p. 397). Similarly, China is restrained in its 
advocacy of exclusive state authority over internet governance, in part, by its 
perception of the international community's support for democratic ideals. 
 
These broad assumptions of constructivism are incorporated into the dissertation's 
perspective. Indeed, Moravcsik's own restatement of liberal theory echoes 
constructivist assumptions, when he states that state and other organizational 
interests are, in part, constituted by the identities and values of individuals and 
sub-groups within them (Moravcsik 1997, pp. 517-18, 540-41). While Moravcsik 
also criticizes constructivism, this is limited to constructivist frameworks that 
accept structural limitations on political analysis; that is, where the inner 
workings of states are ignored. He notes with approval constructivist approaches 
that adopt liberalism’s ‘bottom-up’ orientation (Moravcsik 1997, pp. 539-41). 
Thus constructivism, when not predicated solely on structural reasons for the 
development of state identities and interests, is very similar to and broadly 
compatible with liberalism's foundational tenets. As with material structure, the 
ideational structure of world politics is also used by the dissertation as another 
factor influencing actors' identification of, and strategy in the pursuit of, their 
interests. 
 
In summary, the dissertation's multi-causal perspective adopts at its core liberal 
assumptions which frame global politics as a bottom-up, interest-driven process 
conducted by a variety of primarily rational political actors – including states 
acting on behalf of a sub-set of domestic society and a range of domestically or 
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transnationally active non-state actors. It also incorporates the behavioural realist 
insight that concerns for power maximisation and survival can drive interest 
formation, but argues that such factors are not always dominant and, in 
conformity with constructivist perspectives, accepts that interest formation and 
pursuit is also driven by ideas, values and perceptions of reality. The 
dissertation's perspective acknowledges the structural realist insight that interests 
are pursued by actors with widely varying relative material or hard power 
capabilities, and their capacity to advance their interests is affected by the broader 
material power configuration – or material structure – of the international system. 
Similarly, it acknowledges the structural constructivist insight that the global 
distribution of ideas – or ideational structure of the world – also facilitates or 
constrains efforts to advance interests. The significance of any one factor is 
argued by the dissertation to be ultimately contingent on the specific factual 
circumstances or context in which political activity is occurring. 
 
b. The Dynamics of Global Governance Norms 
 
The second element of the dissertation's methodology is its conception of how 
global governance norms arise and develop. This conception is informed by the 
dissertation’s multi-causal theoretical perspective, but relies primarily upon 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm lifecycle model (the norm lifecycle 
model), which is argued to be the most useful framework for understanding the 
dynamics of norm diffusion in global governance. To justify the dissertation’s 
approach, the concept of a ‘norm’ is reviewed along with various theoretical 
approaches to norm dynamics and the literature on regime theory. While regime 
theory appears a natural choice for the dissertation considering its topic, in 
practice the theory’s usefulness is limited due to its theoretical similarity to 
general international relations theory, and its broader focus on regime 
components beyond norms themselves. Instead, the dissertation argues that the 
norm lifecycle model provides a more parsimonious, yet still acceptably holistic, 
framework for understanding norm dynamics, which is flexible enough to 
accommodate a multi-causal theoretical perspective and accurate in explaining 
how and why global governance norms diffuse across international and domestic 
governance structures – especially when supplemented by Acharya's (2004) 
insights into norm localization. 
 
i. Norms, Norm Dynamics & Regime Theory 
 
Prior to discussing approaches to norm dynamics, it is important to clarify what 
the dissertation means by 'norm'. There are multiple different definitions of 'norm' 
within the literature. One popular definition within constructivist studies is that a 
norm is a “standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” 
(Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, p. 891). Within the regime theory literature, the 
accepted definition is a “standard of behaviour in terms of rights and obligations” 
(Krasner 1982, p. 186). A large number of other definitions exist (see: Björkdahl 
2002, pp. 13-5). While some are highly specific, such as Raymond's (1997a, p. 
128) definition of international norms as “generalized standards of conduct that 
delineate the scope of a state's entitlements, the extent of its obligations, and the 
range of its jurisdiction”, for the dissertation’s purposes the common 
    19 
 
constructivist definition – a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a 
given identity – is sufficient. 
 
A more fundamental issue in the definition of norms is the issue of whether they 
must have a certain normative character, or ‘oughtness’, to qualify as norms? 
Some scholars argue that standards of behavior must be genuinely agreed upon by 
a majority of actors – must contain a degree of ethical 'oughtness' – to be regarded 
as legitimate or as norms rather than other kinds of rules (Björkdahl 2002, p. 14; 
Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, p. 891, 892; Florini 1996, p. 364). Conversely, others 
regard norms simply as repeated behavioral patterns which do not necessarily 
require ethical justification (Björkdahl 2002, p. 13, 14; Raymond 1997b, pp. 216, 
7); as Klotz (1999, p. 14) states: “Standards [of behavior] can have functional and 
non-ethical origins and purposes.” This issue is critically important to the 
dissertation because one norm it examines (the US authority norm) is highly 
contested and lacks a clear normative justification. Because of this, the 
dissertation takes the view that norms include simple functional patterns of 
behavior which are complied with in specific social settings. Such norms do not 
necessarily rest on genuinely agreed-upon ideas about appropriate behavior and 
thus may not be legitimate, but they are norms nonetheless (Payne 2001, p. 41). 
Adopting this less exclusive definition enables each norm assessed by the 
dissertation to be analysed using the same methodological framework, allowing 
more functional or non-ethical norms to be examined alongside norms with a 
greater degree of genuine ethical support. 
 
Beyond definitional concerns, there are multiple perspectives on how norms arise 
or evolve within international society. Each of the three core paradigms in 
international relations provide an implicit or explicit suggestion as to how the 
process of norm dynamics operate, as the literature directly addressing this issue 
illustrates. Liberal perspectives claim that norms are proposed or accepted by 
states when they are in their interest, and norms spread when they are in the 
mutual interest of a number of states (Jervis 1999, pp. 45-6; Keohane 1984, p. 14, 
87, pp. 99-100). Pressure from domestic and transnational interest groups can 
change state attitudes towards global governance norms and explain their 
evolution and diffusion (Cortell & Davis Jr 1996, p. 452; Moravcsik 2000, p. 
226). Realist perspectives sustain arguments that norms are proposed or endorsed 
by powerful states which exert material influence via incentives or coercion to 
induce widespread acceptance or compliance (Andresen & Agrawala 2002, p. 42; 
Mearsheimer 1994, pp. 12-5). Changes in relative power explain changes in state 
attitudes towards global governance norms (Argomaniz 2009, p. 122; Payne 
2001, p. 41). Constructivists argue that states propose or support norms that 
conform to their beliefs, while resisting or replacing norms that do not (Acharya 
2004, p. 240; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, p. 899). Changes in state responses to 
global governance norms are explained by learning processes and socialization – 
as ideas and beliefs evolve, or due to social interaction and peer pressure, state 
attitudes towards norms are revised (Checkel 1997, p. 477; Foot & Walter 2013, 
p. 335). 
 
Similarly, regime theory also includes within its ambit explanations for how 
global governance norms arise. This is because international regimes, in their 
classical definition, are conceived of as: “sets of implicit or explicit principles, 
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norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations (Krasner 1982, p. 186).” The 
establishment of global governance norms, as one constituent element of an 
international regime, are thus addressed by regime theory. In general, however, 
regime theory's approach to norm dynamics parallels the three broad paradigms 
of the international relations field (Adler & Haas 1992; Hasenclever, Mayer & 
Rittberger 1996; Hopf 1998, pp. 188-91; Keohane 1984; Krasner 1982; 
Moravcsik 2000, pp. 225-9; Simmons & Martin 2002; Wendt 1992). Partly 
because of this, the dissertation relies on its multi-causal theoretical perspective 
instead of regime theory. The primary reason for excluding regime theory, 
however, is because it has a broader focus than just global governance norms, and 
incorporates principles, rules, and decision-making procedures into analysis. This 
broader focus is not incompatible with the dissertation's subject matter, but its 
inclusion adds an unnecessary layer of complexity to the dissertation's 
methodology. 
 
Instead, the dissertation adopts the norm lifecycle model, which deals directly and 
exclusively with theory related to norm dynamics. The reason for employing a 
model of norm dynamics at all is because the dissertation's theoretical perspective 
– while effective in explaining state or other actor behavior and factors 
influencing it – lacks a clear framework for conceiving of the overall process of 
normative change in global governance. Understanding this process has been a 
particular focus of the constructivist school of international relations, which has 
generated a few different models to explain it, including the evolutionary model 
of Florini (1996), and the spiral model of Risse-Kappen and Sikkink (1999). 
However, the dissertation adopts Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm lifecycle 
model because its conception of a structured, three-stage process of norm 
dynamics is simple, logical and relatively comprehensive. These characteristics 
have contributed to its popular acceptance amongst scholars studying global 
governance norms (see, for example: Acharya 2004; Cronin 2005; Fukuda-Parr & 
Hulme 2011; Harrison 2004; Hoffmann 2003; Ingebritsen 2002; Prantl & Nakano 
2011).  
 
ii. Finnemore & Sikkink's Norm Lifecycle Model 
 
Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998, pp. 894-905) norm lifecycle model conceives of 
norms as arising in a three-stage process of norm emergence, norm cascade and 
norm internalization. In the first stage, new ideas lead ‘norm entrepreneurs’ – 
individuals or sub-national groups – to redefine their interests and begin 
advocating for the recognition of a new norm, typically within domestic society. 
Eventually, these norm entrepreneurs develop or acquire an organizational 
platform which can directly influence state governments, populations in other 
states and various other transnational actors. Such platforms may be new or 
existing non-government organizations (NGOs), the norm entrepreneurs' own 
state government, or sympathetic international organizations. From these 
platforms, the new norm is promoted at the global level and ideally states and 
other actors are persuaded of the norm’s legitimacy. Norm advocacy, at both 
domestic and supranational levels, often occurs in an environment where pre-
existing norms already operate. Thus the process is often contested. Finnemore 
and Sikkink (1998, p. 899) use the example of women's suffrage to illustrate this; 
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a new idea of female equality led to advocacy for women’s right to vote, a new 
norm that emerged in an environment where such a right was contested. 
 
Eventually, norm entrepreneurs convince enough other actors to accept the new 
norm and the second stage of ‘norm cascade’ occurs, representing the new norm’s 
accelerating level of acceptance. Once a critical mass of states accept the norm – 
its ‘tipping point’ – a cascade of other states and actors begin to accept or 
conform to it, and it becomes an established norm. A critical mass of states can be 
achieved in two different, complementary ways – either enough states, or enough 
‘critical states’, accept the norm. Finnemore and Sikkink tentatively suggest one-
third of all states as a critical mass, while what constitutes a critical state is 
context-specific. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 901) use landmine prohibition 
as an example of this. Both Britain and France were critical states for a norm 
against landmine use due to their status as military great powers using landmines; 
when they accepted the norm, it facilitated the norm’s cascade through the 
international community. Prior to a norm cascade, states typically reject a new 
norm absent domestic political pressure. Post-tipping point, states begin to accept 
norms due to socialization pressures and identity concerns – they wish to be seen 
as legitimate members of the global community. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 
902) do briefly acknowledge that material persuasion or coercion can be a factor 
in compliance, but primarily place causality for conformity on ideational factors.  
 
The third and final stage of the norm lifecycle is 'norm internalization'. After the 
norm cascade phase, states will gradually internalize the norm to the point that it 
achieves a taken-for-granted quality. That is, even if acceptance of the norm is 
due to ideational or material pressures, eventually the ideas underpinning the 
norm’s legitimacy become accepted, and conformity to it becomes automatic. 
This final stage represents the point at which a norm becomes entrenched in 
international society, where it permeates both the domestic societies and formal 
government structures of states, and of international organizations. Norms related 
to slavery, such as the prohibition on the right to own humans, are an example of 
largely internalized norms which are entrenched in international organizations, 
state structures and within the vast majority of domestic societies (Finnemore & 
Sikkink 1998, p. 891, 916). Reaching this stage, or even the norm cascade stage 
of the norm lifecycle, is not an inevitability, and many new norms of global 
governance either fail to cascade at all or, if they do, remain only partially 
internalized by the broader body of states within the international system. A 
graphical representation of the norm lifecycle model is provided below in Figure 
1. 
 
Figure 1: The Norm Lifecycle Model 
 
Source: Finnermore and Sikkink (1998, p. 896) 
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iii. Norm Localization 
 
The norm lifecycle model is relatively comprehensive, but it is limited in its 
ability to explain norm internalization in specific organizations or in the domestic 
sphere. This issue is addressed by Acharya (2004, pp. 250-4), who argues that 
global norms permeate lower levels of political organization through a norm 
localization process. A global norm’s legitimacy may not be recognized by local 
or domestic society at all, and thus no internalization will occur. Alternatively, a 
global norm may be supported sufficiently that it localizes, with a partial 
internalization where the global norm is adapted, to better fit within the pre-
existing framework of local norms. At the extreme end of localization, sufficient 
local acceptance of a global norm may ultimately result in full internalization, 
with the global norm displacing pre-existing local norms either entirely or in 
relative importance. Acharya (2004, pp. 256-60) illustrates this localization 
process with the global norm of collective security in the Southeast Asian region. 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations partially adopted this norm, but 
modified it into a norm of cooperative security that ensured it did not conflict 
with the more locally-accepted norm of non-interference in internal affairs. The 
dissertation employs the more specialized model of norm localization to enhance 
its explanation of internet governance norm dynamics and China's engagement 
with them. In particular, norm localization is used to describe how China has 
responded to the US authority and privatized governance norms at the domestic 
level. Norm localization is also used to explain why the privatized governance 
and multi-stakeholder governance norms, respectively, refer to different degrees 
of non-state actor authority and different classes of stakeholders in different 
internet governance organizations. 
 
iv. The Dissertation's Theoretical Perspective and the Norm 
Lifecycle Model 
 
Finnemore and Sikkink's model of norm dynamics is highly persuasive due to its 
effectiveness in describing normative diffusion across the globe. However, this 
norm lifecycle model is explicitly predicated on constructivist grounds, and the 
dissertation makes a few minor changes to the model that are in keeping with its 
multi-causal theoretical perspective. Firstly, it should be noted that norm 
lifecycle’s agent-driven, bottom-up description of norm dynamics is as much 
compatible with liberal perspectives as it is with constructivist views. Thus, there 
is no requirement to modify this aspect of the model to fit with the multi-causal 
theoretical perspective. However, while Finnemore and Sikkink do not explicitly 
exclude material factors from the second 'norm cascade' stage, the dissertation 
argues that these factors should be more fully acknowledged. In particular, the 
dissertation would emphasize the more realist view that norm cascade occurs not 
only when ideational persuasion and pressure lead states into accepting norms, 
but also when particularly powerful states are able to use material incentives – 
either in the form of bribes or threats – to coerce states into conformity. Figure 2 
below illustrates this perspective on the norm lifecycle. 
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c. State Roles Towards Global Governance Norms 
 
The third component of the dissertation's methodology is its framework for 
assessing the roles states adopt towards global governance norms, which is 
subsequently used to assess the roles China has adopted towards core internet 
governance norms. Unlike the previous two elements of the dissertation’s 
methodology, the dissertation aims to improve upon existing theory on state roles, 
and thereby make a modest contribution to existing knowledge. Specifically, it 
aims to improve upon the standard norm-maker/norm-taker approach to this 
issue. Thus, this section of the chapter begins with a review of studies employing 
the norm-maker/taker framework and existing attempts within the literature to 
improve upon the framework. Using this existing literature and the norm lifecycle 
model as a guide, a new framework is developed that consists of four potential 
state roles towards global governance norms: norm-entrepreneur, norm-maker, 
norm-supporter, and norm-taker. This framework is argued to be an improvement 
upon the existing norm-maker/taker framework because it more accurately covers 
the range of relationships states can have with global governance norms over their 
lifecycle. The inclusion of more dynamic, process-oriented norm-entrepreneur 
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oriented roles of norm-maker and norm-taker. This new framework aims to strike 
a reasonable balance between the need for accuracy in describing state roles – 
which is lacking in the standard norm-maker/taker framework – and the benefits 
of conceptual clarity inherent in the parsimonious norm-maker/taker dyad. 
 
i. The Norm-Maker/Norm-Taker Dyad 
 
The dominant framework for describing the relationship states have with 
developing norms is a dyadic conception of states as either norm-makers or norm-
takers. Generally, scholars have categorized states as being either a norm-maker 
by virtue of imposing norms that regulate a global governance issue area or 
playing a pivotal role in others' adoption those norms, or a norm-taker by virtue 
of accepting existing norms regulating an issue area or by accepting norms 
proposed by others. For instance, Lee, Chan and Chan (2012) – adopting a 
slightly different nomenclature – consider whether China can be considered a 
rule-maker in relation to the principles regulating humanitarian intervention in the 
Darfur region of the Sudan. The authors do not distinguish definitions of China's 
status beyond either rule-taker or rule-maker. Many other studies examining the 
roles played by states or other political actors adhere to this simple division of 
norm-maker and norm-taker roles (Dubash 2011; Foot & Walter 2013; Hirono & 
Lanteigne 2011; Ikenberry 1996; Posner 2009; Reilly 2011; Schirm 2012; Wang 
& Rosenau 2009, pp. 27-9). The division of states into norm-makers or norm-
takers is often explicit, but some authors implicitly define norm-maker status as a 
state having a substantial influence on the adoption of specific governance 
structures, with the converse assumption being that a lack of such influence 
results in the state being a norm-taker (Lake 1993; Medeiros 2009; Oberthür & 
Kelly 2008).  
 
The dyadic norm-maker/taker framework predominantly grounds its assessment 
of state roles towards global governance norms on structurally-determined 
outcomes, with interests forming a secondary basis for some determinations of 
norm-taker status. Using this approach, states that have been capable of securing 
their preferences in the establishment of global governance norms are classified 
as norm-makers. Conversely, norm-takers are those states which are incapable of 
ensuring that global governance norms reflect their preferences, and must accept 
the preferences or others, or are states indifferent to the norms governing a 
specific issue area. The norm-maker/taker framework and its theoretical 
underpinnings do have merit. Firstly, it is parsimonious and this enables a clear 
assessment of whether states are norm-makers or norm-takers with respect to 
global governance norms. Secondly, it correctly identifies that successful state 
norm-making must be supported by the requisite material or ideational power to 
impose, or persuade others to accept, specific global governance norms – and that 
a lack of such power may result in states being forced to adopt a norm-taker role.  
 
However, by focusing primarily on the influence of structural factors and thus on 
outcomes, this dominant approach overlooks the significance of state behavior 
during the process of normative change in global governance. States currently 
attempting to replace or change existing norms will be classified as norm-takers 
because they have not yet successfully ensured that their preferences are 
implemented. Conversely, states actively resisting the norm-making of other 
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states will be classified as norm-makers if their resistance is successful, and 
norm-takers if it is not. In these examples, the norm-maker and norm-taker labels 
obscure our understanding of state behavior, as they do not accurately describe 
the relationship a state has towards a given norm. A few scholars have noted this 
inadequacy of the basic norm-maker/taker framework in describing state roles 
towards global governance norms. Yet despite recognizing flaws in this dyadic 
framework, scholarly attempts at developing an improved conceptual framework 
has been largely piecemeal in fashion.  
 
Gao (2011a), in a study of China's role in global trade governance, posits a third 
role of rule-shaker to complement those of rule-maker and rule-taker. Gao 
(2011a, pp. 167-70) uses this role to describe China's limited contestation of 
global trade rules on procedural or substantive grounds. Similarly, Hufbauer 
(1995), in a brief article addressing China's potential role in regional economic 
integration, notes that it may adopt a role of rule-breaker by ignoring existing 
rules or opposing their adoption. Li's (2011, pp. 315-9) examination of China's 
engagement with international peacekeeping norms diverges from the norm-
maker/taker approach, noting that states can be norm-setters or norm-contesters. 
Li defines norm-setting to include both norm-making and norm-taking (with 
norm-taking in this context understood as contributing to a norm's worldwide 
cascade, and thus helping to 'set' or establish it); while norm-contesting is 
behavior directed at defending existing norms from replacement attempts, or 
aimed at challenging the appropriateness of new replacement norms. Li's 
conception of norm-setting illustrates the close connection that the norm-
maker/taker literature has with studies of norm dynamics – even making explicit 
reference to Finnemore and Sikkink's conception of a norm entrepreneur. 
Nevertheless, these studies have not attempted to redefine a coherent set of state 
roles to redress the limitations in the norm-maker/taker framework.  
 
ii. Beyond The Norm-Maker/Norm-Taker Dyad 
 
The above review of the norm-maker/taker literature argues that its existing 
formulation suffers from an overly outcome-oriented focus that limits its 
accuracy, particularly when describing state roles towards global governance 
norms during the process of their development. Likewise, it illustrates that there 
have been no holistic efforts to redress this limitation through the development of 
an improved framework. For these reasons, the dissertation develops its own 
formulation of a broader and more process-oriented approach to describing 
potential state roles. It argues that an acceptably accurate yet still relatively 
parsimonious framework can be derived from linking the norm-maker/taker 
framework with Finnemore and Sikkink's norm lifecycle model and, in the 
process, adding two additional roles of norm-entrepreneur and norm-supporter to 
the existing framework. This broader framework allows state behavior towards 
global governance norms to be more accurately described throughout these 
norms' lifecycles, improving the analyst's capacity to assess state engagement 
with global governance norms, and facilitating more robust predictions of how 
states may behave in the future.  
 
Finnemore and Sikkink's model of norm dynamics, as noted, consists of three 
separate stages in a norm's lifecycle, being norm emergence, norm cascade and 
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norm internalization. In the norm lifecycle model a norm begins its life as an idea 
that is promoted by an agent, described as a norm entrepreneur. In the context of 
the norm-maker/taker framework, a norm entrepreneur is uneasily described as a 
norm-maker prior to the successful triggering of a norm cascade. This is because 
the norm they are advancing does not become established until it reaches its 
tipping point, and commences its cascade through international society. As an 
additional role within the norm-maker/taker framework, however, 'norm-
entrepreneur' is well suited to describing a state that is attempting to become a 
norm-maker; in effect, norm entrepreneurship describes norm-making in 
progress. Adding norm-entrepreneur to the existing dyadic framework introduces 
one new process-oriented state role that ameliorates the outcome-oriented 
weakness of the norm-maker role. It allows more accurate description of states 
who under the original norm-maker/taker dyad would simply be norm-takers for 
structural reasons but who are, when their actual behavior is taken into account, 
better understood as adopting a more active role.  
 
A related limitation within the norm-maker/taker framework is its capacity to 
describe the behavior of states that oppose the norm-entrepreneurship or norm-
making of others. States who respond to this activity with some form of resistance 
are uneasily described as norm-takers, because they are unwilling to accept the 
emerging norms advocated for by norm-entrepreneurs, and they are not passively 
indifferent to them either. Instead, they are active opponents of new global 
governance norms, regardless of whether structural factors ultimately frustrate 
their efforts to prevent norm-entrepreneurs from succeeding and becoming norm-
makers. Therefore, the dissertation argues that an additional role of norm-
supporter is necessary to describe behavior that is the opposite of norm-
entrepreneurship. This role of norm-supporter acknowledges the response that 
states can adopt towards new norms prior to them reaching the tipping point that 
triggers a norm cascade. It enables the difference in roles between actors with 
differing interests to be taken into account. Those actors who are indifferent to a 
newly emerging norm are better described as norm-takers, while those whose 
interest in the old norm is intense enough to trigger relatively active opposition 
are better described as norm-supporters. 
 
iii. A Process & Outcome Oriented Framework 
 
Together, the four separate potential state roles outlined above are argued by the 
dissertation to constitute an adequately accurate, yet still reasonably 
parsimonious, framework for describing state engagement with global 
governance norms. It redresses the limitations that arise from the outcome-
oriented norm-maker/taker framework through its inclusion of two additional 
process-oriented roles, and links all four roles to Finnemore and Sikkink's norm 
lifecycle model. By linking potential state roles to this model, the dissertation's 
framework ensures that it covers the broad range of possible roles states can 
adopt towards global governance norms across each norm’s lifecycle. A graphical 
representation of the link between the dissertation's process and outcome-oriented 
framework is provided below in Figure 3, and this final element of the chapter 
concludes with an overall restatement of the dissertation's framework, and its 
links to both the norm lifecycle model and the dissertation's multi-causal 
theoretical perspective. 
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For theoretical purposes, the dissertation's framework assumes that all states, or 
other actors, are initially norm-takers with respect to whichever norms are 
currently entrenched in the global governance issue area under examination. As 
new ideas arise in states' domestic populations or amongst state representatives, 
new state preferences may develop that lead a state to promote new norms in a 
global governance issue area that better reflect their interests. Alternatively, as the 
material or ideational structure of global politics changes, states may determine 
that they now have the requisite power to challenge existing global governance 
norms which are contrary to their interests. When this occurs, states retain their 
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previous norm-taker role (if they continue to comply with the pre-existing norm) 
but also become norm-entrepreneurs that advocate for their preferred norm as a 
replacement for a pre-existing norm. If they succeed in advancing their preferred 
norm to its tipping point, a norm cascade occurs and the new norm becomes 
entrenched within the global community. At this time, norm-entrepreneurs 
become norm-makers – a change in description that reflects their success in 
overcoming any material or ideational structural barriers to the new norm's 
adoption. Any states that actively join with norm-entrepreneurs prior to the new 
norm reaching its tipping point can also be described as norm-entrepreneurs and, 
when the new norm’s tipping point is reached, can then be described as norm-
makers. 
 
Conversely, states that actively oppose the norm-entrepreneurship of others in 
defense of existing, entrenched norms can be described as norm-supporters of the 
existing norm. If such states fail to prevent a new norm from reaching its tipping 
point, they become norm-takers in relation to the new norm. If norm-supporting 
states refuse to conform to a newly-established norm, then they themselves 
become norm-entrepreneurs, advocating for a return to the previously dominant 
norm or another alternative. States that were passive norm-takers of the 
previously dominant norm, and which form part of the post-tipping point norm 
cascade by conforming to the new norm, remain norm-takers. However, if these 
norm-taking states refuse to accept the newly established norm, they, like 
recalcitrant norm-supporters, are similarly transformed into norm-entrepreneurs 
advocating for a return to the previously dominant norm or another alternative. 
Likewise, if post-norm cascade the newly minted norm-makers find themselves 
defending the new norm against states challenging it, then they can also be 
described as norm-supporters in relation to the norm they established as the 
process of normative change continues. 
 
In theory, if a new norm cascades, and all state actors accept or conform to it, it 
will internalize to the extent that it is taken for granted by all. If that were to 
occur, then eventually all states would gradually revert to the same practical 
stance towards that norm and could be described as either norm-makers who 
played a pre-tipping point role in advocating for the norm, or norm-takers who 
accepted the norm post-tipping point. In practice, of course, it is unlikely that any 
new norm will reach such universal acceptance, and thus after a new norm's 
tipping point and in the norm cascade and internalization stages it is likely there 
will be a mix of states that can be described as norm-makers and norm-takers in 
relation to the newly entrenched norm, and as norm-entrepreneurs and norm-
supporters in relation to efforts to replace the newly-established norm. In the 
event that an issue area of global governance arises that is substantively new, with 
no pre-existing norms to regulate it – such as occurs when new technology gives 
rise to new governance issues such as international flight, the regulation of outer 
space, or the control of nuclear weapons – the overall process is slightly 
modified. No states can be norm-supporters because there are no pre-existing 
norms that regulate the new issue area. However, any state that actively engages 
in the development of norms to regulate the new global governance issue area can 
be described as a norm-entrepreneur and, once a given norm cascades, the 
standard set of state roles become applicable to the issue area. 
 




This final chapter section deals with the dissertation's methods, rather than its 
theoretical frameworks. In particular, it outlines how the dissertation identifies its 
sources of evidence, and the specific methods by which evidence is analysed. The 
first issue of identifying sources of evidence is addressed by reviewing the 
approaches taken in the norm-maker/taker literature and in related literatures on 
state compliance with international law. On the basis of this, a range of specific 
criteria by which China's engagement with core internet governance norms are 
identified at both the domestic and supra-national levels. Drawing on compliance 
literature as a further guide, a range of specific factors by which China's 
engagement with core internet governance norms can be identified are developed. 
The chapter then concludes with a brief outline of, and justification for, the 
methods by which evidence is analysed. The dissertation predominantly relies 
upon the qualitative documentary analysis method, although basic quantitative 
analysis of some sources is also conducted. 
 
i. Source Identification 
 
Within the norm-maker/taker literature, there are two broad approaches taken to 
acquiring evidence of state engagement with global governance norms. 
Some authors focus solely on state behavior at the global level (Andresen & 
Agrawala 2002; DeLisle 2000; Gao 2011b; Hirono & Lanteigne 2011; Ikenberry 
1996; Lake 1993; Lee, Chan & Chan 2012; Medeiros 2009; Reilly 2011; Vogler 
& Stephan 2007; Wang & Rosenau 2009). Indeed, Vierra (2007) explicitly notes 
this tendency to emphasize internationally-expressed behavior in his review of the 
literature relating to normative change in international society. Other authors, 
however, more explicitly recognize the significance of the domestic level as a 
source of evidence for state engagement with global governance norms. For 
example, Dubash (2011), in a study of India's capacity to be a global energy 
governance leader, emphasizes the relevance of international and domestic 
behavior in assessing India's status as a norm-maker or taker. A number of other 
empirically oriented studies do likewise (Argomaniz 2009; Foot & Walter 2013; 
Li 2011; Oberthür & Kelly 2008; Posner 2009; Schroeder 2008). 
 
Studies that exclusively examine state behavior at the global level are appropriate 
in some circumstances, such as when global governance norms are primarily 
designed to regulate international state behaviour. However, this approach is not 
suitable to assessment of state roles towards norms influencing both international 
and domestic behaviour. In addition, because these approaches focus solely on 
the international level, they are not equipped to examine state relationships 
towards norms across their lifecycle, as such norms may arise in the norm 
emergence stage from ideas within domestic society. Considering the domestic 
sphere is thus necessary for some global governance norms, and also when 
analysis focuses on state involvement in the development and evolution of these 
norms. This is the case with internet governance because the internet operates and 
is governed at both the international or transnational level, and at the domestic 
level. Aside from this, the dissertation seeks to determine the roles China has 
played in the evolution of core internet governance norms over their lifetimes. 
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For these reasons, it examines evidence of China's engagement with these norms 
at both the domestic and global levels.  
 
The above discussion implies that the norm-taker/maker literature simply 
analyses state behavior without further specifying the factors relevant to analysis; 
implicitly, this is not the case in almost all studies and it is explicitly not the case 
in some. However, the most rigorous approach to identify relevant factors exists 
in the related literature on compliance within the international law and regime 
literature (Chayes & Chayes 1993; Kent 2009; Mushkat 2011). State compliance 
with international law is also an area of inquiry that examines domestic aspects of 
state behavior in conjunction with international or transnational activity (Chayes 
& Chayes 1993; Clarke 2003; Feinerman 1995; Guzman 2002; Kent 2002; Kreps 
& Arend 2006; Nadelmann 1990; Raustiala & Slaughter 2002). It can therefore 
be a valuable guide to identifying relevant evidence sources for the dissertation's 
own analysis. That said, much of the compliance literature deals with theoretical 
question of explaining state compliance with international law or regimes 
(Chayes & Chayes 1993; Clarke 2003; Feinerman 1995; Guzman 2002; Kent 
2002, 2009; Koh 1997; Kreps & Arend 2006; Mushkat 2011; Raustiala & 
Slaughter 2002; Slaughter & Ratner 1999). This is not examined here, as it covers 
the same ground as that of the dissertation's multi-causal theoretical perspective.  
 
Of the compliance studies which explicitly outline factors relevant to analysis of 
state behaviour, Kent's (2009, p. 26, 27) is the most useful. She summarizes 
existing approaches into four broad factors. These are the level of formal 
compliance with the law or regime, the ‘depth’ of its compliance internationally, 
the ‘depth’ of its compliance domestically, and the degree of cooperation the state 
has with the spirit of the law or regime. Of these, it is the first category of formal 
compliance which identifies which factors are relevant to assessment of state 
behaviour. The other factors draw upon those in this first category to assess state 
satisfaction with laws or regimes and are not examined here because other 
elements of the dissertation's methodology address similar issues. With respect to 
formal compliance, the five factors Kent (2009, p. 26, 27) outlines as relevant to 
analysis are: 
 
“(1) accession to a treaty or agreement; (2) procedural compliance with 
reporting and other requirements; (3) substantive compliance with the 
rules and principles promulgated by the multilateral body, exhibited in 
international or domestic behaviour; (4) de jure formal legal compliance, 
or the implementation of international norms in domestic legislative 
provisions, in judicial incorporation, or in institutional development; and 
(5) practical compliance, or compliance at the level of domestic 
implementation and enforcement.” 
 
Drawing upon Koh's work, Kent further distinguishes the fifth category into 
political implementation, being government policy conforming to international 
norms, and social implementation, being widespread civil obedience to norms.  
 
The level of specificity with which compliance studies identify relevant factors to 
assessing state engagement with international law or regimes is highly beneficial 
in structuring analysis. There are, however, two aspects of compliance criteria 
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that complicate its usage for this dissertation. Firstly, it is designed to examine 
formal international treaty law, and regimes founded on hard international law. 
Internet governance is neither founded upon formal international law nor is the 
regime a formal intergovernmental regime. Secondly, compliance criteria are 
explicitly focused on analyzing state acceptance of rules and norms, rather than 
state involvement in their development and establishment. This emphasis has 
been noted by Paltiel (2007, p. 201, 202) in a criticism of compliance studies' 
inherent orientation towards assessing non-Western states compliance with laws 
and regimes largely derived from Western states' preferences.  
 
Nevertheless, compliance criteria are still a useful guide, and can be modified to 
suit the less formal structure of internet governance, and to be more appropriate to 
the overall process of normative change in global governance. In particular, these 
criteria need to be reformulated to acknowledge the role played by non-state 
actors in internet governance, and also need to be stretched to include 
involvement in the development of internet governance norms. With those 
requirements in mind, the dissertation identifies the factors relevant to its analysis 
of Chinese roles towards internet governance norms as: 
x Domestic government activity, including –  
o Development of internet governance organizations and laws. 
o Participation in internet governance and judicial interpretation of 
laws. 
o Development of internet governance policy. 
x Domestic non-government actors' activity, including – 
o Participation in designing internet governance organizations. 
o Participation in internet governance. 
o Statements on internet governance issues. 
x International government activity, including –  
o Participation in the design of internet governance organizations.  
o Participation in internet governance. 
o Participation in the formation of relevant agreements. 
o Statements in global fora. 
x Transnational non-government actors' activity, including all of the same 
factors as those related to international government activity. 
 
ii. Data Acquisition 
 
The final issue dealt with in the dissertation's methodology is its method of 
acquiring data. In short, the dissertation primarily relies on qualitative 
documentary analysis with a limited amount of basic quantitative analysis where 
possible. Qualitative documentary analysis is employed to create a narrative 
account of internet governance's history and organization. This account is itself 
used to define the four core internet governance norms with which the 
dissertation examines China's engagement, and is also used to analyse the overall 
lifecycles of each norm. A narrative account of the history of Chinese 
government and non-government interaction with these four internet governance 
norms is then developed, and this account is used to determine the political roles 
China has adopted to these core norms, as well as the alternative norms China has 
proposed to replace them. This account is supported, where appropriate and 
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possible, by basic quantitative analysis through the generation of numerical data 
related to China's involvement in internet governance. 
 
The documents drawn upon derive from various sources guided by the factors 
identified above. More generally, the dissertation sources evidence from Chinese 
and non-Chinese government records and statements, the records and websites of 
relevant governance organizations, as well as academic journal articles and 
scholarly books. Evidence is also occasionally drawn from pertinent newspaper 
articles, non-official websites and relevant blogs. These sources allow the 
generation of a detailed, factual account of China's behavior towards core internet 
governance norms. The first category of governmental, institutional and scholarly 
sources are accorded greater evidentiary weight due to their official status or 
peer-reviewed and conventional academic nature, granting them relatively higher 
prima facie credibility (Burnham 2004, p. 186, 188). The remaining category, 
while of lesser credibility due to their informal and unofficial status, are 
employed to buttress more credible evidence acquired and increase the depth of 
factual data. Despite the potential inaccuracy in facts reported in this second 
evidence source, the dissertation argues their use is appropriate provided that the 
limits of their reliability and evidentiary weight are properly acknowledged 
(Bowen 2009, p. 33; Burnham 2004, p. 170, 171). 
 
The qualitative documentary analysis method is the primary method used by the 
dissertation because it is the most appropriate method of analyzing Chinese 
involvement in internet governance. Quantitative methods are inappropriate 
because, in general, numerical methods of generating evidence are not suitable 
for providing coherent accounts of behavior in multiple related, but significantly 
different, contexts (King, Keohane & Verba 1994, p. 5, 6; Strauss 1987, p. 2). 
That said, quantitative analysis can be employed in some circumstances, 
including generation of basic numerical data related to, for example, Chinese 
attendance over time at internet governance meetings. In general, however, 
quantitative methods cannot be used to provide a contextual account of China's 
behavior generally, or be consistently applied across all aspects of Chinese 
engagement with internet governance or across all sources (Patton 1999, p. 1193, 
1195; Weber 1990, p. 9, 13).  
 
In addition to this, other qualitative methods of acquiring evidence are 
impractical. This is because of the subject matter of the dissertation and because 
of linguistic barriers. Given the general political sensitivity of the Chinese 
government towards internet-related issues, observation and interview techniques 
are impractical and complicated by linguistic barriers. In contrast to these 
methods, however, qualitative documentary analysis can be employed to generate 
a factual account of China’s activity and attitudes across all areas of enquiry and 
across all categories of sources, granting consistency to the analysis generally 
and, therefore, improving the internal logic of the research project as a whole. It 
also makes the task of any subsequent verification of the validity analysis easier 
by rendering evidence used in the dissertation more readily accessible (King, 
Keohane & Verba 1994, p. 8). Nevertheless, there are some limitations to the 
primary use of qualitative documentary analysis that need to be addressed. 
Firstly, as mentioned, the reliability or credibility of documents, particularly 
informal or unofficial documents, may be variable (Bowen 2009, p. 33; Patton 
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1999, p. 1190). This uncertainty can be reduced by ensuring that the source of 
documents – when used as secondary sources where bias could color their 
presentation fact – are squarely acknowledged, and caution taken in accepting 
their validity (King, Keohane & Verba 1994, p. 9). 
 
Secondly, the use of a single method for acquiring factual evidence can 
potentially distort understanding, as different methods of acquiring data describe 
different aspects of empirical reality. This flaw, or limitation, in the use of a 
single method is typically counteracted through ‘triangulation’, being the use of 
multiple methods, sources, analysts, or theories to corroborate the validity of 
factual or theoretical claims (Patton 1999, p. 1192, 1193). The use of multiple 
methods, as discussed, is largely impractical and inappropriate; nevertheless, the 
dissertation's usage of qualitative documentary analysis is buttressed at times by 
basic quantitative methods. The use of multiple analysts is similarly 
inappropriate, due to this being a dissertation required to be conducted 
individually. As noted the dissertation does draw upon a range of sources, which 
limits the extent of any overall uncertainty about credibility of evidence. Finally, 
theoretical triangulation relates to the theoretical significance, rather than the 
factual validity, of claims. While the dissertation does provide a theoretical 
explanation for its findings, it is beyond its scope to consider multiple 
perspectives – such a task is more appropriate to any follow up study. 
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4. The Technical Internet, Its History & Governance 
 
The last chapter outlined the dissertation’s methodology and methods, which are 
employed in its analysis of core internet governance norms and Chinese 
engagement with them. Before engaging in this substantive analysis, however, it 
is necessary to delineate the scope of the dissertation’s analysis, and introduce the 
historical and organizational context in which internet governance occurs. This 
chapter provides this background information. It first defines internet governance, 
narrowing the concept to technical internet governance before further delineating 
the dissertation’s focus to three specific elements of this governance, namely: 
internet-specific technical standards (internet standards), the internet protocol 
system, and the domain name system. Following this, a brief description is given 
of the technical internet’s technological characteristics, which illustrates how 
internet standards, the IPS, and the DNS operate. A broad overview of the 
technical internet’s historical development and governance is then provided. This 
history describes the internet’s US origins and the influence of this on its 
technological design and governance, as well as the internet’s evolution into a 
global communications system, and the related political evolution of its global 
governance. The chapter concludes with an overview of the contemporary 
technical internet governance regime. It outlines the organizations that administer 
the technical internet and decide upon internet governance policy, as well as the 
organizations which contribute to this policy development and shape the internet 
governance regime’s future evolution. The linkages between the global, regional 
and domestic levels of internet governance are also illustrated, along with a 
description of the various actors involved in the governance process. 
 
a. Internet Governance 
 
Internet governance is a broad concept and it can be defined in a range of 
different ways, depending on the theoretical perspective and empirical focus of 
inquiry. It can, for instance, be framed by domestic legal theory, by regime 
theory, or by reference to substantive governance issues or levels of governance 
(compare, for example: Kurbalija 2010; Lessig 1999; Mayer-Schonberger 2002; 
Mueller, Mathiason & Klein 2007). However, consistent with its focus on the 
international and transnational politics of internet governance, the dissertation 
adopts the definition of internet governance provided by a UN taskforce, the 
Working Group on Internet Governance. This definition (the WGIG definition) 
conceives of internet governance broadly as: “the development and application by 
Governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of 
shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes 
that shape the evolution and use of the Internet (WGIG 2005f, p. 4).”  
 
Aside from its overall definition, the WGIG definition also defines the 
substantive scope of internet governance issues across the four categories of 
technical issues, internet-specific issues, issues relevant to both the internet and 
other phenomenon, and internet-related development issues (WGIG 2005f, p. 5). 
As these categories imply, internet governance has a very wide scope. Due to this, 
the dissertation limits its consideration to the technical issues category. Apart 
from considerations of time and space, this deliberate limitation is because 
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technical issues are foundational to the internet’s existence, and thus an important 
issue area, as existing studies have not considered China’s engagement with these 
issues in substantial detail, or with a specific focus on the norms regulating 
technical internet governance. Further, the most controversial governance 
organizations and norms within internet governance are largely concerned with 
technical issues (Collins 2007, p. 23; Komaitis 2008, p. 58). Thus, this area 
provides the most significant context for examining China's engagement with 
internet governance.  
 
The WGIG definition states that technical issues involve (WGIG 2005f, p. 5): 
 
“Issues relating to infrastructure and the management of critical Internet 
resources, including administration of the domain name system and Internet 
protocol addresses (IP addresses), administration of the root server system, 
technical standards, peering and interconnection, telecommunications 
infrastructure, including innovative and convergent technologies, as well as 
multilingualisation.” 
 
This definition captures the critical role that the internet's core technical 
architecture has in both constituting and regulating the global internet. However, 
it goes further by linking purely internet-specific issues with internet-related 
technical telecommunications governance issues. For the dissertation’s purposes, 
this is too broad for precise analysis of Chinese engagement with internet 
governance – it includes substantive issues that are not specific to the technical 
internet, and not regulated by core internet governance norms.  
 
Accordingly, the dissertation limits its scope to internet-specific technical issues 
within the WGIG definition, namely the management of critical internet resources 
– including IPS and DNS administration – root server system administration, 
internet standards, and multilingualization. Of these, root server system 
administration and multilingualization are essentially sub-issues within the 
governance issues of internet standards, the IPS, and the DNS. Root servers are 
the authoritative routing servers containing information about domain names and 
IP addresses, and can be subsumed within analysis of their governance (Mueller 
2004 ch. 3). Likewise, multilingualization refers to multi-lingual domain names 
and can be subsumed within analysis of internet standards and the DNS 
(Kurbalija 2010, pp. 46-7). Therefore, the dissertation limits its focus to three 
categories of technical internet governance issues: internet standards, IPS 
administration and policy, and DNS administration and policy.  
 
b. The Technical Internet 
 
The heart of the technical internet is the transmission control protocol/internet 
protocol (TCP/IP) suite of computer internetworking standards, which enable the 
internet’s existence and regulate its operation (Mueller, Mathiason & Klein 2007, 
p. 244). While they rely on computers and telecommunications networks to 
function, it is this TCP/IP protocol suite that interlinks discrete computers and 
networks with each other, transforming them into the internet. TCP/IP’s operation 
is commonly described by postal analogy (e.g. Drezner 2004, p. 491). IP acts as a 
digital envelope showing the receiver's and sender's addresses, while TCP acts as 
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a digital letter filled with information – together they form a ‘packet’. Using 
TCP/IP, the digital equivalent of a book can be mailed through the digital 
equivalent of an unreliable postal service with weight restrictions and careless 
employees. TCP splits the novel into numerous parts with reassembly 
instructions, while IP provides addressing information. The entire novel can then 
be reliably transmitted even if each packet travels a different path, arrives in the 
wrong order, or is lost in transit – if a packet doesn't arrive, the receiver can 
inform the sender and it can be resent (Challinor 2000). TCP/IP forms part of a 
broader group of internet-specific technical standards that operate “above the wire 
and below the application” (DeNardis 2009b, p. 170; IETF 2000a, 2012). 
Together, this system of internet standards enables the internet’s existence. 
 
To work effectively, internet standards rely upon the internet protocol system and 
the autonomous system, which allocates each computer and computer network its 
own unique digital address (e.g. 192.0.34.123) (Gao 2001). IP addresses are 
generally used by individual computers, while autonomous system (AS) numbers 
are typically used by larger networks to facilitate more efficient communication 
between them. Each such signifier on the internet must be unique, however, for 
the system to work properly (Mueller 2004, pp. 33-4). For this reason, these 
unique addresses are allocated hierarchically from the global level to the regional 
or national level, then down further to smaller network operators and eventually, 
in the case of IP addresses, to specific computers. IP addresses and AS numbers 
are allocated by the same internet governance organizations. Thus, for the 
dissertation’s purposes, references to the IPS include references to the AS unless 
the context indicates otherwise. 
 
While internet standards and the IPS allow the internet itself to function, a further 
domain name system exists to facilitate easier human navigation of it. The DNS is 
a global system of unique linguistic addresses (Mueller 2004, ch. 3). It offsets the 
inherent difficulties involved in internet navigation via IP addresses (e.g. 
192.0.34.163) with a system of linguistic identifiers (e.g. www.icann.org). Much 
like the IPS, each domain name must be unique to work properly, and thus the 
DNS is organized hierarchically. This hierarchy is based on distinct namespaces, 
such as .com or .au. Rights to specific namespaces are granted contractually by a 
global authority to a namespace operator (registry), which then contractually 
authorizes lower level operators (registrars) to sell specific names (e.g. icann.org) 
(Kurbalija 2010, p. 43, 44). The registrars keep lists of all domain names in use 
and provide these to the registry which, in turn, provides these lists to the global 
authority. 
 
The IPS and DNS enable machines and humans to navigate the internet, 
respectively, but it is the root server system which binds the two together into a 
coherent whole. Root servers contain information about the association of IP 
addresses with domain names. They enable computers to find the network 
location (IP address) of websites when a user searches for it with a domain name 
(Karrenberg 2004). Root servers allow IP address associations with domain 
names to be traced up from individual computers to the global authority and back 
down again. In practice, however, this is rarely necessary as this information is 
distributed to lower-level servers to limit bandwidth usage and increase the 
internet’s efficiency (Karrenberg 2008; Mueller 2004, pp. 47-50). Root servers 
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are the bridge that connects the IPS and DNS, rendering the internet truly global 
for everyone (DeNardis 2009a, p. 176; IETF 2011a). Figure 4 below provides a 
basic graphical illustration of the role root servers, and other technical internet 




c. A Brief History of the Technical Internet & Its Governance 
 
i. The Early Internet 
 
The internet grew out of computer internetworking research in the Cold War era, 
conducted by predominantly Western governments, private sector corporations, 
civil society academics and computer science enthusiasts (Franda 2001, pp. 22-5). 
The distinctive, global information and communication technology now described 
as the internet was the most successful variant of this research. It arose within the 
US and reflects a series of concerns that motivated the research of Western 
governments and the epistemic community of computer scientists (Cerf 2012; 
Werbach 2008, p. 350). The technology itself, and its governance, has been 
heavily influenced by the historical interplay between the interests of this diverse 
group of actors and their capacity to use power to advance those interests. The 
internet and its governance structure has been particularly shaped by the US 
government, which used its greater relative material power to implement its 
preferences while moderating its decisions to appeal to the values and interests of 
various domestic and foreign non-state or state actors. 
 
The early computer internetworking research that ultimately led to the internet’s 
development was motivated by concerns amongst state governments and the 
technical community over existing network technologies which, in the Seventies, 
were beginning to be marketed by private sector computing giants such as IBM. 
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These technologies were proprietary, a feature which violated the open access 
values of the epistemic community of computer specialists, and jeopardized the 
interests of many Western governments and private sector actors (Eriksson & 
Giacomello 2006, pp. 224-5; Malcolm 2008, pp. 3-5). This concern is well 
illustrated by IBM’s 1975 refusal of a Canadian government request to develop a 
method of interconnection between IBM’s proprietary internetworking standards 
and other such standards. Such behavior led the French government to advise 
European counterparts in 1978 that, “If IBM became master of the network 
market, it would have a share – willingly or unwillingly – of the world power 
structure”. (Drezner 2004, p. 491). Thus, consistent with the values of many 
computer scientists and the interests of state governments, much internetworking 
research from this period aimed at the development of open access standards. 
 
In addition, Western governments – particularly the US government – wanted to 
develop computer networking technologies that would enable 
telecommunications to operate in the event of Cold War hostilities (Cullen & 
Choy 1999, pp. 99-100; Franda 2001, p. 23). This led to US government-funded 
research of internetworking standards which optimized open access, 
interoperability, and reliability in an effort to maximize the survivability of 
computer networks (Cerf 2012). The end result of this was the development of 
TCP/IP by a US experimental research unit called ARPA (and now called 
DARPA), under the auspices of the Department of Defense (Sonbuchner 2008, p. 
188). TCP/IP's design criteria were also complementary with the interests of other 
Western governments and non-state actors that desired open, efficient and reliable 
internetworking standards. This was important to the US government due to its 
interest in undermining the state-centric International Telecommunications 
Union’s (ITU) control over global telecommunications, which had a preference 
for protectionist policies (Drake & Wilson 2005, ch. 1; Mueller, Mathiason & 
Klein 2007, p. 239). At this time the ITU was attempting to establish a set of 
universal technical standards for computer internetworking. Thus, ensuring 
TCP/IP was attractive to others served US government interests in undermining 
ITU authority. While the story is more detailed, the end of these 'protocol wars' 
was that TCP/IP became internationally recognized as an open access 
internetworking standard alongside other standards. 
 
By the early Nineties, computer usage and internetworking began to accelerate 
dramatically as personal computer ownership spread (Selin 1996, p. 368).  
Combined with the invention of the http protocol and the development of the 
World Wide Web, this led to further acceleration of the nascent internet’s growth 
(Mueller 2004, pp. 100-10). Due to the size and wealth of the US market at this 
time, the vast majority of networked computers were physically located in the US 
and used the TCP/IP protocol suite (Komaitis 2009, p. 137). This made the 
TCP/IP network attractive to non-US users, and the globe slowly transitioned to 
TCP/IP use. Ultimately, the majority of Earth’s computers began using TCP/IP 
and the US-based network emerged as the internet. As noted, TCP/IP requires a 
centralized IPS and is supported by the DNS. Because of TCP/IP’s US-centric 
history, these governance systems were located in US territory and operated by 
both US academics and the US government – with responsibility transitioning 
over time from the Department of Defense to the Department of Commerce and 
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its agency, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
(NTIA) (NTIA 1998b; Sonbuchner 2008, pp. 187-9).  
 
ii. The ICANN Era 
 
This early internet governance regime operated without major controversy until 
the beginning of the Nineties when, due to the internet’s rapid growth in the early 
Nineties, a larger-scale method of managing the IPS and DNS became both 
necessary and potentially lucrative. Consistent with domestic US norms, the US 
government granted private companies a share in the management of the DNS 
alongside US academics (Eriksson & Giacomello 2009, p. 212; Mueller, 
Mathiason & Klein 2007, p. 238). Despite private sector involvement in DNS 
management being consistent with US domestic beliefs in general, it was not so 
with respect to the civil society members of the US, and increasingly the 
transnational, technical internet community (Drezner 2004, p. 494). Nor was it in 
the interests of the ITU and many state governments for the US to enjoy 
operational control and territorial jurisdiction over the internet's core architecture 
(Whitmore, Choi & Arzrumtsyan 2009, p. 5).  
 
As private sector actors involved in DNS governance began to charge fees for 
domain name registration, those opposed to privatization of the internet’s 
architecture were galvanized into action. A collection of US and non-US 
technical internet community members, along with internet-related international 
organizations, formed a coalition called the International Ad-Hoc Committee 
(IAHC) (Mathiason 2008, p. 53, 54) The IAHC formulated a plan to transfer the 
IPS and DNS away from exclusive US control (Franda 2001, p. 45; Mueller, 
Mathiason & Klein 2007, pp. 238-240). A new hub was to be established in 
Switzerland to prevent privatization of the internet's architecture and 
consolidation of US power over the internet. In fact, the internet’s global root was 
briefly transferred away from the US government-designated private sector 
operator – Network Solutions (now VeriSign) – by Jon Postel, a ‘father of the 
internet’ involved in DNS governance (Werbach 2008, p. 357). On January 28, 
1998, Postel engineered a switch of the global root from Network Solutions’ 
server to his own at the University of Southern California (Goldsmith & Wu 
2006, pp. 42-6) 
 
The IAHC transfer plan was already known to the US government when Jon 
Postel switched the internet’s core root server. His actions immediately came to 
their attention and the government successfully demanded that Postel restore the 
server to Network Solutions’ control – publicly asserting its authority over the 
internet's root in the process, on the basis of having funded TCP/IP research 
(Sonbuchner 2008, p. 190). This position had been developed in response to the 
threat of the IAHC proposal, and growing resentment over both US internet 
control and internet commercialization. The Clinton administration's top internet 
expert, Ira Magaziner, summarized the government’s position in an interview at 
the time, stating that: “The United States paid for the Internet, the Net was created 
under its auspices, and most importantly everything Jon [Postel] and Network 
Solutions did were pursuant to government contracts.” (Goldsmith & Wu 2006, p. 
41). 
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Having decisively asserted its authority, the US government moved to establish a 
global regime for technical internet governance that would entrench its control, 
reflect its own values and interests, and allay the concerns of the international and 
technical internet community (Drezner 2004, pp. 495-7; Mueller 2004, ch. 6 & 7). 
The Clinton administration demanded that all interested parties collectively 
negotiate the formation of this regime. Ultimately, following a first abortive 
attempt at negotiations, the administration provided its own set of guidelines on 
how this system should be constituted (NTIA 1998a). The US government 
required penultimate authority for internet governance to be granted to a non-
profit corporation, incorporated under US law and located within US territory, 
that was to be internationally representative and inclusive of state, private sector, 
civil society and individual actors. This resulted in the creation of ICANN, which 
oversees the global operation of, and policy development for, the IPS and DNS. 
When ICANN was created, the US government initially planned to divest itself of 
authority over the technical internet by gradually transferring it to the technical 
internet community, a plan halted by the Bush administration but restarted by the 
Obama administration, which has stated it will relinquish the US government’s 
authority in 2015 (Cukier 2005, p. 8; NTIA 2014b). 
 
ICANN’s structure and the regime it largely oversees will be outlined in detail 
below, but it is important to note that its design reflects a few core values and 
interests of the parties involved in, and influencing, its establishment. First and 
foremost, it reflects US governmental concern to maintain unilateral, ultimate 
authority over the technical internet (DelBianco & Cox 2008). While this 
authority has waned, and by design will eventually disappear, it remains formally 
in place (NTIA 2012a; ICANN 2009r; Mueller & Kuerbis 2014, p. 3, 4; US 
Supreme Court 1945). Secondly, ICANN reflects a belief that non-state actors, 
and the private sector in particular, are best positioned to ensure that the internet 
both operates effectively and in a manner beneficial to commercial and non-
commercial internet users (Ayres 2008; ICANN 2012at). Thirdly, ICANN 
reflects a belief that civil society involvement in internet governance prevents 
state or private sector attempts to restrict open internet access or freedom of 
speech generally (IETF 2011b; MacKinnon 2009b). The existence of US 
hegemony over the internet, and the core values and interests that ICANN 
reflects, decisively shapes the global politics of internet governance. 
 
iii. Post-ICANN Regime Reform Efforts 
 
In the years leading up to ICANN's establishment, developed world governments 
and the ITU began to realize the magnitude of the internet's significance. Despite 
last-ditch efforts by the IAHC to circumvent US government control, it was able 
to entrench its technical internet authority through the establishment of ICANN. 
Nevertheless, from within the ITU, aggrieved state actors resolved to reform 
internet governance by removing unilateral US control and replacing non-state 
actor authority with the norm of state primacy in global telecommunications 
governance (ITU 1998b). To this end, and others, the 1998 Plenipotentiary 
Meeting of the ITU called for the establishment of a world summit on the nascent 
'Information Society'. This call was approved by the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) in 2002, which formally established the World Summit on the 
Information Society (UNGA 2002).  
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The WSIS took place over two Summits in 2003 and 2005, with a range of other 
meetings supporting it. It continues to exist today, although in a largely vestigial 
capacity with respect to issues of internet governance (ITU 2006). The topic of 
internet governance emerged as a major, and perhaps the major, controversy of 
the WSIS process, and spawned the creation of a specialized body between the 
two main Summits (Kummer 2007; Rogers 2007). This body, the WGIG, 
developed the global consensus definition of internet governance (WGIG 2005f). 
Nevertheless, the WSIS failed to resolve disputes surrounding internet 
governance. In its final Summit, it recommended that a body, the Internet 
Governance Forum, be established to continue debate on internet governance 
policy and reform (IGF 2012a; Malcolm 2008; WSIS 2005b). The IGF has 
operated since 2006, serving as an organizational platform where disparate state 
and non-state actors meet annually to discuss internet governance and the future 
of its global governance. 
 
The ITU and the various governments dissatisfied with the US government-
imposed, ICANN-led regime quickly realized the IGF was not likely to instigate a 
major change in internet governance. They initiated a range of measures aimed at 
triggering a wholesale restructure of the internet governance regime, with a view 
to replacing core internet governance norms with ones more suited to their state-
centric preferences. These include attempts at restructuring internet governance, 
including resolutions at the UN proposing international treaties that would affect 
this issue (UNGA 2011b), through efforts at reform through the 2013 
renegotiation of the ITU's primary International Telecommunications Regulations 
(ITR) treaty (Fidler 2013), and, following a wave of anti-US sentiment after 
revelations of global surveillance by the US National Security Agency, at 
NETMundial – an international meeting hosted by Brazil aimed at developing 
collective will to reorganize internet governance (Mueller & Kuerbis 2014). 
These and various other ad-hoc activities, along with regularized activities in 
organizations such as ICANN and the IGF, continue to drive the evolution and 
global politics of internet governance and the core norms regulating it. 
 
d. The Technical Internet Governance Regime 
 
As the above history of the internet suggests, the contemporary technical internet 
governance regime is centered on ICANN. The regime, however, is much broader 
than just this one organization. While ICANN, its subsidiary bodies and a range 
of affiliated organizations administer and develop policy for the internet protocol 
and domain name allocation systems, internet standards governance is largely 
outside of its jurisdiction – although administration of the IPS and DNS is, of 
itself, a form of administering internet standards usage. The regime also extends 
beyond administrative and policy-setting activities, covering broader policy 
debate on internet governance issues and discussion on the future of the internet 
governance regime itself. The regime is multi-faceted and complex, incorporating 
a broad array of international intergovernmental organizations, transnational 
organizations, regional state and non-state organizations, state governments, and 
domestic non-state organizations. To make sense of this intricacy, discussion of 
the regime is separated into two sections addressing firstly administrative 
organizations, being those which administer the technical internet and/or have 
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authority to set policy related to it, and secondly policy organizations, being those 
which contribute to policy debate and discussion of the regime’s future. 
 
Similarly, the range of different actors participating in internet governance is very 
diverse. Internet governance organizations allow involvement in their activities 
by state actors and non-state actors, or by a combination of various stakeholder 
groups that typically include some or all of the following: governments, 
intergovernmental organizations, private sector actors, civil society actors, the 
technical community, academia, and individuals (Ayres 2008; IGF 2012i; WSIS 
2007). However, while the below discussion uses loose terminology, subsequent 
chapters in the dissertation categorize actors more strictly as either state or non-
state actors, or as members of three broad stakeholder groups – government, the 
private sector, and civil society. State actors include governments, 
intergovernmental organizations and their respective agencies or representatives. 
Non-state actors include all other actors. The government stakeholder group 
refers to all of the state actors defined above. The private sector stakeholder group 
includes all organizations or individuals that are not explicitly state actors and 
which operate explicitly on a profit-making basis (Börzel & Risse 2005, pp. 3-5). 
Similarly, the civil society stakeholder group are all organizations that are not 
explicitly state actors, but which are not explicitly oriented towards profit-making 
(Arts 2003, p. 5).  
 
i. Administrative Organizations 
 
Administration and policy setting for the technical internet occurs within a variety 
of different organizations and is conducted by a range of actors. There are, 
however, two basic divisions. Some organizations and actors are primarily 
involved in internet standards administration and policy-setting, while others are 
primarily involved in these activities in relation to the internet protocol and 
domain name systems. Internet standards are largely governed outside the 
hierarchical framework of organizations that govern the IPS and DNS. In addition 
to this, internet standards are primarily governed at the global level. While these 
standards are administered by actors at multiple different levels of political 
organization, policy is set for them solely at the global level. By contrast, the IPS 
and DNS are governed across global, regional and domestic levels, although 
policy setting is concentrated in global level organizations. 
 
1. Internet Standards 
 
Generally speaking, internet standards do not require complex administration to 
function, they just need to be configured properly to enable internet connectivity 
(IETF 1996b, s. 1.1, 3.3). Their open access design also means anyone can use 
them without securing express permission (IETF 2008). Thus, daily 
administration of internet standards is typically handled by IT departments and 
specialists that supervise or repair computers and computer networks.1 The 
development of internet standards themselves, however, is subject to a complex 
                                                          
1 While the general usage of internet standards only requires proper configuration and is open to 
all, actual internet access requires a unique IP address (IETF 2011a). This specific, authoritative 
instance of internet standard protocol parameter allocation is IPS governance, and DNS 
governance is another form of it. 
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governance system. The chief organizations involved in the internet standards 
development process are the Internet Society (ISOC), the Internet Architecture 
Board (IAB), the IETF and its Steering Group (IESG), and the Internet Research 
Taskforce (IRTF) and its Steering Group (IETF 2011b). Of these various bodies, 
it is the IETF which actually conducts internet standards development.  
 
ISOC serves as a legally incorporated institutional home for – and financial 
supporter of – the other bodies (Cerf 1995; Cerf, Kahn & Chapin 1992; IETF 
1996b; ISOC 2014a). It has a minor procedural role in internet standards 
development and in the IETF’s and IAB’s internal governance processes (IETF 
1996b, s. 6.5.3; 2004b, ss. 3.7, 4.5, 6). The IAB has overseen TCP/IP 
development since its earliest days (IETF 1990). Nowadays, it is the supervisor of 
– and external liaison for – the IETF and IRTF, and serves a range of other 
administrative and advisory roles (IAB 2014; IETF 2000b). Like ISOC, the IAB 
only has a minor procedural role in internet standards development and in the 
IETF and IRTF’s internal governance – although it does set overall priorities for 
these bodies (IETF 1996b; 2000b, s. 2.1; 2004b, s. 3.7.3; 2011b). The IRTF and 
IRSG focus on long-term research and are not directly involved in standards 
development (IETF 1996a, 2011b).  
 
The IETF forms the heart of the internet standards governance system.  
Within it, computer scientists and IT specialists from around the world pool their 
technical knowledge to develop internet standards (IETF 2011b, s. 3.12). The 
IESG, as the IETF’s steering group, coordinates the IETF's activities and makes 
final substantive decisions on internet standards (IETF 1996b, s. 6). Its 
membership is drawn from the IETF and serves for two years in the IESG, while 
also acting as Area Directors within the IETF (IETF 2011b). Area Directors are 
responsible for coordinating standards development for specific technical issue 
areas, with a number of Working Groups within each area. These Working 
Groups develop standards through online mailing lists and in face-to-face 
meetings at regular IETF meetings (IETF 1998, s. 3). Participation is open to 
anyone, both in the online mailing lists and in face-to-face meetings. Decisions on 
standards are based on 'rough consensus', as determined by the Working Group 
Chair(s). Once rough consensus is reached, the Chair asks the Area Director to 
recommend it to the IESG for approval as an internet standard (IETF 1998, s. 
7.4). Most standards development work is done by Working Groups, but it is also 
possible for individuals to directly propose internet standards (IETF 1996b, s. 
2.2). 
 
The IETF operates according to a libertarian philosophy, exemplified by a famous 
quote from IETF member David Clark who stated that: “We reject kings, 
presidents and voting. We believe in rough consensus and running code.” (IETF 
2011b). Reflecting this, IETF membership is open to any individual in their 
personal capacity, and only in this capacity. Its leadership is largely voluntary and 
drawn from active IETF members, who are selected by a partially randomized 
Nominating Committee after consultation with the IETF community (IETF 
2004b). The IETF holds exclusive authority over the setting of internet standards, 
although a number of other entities contribute to their development, including 
taskforces set up by global or regional multilateral intergovernmental 
organizations, government agencies, transnational organizations, universities and 
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research institutes, and individual computer scientists or IT specialists (APEC 
2012; DeNardis & Raymond 2013, p. 10; The IPv6 Forum 2012; ISO 2012; Tso 
2008, p. 126; Zhao 2004, pp. 5-6). However, such activity must filter through the 
IETF to result in a formal internet standard. 
 
2. The IPS & DNS 
 
ICANN directly oversees the internet protocol, domain name and root server 
systems, coordinating their technical administration and setting policy for them. 
ICANN is a formally independent, not-for-profit public benefit corporation 
incorporated under Californian law (ICANN 2012au). It has authority over 
domain name usage and – in conjunction with the Internet Assigned Numbers 
Authority (IANA) and VeriSign – authority over the IPS, AS and root server 
system (IANA 2012; ICANN 2012at; NTIA 2012b). The right to use globally 
unique IP addresses, AS numbers and domain names is given subject to 
contractual agreement with ICANN’s policies (DelBianco & Cox 2008, pp. 28-
30). Actors below ICANN, often private businesses, then sell or distribute these 
resources to smaller entities until unique IP addresses are assigned to individual 
computers and unique domain names assigned to individual persons.  
 
Historically, ICANN’s authority derived from a contract with the US government 
and it remains partially supervised by it. This contract was replaced in 2009 by an 
‘Affirmation of Commitments’, which transitioned the US government’s 
exclusive power of policy review to the wider ICANN community (ICANN 
2009a). Nevertheless, the Affirmation of Commitments requires ICANN to 
remain headquartered – and legally incorporated – within the US, rendering it 
ultimately subject to US legal jurisdiction (ICANN 2009r; US Supreme Court 
1945). In addition, the IPS and root server system is directly managed by the 
IANA and Verisign, both deriving their authority from US government contracts 
requiring them to operate according to ICANN policy (NTIA 2012a, 2015). US 
government involvement in IPS and DNS governance is indirect and does not 
typically affect its daily operation, but the US government retains the final right 
to approve changes to the internet’s global root (Mueller & Kuerbis 2014, p. 3, 4; 
NTIA 2014b). This ensures ultimate US government control of internet 
governance and galvanizes states and other actors to push for reform of the 
current regime (WGIG 2005f, p. 5; DelBianco & Cox 2008, p. 41; Drezner 2004, 
p. 497).  
 
Administration of the IPS is supervised by ICANN but daily administrative 
activity is conducted by the IANA, which authorizes and maintains records of IP 
address and AS number allocations to the regional level (IANA 2012). Regional 
internet registries (RIR) then divide the globe up geographically for IP address 
and AS number allocation (Mueller 2004, pp. 39-48). For example, the Asia-
Pacific Network Information Centre authorizes and administers IP address and 
AS number allocations to users in the Asia-Pacific (APNIC 2012a). Below RIRs 
are two types of lower level authorities, each contractually authorized by their 
respective RIRs (IANA 2014). National internet registries (NIR), like the China 
National Network Information Centre (CNNIC), have allocation monopolies 
within the territory of some states (CNNIC 2003b). In others states, private sector 
internet service providers (ISP) receive IP addresses and AS numbers directly 
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from their RIR and in this capacity are known as 'local internet registries (LIR) 
(IANA 2014). NIRs and LIRs then allocate these resources downwards to smaller 
ISPs and businesses, which in turn manage the allocation to individual computers. 
 
ICANN exerts more direct administrative control over the DNS, yet the IANA 
along with VeriSign still undertake much of its daily administration (IANA 2012; 
ICANN 2001i, 2009a, 2011g; NTIA 2014b). ICANN negotiates contracts with 
DNS registries or registrars which authorize them to operate and compels 
compliance with ICANN’s policies (ICANN 2014d). These contracts also direct 
registries to provide domain name allocation information to the IANA ( ICANN 
2012q). As part of this process, the IANA and VeriSign maintain the root servers 
that link the IPS and DNS together (NTIA 2012a). Two types of domain names 
exist: country-code top-level domains like .au for Australia, and generic top-level 
domains (gTLD) such as .com. In theory, ccTLD operators are authorized by 
ICANN, but in practice many are selected by state governments who regard their 
ccTLD as sovereign property (IANA 2007; Park 2009). Nevertheless, ccTLDs 
and the IANA cooperate to ensure these domains are accessible by all. In regard 
to gTLDs, ICANN grants contractual authority to manage and distribute these 
domains to predominantly private sector registries (ICANN 2012an). Both ccTLD 
and gTLD registries subsequently authorize registrars, such as the well-known 
US company 'GoDaddy', which in turn sell domains to businesses or individual 
consumers (ICANN 201aj). 
 
Policy-setting for the IPS and DNS is largely conducted by ICANN and its 
subsidiary bodies or affiliated organizations. However, this policy also intersects 
with domestic law once these systems reach the national level. There is wide 
variation in policy approaches across domestic internet governance regimes, 
where some states establish formal government oversight of the IPS and DNS, 
while others only intervene for specific purposes. China, for example, asserts 
state authority over the IPS and DNS within its territory – authorizing allocation 
authorities and actively supervising them (Ministry of Information Industry 2004, 
2005a, 2005b). By contrast, more liberal states such as Australia generally only 
intervene for narrower law enforcement purposes, such as with laws relating to 
search warrants (Australian Government 1995, Pt. 10.6, 10.7). Particularly with 
respect to the DNS, state law overlaps with ICANN policy on issues such as 
intellectual property, privacy and defamation protection, registration of public 
service or anti-social domains, and domain name dispute resolution procedures 
(Chik 2008; Deibert 2010, p. 285, 286; ICANN 2012aq 2014a; Ministry of 
Information Industry 2004; Mueller & Chango 2008; Willoughby 2009). 
Nevertheless, despite these national idiosyncrasies, ICANN sets global policy and 
contractually requires IPS and DNS operators to comply with its policy. 
 
ICANN policy-making processes involve the input of 'Advisory Committees' and 
'Supporting Organizations' constituted by different stakeholder groups – self-
described by ICANN as a ‘bottom up, consensus-driven, multi-stakeholder 
model’ of governance (ICANN 2009a, art. 8(c); 2012at). It reflects the 
compromise negotiated by the US government during ICANN’s creation and 
privileges non-state actors, particularly the private sector (Ayres 2008, p. 2; 
Kesan & Gallo 2008, p. 362). Ultimate decision-making authority is vested in 
ICANN's Board of Directors, which consists of 16 voting members and five non-
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voting liaisons (ICANN 2011g, art. VI). Eight voting members are chosen by 
ICANN's Nominating Committee and seven by ICANN's Supporting 
Organizations – the remaining voting member is the ICANN President. The five 
non-voting liaisons are appointed by ICANN's Advisory Committees, the 
Technical Liaison Group (TLG), and the IETF. Figure 5 illustrates the Board's 
place in ICANN and ICANN's overall structure. 
 
Figure 5: ICANN’s Organizational Structure 
Source: ICANN (2014ce). 
 
ICANN's Board reflects its overall organizational structure. Supporting 
Organizations represent stakeholders concerned with specific policy areas 
(ICANN 2011g). The Address Supporting Organization (ASO) represents IP 
address and AS number allocation stakeholders. The Country-Code Name 
Supporting Organization (ccNSO) represents ccTLD operators. The Generic 
Name Supporting Organization (GNSO) represents gTLD operators along with 
commercial and non-commercial gTLD users. Individual internet users are 
represented through the At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC). Governments 
are represented through the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC). Root 
server administrators are represented through the Root Server System Advisory 
Committee (RSSAC), and internet security experts through the Security and 
Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC). The TLG represents various internet-
related technical standards organizations, while the IETF represents itself. 
ICANN’s Nominating Committee is composed of a broad cross-section of 
delegates from these subsidiary bodies (ICANN 2011g, art. VII).  
 
The ICANN Board’s structure grants a wide range of stakeholders input into 
policy setting, but it is clear that non-state actors have greater decision-making 
authority than state actors, which are relegated to largely advisory roles. This is 
the most notably controversial aspect of ICANN’s governance model (Kesan & 
Gallo 2008, p. 390, 391). ICANN’s broader policy development processes also 
reflect its governance model and philosophy, however. The Board generally 
makes policy based on reports or submissions from Supporting Organizations, 
Advisory Committees and other subsidiary bodies (ICANN 2012at). These bodies 
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develop policy related to their area of focus and put them to the Board for 
approval, while also advising the Board on how other policies may affect their 
stakeholders. A range of further measures ensure transparency and accountability 
in Board decisions, including public agenda announcements, public solicitation of 
comments, public Board records, and a variety of policy appeal procedures (see, 
for example: ICANN 2011g, arts. III, IV, V, XII; ICANN 2014ch). 
 
Each of ICANN’s subsidiary bodies has its own organizational structure and 
policy development processes, as do a range of affiliated organizations that liaise 
with ICANN. Many of ICANN's subsidiary bodies only operate at the global 
level, without geographical sub-division, due to the nature of their policy focus. 
For example, as gTLDs such as .com and .org are not geographically organized, 
the GNSO only operates at the global level and is organized via stakeholder class 
rather than geographical origin of stakeholders. For similar reasons, the GNSO, 
GAC, RSSAC, SSAC, TLG and the IETF all operate solely at the global level. 
By contrast, the ccNSO, ASO and ALAC also have subsidiary bodies or affiliated 
organizations that are regionally organized. 
 
The ASO is responsible for developing policy related to the IPS and is comprised 
of five stakeholder groups – the five regional RIRs. The ASO's Executive Council 
consists of 15 members elected by each RIR's membership or Executive Council. 
ASO policies are developed within and amongst RIRs, voted upon by each RIR in 
accordance with its own policy development process, and then reviewed by the 
ASO Executive Council before it is put to the ICANN Board (ASO 2014b). The 
ASO acts as the representative of the various RIRs within ICANN. There is also a 
twin organization, the Numbers Resource Organization (NRO), constituted by the 
same members as the ASO, which acts as the coordinator for the RIRs activities 
and as their representative to governments and other bodies (ASO 2014a).  
 
As the ASO’s structure suggests, the Asia-Pacific region’s RIR contributes to 
ICANN’s policy development. However, APNIC also directly develops IPS 
policy for the Asia-Pacific region (APNIC 2012a). Membership within APNIC is 
open to all organizations and individuals, but voting rights and voting weight 
within it is based on the number of IP address allocations a member is responsible 
for (APNIC 2014m, 2014o). APNIC appoints an Executive Council from 
amongst its membership, but each Councilor must act in their personal capacity. 
Decisions of the Executive Council require a simple majority vote (APNIC 1998, 
Pt. V). Policy is developed within APNIC through similar processes to within the 
IETF, via working groups, public mailing lists and consensus decisions at open 
meetings, followed by Executive Council endorsement (APNIC 2014w). The 
Executive Council may also refer any policy to a formal vote by APNIC's 
membership, and the general membership may pass policies or overturn 
Executive Council decisions through votes at APNIC meetings (APNIC 1998, Pt. 
VII; 2004e). 
 
Policy for the DNS is developed within both the ccNSO and the GNSO. The 
ccNSO is constituted by ccTLD operators, such as .au or .cn. It is headed by a 
Council made up of three representatives appointed by ICANN's Nominating 
Committee and three ccTLD operator representatives from each of ICANN's 
regional areas – North America, South America, Europe, Asia-Pacific, and Africa 
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(ICANN 2011g, art. IX). The ccNSO Council manages the ccNSO's activities and 
establishes working groups on policy issues. Policy decisions are made by 
Council consensus or supermajority vote, then submitted to a vote of general 
ccNSO members before being put to the ICANN Board (ICANN 2011g Annex 
B). Aside from its global level organization, the ccNSO also affiliates with 
Regional Organizations of ccTLD operators. For the Asia-Pacific, this is the 
Asia-Pacific Top-Level Domain Association (APTLD) (APTLD 2012). It is 
constituted by voting ccTLD operator members and non-voting members from 
the DNS community. APTLD policy decisions are determined by vote at annual 
meeting. It largely acts as a forum for communication amongst Asia-Pacific 
ccTLD operators, but it and other Regional Organizations can submit policy 
proposals to the ccNSO Council (ICANN 2011g, art IX, s. 3(2)). 
 
The GNSO is responsible for developing gTLD policy, and is comprised of four 
stakeholder groups reflecting a gTLD constituency: registries, registrars, 
commercial users, and non-commercial users. These stakeholder groups and 
ICANN's Nominating Committee appoint members to the GNSO Council which 
makes final decisions on policies developed by the GNSO. Once the Council 
accepts a policy, it is then passed to the ICANN Board. GNSO policies are 
developed via Working Groups chartered by the GNSO Council, in a similar 
fashion to how policy development is organized in the IETF (GNSO 2014a, 
2014b; ICANN 2011g, art. X).  
 
The above organizations partially specialize in either IPS or DNS policy, but the 
GAC and the ALAC have a broader focus. The GAC is expressly constituted as 
an advisory body and has two stakeholder groups, national governments and 
intergovernmental organizations, but only governments have voting privileges. 
Nevertheless, GAC’s policy recommendations are customarily determined 
through consensus in typically closed-door meetings (GAC 2011). Both the 
GAC’s and ICANN’s bylaws require the ICANN Board to consider GAC advice 
and, in the case of public policy-related issues, to provide reasons if GAC advice 
was not followed (ICANN 2011g, art. XI, ss. 2 (1) (j), (k)).  
 
The ALAC is responsible for representing individual internet users within 
ICANN, and is comprised of regional and local organizations designed to 
represent individual internet users (ICANN 2011g, art. XI, s. (2) (4)). The 
Advisory Committee itself is composed of two representatives from each of the 
ALAC's Regional At-Large Organizations (RALO) and one representative from 
each of ICANN's five geographical areas chosen by ICANN's Nominating 
Committee. The ALAC makes general policy decisions based on consensus or, in 
the event an ALAC member requests a vote, by simply majority (ALAC 2013 art. 
12). The ALAC develops policy through chartered work teams, which may or 
may not be open to the public, as well as via generally public mailing lists and 
meetings (ALAC 2013 ss. B, C).  
 
The ALAC’s Asia-Pacific RALO is the Asian, Australasian and Pacific Islands 
RALO (APRALO). The APRALO is responsible for representing individual 
internet users from the Asia-Pacific region and is comprised of local At-Large 
Structures (ALS) (APRALO 2009). Each ALS has one vote within APRALO, 
although decisions are made by consensus where possible, or majority vote where 
    49 
 
not. APRALO meetings are only open to its members, but its website is publicly 
accessible and provides a space for contribution to APRALO's policy 
development (APRALO 2014). The ALSs themselves have a broad variety of 
organizational structures, reflecting the substantial diversity amongst different 
states, cultures and interest groups within states and the relatively non-specific 
criteria for their certification by ICANN (ALAC 2014). 
 
The remaining subsidiary bodies or ICANN-affiliated organizations have very 
specific foci. The RSSAC, SSAC and TLG focus specifically on root server, 
security or other technical issues, respectively, and are all relatively small 
advisory bodies to the ICANN Board. RSSAC and SSAC members are appointed 
directly by the board (ICANN 2011g, art. XI, s. 2). The TLG includes 
representatives from the IAB, the ITU, the World Wide Web Consortium (which 
develops http and html standards), and the European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ICANN 2011g, art. XI-A, s. 2). The IETF similarly provides 
assistance in technical matters to the ICANN Board (ICANN 2011g, art. VI, s. 9 
(d)).  
 
ii. Policy Organizations 
 
Beyond administrative organizations, a range of policy organizations form part of 
the internet governance regime. They do not administer the technical internet or 
have authority to set policy, but they still influence internet governance. Some 
affect the evolution of the internet governance regime, some feed policy inputs 
into the IETF or ICANN, and some are forums where the technical internet 
community network amongst themselves. A few policy organizations – 
particularly those primarily focused on internet governance – have internal 
structures that reflect core internet governance norms. This makes them 
particularly relevant to the dissertation’s analysis. For reasons of space and due to 
difficulties in public access to documents, however, only the most relevant and 
accessible of these are considered. Nevertheless, a broad, if brief, overview of 
policy organizations is provided here to provide context. 
 
1. Global Level Organizations 
 
The UN is the highest level policy organization that influences the internet 
governance regime’s evolution. Its General Assembly occasionally votes on 
internet governance-related treaties or resolutions. For example, the UNGA 
approved the ITU's proposal for the WSIS and, post-WSIS, has charged the UN 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) with managing post-WSIS outcomes 
(UNGA 2002; UNGA 2006). ECOSOC itself has designated the UN Commission 
on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD) as the coordinator of 
the WSIS review process (ECOSOC 2006). Of all UN agencies, however, the 
ITU has played the most prominent role in internet governance. It proposed the 
WSIS and supervised its initial operation (ITU 1998b, 2006). In addition, as the 
chief forum for global telecommunications governance, the ITU also 
intermittently addresses internet governance (Zhao 2004). For example, 
negotiations related to updating the ITU’s International Telecommunications 
Regulations (ITR) have been used by some states to push internet governance 
reform (ITU 2012b; WCITleaks.org 2012a). 
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The WSIS itself is particularly relevant to the global politics of internet 
governance. As noted, it was the first international attempt at reforming internet 
governance. Debate on this issue occurred at the two main WSIS Summits and in 
their related preparatory and regional conferences, including within the WGIG – 
which exclusively addressed internet governance (ITU 2006). The WSIS was an 
explicitly multi-stakeholder process (UNGA 2002). However, despite a variety of 
non-state actors being entitled to participate in the WSIS, only state governments 
were entitled to vote on WSIS outcomes (Raboy 2004, pp. 228-31; WSIS 2007). 
Following the two main WSIS Summits, high level discussion of internet 
governance largely moved to the IGF – an organization proposed by the WSIS 
itself – although an annual review of progress towards WSIS outcomes is headed 
by the UNCSTD (WSIS 2005b). 
 
The IGF was the WSIS’ successor for high-level internet governance debate and 
is now the most prominent policy organization (Malcolm 2008, p. 339, 353).  
It is a prominent annual forum in which the international and transnational 
community jointly debate internet governance (IGF 2012b). The IGF began in 
2006 and its initial five-year mandate extended for another five years in 2011 
(UNGA 2011a, para. 17). Similarly to the WSIS, the IGF’s meetings are preceded 
by a series of preparatory meetings and supplemented by regional – and some 
national – internet governance forums (IGF 2012i; Malcolm 2008, pp. 364-78). 
The IGF is a multi-stakeholder body and grants authority to non-state actors (IGF 
2012b). While not empowered to make any decisions or recommendations, the 
IGF’s primary organ – the Multi-Stakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) – is 
constituted by a panel of government, private sector and civil society actors with 
equal authority over its agenda. Participation in the IGF is also multi-stakeholder, 
open to the three stakeholder groups of governments, the private sector and civil 
society.  
 
A final group of global-level policy organizations are those created by the 
transnational technical internet community. Chief amongst these is the ISOC, the 
institutional and financial home for the IETF (Cerf 1995). The ISOC also serves 
as a home for the broader internet community, including both individual and 
organizational members (ISOC 2014d). It provides a networking and policy 
deliberation forum, and a platform for policy advocacy by the technical internet 
community. It is a multi-stakeholder organization committed to open, bottom-up 
governance, and determines its policies by majority vote in generally public 
annual meetings (ISOC 2013, art. II; 2014c). In addition to the ISOC, a range of 
further transnational organizations exist at the global level, such as the 
International Association of Top-Level Domains (IATLD) – a group which 
lobbies ICANN on policy – and the Multilingual Internet Names Consortium 
(MINC), which is dedicated to promoting multi-lingualization of domain names 
(IATLD 2014; MINC 2014). 
 
2. Regional & Domestic Level Organizations 
 
Below the global level are a number of regional and domestic-level policy 
organizations. As noted above, some regional and domestic bodies are affiliated 
with the IETF’s internet standards development processes or incorporated within 
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ICANN’s IPS and DNS policy development processes. Beyond these, a range of 
regionally-focused intergovernmental organizations touch upon internet 
governance activities. For the Asia-Pacific region, these include the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the Asia-Pacific Telecommunity 
(APT) (APEC 2014; APT 2014). Both are primarily state-based organizations and 
consider internet governance policy matters as part of their broader 
telecommunications policy activities. They are not explicitly multi-stakeholder 
bodies, but they do allow involvement in policy discussion by non-state members.  
 
As noted, the IGF also incorporates a series of subsidiary or affiliated regional 
and national level forums. For the Asia-Pacific region this forum is the Asia-
Pacific Regional Internet Governance Forum (APrIGF) (APrIGF 2012a). Like the 
IGF itself, the APrIGF is explicitly a multi-stakeholder body and grants non-state 
actors authority over its operation (APrIGF 2013e). In addition to regional IGFs, 
the technical internet community in some states have organized national level 
IGFs to feed into either their associated regional IGFs or directly to the global 
IGF (auIGF 2014; MYIGF 2014). Similarly, the ISOC establishes subsidiary 
regional Bureaus, including an Asia-Pacific Bureau, which seek to coordinate 
regional ISOC activity (ISOC 2014b). Below ISOC’s regional Bureaus are 
national or sub-national chapters, which have a variety of forms and play a role in 
ISOC’s internal governance processes and other activities (ISOC 2013art. IV). 
ISOC chapters also typically contribute to internet policy development in their 
national or sub-national areas, and provide a platform for the technical internet 
community's self-organization.  
 
A range of specialized regional internet governance bodies also exist, providing 
platforms in which the technical internet community can network and share 
expertise. In the Asia-Pacific, examples include the Asia-Pacific Internet 
Association (APIA) – which hosts an annual meeting for private sector actors 
engaged in internet-related business in the region – and 'AP*' or 'APstar', a loose 
coalition of Asia-Pacific internet organizations that facilitates policy development 
and coordination amongst the Asia-Pacific technical internet community (APIA 
2014; APStar 2014). Finally, at the domestic level a further group of actors 
contribute to policy development for the technical internet and foster technical 
internet community networking. These include government agencies, universities 
and research institutes, national or sub-national industry bodies, civil society 
interest groups, and interested individuals. 
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5. Core Technical Internet Governance Norms 
 
The previous chapter discussed the technical internet’s history and the structure 
of the contemporary internet governance regime, and in the process alluded to 
some of the normative beliefs and practices that shape internet governance. This 
chapter, in contrast, explicitly focuses upon these beliefs and practices; in 
particular, those that are the most significant in shaping which actors have 
decision-making authority for internet governance, and which actors have the 
right to participate in governance. It draws upon the previous chapter’s analysis 
and the insights of internet governance scholars to identify and describe four core 
internet governance norms, with which the dissertation subsequently analyses 
Chinese engagement to determine if China has been or can be a norm-maker in 
internet governance. These four norms are:  
x The US authority norm, which rationalizes the US government’s authority 
over the technical internet. 
x The privatized governance norm, which justifies non-state actors' 
authority over internet governance. 
x The multi-stakeholder governance norm, which legitimizes the right of 
various stakeholder groups to participate in internet governance. 
x The state authority norm, an emerging alternative to both US government 
authority and privatized governance that seeks to justify the rights of state 
actors to equal or greater authority over internet governance than non-state 
actors. 
 
a. The US Authority Norm 
 
The US government authority norm is a standard of behavior specifying that the 
US government alone has ultimate authority over the IPS and DNS, and may 
determine who governs it and how they do so. ICANN’s initial creation, its 
contractual authorization as the IPS and DNS administrator, supervisor and chief 
policy-setting body, and its early supervision by the US government were all 
expressions of this norm, representing the US government asserting its authority. 
However, as part of the gradual transition of ultimate authority to the technical 
internet community, the US government’s authorization and supervision of 
ICANN lapsed in 2009, when the initial contract between the US government and 
ICANN was replaced with the Affirmation of Commitments. Nevertheless, this 
development still requires ICANN to remain incorporated and headquartered in 
the US, rendering it subject to US legal authority. In addition, the US government 
retains express authority over the IPS through its contractual authorization of the 
IANA as its administrator, over the DNS and root server system through its 
contractual authorization of the IANA and VeriSign as their administrators, and 
through its role as the final authorizer of changes to the root zone file. Therefore, 
internet use implicitly signifies acquiescence to US government authority, as all 
authoritative internet resources originate from US government-authorized agents. 
Similarly, at least until 2009, acceptance of ICANN policy and participation in its 
development involved implicit compliance with US government authority. 
 
The dissertation has predominantly identified the existence of the US authority 
norm from its own analysis of the technical internet’s US-centric history, and 
from the role the US government has in its governance; this establishes US 
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authority as a fact. The normative character of this authority, however, is 
generally not noted in the literature on internet governance, although it is still 
recognized by some, even if largely in a negative sense. For example, a study 
focusing specifically on principles and norms for the internet governance regime 
notes that “the unilateral control of the DNS root currently held by the US 
government is undesirable (Mueller, Mathiason & Klein 2007, p. 250).” 
Likewise, the WGIG report (WGIG 2005f, p. 12) itself explicitly notes the 
normative element of US authority, arguing that “No single Government should 
have a pre-eminent role in relation to international Internet governance”. It could 
be argued that the US authority norm’s arguable lack of legitimacy or ethical 
‘oughtness’ renders it more of a rule than a norm, with power underwriting its 
existence rather than genuinely shared expectations or beliefs about its 
appropriateness.  
 
While there is an arguable lack of ethical ‘oughtness’ to US government 
authority, there are still ethical justifications for its existence. From the US 
government's perspective, its role as the inventor of TCP/IP renders its 
assumption of ultimate authority appropriate (Goldsmith & Wu 2006, p. 41; 
Sonbuchner 2008, p. 190). This appropriateness is further justified, from the US 
government's perspective, by the belief that its status as a democracy and great 
power qualify and entitle it to assume benign authority over internet governance, 
where it can further advance its preferences for privatized governance and 
freedom of expression (DelBianco & Cox 2008, p. 39, 40; NTIA 1998a). 
Regardless of the ethical basis of the US authority norm, the dissertation argues 
that it can still be identified as a norm, as it does in fact regulate which actor has 
ultimate authority over the internet. This is acknowledged, albeit grudgingly, by 
those who use the internet and engage with internet governance. Norms, as noted 
in the methodology chapter, “can have functional and non-ethical origins and 
purposes”. (Klotz 1999, p. 14). Beyond the US authority norm’s identification as 
a norm itself, its identification as one of the most significant internet governance 
norms is due to the fact that it regulates the exercise of authority over the 
technical internet at the highest level. Indeed, because it defines who has ultimate 
authority over the IPS and DNS, it is arguably the most significant internet 
governance norm.  
 
i. The Lifecycle & Theoretical Drivers of the US Authority 
Norm 
 
US government authority has arguably structured internet governance since the 
internet’s earliest days, but its significance only gradually emerged as the 
technology grew in importance both within the US and globally. As noted, 
TCP/IP research was funded by the US government, and responsibility for early 
IPS and DNS governance was assigned by the US government to both its own 
computer scientists and those from academia. Through these actions, US 
government representatives acted as norm entrepreneurs, establishing a 
behavioural standard of US government authority over the technical internet. At 
that early stage, this assertion of authority was relatively uncontroversial because 
it advanced US academics interest in participating in internet standards 
development and internet governance, and because the TCP/IP network was 
mostly a research tool used primarily by US actors. The issue of US government 
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authority only became a major controversy when internet use expanded, 
spreading globally and beyond the research community.  
 
These developments led the US government to assign some DNS governance 
responsibility to the private sector, which contravened the interests of the 
technical internet community, and raised awareness of US government authority 
over the technical internet amongst the international community. Ultimately, it 
triggered the IAHC attempt to relocate the internet’s global root, a challenge to 
the emerging US authority norm that led the US government to overtly assert its 
authority over the IPS and DNS and oversee the creation of ICANN. The US 
government had clear material interests motivating this assertion of its authority – 
the desire to safeguard or enhance US power, and to undermine ITU authority 
over global telecommunications. Similarly, ideational interests drove the US to 
protect its authority in the belief this would help advance freedom of expression 
online, and advance the legitimation of privatized global governance processes 
(Rogers 2007, p. 6; Weinberg 2011, p. 198).  
 
It can reasonably be argued that the US authority norm reached its global tipping 
point – the moment in transition from its emergence stage to its cascade stage – 
when the US government used its material power to enforce its authority. It 
coerced the return of the global root from Jon Postel’s servers to Network 
Solutions’ while pressuring the technical internet community and the 
international community into acceptance of ICANN as the penultimate authority 
over the IPS and DNS. In theoretical terms, the US acted as a critical state that 
triggered a coercive norm cascade. It had the material power necessary to do so, 
due to its physical control over the internet’s architecture, and due to the 
importance of the US network to other states. Conversely, others had a material 
interest in acquiescing to US government authority – it allowed them access to 
the internet and the various benefits it brings. They also lacked the material power 
to establish a competing network, as the value of the internet at that time was 
centered heavily on access to US-based services and information. In addition, the 
US government’s strategy in establishing ICANN – limiting its own use of 
authority, and empowering non-state actors – mitigated the challenge US 
government authority represented to others’ interests ( see for example: ITU 
2005a, p. 3; Von Arx & Hagen 2002, p. 14, 15).  
 
Based on this argument of the US as a critical state, the dissertation asserts that 
1998 constitutes the tipping point for the US authority norm, as the forced return 
of the root and ICANN's establishment occurred in this year. It could be also 
argued, however, that the tipping point of the US authority norm was not reached 
until 2002. From 1999 to 2002, ICANN’s GAC membership doubled, with 
membership increasing from roughly 30 to 60. Thus in 2002 the GAC achieved a 
state government membership level of approximately 60 – roughly one-third of 
all states in existence (WSIS 2005a, pp. 2-6). Nevertheless, the dissertation 
argues that 1998 reflects the more appropriate marker than 2002, because this 
marks the time US government authority was first challenged and overtly 
asserted, meaning states were forced to acknowledge its existence at this time. 
The rough doubling of GAC membership between the years 1999-2002, and 
2002-2004, constitutes the actual norm cascade phase for the US government 
authority norm (WSIS 2005a, p. 5).  
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On this logic, the US authority norm entered its internalization phase in 2004 
when more than half of all states at least nominally accepted US government 
authority. However, given its controversial nature and subsequent efforts to 
replace it, it seems highly unlikely it will ever truly engender internalization – 
material incentives justify acceptance of this norm rather than genuine belief in 
the appropriateness of US government authority. While US material power over 
the internet has declined over time, unilateral disconnection from the US-
controlled global root is highly unlikely; it would be a serious economic risk and 
could create a perception of isolationism. Widespread defection from US 
government authority through the coordinated creation of an alternate IPS and 
DNS is more likely, but also improbable. The limitations the US government has 
placed on itself, combined with the democratic nature of ICANN’s privatized 
governance model, means that the norm is primarily opposed for ideational 
reasons – due to its inherent inequality. For US allies and more liberal states, their 
interest in a more equitable replacement is balanced by interests in either 
protecting US power or advancing democratic models of global governance. For 
non-US allies and more illiberal states, such competing interests do not exist, but 
the political history of internet governance has illustrated that reaching global 
agreement on replacement of the US authority norm has been difficult. 
 
Nevertheless, while there are reasons for the US authority norm’s continued 
existence, it is undoubtedly the most controversial and contested core internet 
governance norm. Resistance to it drives the behavior of many state actors – both 
governments and intergovernmental organizations – which seek to replace this 
norm with the alternative state authority norm that has traditionally justified who 
has ultimate authority in global governance, and in the broader issue area of 
global telecommunications governance overseen by the ITU (MacLean 2008). 
Resistance to the US authority’s norm also drives the behavior of some state 
actors and many non-state actors who seek to replace it with a new norm that 
grants either a multi-stakeholder coalition of state and non-state actors ultimate 
authority over the technical internet, or grants a multi-stakeholder coalition of 
purely non-state actors such authority (Mueller 2010, p. 246; Mueller & Kuerbis 
2014). Indeed, the US government itself states that its ultimate goal is to replace 
its authority with the privatized governance norm, which will justify non-state 
actors not only having administrative and policy development authority over 
internet governance, but also ultimate authority over the internet's global root 
(NTIA 2014b). The US plans to divest itself of its residual authority in 2015, and 
thus it is likely that the US authority norm will very soon come to the end of its 
lifecycle through its replacement with non-state actor authority. 
 
b. The Privatized Governance Norm 
 
The privatized governance norm is a standard of behavior stipulating that non-
state actors have the right to exercise authority over the technical internet's 
administration and policy development. This norm is particularly well entrenched 
in internet standards governance, where only natural persons may participate in 
the IETF’s processes. Unlike IPS and DNS governance, non-state actors wield 
ultimate authority over internet standards. As noted, state actors and non-state 
organizations can contribute to the development of TCP/IP protocols, but such 
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activity must feed into the IETF for further development. Non-state actor 
authority is more limited in its application to IPS and DNS governance, as 
ultimate authority remains vested in the US government. Nevertheless, both 
private sector and civil society actors have the right to exercise authority over IPS 
and DNS administration and policy. ICANN most prominently reflects the 
privatized governance norm, as non-state actors alone enjoy voting rights on the 
Board, and policy development is largely conducted by its subsidiary bodies, 
which are predominantly populated by non-state actors. State actors are only 
permitted an advisory role in ICANN through the GAC and its appointment of a 
non-voting Board member. The privatized governance norm also influences other 
regime organizations. The RIRs, for example, allow both state and non-state 
actors to participate in policy development and decision-making. Similarly, in the 
IGF, authority over the Forum's agenda is shared amongst state and non-state 
actors. 
 
The privatized governance norm has been identified by the dissertation both 
through its own analysis of internet governance’s history and characteristics, 
which identify its existence as a fact. However, the dissertation is supported in its 
identification of the privatized governance norm by both regime organizations 
themselves and by internet governance scholars. The NTIA’s initial proposal for 
ICANN stated that private-sector action is “preferable to government control” 
(NTIA 1998a). ICANN, as noted, explicitly refers to itself as having a multi-
stakeholder governance model, while also stating that a core value is “remaining 
rooted in the private sector” (ICANN 2011g, art. I, s. 2 (11)). Similarly, APNIC’s 
governing membership is “open to any person, unincorporated association, firm, 
corporation, governmental organization, or non-governmental organization” 
(APNIC 1998, ss. 3(a), 4). Beyond this, the privatized governance that 
characterizes internet governance has been a particular focus for scholars. While 
frequently characterized as multi-stakeholder governance, the fact of privatized 
governance is noted by many scholars, as is normative argument in its favor 
(Kesan & Gallo 2008, p. 403, 404; Kleinwachter 2004, p. 239, 249; Malcolm 
2008, p. 39, 40, 320; Mueller, Mathiason & Klein 2007, p. 239, 250). 
 
Unlike US government authority, non-state actor authority has a reasonably high 
level of legitimacy, with genuine acceptance amongst many internet governance 
participants. The appropriateness of the privatized governance norm stems from 
liberal beliefs in democracy and limited government, and it enjoys a broad level 
of support amongst liberal state governments – particularly those with a solidarist 
view of sovereignty – because it empowers individuals and various societal 
groups to participate in governance (ITU 2005a; Kleinwachter 2004, p. 237, 241, 
248; NTIA 2014b; Weinberg 2011, p. 198). For similar reasons, it enjoys support 
from non-state actors themselves; these actors, however, also have more material 
reasons for accepting this norm as it justifies their own increased power (Mueller 
2010, p. 217, 220). Non-state actor authority is significant because, like the US 
authority norm, it regulates the exercise of authority at the highest level in 
internet standards governance. Similarly it regulates authority at the penultimate 
level in IPS and DNS governance. The privatized governance norm is also 
significant because it represents a direct challenge to the traditional authority of 
states in global governance, asserting that non-state actors have the right to equal, 
or greater, authority over internet governance than state actors. In most issue 
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areas and through most of modern history, the reverse has been true (MacLean 
2008; Rosenau 1995, pp. 18-20; Weiss 2000, p. 809, 810). 
 
i. The Lifecycle & Theoretical Drivers of the Privatized 
Governance Norm 
 
Similarly to US government authority, the privatized governance norm emerged 
from the internet’s US-centric history, arguably structuring internet governance 
from its inception and growing in significance alongside the internet itself. The 
US government never asserted proprietary rights over TCP/IP standards, as this 
would fatally undermine its interests in creating open standards and undermining 
ITU authority. Because of this, US non-state computer scientists have always 
been active in internet standards governance and acted as norm entrepreneurs – 
gradually distancing themselves from US government funding and entrenching 
their own authority. Remaining US government links to internet standards 
governance were severed in the early Nineties, when the IAB transitioned its 
institutional home from DARPA to the ISOC. At the same time, in 1992, the 
IETF formalized the exclusive rights of natural persons to authority over internet 
standards development (IETF 1992). Conversely, non-state actor authority over 
IPS and DNS governance was initially granted by the US government to US 
academics, with it eventually incorporating private sector actors into DNS 
governance – forcing US academics to share authority with Network Solutions. 
At around this time, similar commercialization of the internet was occurring in 
other states as ISPs began to be more involved in IPS administration and as the 
DNS grew in importance (Paré 2003, p. 75). Thus, a combination of US 
government representatives and transnational non-state computer scientists acted 
as norm entrepreneurs that gradually established non-state actor authority within 
IPS and DNS governance.  
 
The privatized governance norm emerged because it was in the material interests 
of the US government, as noted, to empower US non-state actors to establish an 
open, attractive, internetworking system that helped undermine ITU authority. 
Similarly, for such non-state actors it enhanced their own power. The main 
reasons for the norm’s emergence, however, are ideational. As noted above, the 
US has interests in advancing liberal ideals, including the ideal of privatized 
governance. Likewise, these ideals were shared by the liberal, developed states 
that were the early adherents to the US TCP/IP network and by non-state actors in 
these states. As with the US authority norm, however, it was the US 
government’s grant of authority to the private sector and the resultant triggering 
of the IAHC efforts, which led to US material power being exerted to create 
ICANN and entrench the privatized governance norm in IPS and DNS 
governance. 
 
Identifying the privatized governance norm’s tipping point is complicated by its 
earlier, uncontested emergence in internet standards governance. 1992 is arguably 
the tipping point for the norm within internet standards governance as the IETF 
formalized its processes that year. Non-state actor authority in internet standards 
governance then quietly cascaded across transnational and international society 
without any substantial opposition – even the ITU took nearly a decade to begin 
half-hearted attempts at asserting state authority over this governance (Zhao 
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2004). However, despite this earlier tipping point, it is more reasonable to regard 
the privatized governance norm’s general tipping point as occurring in 1998 – 
with the US serving as a critical state by using its material power to coercively 
bring about the norm’s tipping point in IPS and DNS governance through 
ICANN’s establishment. This use of material power forced both civil society and 
private sector actors to accept each other’s authority over this governance, and 
forced state actors to acknowledge the authority of non-state actors. Thus, despite 
the privatized governance norm’s earlier emergence in internet standards 
governance, the dissertation argues that the norm reached its overall global 
tipping point in 1998. As with US government authority, the same theoretical 
factors precluded other states from opposing this action, although the material 
interests of non-state actors and shared ideational interests in privatized 
governance amongst liberal state and non-state actors meant opposition was less 
intense (Mueller 2004, p. 174). 
 
The dissertation therefore argues that the privatized governance norm’s cascade 
stage commenced in 1998 and concluded around 2004, when more than half of 
the states in the world had joined the GAC and publicly acknowledged that state 
actors do not enjoy decision-making authority over internet governance – as 
stated in Principle 2 of the GAC's Operating Principles (GAC 2011). Based on 
this analysis, non-state actor authority is currently in the norm internalization 
stage of its lifecycle. However unlike the US authority norm, there is a reasonable 
chance that it may internalize across the global community to the extent that it 
achieves a 'taken for granted' quality. This is arguably already the case with the 
norm’s application to internet standards governance, where there is little to no 
challenge to the IETF’s authority beyond occasional claims by governments or 
the ITU that the ITU itself would be a more appropriate authority due to its more 
representative character (Kleinwachter 2004). It also appears relatively 
uncontroversial at the regional level, within RIRs’ governance of the IPS and 
regional, DNS governance-oriented administrative organizations. Non-state actor 
authority in many policy organizations also illustrates, perhaps, a growing 
acceptance of the privatized governance norm. For example, while the WSIS 
denied authority to non-state actors, the IGF has granted formally equal authority 
to both state and non-state actors, as did NETMundial. 
 
Non-state actor authority may also potentially evolve into a more significant core 
internet governance norm, as it is a competitor to the US authority norm as the 
normative regulator of who has ultimate authority over the technical internet. 
Attempts to entrench ultimate non-state actor authority over IPS and DNS 
governance began with the IAHC proposal. However, despite the US 
government’s decisive victory over these early efforts to dislodge its ultimate 
authority, the US government itself – reflecting US domestic beliefs and strategic 
efforts to incorporate various stakeholders into ICANN – stated that it aimed to 
eventually transfer this authority to the transnational technical internet 
community, a plan that was reaffirmed in 2014 by the Obama administration, 
with the goal to transfer ultimate IPS and DNS authority to ICANN in 2015 
(NTIA 2005, 2014b). While beyond the scope of the dissertation to examine in 
detail, support for the privatized governance norm's replacement of US 
government authority appears strong amongst most non-state actors, and amongst 
liberal state governments with a more solidarist perspective on sovereignty.  
    59 
 
 
Nevertheless, non-state actor authority remains highly controversial in global 
level IPS and DNS governance due to its challenge of traditional state authority. 
The privatized governance norm remains controversial amongst state 
governments with a pluralist conception of sovereignty including, but not limited 
to, most illiberal states (Mueller 2010, p. 258). These state governments, and 
other non-state actors who disagree with the libertarian beliefs underpinning the 
privatized governance norm, advocate for the state authority norm to replace the 
norm of non-state actor authority as the regulator of authority within ICANN 
(Kesan & Gallo 2008, p. 399). The likelihood of such efforts being successful is, 
however, even lower than efforts for the state authority norm to replace the US 
authority norm. As noted, there is a much broader level of genuine ideational 
support for the privatized governance norm amongst liberal state governments, 
and it is arguably in both the material and ideational interests of non-state actors. 
Thus, there is less opposition to the norm in general. Unilateral disconnection 
from the predominantly privately governed IPS and DNS would incur severe 
economic and prestige consequences for states opposed to this norm. Likewise, 
widespread defection from the norm through the creation of an alternate, 
predominantly state actor-governed IPS and DNS faces greater collective action 
challenges than in response to state rejection of US government authority, as 
material interests in – and ideational support for – the privatized governance norm 
is higher amongst liberal states and non-state actors. 
 
c. The Multi-Stakeholder Governance Norm 
 
The third core internet governance norm the dissertation identifies is the multi-
stakeholder governance norm. This norm, like the concept of multi-stakeholder 
governance itself, relates to the right of different stakeholder classes interested in, 
or affected by, internet governance to participate in that governance (Vallejo & 
Hauselmann 2004, p. 3). The identification of relevant stakeholder classes, and 
the distribution of authority amongst these stakeholders, varies across different 
governance issue areas and organizations (DeNardis & Raymond 2013; Vallejo & 
Hauselmann 2004, p. 6). Of itself, multi-stakeholder governance does not 
stipulate which actors have authority, but it does stipulate that all relevant 
stakeholders should have some participatory rights. Outside of internet standards 
governance, which does not recognize any stakeholder class beyond the natural 
individual, the multi-stakeholder governance norm is particularly well entrenched 
in the internet governance regime. It justifies the grant of voting and non-voting 
Board seats to various stakeholder classes on the ICANN Board, and justifies the 
existence and organization of ICANN’s subsidiary bodies. Within some of these 
subsidiary bodies, such as the GNSO, the norm also justifies participation by 
further, more finely grained, stakeholder classes. In policy organizations, multi-
stakeholder governance justified the right of non-state actors to participate in the 
WSIS and NETMundial, and it continues to justify the rights of state and non-
state actors to participate in the IGF’s processes. 
 
Like the privatized governance norm, the multi-stakeholder governance norm has 
been identified by the dissertation through analysis of internet governance’s 
history and structure, which identify its factual existence. In addition, the norm is 
explicitly recognized by both regime organizations and by internet governance 
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scholars. At first, the NTIA and ICANN did not overtly identify multi-
stakeholder governance as a guiding norm for internet governance, but the 
NTIA’s proposal for ICANN’s establishment included the statement that: 
“Technical management of the Internet should reflect the diversity of its users 
…[and] ensure international input in decision making.” (NTIA 1998a). ICANN 
did not refer to itself as a multi-stakeholder organization until 2002 but, as noted 
above, it now refers to its own governance model as multi-stakeholder (ICANN 
2002a; Weinberg 2011, p. 199, 201). Some administrative organizations are not 
multi-stakeholder, such as the ccNSO or APTLD, which only recognize a single 
stakeholder class. Others, such as APNIC, do recognise multiple stakeholders 
without explicitly noting their multi-stakeholder character. In contrast, policy 
organizations closely related to internet governance, such as the WSIS, IGF and 
NETMundial, have always explicitly noted their multi-stakeholder character. 
Internet scholars also consistently recognize the existence of multi-stakeholder 
governance within the internet governance regime (DeNardis & Raymond 2013; 
Kleinwachter 2004; Malcolm 2008; Raboy, Landry & Shtern 2010). 
 
The multi-stakeholder governance norm has perhaps the strongest degree of 
genuine acceptance amongst internet governance participants, in part because its 
legitimacy is more broadly recognized – multi-stakeholder governance gradually 
infiltrated UN processes in the Nineties, particularly in relation to global 
environmental governance (Codding Jr & Gallegos 1991; Hemmati, Dodds & 
Enayati 2002, ch.1). Multi-stakeholder governance is considered appropriate 
because it is believed to render policy development more sensitive to 
stakeholders’ interests, thus improving policy legitimacy and effectiveness 
(Hemmati, Dodds & Enayati 2002, pp. 20-5). In internet governance, because the 
multi-stakeholder governance norm is silent on which actors should wield 
authority, it is relatively uncontroversial and not generally challenged – even by 
illiberal states. The norm is highly significant within internet governance because 
it legitimizes the rights of various actors to participate in governance, including 
the rights of both state actors within ICANN and non-state actors of varying 
stakeholder class across a range of organizations. The privatized governance 
norm may justify non-state actor authority over the technical internet, but multi-
stakeholder governance justifies the rights of both private sector and civil society 
actors to wield this authority. The multi-stakeholder governance norm is also 
significant because it affects the structure of ICANN's subsidiary and affiliated 
organizations, many policy organizations and domestic internet governance 
regimes. 
 
i. The Lifecycle & Theoretical Drivers of the Multi-
Stakeholder Governance Norm 
 
Prior to ICANN’s establishment, IPS and DNS governance was not a consciously 
multi-stakeholder process, despite being conducted by US government agencies 
alongside US civil society actors, with gradual inclusion of US and non-US civil 
society and private sector actors. For example, RIRs such as APNIC have always 
subconsciously facilitated involvement by multiple stakeholder classes (APNIC 
2012b). It wasn’t until the ITU-organized WSIS posed a challenge to ICANN’s 
authority that IPS and DNS governance began to be consciously identified as a 
multi-stakeholder process (Weinberg 2011, p. 199, 201). Nevertheless, internet 
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governance has been multi-stakeholder in character from its earliest days. The 
early players in internet governance – the US government, US academics, and 
later Network Solutions – can arguably be considered norm entrepreneurs 
implicitly establishing the multi-stakeholder governance norm. This is 
particularly so with the US government, which was responsible for granting a role 
in DNS governance to the private sector in the mid-Nineties.  
 
Materially, multi-stakeholder governance was and is clearly in the interests of 
non-state actors, as it justifies their place at the governance table regardless of 
whether they get to wield authority. While undefined at the time, the multi-
stakeholder governance norm was also clearly in the material interest of the US 
government when it established ICANN; the inclusion of multiple stakeholders 
was a way to include governments in internet governance without ceding 
authority to them, and a means of resolving the simmering tension between civil 
society and private sector actors which was partially responsible for the IAHC 
affair. The emergence of multi-stakeholder governance was also clearly due to 
domestic US libertarian and democratic beliefs, which drove the US government 
to allow civil society participation in IPS and DNS governance, and later to 
incorporate the private sector into DNS governance. 
 
Because multi-stakeholder governance was implicitly part of internet governance 
prior to its explicit articulation as a norm, it seems reasonable to conclude that the 
multi-stakeholder governance norm reached its tipping point when the US 
government exerted its material power to structure internet governance via the 
ICANN model. By doing so, the US acted as a critical state that coerced state and 
non-state actors into accepting the rights of various stakeholders to participate in 
internet governance. Alternatively, multi-stakeholder governance could be said to 
have reached its tipping point later in either 2002, when ICANN incorporated the 
term multi-stakeholder into its bylaws, or in 2003, when the first WSIS Summit 
concluded with unanimous agreement amongst state actors that internet 
governance should be multi-stakeholder in character. It is more logical, however, 
to accept the 1998 date, as the multi-stakeholder governance norm was clearly 
emerging prior to ICANN’s establishment, and the US government’s actions 
decisively entrenched the rights of various stakeholder classes to participation in 
IPS and DNS governance. 
 
On this view, the norm cascade period commenced in 1998 and the actions of 
state actors in 2001 and 2003 constituted elements of that phase in the multi-
stakeholder governance norm's lifecycle. Given the WSIS dealt with matters 
beyond internet governance itself, 2003 is argued to be the most appropriate date 
for the conclusion of the norm cascade period, because the WSIS agreement 
reached in this first Summit was the first time at which a majority of state 
governments explicitly acknowledged multi-stakeholder governance in the 
context of internet governance. The rapid acceptance of the multi-stakeholder 
governance norm by internet governance participants is due to it serving the 
material interests of state actors, as it justified their right to have some 
participatory rights within ICANN, and thus some influence over IPS and DNS 
policy. Similarly, it granted non-state actors the right to participation in internet 
governance activity. Acceptance is also due to the broad ideational support that 
multi-stakeholder governance generally has in the international community, as 
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discussed above. Multi-stakeholder governance has thus been in its internalization 
phase since 2003, and is likely to develop a genuine ‘taken-for-granted’ character, 
if it hasn’t already, due to the broad ideational support it receives (WGIG 2005f, 
art. IV, s. 29). 
 
d. The State Authority Norm 
 
The state authority norm is an emerging norm, rather than an established one; it 
relates to the right of state actors to enjoy equal authority over internet 
governance, either exclusively amongst themselves or in terms of states wielding 
equal or greater rights relative to non-state actors. Exclusive state authority is 
most frequently proposed as a replacement for the US authority norm, granting 
states collectively equal rights to ultimate authority over the internet’s global root. 
It is also advocated as an alternative to the privatized governance norm in IPS and 
DNS governance, replacing non-state actor authority with exclusive state 
authority. Some advocates of the state authority norm propose only that it weaken 
non-state actor authority, rather than replace it entirely, arguing that state actors 
should have equal or greater rights than non-state actors in IPS and DNS 
governance. As an emerging norm, the state authority norm does not currently 
operate in any of the internet governance regime’s administrative organizations – 
save at the national level. Some policy organizations, however, are regulated by 
this norm. Clearly the UN and ITU, as intergovernmental organizations, privilege 
state actors. Those more closely related to internet governance may be less 
discriminatory, however. The WSIS, for example, only allowed state actors to 
determine WSIS outcomes, but the IGF grants agenda-setting authority to both 
state and non-state actors. 
 
The state authority norm has been identified in part from analysis of internet 
governance’s history and structure; the post-ICANN era particularly indicates 
sustained efforts at advocacy of this norm. Advocacy for state authority is also 
well documented in policy organizations and in scholarly analysis of internet 
governance. The WSIS outcomes included statements that: “Policy authority for 
Internet-related public policy issues is the sovereign right of States (WSIS 2005b 
s. 35 (a)).” Similarly, the WGIG proposed a range of alternative structures for the 
internet governance regime which granted greater state authority, and argued that: 
“No single Government should have a pre-eminent role in relation to international 
Internet governance (WGIG 2005f, art. V, s (2), pp. 13-15).” Subsequent 
advocacy for greater state authority has occurred within the UN, the IGF and 
other fora. State authority norm advocacy by some governments has also been 
noted by many scholars analyzing internet governance politics (Kesan & Gallo 
2008, p. 399; Mueller 2010, p. 258; Rogers 2007, p. 9; Weinberg 2011, p. 200; 
Werbach 2008, p. 365). The norm is similarly identified from the dissertation’s 
analysis of China; as subsequent chapters illustrate, the Chinese government is a 
strong advocate for greater state authority. 
 
The state authority norm's appropriateness stems from traditional beliefs about 
state sovereignty and the rights of states in global governance. In their strongest 
conception, these beliefs justify the political view that only state governments, 
and their duly authorized agents, have the right to participate in global 
governance, while in weaker conceptions they justify views that states should 
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have greater or at least equal authority over global governance relative to non-
state actors (WGIG 2005f, pp. 13-6). There appears to be a reasonably high 
degree of support amongst state actors for greater state authority over internet 
governance, both amongst illiberal governments and amongst more liberal states 
with a more pluralist view of sovereignty (Kummer 2007, pp. 6, 10; Mueller 
2010, p. 258). The norm is significant because advocacy for it drives much of the 
politics relating to the internet governance regime’s evolution – including the 
behavior of the Chinese government. This makes it particularly important to the 
dissertation’s subject matter. 
 
i. The Lifecycle & Theoretical Drivers of The State Authority 
Norm 
 
The state authority norm is currently in its norm emergence phase, and does not 
yet have any substantive effect on internet governance – as defined by this 
dissertation – above the national level. Its emergence is due primarily to the 
material interests of states and intergovernmental organizations; the norm justifies 
the rights of state actors to greater authority over internet governance. The norm 
is also arguably in the material interests of some non-state actors from developing 
countries, given that currently the internet governance regime grants greater 
influence to the US government and Western, predominantly US-based, non-state 
actors who participate in higher numbers than their developing world counterparts 
(Collins 2007, p. 16; Tripathi, Singh & Dube 2009, p. 381). The norm's 
emergence is also driven by traditional beliefs about the role of the state as the 
sole legitimate representative of its population’s collective will, and by beliefs 
that only state governments or their agents have a legitimate right to participate in 
politics above the national level (Hu 2005, p. 189; Kummer 2007, p. 10, 11). As 
an alternative to the US authority norm, and given the various factors highlighted 
above that lead states to acquiesce to US government authority, it seems unlikely 
that the state authority norm will reach its tipping point. For similar reasons, it is 
unlikely that this norm will reach its tipping point as a replacement for the 
privatized governance norm.  
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6. Domestic Chinese Internet Governance 
 
This chapter is the first of three which present the dissertation’s research into 
Chinese engagement with internet governance and its core norms. Each of these 
empirically-oriented chapters analyse different aspects of Chinese participation in 
internet governance with a focus on how this reflects on Chinese engagement 
with core internet governance norms. This chapter examines China’s domestic 
internet governance regime and policy, the next chapter examines Chinese 
engagement with administrative organizations, and the third empirically-oriented 
chapter examines Chinese engagement with policy organizations. Each of these 
three chapters briefly illustrates the significance of its analysis to China’s 
relationship with core internet governance norms, but direct analysis of China’s 
overall roles towards each of these norms, and the theoretical factors that shape 
these roles, is presented in the subsequent four chapters. This chapter considers 
the history and structure of China's domestic technical internet governance 
regime. It first examines the history of China’s early engagement with the 
technical internet, followed by analysis of the role of China’s government in its 
domestic regime, and concluding with analysis of the structure of the 
administrative and policy organizations within China’s domestic regime. 
 
a. China's Early Engagement with the technical Internet 
 
China’s first engagement with the internet began in the late Eighties, and this 
gradually deepened as the internet grew past its research-oriented youth. China's 
relationship with the internet dates specifically to 1987, when China's first 
computer network was established (Cullen & Choy 1999, p. 103; Mueller & Tan 
1997, p. 82). This network allowed the first transnational email to be sent from 
China to Germany, but the network was not based on TCP/IP protocols and could 
only interconnect with US networks through European gateways (Tso 2008, p. 
118; Zheng 1994, p. 236). Early Chinese networks used a range of different 
technical standards, with the earliest TCP/IP-based network established in 1992, 
at Tsinghua University (CNNIC 2004 at 13). Direct, and permanent, 
interconnection between Chinese networks and the internet – the US TCP/IP-
based network – did not occur until April 20, 1994 (State Council 2010, Pt. I). 
This direct internet link arose from discussions between Chinese and Western 
computer scientists, followed by negotiations between Chinese and US 
government officials that culminated in a formal intergovernmental agreement at 
the 1994 Sino-US Joint Commission on Scientific and Technological Cooperation 
(Harwit & Clark 2001, p. 382; Tso 2008, p. 119, 120). Thus, by necessity, the 
Chinese government and Chinese civil society computer scientists were required 
to acknowledge US government authority over the technical internet.  
 
Following this Sino-US agreement, China began receiving IP address allocations 
from APNIC (CNNIC 2004 at 23). The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), 
which played a key role in facilitating China’s internet access and was the 
administrator of Beijing city's largest research network, undertook IP address 
allocation in China through its subsidiary network information center (Tso 2008, 
p. 120; Zheng 1994, p. 239). The CAS' role in IP address allocation was 
subsequently formalized by the Chinese government in 1997 when it authorized 
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the CAS to establish the China Internet Network Information Centre (CNNIC 
2003c, at 61, 63). China’s early IPS governance thus followed the basic structure 
of the US system; while government was involved to some extent, particularly 
with respect to funding and the designation of authority, non-state actors from 
civil society universities and research institutes took a leading role in the 
administration. 
 
Although China formally interconnected with the TCP/IP-based internet in 1994, 
China's ccTLD – the .cn domain – was established and incorporated into the 
internet's global root much earlier, in 1990 (CNNIC 2004, at 10; Mueller & Tan 
1997, p. 83). Establishment of this domain was facilitated by collaboration 
between Chinese, German and US computer scientists who secured temporary 
permission from US authorities to create China's experimental TCP/IP-based e-
mail services (Tso 2008, p. 118). Much like the later interconnection between 
China and the US-based IPS, establishing the .cn domain initially occurred with 
recognition of US authority over it. The computer server storing the .cn domain's 
registry information was located in Germany from 1990 until formal Chinese 
interconnection with the internet in 1994, at which time it was transferred to 
servers physically located in China (Tso 2008, p. 118; Xue 2004b, p. 561). The 
.cn domain was jointly administered by computer scientists in both Germany and 
China until 1994, at which time the CAS became its sole operators (CNNIC 2004 
at 10; Xue 2004b, p. 561). When the Chinese government later formalized the 
CAS' role in IP address allocation in 1997, it also formally authorized the CNNIC 
to manage the .cn domain (CNNIC 2003c, at 61, 63). Thus, similarly with the IPS 
in China, the early operation of China's DNS has been characterised by civil 
society actors assuming the lion's share of governance responsibility.  
 
b. The Chinese Government's Role in Domestic Governance 
 
As discussed below, and reflecting the global regime’s structure, daily 
administration of – and policy development for – China's technical internet is 
primarily conducted by a nominally non-state actor-led, multi-stakeholder 
governance regime. However, the Chinese government is, and always has been, a 
supervisor of this activity – the bureaucracy has formal oversight of the domestic 
regime, and Chinese law shapes some elements of internet governance policy. 
Beijing contributed funding to the early development of Chinese computer 
networks and, as noted, it was necessary for the Chinese and US governments to 
formally agree on Chinese interconnection with the internet (Tso 2008, pp. 116-
21; Zheng 1994, pp. 236-9). After this, the Chinese government continued to fund 
the development of China’s internet-related telecommunications infrastructure 
and encouraged the private sector to take commercial advantage of the internet 
through initiatives such as the ‘three Golden’ projects (Hughes & Wacker 2003, 
pp. 13-5; Tso 2008, p. 120, 121).  
 
In 1996, the Chinese government began to formally regulate internet governance. 
The State Council, the PRC’s peak government body (as opposed to the CCP’s) 
began a re-organization of Chinese technical internet-related policy development 
(Saich 2004, p. 115, 153; Tan 1999, pp. 266-8). It established the Leading Group 
on Informatization to coordinate the various ministries, departments and state-
owned enterprises that were currently involved in this area (Tso 2008, p. 123; 
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Xue 2004b, p. 561). The Leading Group developed a centralized, coherent 
regulatory environment for China’s internet, headed by a new super-ministry – 
now the Ministry for Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) – created in 
1998 (Fu & Mou 2010, p. 650, 656; Harwit & Clark 2001, p. 387). As part of this 
process, the Leading Group formally authorized the CNNIC’s role in domestic 
IPS and DNS governance. However, while the CNNIC was able to develop its 
own policy on the IPS and China’s .cn domain, the Leading Group also 
established a series of interim regulations providing guidelines for this policy 
(Shao 2012 ch. 2; Xue 2004b, p. 561, 562). Authority over these interim 
regulations later passed to the (now) MIIT and they were revised into permanent 
legislation.  
 
The formal authorization of the CNNIC was the first act to unequivocally assert 
the Chinese government’s authority over the technical internet in China, which 
eventually extended to requiring records of IP address allocation and domain 
name registrations to be provided to Beijing (Xue 2004b, p. 561, 562). Such laws 
specifically note APNIC's role in IP address allocation and indirectly note 
ICANN/IANA's role, with each containing a provision stating that the law applies 
to “organizations that obtain the IP addresses directly from the Asia Pacific 
Network Information Center and other international institutions with the 
administrative right of IP addresses” (Ministry of Information Industry 2005a art. 
2; 2005b, art. 4). Reflecting this, the CNNIC’s own IP address allocation policy 
notes that its activities are conducted in conformity with APNIC’s policies 
(CNNIC 2003a). The combination of initial direct acknowledgement of the US 
government’s authority over the IPS, along with subsequent regulation of the 
domestic Chinese IPS, indicates the limit Beijing places on recognizing US 
authority. Similarly, the explicit legal recognition of APNIC and ICANN’s 
authority combined with regulation of the CNNIC represents both a demarcation 
of the extent to which Beijing accepts non-state actors exercising authority over 
internet governance, and a substantial degree of acceptance or conformity with 
the privatized governance norm. 
 
Like the IPS, domain names in China have been formally regulated since 
promulgation of the Leading Group's interim regulations, and Chinese language 
domain names (Chinese IDNs) – such as .ѝഭ (.zhongguo [.China]) – have been 
regulated since at least 2000 (CNNIC 2004). Regulations specify that DNS 
registries and registrars, including those engaged in gTLD business, must be 
approved by the Chinese government, yet also note that they must comply with 
policy in the “international Internet domain name system” (CNNIC 2012c arts 3, 
4, 7, 9; Ministry of Information Industry 2004, arts. 4, 12). Beijing’s authority 
over DNS governance is also evident in government directives, such as one 
issued in 2006 requiring the CNNIC to conduct a six-month review of domain 
registrations to remove any that could damage China’s global image (Ministry of 
Information Industry 2006). However, Chinese law also provides the CNNIC 
authority to administer and developing DNS policy and oversee domain name 
dispute resolution (Ministry of Information Industry 2004, art. 36-39). 
Nevertheless, the law renders such dispute resolution subordinate to either 
decisions of a people's court or of an arbitration institution (Ministry of 
Information Industry 2004, art. 38). Thus, like the IPS in China, there seems to be 
a tension between Beijing’s assertion of ultimate authority over China’s DNS, 
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along with overlapping conformity with the privatized governance norm through 
empowerment of the CNNIC and recognition of ICANN’s authority. 
 
The Chinese government's 1997 assertion of authority over China's internet 
included authority over the .cn domain and it has repeated this claim multiple 
times (State Council 2010, Pt. VI; IGF 2006a; Park 2009; Yu 2003, p. 6). This 
challenges the US government’s and non-state actors’ authority, as the US 
government and ICANN claim authority over both ccTLD and gTLD allocation 
(IANA 2007; Sonbuchner 2008). The fact that the .cn domain, and other ccTLDs, 
remain within the US-controlled, ICANN-operated global root indicates 
ICANN’s and the US government’s unwillingness to aggressively assert their 
authority, as this could force a determined challenge to it (DelBianco & Cox 
2008, p. 41; Park 2009, p. 193). Conversely, the failure of ccTLD operators to 
decisively sever the link between their nameservers and ICANN's global root 
servers likely results from both technical difficulties in doing so and the political 
damage that this could cause (Von Arx & Hagen 2002, pp. 10-2, 35-8; Yu 2003, 
p. 7). It would be technically difficult to stop the IANA from directing domain 
name resolution to Chinese .cn domain nameservers, and doing so would sever 
the .cn domain from the internet – which would be politically isolating and could 
be economically damaging. As a result, China’s claims of sovereign ccTLD 
authority represent a primarily symbolic action, both rejecting US government 
and non-state authority while accepting their role in global administration of 
ccTLDs. 
 
Chinese government preferences towards internet governance are also reflected in 
general government policy statements on the internet, in particular in the White 
Paper on the Internet that Beijing released in 2010, which provides an overview 
of the Chinese government's view of various aspects of the internet's general 
importance and the means by which it should be governed (State Council 2010). 
Most of the policy statements relevant to core internet governance norms are 
contained within 'Chapter IV: Basic Principles and Practices of Internet 
Administration' and 'Chapter VI: Active International Exchanges and 
Cooperation' – although brief comments on the internet standards governance are 
made in 'Chapter I: Endeavors to Spur the Development and Application of the 
Internet'. 
 
Chapter VI provides an indication of Chinese resistance to the US authority norm, 
clearly outlining the Chinese government's view of the division of authority, 
noting that: “Though connected, the Internet of various countries belongs to 
different sovereignties” (State Council 2010 ch. VI). Chapter VI also clearly 
outlines the Chinese government's view on how the internet governance regime 
should be structured, namely that: 
 
“China holds that the role of the UN should be given full scope in 
international Internet administration. China supports the establishment of 
an authoritative and just international Internet administration organization 
under the UN system through democratic procedures on a worldwide scale 
… China maintains that all countries have equal rights in participating in 
the administration of the fundamental international resources of the 
Internet, and a multilateral and transparent allocation system should be 
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established on the basis of the current management mode (State Council 
2010 ch. VI).” 
 
The first sentence of Chapter VI, stating that the internets of various countries are 
their respective property, is a clear rejection of US government authority – 
particularly given the surrounding context. The more detailed statement on 
reform of the current regime, arguing it should be inter-governmentally 
conducted on the basis of equal state sovereign rights, makes this very clear. This 
detailed statement also clearly indicates that China's preferred alternative to the 
US authority norm is the state authority norm. 
 
Chapter VI is also a clear rejection of the privatized governance norm in favor of 
the state authority norm, and terms such as 'democratic procedures on a 
worldwide scale' and 'multilateral' are intended to convey that internet governance 
should be conducted predominantly by governments – a subtle use of language, 
the meaning of which is made clearer when compared with similar Chinese 
government statements in global level policy organizations (in chapter 8). The 
white paper also provides insight into Beijing’s view of non-state actor authority 
in Chapter IV, which asserts that: “The Chinese government plays the leading 
role in Internet administration ... The state telecommunications administration 
department is responsible for the administration of the Internet industry, including 
the administration of basic resources of the Internet such as domain names, IP 
addresses within China” (State Council 2010, ch. IV). Interestingly, no specific 
mention is made of the CNNIC, despite its authorization from the MIIT to 
manage the Chinese IPS and elements of the DNS. 
 
Chapter IV does note, however, that China “actively explores channels and 
methods of scientific and effective Internet administration by law, and has formed 
a preliminary Internet administration model that is suitable for China's conditions 
and consistent with international practices” (State Council 2010, ch. IV). Thus, 
while the government clearly asserts its ultimate authority, it also appears keen to 
conform to the international practice of giving direct administrative and policy 
authority to non-state actors. Nevertheless, Chapter IV does not directly 
acknowledge the privatized governance norm, although it does state that: “The 
state proactively promotes industry self-regulation and public supervision. The 
Internet Society of China (ISC) ... is a national organization of the Internet 
industry with a remit for serving the development of that industry, netizens and 
the decisions of the government” (State Council 2010, ch. IV). The final element 
of the white paper relevant to the privatized governance norm is Chapter I, which 
indirectly acknowledges non-state actor authority by making brief mention of the 
IETF's role in internet governance in discussion of Chinese contributions to 
internet standards development (State Council 2010, ch. I). 
 
No part of the White Paper on the Internet directly uses the term 'multi-
stakeholder', giving an indication that the multi-stakeholder governance norm is 
relatively uncontroversial for the Chinese government. In this respect, Chapter VI 
notes that a reformed internet governance regime should be based on the 'current 
management system' and states that: 
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“The governments of all countries should support the Internet industry in 
holding international exchange activities, encourage its efforts to expand 
consensus through exchanges, and resolve problems facing the Internet 
industry with joint efforts. The development of the Internet industry 
brings with it a series of new scientific and moral problems. Experts and 
scholars of various countries should be encouraged to conduct academic 
exchanges and share their research findings (State Council 2010, ch. VI).” 
 
Thus, there is perhaps some level of acceptance of multi-stakeholder governance 
within Chapter VI, if only with respect to non-state actors having a role in 
enhancing consensus between countries on internet governance issues, and in 
providing information to state actors. Chapter IV's statement that China's 
domestic regime is 'consistent with international practices' and its recognition of 
the ISC also indicates some level of acceptance of the multi-stakeholder 
governance norm. 
 
c. Chinese Administrative Organizations 
 
i. Internet Standards 
 
As discussed, internet standards governance doesn’t require coordinated daily 
administration (beyond allocation of IP addresses and similar resources), and 
internet standards development is solely conducted at the global level by the 
IETF. That said, the CNNIC has somewhat sidestepped the IETF via its role in 
the coordination of internet standards development elated to Chinese IDNS such 
as .ѝഭ (.zhongguo [China]). In fact, as discussed in more detail below, 
standards related to these Chinese IDNS were implemented in China's internet 
unilaterally – that is, without waiting for either IETF approval of the standards, or 
for ICANN's development of a regulatory environment for incorporating IDNs 
into the global root (Xue 2004b, p. 563). In a sense, therefore, the CNNIC has 
acted in a governance capacity for internet standards, but this has only occurred in 
relation to development of standards for Chinese IDNs and the CNNIC has been 
quick to apply to the IETF to have such standards recognized officially (Tso 
2008, pp. 125-8). The CNNIC's activities in developing Chinese IDN-related 
standards is better seen as simply a part of the preliminary process of internet 
standards development that occurs prior to formal submission of such standards 
to the IETF. While its actions in relation to Chinese IDN standards development 
somewhat contravene the authority of the IETF, it doesn't contravene the 
operation of the privatized governance norm in internet standards governance, 
given that the CNNIC itself is nominally a civil society actor itself.  
 
Aside from the CNNIC, there are a range of domestic Chinese organizations 
engaged in internet standards development, and which feed their activity into the 
IETF. Chinese private sector actors, such as corporations involved in 
telecommunications or technical internet-related business, and Chinese civil 
society actors, such as technical internet governance organizations and 
universities, research institutes or think tanks, do participate in the development 
of internet standards (Arkko 2013; Tso 2008, p. 126). Nevertheless, because of 
the strictly global-level organizational structure of internet standards 
development, and the resulting transnational relationships that such activity 
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entails, the dissertation discusses Chinese involvement in this activity in more 
detail in the subsequent chapter. In one sense, however, the fact that the Chinese 
government does not intervene in or formally regulate the internet standards 
development process within China does suggest a degree of conformity or even 
acceptance of the privatized governance norm – at least in the relatively apolitical 
context of its application to internet standards. 
 
ii. The IPS and DNS 
 
As foreshadowed, and with the exception of the Chinese government's 
supervisory role, the CNNIC is the highest IPS authority within China. Below 
this, the private sector also clearly has a substantial role in operating the lower 
levels of China's IPS and DNS, as it is the business of ISPs to provide internet 
access to customers by supplying IP addresses to them, and the business of 
registries and registrars to provide domain name registration for internet users 
(CNNIC 2012a, 2012e; Ministry of Commerce 2007). The CNNIC does not have 
a set of publicly available bylaws that governs its operation. Nevertheless, some 
information about its internal workings is available. The CNNIC Steering 
Committee is the highest authority within the organization and is supported by an 
Expert Committee, both of which are constituted by a range of civil society, 
government and private sector actors (CNNIC 2013a; Xue 2004b, p. 562). It is 
debateable how independent the CNNIC is from the Chinese government, 
particularly given the fact that the CNNIC includes a CCP Party cell that actively 
recruits members from within the CNNIC and contributes to the organization's 
work (CNNIC 2012b, p. 41). Nevertheless, even if it is concluded that the 
CNNIC is not very independent from the Chinese government, it remains the case 
that the organization operates according to a multi-stakeholder governance model 
and generally empowers non-state actors to wield substantial authority over 
China's domestic internet.  
 
The CNNIC is responsible for administering IP address and AS number 
allocation within China, and for setting policy related to this activity (CNNIC 
2012e). Ultimately, the CNNIC's authority over the IPS in China is derived from 
both the Chinese government and from APNIC. The Chinese government 
authorizes the CNNIC to govern China’s IPS, but the CNNIC sources the 
necessary resources from APNIC, and thus ultimately from the IANA (CNNIC 
2012e). Thus, despite the Chinese government intervening at the national level, 
there is no competing, uniquely Chinese IPS – if there were, China would be 
severed from the internet. Given that the IANA's own authority ultimately derives 
from the US government, China’s acceptance of the IANA’s authority carries 
with it a tacit conformity to the privatized governance norm, as well as to the US 
authority norm.  
  
The CNNIC is also the highest authority for elements of DNS governance in 
China, including for the .cn domain and for Chinese IDNs, with authority derived 
from the Chinese government and ICANN. The CNNIC largely operates the 
Chinese DNS within the global root and in accordance with ICANN policy, but as 
noted it also recognizes Beijing’s authority over the .cn domain. The CNNIC has 
operated its own domestic domains outside of the global root. Chinese IDNs – 
such as .ѝഭ (.zhongguo [China]), .㖁㔌 (.wangluo [network]) and .ޜਨ 
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(.gongsi [company]) – have existed since the end of the Nineties (Xue 2004b, pp. 
563-6). The .ѝഭ domain was only incorporated into the ICANN-operated global 
internet root in 2010, while other Chinese IDNs remain outside of the global root 
pending a long and ongoing technical and policy development process (CNNIC 
2012d; ICANN 2014cf).  
 
That the CNNIC has been willing to develop and deploy its own Chinese IDNs 
absent ICANN's approval does indicate a degree of rejection of ICANN's, and 
ultimately, the US government's authority over the DNS, as they did not wait for 
ICANN’s approval. CNNIC officials have, however, claimed that Chinese IDNs 
do not represent a challenge to the globally-centralized DNS, and were designed 
to be compatible with ICANN’s eventual multi-lingualization policy (MacKinnon 
2006; Tso 2008, pp. 126-8; Xue 2004b). This has since turned out to be the case 
(Dam 2010; CircleID 2012). Moreover, as discussed in the next chapter, China 
has been an active participant in the development of internet standards and 
general policy related to ICANN's eventual incorporation of IDNs into the global 
root. Thus, while the CNNIC's establishment of Chinese IDNs does demonstrate a 
degree of independent initiative to develop new domains, it also illustrates a clear 
baseline level of conformity to ICANN's, and the US government's, claims to be 
the ultimate authorities over the DNS.  
 
In 2008, China established two further Chinese IDNs, the .᭯ᓌ (.zhengfu 
[government]) and .ޜ⳺ (.gongyi [public interest]) domains. Unlike other 
Chinese IDNs, these are not operated by the CNNIC, but by a non-profit 
organization called the China Organizational Name Administration Center 
(CONAC) (CONAC 2014a, 2014b). Like the CNNIC, CONAC has no publicly 
available bylaws, but it also doesn’t provide much information about its internal 
workings. The two domains operated by CONAC are scheduled to be 
incorporated into the internet's global root once ICANN's IDN TLD technical and 
policy development processes are finalized, following the signing of a registry 
contract with ICANN at the end of 2013 (CONAC 2013). That these new 
domains are operated by a civil society organization provides further evidence of 
China’s conformity to the privatized governance norm, as does CONAC’s 
willingness to recognize ICANN’s global authority. The extent to which CONAC 
reflects Chinese acceptance of non-state actor authority should not be overstated, 
however, the organization is closely affiliated with the Chinese government – 
being authorized by the MIIT. Also, while there is no direct evidence of a CCP 
cell within CONAC, it is highly likely one exists as it is the CCP’s policy to 
establish a party cell in any Chinese organization with more than three members 
(Saich 2000, p. 133). The CCP may not be as vigilant in implementing this policy 
as in past years, but given the close association CONAC has with the Chinese 
government, it is reasonable to assume it has significant influence over the 
organization. 
 
d. Chinese Policy Organizations 
 
The most important policy organization in China’s domestic regime is the 
Internet Society of China (ISC), which is distinct from the ISOC and is not a 
national ISOC chapter; in fact, there are no China-based chapters of the ISOC. 
The ISC likely represents an attempt by the Chinese government to keep the 
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Chinese technical internet community somewhat separate from the broader 
transnational community. It is formally a non-profit, non-government 
organization designed to operate, similarly to the ISOC, as a forum for interaction 
amongst the Chinese technical internet community, but is also clearly associated 
with the Chinese government – serving as a vehicle for the popularization of 
government policy and subject to supervision by the Chinese government (ISC 
2011a, 2011b). Rebecca MacKinnon, a well-known Chinese internet expert, has 
stated that the ISC is effectively a “quasi-governmental” organization 
(MacKinnon 2012, p. 35) Unlike the CNNIC, the ISC's structure is formally 
designated. The ISC's by-laws clearly note that members of civil society and the 
private sector, along with individual technical internet experts, may become 
members of the ISC (ISC 2011b, art. III). These members are entitled to vote for 
representatives in the ISC Congress, which then itself elects a Board and Standing 
Committee for the organization (ISC 2013). There is no direct evidence of a CCP 
cell within the ISC, but it is likely that one exists similarly to that within the 
CNNIC, given CCP policy and the ISC’s relationship with the Chinese 
government (Saich 2000, p. 133). The ISC’s multi-stakeholder structure does 
indicate some Chinese acceptance of multi-stakeholder governance. 
 
Aside from the national level ISC, lower-level provincial and municipal Internet 
Societies also exist within China that are, again, not affiliated with the ISOC and 
which operate on a similar basis to the ISC (see, for example: Shanghai Internet 
Society 2009; Guangdong Internet Society 2014). These provincial and municipal 
level Internet Societies do not appear to be formally associated with the national 
ISC – at least in terms of any hierarchical organization – but are also multi-
stakeholder in their membership. Finally, as with other states, there are a range of 
other organizations such as private sector telecommunications or internet 
companies, and civil society universities, research institutes and individual 
computer scientists, that contribute to domestic Chinese internet governance 
through membership in the CNNIC, the ISC and lower-level Internet Societies, or 
through participation in standards development activities or various technical 
internet-related administrative or policy development fora (CDNC 2004b; 
CERNET 2006; CNNIC 2013a; ISC 2013).  
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7. Chinese Engagement with Administrative Organizations 
 
The previous chapter focused upon the domestic aspects of China's engagement 
with internet governance and core internet governance norms. In contrast, this 
chapter, and the subsequent chapter on policy organizations, explores Chinese 
involvement in global and regional level internet governance. This chapter 
presents an empirical analysis of Chinese participation within administrative 
organizations, examining the engagement of the Chinese government, private 
sector and civil society, and briefly highlighting how their participation in 
administrative organizations sheds light on China’s relationship with core internet 
governance norms. The chapter’s analysis first considers Chinese involvement in 
internet standards development and related activity that feeds into the IETF's 
processes, followed by examination of Chinese participation within organizations 
directly involved in IPS and DNS administration and policy setting. It attempts to 
provide a loosely chronological account of Chinese engagement but, due to the 
fragmented nature of the internet governance regime, chronological continuity is 
not maintained across analysis of different internet governance issues or across 
Chinese involvement in different administrative organizations. 
 
a. The IETF & Internet Standards 
 
i. The IETF 
 
Chinese participation in the IETF has gradually increased since the early Nineties, 
but analyzing the extent of government, private sector and civil society 
involvement is complicated by the IETF’s limiting of formal participation to 
natural persons in their individual capacity. Nevertheless, IETF records provide 
an indication of overall Chinese involvement and some indication of participants’ 
stakeholder affiliation. Generally speaking, Chinese engagement with the IETF 
was minimal until 2005, but since then Chinese nationals have attended IETF 
meetings in increasing numbers, and have become increasingly significant 
contributors to the IETF's standards development (Appendix 1 and Appendix 2). 
The rise of Chinese participation in IETF meetings is illustrated in Figures 6 and 
7, below. Similarly, the growth in significance of China to the IETF’s overall 
output is illustrated in Figures 8, 9 and 10 below. With respect to that 
significance, the Chair of the IETF noted in 2013 that China would shortly 
become the second biggest contributor to the IETF after the United States (Arkko 
2013). Approximately 408 Chinese authors have contributed to IETF documents, 
including Requests For Comments (RFC) – the IETF's documents of record – 
with at least 154 Chinese-authored RFCs (Appendix 2). The exact number of 
Chinese authors cannot be precisely determined, because IETF statistics are 
computer-generated and provide some erroneous information (Appendix 2).  




Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 1) 
 
Figure 7: Chinese Attendance at IETF Meetings by Stakeholder Group 1994 - 
2014 
 
Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 1) 
Figure 6: Total Chinese Attendance at IETF Meetings 1986 - 2014 
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Figure 8: Comparison of Country Contributions to RFC Authorship 
Source: IETF (2014e) 
 
Figure 9: Author Numbers by Country for IETF Documents (RFCs & Other 
Working Documents) 
 
Source: IETF Tools (2015b) 
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Figure 10: Chinese RFC Authorship By Year 
 
Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 2) 
 
Although Chinese participation in IETF meetings and contributions to IETF 
document production has increased significantly, appointment of Chinese 
individuals to administrative positions in the IETF has been lesser but has also 
gradually increased. One Chinese civil society-affiliated participant, Li Xing, was 
appointed to the IAB in 2013, but no Chinese citizen has been appointed an IETF 
Area Director or, therefore, been an IESG member (IAB 2014; IETF 2014g). 
Eight Chinese nationals have been appointed as Working Group Chairs however, 
with the first such appointment in 2005. All Chinese Working Groups chairs, 
with the exception of one civil society-affiliated representative and one of 
unknown affiliation, have been private sector-affiliated (Table 1). 
 






Dates Active Chinese Chair(s) 
Dmm  2007 - 
Present 
Dapeng Liu (Private Sector) 
Lwig  2011 - 
Present 
Zhen Cao (Private Sector) 
Mif  2009 - 
Present 
Hui Deng (Private Sector) 
softwire  2005 - 
Present 
Yong Cui (Civil Society) 
ppsp  2010 - 
Present 
Ning Zong (Private Sector) & 
Yunfei Zhang (Unknown) 
 decade 2010 -2012 Haibin Song (Private Sector) 
 hokey 2006 - 2012 Tina Tsou (Private Sector) 
Source: IETF (2014a, 2014c, 2014f) 
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While unable to directly engage with the IETF, the Chinese government has 
tacitly accepted the organization’s role in internet standards governance by 
allowing Chinese citizens to participate in the IETF. This is also evident in the 
Chinese government’s willingness to allow the IETF’s 79th meeting to occur in 
Beijing in 2010 (IETF 2010b). Chinese government-affiliated IETF participants, 
mostly MIIT employees, attended this meeting and have attended a number of 
others (IETF 2010a). The first recorded IETF meeting attendance by Chinese 
government-affiliated individuals was at IETF 31 in December 1994, where nine 
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications employees attended (Appendix 1). In 
fact, these were the first recorded Chinese participants in IETF meetings. Chinese 
government employees have also attended the 39th, 45th, 51st, 63rd, 68th and 
72nd IETF meetings; beginning with IETF 74 in 2009, Chinese government 
employees have attended every subsequent meeting.  
 
Chinese government employees have also made a minor contribution to authoring 
IETF documents; at least eight have authored or co-authored RFCs (Appendix 2). 
As Table 2, below, indicates, however, individuals affiliated with the Chinese 
government have been minimal contributors relative to other Chinese stakeholder 
groups. None have been appointed to administrative positions within the IETF, 
however. This involvement of Chinese government-affiliated individuals in IETF 
meetings and document authoring – along with Beijing’s willingness to allow an 
IETF meeting to occur in China and for Chinese individuals to engage with the 
IETF – indicates that the Chinese government is not as strongly opposed to the 
privatized governance norm operation in internet standards as it is towards this 
norm in IPS and DNS governance. Indeed, the lack of Chinese government 
opposition to, and tacit acceptance of, non-state actor authority in internet 
standards governance suggests that the Chinese government may have 
internalized this norm in this governance area to some degree. 
 
Table 2: Summary of Chinese RFC Contributors by Stakeholder Group 
Government Private Sector Civil Society Unknown Total 
8 276 116 8 408 
Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 2) 
 
Save as hosts or sponsors of IETF meetings, Chinese private sector organizations 
are unable to directly participate in the IETF. Chinese corporations have hosted 
and sponsored these meetings, beginning with IETF 70 in 2007, which was 
sponsored by Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications company (IETF 2014d). 
Subsequently, the IETF 79 meeting held in Beijing was sponsored by Huawei, 
ZTE, China Telecom, China Mobile, H3C and Rujie Networks (IETF 2010b). 
Huawei has sponsored six further IETF meetings, from meeting 83 through to 
meeting 88, and was a host of IETF 88. The only further Chinese private sector 
sponsorship was with China Telecom’s support of IETF 85 (Appendix 1). 
Chinese private sector-affiliated individuals have engaged extensively with the 
IETF since IETF 63 in 2005, but prior to this there is only evidence of such 
participation at IETF 34 in 1995. Since IETF 63, however, the Chinese private 
sector has been the most active Chinese stakeholder group within the IETF in 
both meeting attendance and IETF document authorship, as Figure 7 and Table 2, 
above, indicate (see also Appendix 1 and Appendix 2). At least 276 private 
sector-affiliated Chinese IETF participants have authored RFCs and the very first 
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Chinese authored RFC, published in 1995, was co-authored by a private sector-
affiliated individual (IETF 1995; Appendix 2). Five Chinese private sector-
affiliated IETF participants have been appointed as Working Group Chairs (Table 
1). 
 
Chinese civil society organizations are also unable to directly engage with the 
IETF save as meeting sponsors or hosts. Tsinghua University, the CNNIC and the 
ISC all co-hosted the IETF 79 in Beijing, and Tsinghua University also sponsored 
IETF 85 (IETF 2010b) (Appendix 1). Chinese civil society-affiliated participants 
have not engaged with the IETF in equivalent numbers to private sector-affiliated 
individuals, but their engagement has still been substantial, and meeting 
attendance has gradually increased since 2005 (Appendix 1). Chinese civil 
society-affiliated IETF participants have also contributed to a number of RFCs, 
with at least 116 such authors (Appendix 2). Li Xing, from Tsinghua University, 
has been appointed to the IAB, while at least one civil society-affiliated Chinese 
IETF participant has been appointed a Working Group Chair (IAB 2014; IETF 
2014b). The participation of Chinese private sector and civil society-affiliated 
individuals within the IETF's meetings and in the development of Internet 
standards indicates a degree of acceptance of, and conformity to, the privatized 
governance norm amongst these stakeholder groups – suggesting a substantial 
internalization of this norm within Chinese society. 
 
ii. Peripheral Standards Development 
 
Chinese actors have also engaged in internet standards development that has 
ultimately fed into the IETF. Domestic Chinese universities, private sector 
corporations and government organs have been engaged in the development of 
internet standards which have then been fed into the IETF as standards proposals; 
RFC 5814, for example, involves Chinese contributions from all three categories 
of stakeholders and is based in part off development conducted in China (IETF 
2010c). Aside from this, Chinese computer scientists have been involved in 
regional development of internet standards. Of particular note is the Joint 
Engineering Taskforce established as a joint venture in 2000 by network 
information centers (NIC) across the East Asian region (Tso 2008, pp. 126-8). 
This body included the CNNIC and its Japanese, Taiwanese and Singaporean 
counterparts. 
 
The Joint Engineering Taskforce was established by the Chinese Domain Name 
Consortium (CDNC), a body dedicated to developing, and regulating, Chinese 
IDNs. The CDNC was established in 2000, slightly before the Joint Engineering 
Taskforce was formed, and its initial membership included the CNNIC and 
counterparts from Macao, Hong Kong and Taiwan (CDNC 2004a; Tso 2008, p. 
126). Since then, it has expanded to include Joint Engineering Taskforce 
members, the MIIT's China Academy of Telecommunications Research (CATR), 
and a range of other Chinese and non-Chinese private sector and civil society 
actors (CDNC 2004b). It continues to develop internet standards, with the most 
recent being RFC 6858, which is related to IDN email, and was submitted to the 
IETF's standards track and approved by the IESG in 2013 (CDNC 2014; IETF 
2013). As with Chinese non-state actor participation in the IETF itself, this 
regionally-focused internet standards development activity suggests significant 
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acceptance and internalization of the privatized governance norm’s 
appropriateness in this area. 
 
b. ICANN & IPS/DNS Governance 
 
i. A Brief Overview of Chinese Participation in ICANN 
 
China has engaged with ICANN since its establishment, across all three 
stakeholder groups. This is evident from historical records of ICANN meetings 
that provide a snapshot of Chinese engagement with the organization (see 
Appendix 3). In addition, the ICANN’s various subsidiary bodies and affiliated 
organizations provide their own records that illustrate sustained Chinese private 
sector and civil society participation in ICANN. These historical records are 
somewhat unreliable, because they are often incomplete or in some cases no 
longer accessible. The reason for this is that they have been created in part to 
fulfill ICANN's commitment to transparent governance, but also in part simply as 
a means of record-taking for internal use by participants in ICANN’s governance 
processes. Thus, they cannot be used to provide a definitive account of China's, or 
any other states', engagement with ICANN and related bodies. Nevertheless, they 
can still be used to confirm some level of Chinese engagement with the 
organization, and in their entirety provide a reasonably accurate and 
comprehensive snapshot of that engagement.  
 
In terms of general Chinese engagement with ICANN, China has hosted ICANN 
meetings twice: at ICANN 14 in Shanghai in 2002, and again at ICANN 46 in 
Beijing in 2013 (ICANN 2012ae). Chinese participation has been recorded at 
ICANN meetings since ICANN's fourth meeting in Los Angeles in 1999 (ICANN 
1999c). Beginning with ICANN 4, information about meeting attendees began to 
be recorded – although inconsistently – and these records suggests that Chinese 
attendance and participation in ICANN meetings was consistent but small in 
number until 2009, after which time attendance and active participation began to 
substantially increase; this is illustrated in Figures 11, 12 and 13 below (see also 
Appendix 3).2 At earlier ICANN meetings, it appears that language barriers were 
a deterrent to Chinese attendance. The lack of Chinese participation and its 
potential link to language barriers was noted by attendees at the first ICANN 
meeting held in China in Shanghai, 2002 (ICANN 2002d). Chinese attendance at 
ICANN meetings also appears to be heavily influenced by the geographic setting 
in which the meetings occur, at least as indicated by attendance at ICANN 46 in 
Beijing – which had almost 10 times the level of Chinese attendance than the next 
most attended ICANN meeting.  
                                                          
2 The much larger relative number of Chinese attendees at ICANN 46 skews meaningful graphical 
representation of Chinese attendance at ICANN meetings. ICANN 46 is therefore excluded from 
Figures 11 and 12. Note that the gaps in attendance from roughly 2002 to 2008 reflect errors in 
ICANN record keeping, rather than a lack of Chinese attendance itself. 
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Figure 11: Total Chinese Attendance at ICANN Meetings 1999 – 2014 
(exc. ICANN 46) 
 
Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 3) 
 
Figure 12: Chinese Attendance at ICANN Meetings by Stakeholder Group 
1999 – 2014 (exc. ICANN 46) 
Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 3) 
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Figure 13: Active Chinese Participation at ICANN Meetings by Stakeholder 
Group 1999 - 2014 
 
Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 3)3 
 
Further information from ICANN's subsidiary bodies or affiliated organizations 
illustrates that China has engaged with ICANN from before its first official 
meeting. For example, the Chinese government attended the GAC's first meeting 
in March, 1999 – a few weeks prior to the first general ICANN meeting (GAC 
1999a). However, while the Chinese government was an early participant in 
ICANN, it left the GAC in 2001 and has not generally been an active participant 
(MacKinnon 2009a; Mathiason 2008, p. 89). The Chinese government returned to 
the GAC in 2009, however, and since then its engagement with ICANN at both 
meetings and more generally has increased slightly. Private sector involvement in 
ICANN’s subsidiary bodies and affiliated organizations has been quite limited, 
and Chinese civil society is clearly the most active stakeholder group in ICANN's 
general meetings and in its subsidiary bodies and affiliated organizations. 
 
ii. ICANN & The Chinese Government 
 
The Chinese government’s first recorded attendance at ICANN’s general 
meetings was in 1999; although, as noted above and discussed further below, 
Beijing had earlier engagement with ICANN in the GAC. Chinese government 
participation at ICANN 3 can be inferred through informal chat records of an 
ICANN Board/GAC meeting (ICANN 1999b). At ICANN 4, comments indicate 
China's GAC representative was present at a GAC meeting (ICANN 1999a). 
Records also illustrate Chinese government attendance at ICANN 6, 7 and 8. A 
long gap in Chinese government participation is then indicated from 2001 until 
ICANN 35 in 2009 – save for a statement at ICANN 20 made by a Chinese 
diplomat, Zhao Houlin, in his then capacity as an ITU official. This large gap is 
                                                          
3 Note that ‘active participation’, for the purpose of Figure 13, refers to: recorded attendance at – 
or the chairing of - specific sessions at ICANN meetings, presentations given by Chinese actors, 
and comments made at specific sessions by Chinese actors. 
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due to Beijing’s withdrawal from the GAC in 2001, coinciding with the 
commencement of WSIS, and illustrates an effort to delegitimize ICANN as a 
strategy to weaken the US government’s and non-state actors’ authority over 
internet governance (Tso 2008, p. 132). 
 
China's return to the GAC at ICANN 35 was welcomed by the ICANN Board and 
was followed by government representatives attending each subsequent ICANN 
meeting – with the exception of ICANN 41 and 42 – from ICANN 38 in 2010 to 
the last 2014 meeting, ICANN 51 (Appendix 3). However, all recorded 
statements by Chinese officials from ICANN 35 to 45 related primarily to 
technical issues or advancing China's interests in Chinese language IDNs. China's 
GAC representative’s comments at ICANN 45 are the first recorded Chinese 
government statements at ICANN meetings that are relevant to core internet 
governance norms. Here, in a GAC high-level meeting, China’s representative 
stated that governments should play a greater role in ICANN and the IANA 
should be more accountable (ICANN 2012u). The next three ICANN meetings 
did not result in any further statements relevant to core internet governance 
norms, although the Chinese government was active in these meetings. 
 
However, at ICANN 49 in 2014, the Chinese government stepped up its advocacy 
of the state authority norm, with almost all of its GAC representatives’ comments 
pushing for stronger government authority within ICANN. Of those that weren’t, 
one argued in favor of stronger geographical diversity in ICANN to strengthen 
multi-stakeholder governance, with the representative noting that North America 
accounted for 75% of participation in ICANN, and Europe provided a further 
15% (ICANN 2014z). Beijing’s focus on the state authority norm was likely 
because it sensed an opportunity to advance it, given the US government’s recent 
announcement that it would transition its internet governance authority to ICANN 
in 2015 – itself made in the context of the upcoming NETMundial meeting and 
growing international resentment over US spying programs (Almeida 2014, p. 65, 
66);Lemos 2014, p. 6). Beijing was therefore very active at ICANN 49. 
Interestingly, its advocacy for greater government authority in ICANN was 
frequently framed in terms of advancing the multi-stakeholder governance norm 
by strengthening equality amongst stakeholder groups. This use of multi-
stakeholder governance to justify government equality in ICANN, while perhaps 
mostly an expedient strategy, does suggest some internalization of the multi-
stakeholder governance norm. 
 
The Chinese government’s comments at ICANN 49 included a statement in a 
joint GAC/Board meeting that the upcoming IANA transition should result in 
governments acquiring a decision-making role in ICANN, and that ICANN was 
illegitimate without this (ICANN 2014ah). In a preparatory meeting for the 
ICANN CEO's briefing of the GAC, China's representative again called for 
greater government authority in ICANN, justifying this on the need for genuinely 
multi-stakeholder governance (ICANN 2014ag). In a series of GAC Plenary 
meetings, China's GAC representative further pushed for stronger state roles in 
ICANN, first calling for NETMundial to consider the issue and arguing that 
multi-stakeholder governance should mean equality for state actors in ICANN 
(ICANN 2014ad), then welcoming the US government’s announcement on the 
IANA transition (ICANN 2014ac), and finally reiterating its call for greater state 
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authority in ICANN as a means of improving ICANN’s multi-stakeholder 
character (ICANN 2014ae). China’s GAC representative also enquired in a 
GAC/RSSAC session whether the GAC could be more active in the RSSAC, and 
whether root servers could be more equitably distributed around the globe 
(ICANN 2014ai). 
 
This intensified advocacy for greater state authority continued in ICANN 50, 
where the majority of the Chinese GAC representatives’ comments were again 
related to it, welcoming the upcoming IANA transition and stating support for a 
stronger government role in ICANN (ICANN 2014bc), also arguing that the 
IANA transition should strengthen the role of the GAC within ICANN (ICANN 
2014be), and further, welcoming GAC moves to strengthen its position in 
ICANN (ICANN 2014bg). These comments also clearly indicate continued 
resistance to the US authority norm, and in one GAC meeting China’s 
representative voiced concern over whether ICANN, following the IANA 
transition, remain incorporated under Californian law (ICANN 2014bd). 
Similarly, it showcases continued resistance to ICANN’s privatized governance 
model. ICANN 50 also saw the first comments from a non-GAC representative 
that touched upon core internet governance norms. A Chinese Minister of 
Cyberspace Administration commented, in a high-level government meeting, that 
governments should play a leading role in internet governance, but also that the 
private sector, civil society and other stakeholders had legitimate roles to play 
(ICANN 2014bi). The same Minister gave a speech at the welcome ceremony, at 
one point lauding the US government's decision to transition its internet 
governance authority to ICANN (ICANN 2014bp). 
 
At ICANN 51, China's advocacy for the state authority norm slowed down, 
although China's GAC representative still advocated for an active GAC role in 
the IANA transition, and queried whether the US government's contractual 
relationship with VeriSign – the authoritative root zone file operator – would also 
be transferred to ICANN (ICANN 2014bs). Perhaps indicating Chinese 
favorability to the impending IANA transition, a CATR employee stated in one 
meeting that he welcomed the participation of all stakeholders in ICANN and 
NETMundial, and further noted that China was likely to increase its participation 
in internet governance in an ICANN Public Forum (ICANN 2014bv).  
 
The Chinese government's intermittent participation in ICANN meetings sheds 
some light on China's stance towards core internet governance norms. The 
absence of Chinese government involvement in ICANN meetings until China's 
GAC return in 2009 shows Beijing’s resentment at both US government authority 
and non-state actor authority. At the same time, however, the Chinese 
government’s return to the GAC has seen an increase, if only small, in Beijing’s 
participation in ICANN meetings, which suggests ongoing acquiescence to both 
of these norms. Nevertheless, as Chinese government participation from ICANN 
49 onwards indicates, it has enthusiastically welcomed the announcement that the 
US is abandoning its authority, and pushed for the rights of governments in 
ICANN in response. This illustrates its continuing preference for greater state 
authority over internet governance, even if it has moderated its position by only 
arguing for equality between state and non-state actors in ICANN. The Chinese 
government's involvement in ICANN meetings, and particularly the framing of its 
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arguments about government's role in ICANN post-ICANN 49, also suggests a 
relatively high degree of acceptance of multi-stakeholder governance.  
 
Aside from annual ICANN meetings, Chinese government representatives are 
generally only able to participate in ICANN through the GAC, although one 
Chinese government representative, Zhao Houlin, then an ITU official, was a 
member of ICANN's Independent Review Panel Nominating Committee from 
2000 to 2002 (ICANN 2015al). Unfortunately, GAC meetings and records are 
generally closed to the public. Some Chinese GAC involvement can be observed 
in GAC outreach meetings at general ICANN meetings however, and the GAC 
does provide some limited information about its activities. Chinese government 
representatives are recorded as having attended the first ever GAC meeting, out 
of only 25 states attending. At this meeting they agreed to the first ever GAC 
statement, which noted: “The National Governments endorse the principles 
behind the creation of ICANN.” (GAC 1999a). Ironically, the third such principle 
is 'Private, Bottom-Up Coordination' and includes the phrase “responsible, 
private-sector action is preferable to government control” (NTIA 1998a). It is 
likely the Chinese government did not entirely comprehend the significance of 
these principles, or at least felt pressured to endorse them. Its early GAC 
involvement clearly indicates, however, the Chinese government’s acquiescence 
to the US authority and privatized governance norms. 
 
The first GAC meeting recorded participants and meeting minutes, but 
subsequent meetings have not consistently done so (GAC 2012). Nevertheless, 
given China’s GAC withdrawal was in 2001, it is probable Beijing attended the 
second GAC meeting in 1999 (Thorne 2010; Tso 2008, p. 132). This meeting 
promulgated the GAC’s 'Operating Principles', which include a general 
acknowledgment of ICANN's wide-ranging authority over internet governance, a 
commitment to ICANN’s “private bottom-up coordination”, and an 
acknowledgment that the “GAC is not a decision-making body” (GAC 1999b, 
1999c). These clauses within the GAC's Operating Principles have not been 
changed, thus despite the Chinese government's disapproval, it acquiesced to 
them again upon its 2009 GAC return (GAC 2011). Similarly, Beijing’s 
allowance of the 2001 ICANN meeting in China is particularly significant 
because it occurred the year after China's government withdrew from the GAC – 
illustrating a willingness to acknowledge ICANN’s importance and allow 
Chinese non-state actor participation in the organization (ICANN 2002c). 
 
China's 2001 withdrawal from the GAC can be viewed as motivated by a range of 
factors, as noted by MacKinnon (2009a) on her blog. In part it was a protest 
against government subordination in ICANN, in part a protest against US 
government authority, and in part a protest over Taiwan’s inclusion in the GAC. 
When the Chinese government left ICANN, it engaged in a sustained campaign in 
the WSIS, and later the IGF, to replace the US authority and privatized 
governance norms with the state authority norm, as discussed in detail next 
chapter. Beijing’s decision to re-join the GAC is due in part to Sino-Taiwanese 
rapprochement, which resulted in Taiwan accepting a designation as ‘Chinese 
Taipei’ in the GAC (MacKinnon 2009a). In addition, the Chinese government 
appears to have decided it needed GAC representation to advance its interests in 
IDN policy, which ICANN was beginning to formally develop at this time. 
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China’s GAC representative’s comments at the second GAC meeting since 
China’s return support this analysis, as the representative informed the GAC then 
that China would apply in the first round for a fast-tracked IDN ccTLD (ICANN 
2009k, 2009l). 
 
When China returned to the GAC, the Chinese government commenced more 
direct engagement with ICANN and its policy development processes (ICANN 
2012r). ICANN’s CEO met both the Director General of the CNNIC and 
representatives from the MIIT in a visit to Beijing in March 2010, which was 
followed by a further visit to China in December 2011 (ICANN 2010x, p. 2; 
2011t). China’s GAC return also resulted in China’s public sector reform 
commission acquiring contractual accreditation from ICANN for its gTLD 
registrar activities and membership in the Registrar Stakeholder Group within the 
GNSO (ICANN Registrar Stakeholder Group 2015; InterNIC 2015). Another 
ICANN meeting was held in China after its GAC return, and this meeting 
coincided with ICANN establishing its first 'global engagement center' in Beijing 
in collaboration with the CNNIC (CNNIC 2013b).  
 
In addition to the factors identified above, China’s GAC return and subsequent 
high-level engagement with ICANN, and China’s GAC return, are likely due to 
the failure of WSIS and the IGF to fundamentally shift the power over internet 
governance to a more traditional intergovernmental entity such as the ITU. It 
represented a lessening, if only temporary, of the Chinese government’s intensity 
in its efforts to promote the state authority norm (MacKinnon 2009b). It is also 
worth noting that, despite its clear opposition to US government and non-state 
actor authority in internet governance, Beijing never blocked Chinese non-state 
actors from participating in ICANN during its self-imposed isolation (Thorne 
2010). This, the extent of Beijing’s post-2009 contact with ICANN officials, and 
the 2014 calls for equal rather than greater state authority in ICANN, perhaps 
suggests growing acceptance of the privatized governance norm by the Chinese 
government. 
 
iii. ICANN & The Chinese Private Sector 
 
Chinese private sector actors, much like the Chinese government, have had a 
fairly limited level of engagement with ICANN. The CNNIC's position in 
China’s domestic regime, where it manages all IPS-related allocations within 
China and is the .cn domain registry, limits the degree of direct engagement by 
Chinese businesses with ICANN. However, unlike Chinese .cn domain registrars, 
Chinese gTLD registries and registrars must receive direct or indirect contractual 
authorization from ICANN, and thus must acknowledge ICANN’s authority 
(ICANN 2012aj). This indicates clear acceptance of non-state actor authority and 
indirectly indicates acquiescence to US government authority. Evidence of 
Chinese private sector acceptance of ICANN's authority is also illustrated by the 
roughly 70 – as of 2014 – ICANN-accredited domain name registrars operating 
within China and providing gTLD registration services (ICANN 2014n; InterNIC 
2015). Further evidence of Chinese private sector acceptance of, and engagement 
with, the privatized governance norm and multi-stakeholder governance norms 
can be illustrated through these actors' participation within ICANN meetings and 
with ICANN's subsidiary or affiliated organizations. 
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Sponsorship records for ICANN meetings are generally unreliable until ICANN 
28, and there are no clear indications of Chinese private sector sponsorship prior 
to ICANN 33 (Appendix 3). Chinese corporations, including the Zodiac Group 
(ICANN 35, 36, 46), HiChina (ICANN 45, 46) and Knet (ICANN 43, 46) have 
all sponsored ICANN meetings, with particularly heavy concentration of Chinese 
corporate sponsors at ICANN 46 in Beijing. Unfortunately, no sponsorship 
records exist for ICANN 14, held in Shanghai. At ICANN's general meetings, 
private sector actors have participated in policy discussion and in workshops, but 
generally in small numbers, as indicated in Figure 13 (see also Appendix 3). The 
first record of Chinese private sector involvement, beyond simple attendee 
registration, was at ICANN 6, when an Eastern Communications company 
representative remotely participated in domain name policy meeting. Beyond this, 
active participation in technical discussions at ICANN meetings is not recorded 
again until ICANN 36 and 43. 
 
At ICANN 46 in Beijing, the Chinese private sector were much more active, 
likely due to the meeting’s location. A range of different Chinese corporate 
representatives gave presentations on their businesses or discussed ICANN policy 
issues. No Chinese private sector actors are then recorded as participating in 
policy discussion at ICANN 47 and 48, but a small number of such actors have 
participated in ICANN 59, 50 and 51. Much like the record of the Chinese 
government in ICANN meetings, Chinese private sector involvement illustrates 
that most participation is apolitical, with a business or technical focus. No 
Chinese private sector actors have commented directly on any core internet 
governance norms. Nevertheless, the simple fact of their attendance – and 
engagement in the policy discussions – at ICANN meetings indicates a degree of 
conformity to the privatized governance norm and acceptance of multi-
stakeholder governance. 
 
Like involvement in ICANN meetings, the Chinese private sector has had limited 
participation in ICANN’s subsidiary bodies and affiliated organizations. There is 
some evidence of Chinese private sector engagement with ICANN's Board and 
administrative staff, in particular through the 70 or so Chinese gTLD registrars 
accredited by ICANN (ICANN 2014n; InterNIC 2015). There are about 12 – as 
of 2014 – Chinese-operated new gTLD registries accredited by ICANN (ICANN 
2015ao) Engagement with the ICANN Board is also demonstrated in some 
limited correspondence, where a few large Chinese companies have 
acknowledged ICANN’s authority over gTLDs (ICANN 2000g, 2000h, 2012r). 
Only one private sector representative has been part of ICANN’s executive 
taskforces – the ICANN Membership Implementation Task Force which operated 
around 2002 (ICANN 2015ai, 2015an).  
 
The GNSO is the location of the Chinese private sector’s most active 
participation in ICANN. The precursor to the current GNSO, the Domain Name 
Supporting Organization, had two recorded Chinese members, both of which 
were gTLD registrars (ICANN 2002b). The current peak body of the GNSO, the 
GNSO Council, has no Chinese membership, and there have been no past 
Chinese members of the Council (ICANN 2013v, 2013w, 2013x, 2013y, 2013z, 
2015ab). There are also no current Chinese staff within the GNSO (ICANN 
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2014h). However, two private sector-affiliated individuals have registered as 
candidates for GNSO administrative positions, or as working group members 
(ICANN 2015t, 2015u). One of these individuals is a member of a GNSO 
working group on privacy issues (ICANN 2014i). 
 
As noted briefly in chapter 4, the GNSO is itself supported by a range of 
subsidiary bodies representing various gTLD stakeholders, however, there are no 
reliable public records of sub-GNSO Council leadership groups prior to 2012 
(ICANN 2014m). That said, available records indicate that there have been no 
Chinese members of the Commercial Stakeholder Group Council (ICANN 2013o, 
2015o, 2015p); or within sub-groups of this Group (Intellectual Property 
Constituency 2015; ICANN 2011j, 2012w, 2014f, 2015q, 2015af). Similarly, in 
the Registries Stakeholder Group, there have been no Chinese members of its 
leading Council (ICANN 2013s, 2013t, 2014k). There are also no Chinese 
members of this Group, although two Chinese companies (Alibaba and Sina) are 
observer members, and a KNet representative has been active in two different 
working groups within this Group (gTLD Registries Stakeholder Group 2015a, 
2015b, 2015c, 2015d). In the Registrars Stakeholder Group, there have likewise 
been no Chinese members of its leading Council (ICANN 2013q, 2013r, 2014j). 
There are six recorded Chinese private sector members of this Group, however 
(ICANN Registrar Stakeholder Group 2015). The final sub-group of the GNSO, 
the Non-Commercial Stakeholder Group has also had no Chinese members in its 
leading Council (ICANN 2012x, 2013p, 2014g). There are no public records of 
membership in the NCSG (ICANN 2015r).  
 
iv. ICANN & Chinese Civil Society 
 
Relative to the Chinese government and private sector, Chinese civil society 
actors have been much more active in general ICANN meetings and within 
ICANN's subsidiary bodies and affiliated organizations. The high level of 
Chinese civil society involvement in ICANN suggests a significant degree of 
acceptance and conformity to both the privatized governance and multi-
stakeholder governance norms, and indirectly indicates acquiescence to the US 
authority norm. While the total numbers of Chinese civil society participants at 
ICANN meetings is roughly similar to the Chinese private sector, Chinese civil 
society representatives have been much more active participants, as indicated by 
Figures 12 and 13 above (see also Appendix 3). Similarly, more sustained 
sponsorship of ICANN meetings has been provided by Chinese civil society 
organizations. In particular, the CNNIC has been very active with consistent 
sponsorship from ICANN 32 in 2008 through to ICANN 45 in 2012. While not 
sponsoring ICANN 46 in Beijing, the CNNIC was a co-host of the meeting itself. 
The CNNIC did not sponsor the next two ICANN meetings, but resumed its 
sponsorship for ICANN 49, 50 and 51. CONAC has also been a prominent 
sponsor of ICANN meetings, sponsoring ICANN 37, 38, 43, 44, 45 and acting as 
a co-host for ICANN 46. The CNNIC and the ISC jointly hosted ICANN 14 in 
Shanghai, and the ISC was also a co-host of ICANN 46.  
 
Chinese civil society actors became active participants in ICANN meetings at 
approximately ICANN 20 in 2004. However, due to inconsistencies in ICANN's 
records, incomplete records prior to ICANN 20 and missing records for ICANN 
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30 and 31 disrupt analysis of this pattern (Appendix 3). Prior to ICANN 20, the 
CNNIC is recorded as a signatory in a Communique signed just prior to ICANN 
4, in which ccTLD operators state they will withdraw from the Domain Name 
Supporting Organization – a precursor subsidiary body that later split into the 
GNSO and ccNSO (ICANN 1999d). In fact, perhaps due to the China’s 2001 
GAC withdrawal, the CNNIC did not formally join the ccNSO until 2008 
(ICANN 2008e). Until ICANN 18, civil society participation is only recorded at 
ICANN 6, 10 and 11 in general session attendance records. The first active civil 
society participation was at ICANN 10, where a CNNIC representative was 
recorded engaging in policy discussion at an ICANN Public Forum (ICANN 
2001h). 
 
Increased civil society participation from ICANN 18 onwards is due in part to the 
election of Qian Hualin, a CNNIC-affiliated computer scientist, to the ICANN 
Board earlier in 2003 (ICANN 2014c). From this meeting until ICANN 27, when 
he left the Board, Qian participated in a many sessions at ICANN meetings, most 
were Board meetings and all dealt with internal ICANN governance or technical 
issues. Aside from Qian's participation, a small number of CNNIC and Chinese 
ALS representatives engaged in consistent participation in sessions at ICANN 
meetings until roughly ICANN 35. Some of the Chinese civil society actors that 
began to consistently participate in ICANN meeting sessions around 2003 are 
quite prominent (see Appendix 3). The academic Xue Hong, for example, a 
prominent participant in the ALAC and across ICANN's subsidiary bodies in 
general, has a sustained level of participation at ICANN meetings. Zhang Jian, 
initially a CNNIC employee who has had a number of roles at ICANN and in the 
APTLD, is another. Likewise, Li Xiaodong, a CEO of the CNNIC, has a 
sustained level of involvement in ICANN meetings as have a few other prominent 
CNNIC representatives. 
 
ICANN 35 in 2009 saw another slight increase in the depth of Chinese civil 
society participation in ICANN meetings, and following ICANN 45 in 2012 a 
larger and sustained increase in this depth occurred. The vast majority of Chinese 
civil society participation in ICANN meetings is oriented towards discussion of 
technical policy issues, however. In a few instances, Chinese civil society actors 
have commented on internal governance within ICANN. For example, Xue Hong 
has commented on ALAC governance processes or APRALO election procedures 
at ICANN 37 and 38 respectively, and Zhang Jian has discussed the relationship 
between the ccNSO and the GAC at ICANN 41. This direct engagement with 
ICANN's internal governance structure indicates a substantial degree of 
acceptance by Chinese civil society of the privatized governance and multi-
stakeholder governance norms. Similarly, in other instances Chinese civil society 
actors have discussed domestic Chinese internet governance or compared it to 
global practices. For example, at ICANN 43 Xiadong Lee discussed China's real 
name .cn registration system, and Xue Hong discussed the Chinese government's 
role in .cn domain governance. Such statements are generally designed to inform 
the transnational community about China's practices, and rarely critique them 
beyond noting differences in government’s role in domestic internet governance, 
such as between the US and China. 
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While implicit Chinese civil society attitudes towards privatized governance and 
multi-stakeholder governance can be observed through their general participation 
in ICANN meetings, a few comments by Chinese civil society representatives do 
directly related to these norms. Generally, these comments are directed at multi-
stakeholder governance and expanding stakeholder participation from the 
developing world. There are no statements by Chinese civil society actors at 
ICANN meetings that indicate opposition to multi-stakeholder governance, and 
only a few directly supporting it. At ICANN 44, Xue Hong commented on the 
limits of multi-stakeholder governance approaches – although other statements by 
her at ICANN 49 and 50 indicate a high level of support for the multi-stakeholder 
governance norm. Similarly, at ICANN 45 a CONAC representative stated that 
advancing multi-stakeholder governance in China was their responsibility. At a 
meeting on the IANA transition during ICANN 49, the CNNIC CEO, Li 
Xiaodong, commented in support of multi-stakeholder governance and greater 
developing world participation in ICANN. 
 
Only a few comments by Chinese civil society actors directly touch upon the US 
authority or privatized governance norms. Zhang Jian at ICANN 41 stated that 
the GAC had no authority over the ccNSO, clearly acknowledging the authority 
of non-state actors. However no comments have clearly expressed any 
preferences on these norms. For example, at ICANN 49 Xue Hong commented on 
the need for ICANN to expand its multi-stakeholder character by engaging 
governments and the developing world more, while at ICANN 50 she discussed 
accountability for ICANN and stressed that she and the other panelists in the 
session were not pushing for an 'ITU-like' body. Chinese civil society actors are 
also clearly aware of the US government's relationship with ICANN, but have not 
directly expressed any preferences towards that relationship at ICANN meetings. 
This was indicated by a comment at ICANN 51 by a Chinese member of 
ICANN's coordination group for the IANA transition, which stressed the need for 
ICANN to adopt a multi-stakeholder process, and querying what would happen if 
the US government refused ICANN's proposal.  
 
Beyond ICANN meetings and related activity, there has been a substantial level 
of Chinese civil society engagement with the ICANN Board, bureaucracy and 
subsidiary organizations. Both the CNNIC and CONAC are ICANN-accredited 
IDN registries (ICANN 2015ao). The CNNIC has also been delegated China's 
IDN ccTLD by ICANN (ICANN 2015ak). Qian Hualin from the CNNIC, has 
been the only Chinese ICANN Board member, serving from June 2003 until 
December 2006 (ICANN 2014c). Li Xiaodong, also from the CNNIC, served 
briefly as ICANN’s Vice President for the Asian region (ICANN 2011t). Chinese 
civil society representatives have also been members of ICANN's executive task 
forces: Qian Hualin from the CNNIC was the chair of the President's Advisory 
Committee on IDNs, and academic Xue Hong was a member of the committee 
from 2005 to 2010 (ICANN 2010s). Hu Qiheng from the CNNIC was a member 
of an IDN Committee which operated in 2002 (ICANN 2015am). Two Chinese 
civil society representatives – Xue Hong and Zhang Jian – have been ICANN 
Nominating Committee members in 2009 and 2010, and in 2012 and 2013, 
respectively (ICANN 2008a, 2010a, 2012a, 2013a).  
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There aren't direct records of past ASO membership, but available information 
indicates that Wu Jianping from Tsinghua University was a member of the ASO 
Advisory Committee from 1999 to 2001 (CNNIC 2003c; Tsinghua University 
2006); minutes from ASO meetings also confirm this (ICANN 2000a, 2000b, 
2000c, 2000d, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d, 2001e). Mao Wei, a Chinese 
academic, also appears to have been a member of the ASO Advisory Committee 
in 2006, as ASO meeting minutes confirm (ICANN 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 
2006e, 2006f, 2006g, 2006h, 2006i, 2006j, 2006k, 2006l). Given the NRO has the 
same membership as the ASO, both of these actors have thus been members of 
the NRO (NRO 2015). 
 
The ccNSO was formed in 2004 but, as noted, the CNNIC did not join it until 
2008 – shortly before the Chinese government returned to the GAC (ICANN 
2008e). That said, China has been quite active in the ccNSO since it joined. One 
ccNSO Council meeting was held in Beijing in 2013 (ICANN 2015f). Chinese 
civil society representatives have been ccNSO members from 2008 onward; 
Zhang Jian and Xue Hong were ccNSO members from 2008 through to 2010, and 
2011 to 2014, respectively (ICANN 2015l).  One CNNIC representative is part of 
a current ccNSO working group on the IANA transition (ICANN 2015ac), while 
a range of Chinese civil society actors have been part of past ccNSO working 
groups, predominantly from the CNNIC but also Chinese employees of ICANN 
itself or of the APTLD (ICANN 2015c, 2015d, 2015e, 2015g, 2015h, 2015i, 
2015j, 2015k). 
 
China has been an active member in the APTLD. The CNNIC is a member, but it 
is unclear when it joined (APTLD 2015d). One CNNIC representative is a Vice-
Chair of the APTLD (APTLD 2015b). Another CNNIC representative, Zhang 
Jian, served as APTLD General Manager from May 2010 to the end of 2013 and 
yet another, Qian Hualin, was APTLD Board Chair from July 2000 to mid-2001 
(see Appendix 4; InternetNZ 2010). Chinese civil society representatives have 
also been active in APTLD working groups (APTLD 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 
2013d). APTLD meetings have been held in China on three occasions: Shanghai 
in 2002, Beijing in 2009, and Xian in 2013 (APTLD 2015c). APTLD meeting 
records indicate that Chinese civil society has participated since close to 
APTLD’s establishment, but have become much more active since the end of 
2007 (Appendix 4). With the exception of the attendance of one government 
representative and two private sector representatives at separate APTLD 
meetings, all participation in APTLD has been from Chinese civil society. This is 
illustrated in Figure 14, below. Similarly, sponsorship and hosting of APTLD 
meetings appears to have been only been provided by the CNNIC (Appendix 4). 
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Figure 14: Chinese Attendance at APTLD Meetings by Stakeholder Group 
1998 - 2014 
 
Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 4) 
 
Six Chinese civil society-affiliated individuals have registered for GNSO 
administrative positions or working group membership – four from CONAC, one 
from the CNNIC, and one from Beijing Normal University (ICANN 2015v, 
2015w, 2015x, 2015y, 2015z, 2015aa). A CONAC representative is a member of 
a GNSO working group on policy-making metrics (ICANN 2014e). Another 
CONAC representative is a member of a working group on translation issues 
(ICANN 2014l). A CNNIC member was a member of a past working group on 
intellectual property issues (ICANN 2013u). An ICANN-employed Chinese 
individual was also a member of a registration abuse policy working group 
(ICANN 2015s). Within the GNSO's sub-groups, CONAC is an observer member 
of the Registries Stakeholder Group (gTLD Registries Stakeholder Group 2015b). 
Two CONAC representatives are members of this Group's accountability working 
group (gTLD Registries Stakeholder Group 2015a). 
 
Chinese civil society has been active within the ALAC, although there have been 
no Chinese chairs of the ALAC (ICANN 2015m). There are two Chinese ALSes, 
the Chinese Domain Name Users Alliance (CDNUA) and At-Large@China 
(ICANN 2010c). At-Large@China was a founding member of APRALO, the 
ALAC's Asia-Pacific branch (ICANN 2015b). APRALO has held at least one 
meeting in China, during ICANN 46 (ICANN 2013e). Overall, Chinese activity 
within the ALAC appears to be dominated by one prominent individual, Xue 
Hong. She was a founding member of the ALAC and has since held a range of 
positions within it, including as a member of the ALAC itself, as the ALAC's 
IDN liaison, and as a member of the ALAC Board’s selection committee 
(ICANN 2011k, 2015n). Xue Hong has also been an interim chair of APRALO in 
2010, and then a full Chair of that body in 2011 and 2012 (ICANN 2011a, 
2014cg). She has also been active in a range of ALAC working groups (ICANN 
2011b, 2011e, 2013c, 2014b, 2015a). 
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There are no Chinese members of the RSSAC, but both a CONAC and CNNIC 
representative each joined the RSSAC Caucus – a body working on root server 
policy – when it was formed in 2014 (ICANN 2015ap). There is one Chinese 
member of the SSAC, Li Xiaodong, but no indication of how long he has been a 
member (ICANN 2015aq). Existing records only cover recent years, but it 
appears there have been no Chinese TLG members (ICANN 2015aj).  
 
The extensive participation of Chinese civil society actors within ICANN's 
bureaucracy and policy development activities illustrates a high level of 
acceptance amongst Chinese civil society of non-state actor authority and multi-
stakeholder governance. These actors have assumed active roles in ICANN's 
bureaucracy, from the Board level down to policy development roles in sub-
groups within subsidiary organizations such as the GNSO, which suggests a 
genuine willingness amongst Chinese civil society actors to assume authority 
over internet governance, and active conformity to the privatized governance 
norm. Similarly, the sustained involvement of Chinese civil society actors in 
ICANN and across various different bodies within it, as well as the support stated 
for multi-stakeholder governance at ICANN meetings, suggests genuine 
agreement with the multi-stakeholder governance norm, and substantial 
internalization of the norm. Chinese civil society statements and behavior within 
ICANN do not touch directly upon the US authority norm, however. Indirectly, 
the willingness of these actors to engage in ICANN despite its subordination to 
the US government implies a certain degree of conformity to the US authority 
norm, but gives no indication of whether Chinese civil society genuinely accepts 
it or opposes it. Likewise, Chinese civil society activity within ICANN does not 




Chinese engagement with APNIC deserves special mention because this 
organization is a central element of the IPS in China’s region, and China has an 
extensive history of engagement with it – including prior to its formal 
incorporation in 1995. The Chinese State Information Center, five private sector 
actors, and two civil society organizations were founding members of APNIC 
(APNIC 2012b). Li Xing, from the China Education and Research Network 
(CERNET), attended the first ever APNIC conference and is noted as having 
“made significant contributions to APNIC's formation and establishment” 
(InternetHistory.asia 2014). As an RIR, APNIC existed prior to ICANN’s 
establishment, and like the IETF has subsequently been incorporated into its 
governance structure. That Chinese actors, across all stakeholder groups, were 
founding members of the organization illustrates the length of Chinese 
engagement with privatized and multi-stakeholder governance within internet 
governance. Chinese engagement with APNIC has remained significant 
throughout its history, and this long-standing and increasing participation in 
APNIC’s activities suggests a high level of acceptance of – and conformity to – 
the privatized governance and multi-stakeholder governance norms, including, 
arguably, substantial internalization of their appropriateness. 
 
There are approximately 70 Chinese members of APNIC (APNIC 2014s). Of 
these, only one is a state actor (the State Information Center), while there are four 
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civil society members – the CNNIC, CONAC, CERNET and the CERNET 
Center – and 65 private sector actors. However, while private sector actors 
dominate China’s share of APNIC membership, civil society representatives are 
far more active within APNIC. Civil society representatives have been active 
members of APNIC’s Executive Council for each year of its existence – save for 
the first year, 1996. Li Xing from CERNET served from 1997 to 2002, Qian 
Hualin from the CNNIC from 2001 to 2006, Mao Wei from the CNNIC from 
2007 to 2008, and Zhang Jian from the CNNIC from 2009 to 2010 (APNIC 
2014q). Currently, Ma Yan from the Beijing University of Posts and 
Telecommunications, and Zhao Wei from the CNNIC serve on the Executive 
Council. Ma Yan was elected in 2003, and his current term expires in 2016. Zhao 
Wei was elected in 2011 and her term ends in 2015 (APNIC 2014p).  
 
Similarly, all Chinese contributors to APNIC policy proposals are associated with 
civil society, save for three individuals of unknown stakeholder affiliation. Nine 
policy proposals in total have been put forth by Chinese authors: four have been 
successfully adopted (APNIC 2010j, 2010m, 2011n, 2011o); and five have been 
rejected (APNIC 2010k, 2010l, 2010n, 2011m, 2012s). Two Chinese citizens are 
employed by APNIC directly, but APNIC provides no historical staff records 
(APNIC 2014a). One staff member, Pan Guangliang, has been particularly active 
in APNIC's technical education and outreach program. He has given presentations 
on APNIC's behalf on multiple occasions (APNIC 2004g, 2006j, 2006k, 2007k, 
2007m, 2007n, 2008f, 2010i, 2013t). APNIC also hosts or attends technical 
Internet-related meetings as a form of outreach and education. APNIC's Global 
IPv6 Summits, held from 2000 until 2011, occurred in China each year from 2002 
through to 2009 (APNIC 2014r). APNIC has also given presentations in internet 
governance-related meetings in Beijing 2002 and 2006, in Shanghai in 2004, 
Xinxiang in 2010, Xian in 2013 and Yangzhou in 2014 (APNIC 2014t, 2014u, 
2014v).  
 
Evidence of Chinese engagement with APNIC is also available from APNIC’s 
membership surveys, which are conducted roughly every second year. No details 
of Chinese engagement were provided in the inaugural member survey in 1999, 
but the second survey noted that Chinese APNIC members were highly positive 
of government involvement in internet development (APNIC 2001c, p. 19). Most 
information in the surveys relates to technical matters, and does not touch upon 
core internet governance norms, however. The percentage of Chinese respondents 
in APNIC surveys has gradually risen from an outlier 23.1% in 2001, with a 
gradual increase from 1.2% in 2004, to 2.2% in 2007, 3.3% in 2009, 6.5% in 
2011 to constituting the largest respondent group with 30.8% in 2012 (APNIC 
2001c, p. 7; 2004f, p. 4; 2007l, p. 12; 2009m, p. 19; 2011l, p. 25; 2012r, p. 7). 
The 2014 survey report did not provide these statistics, but noted that responses 
from Chinese individuals had declined substantially, with 250 fewer responses 
(APNIC 2014n).  
 
The most detail about Chinese engagement with APNIC is available from 
APNIC’s general conferences. However, like ICANN, APNIC's archive is 
incomplete. It begins with APNIC 8, held in 1999, but the recording of attendance 
at APNIC conferences is intermittent (Appendix 5). That said, Chinese attendance 
at APNIC conferences has gradually increased and, like ICANN meetings, has 
    94 
 
spiked when APNIC conferences have been held in China itself (Appendix 5). 
This is graphically illustrated in Figures 15 and 16, below. Transcript recordings 
of APNIC conferences did not commence until APNIC 16, although some 
inconsistent records are provided from APNIC 9 until 16. APNIC conferences 
have been held in China twice, with APNIC 28 held in Beijing in 2009 and 
APNIC 36 held in Xian in 2013 (APNIC 2014l).  
 
Figure 15: Total Chinese Attendance at APNIC Conferences 1999 - 2014 
 
Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 5) 
 
Figure 16: Chinese Attendance at APNIC Conferences by Stakeholder Group 
1999 - 2014 
 
Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 5) 
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While the Chinese government was a founding member of APNIC, it has not 
been an active participant in APNIC conferences, with Beijing’s representatives 
only clearly recorded as attending three (Appendix 5). Similarly, only three 
statements by Chinese government representatives are recorded in APNIC 
conferences, and two of these are from a Chinese ITU official, rather than a direct 
government employee; as illustrated in Figure 17 below (see also Appendix 5). 
The first recorded attendance was at APNIC 28 in 2010, as was the first recorded 
comment by a Chinese government representative. At this conference an MIIT 
representative stated at a plenary meeting on the Internet in China that he 
welcomed all stakeholder involvement in internet governance (APNIC 2009j). At 
APNIC 29 a Chinese ITU official commented on an ITU proposal for IP 
addresses to be allocated on country basis rather than through the usual process 
(APNIC 2010b). The same ITU official discussed the ITU’s relationship with 
APNIC and other internet governance organizations at APNIC 38, where he noted 
that the ITU was not trying to take over the internet and noted the value of multi-
stakeholder governance (APNIC 2014g, 2014i). Although minimally engaged, the 
willingness of Beijing to accept non-state actor authority in APNIC suggests is it 
more concerned with this norm at higher levels of authority than at the regional 
level, and the Chinese government participation in APNIC conferences also 
indicates acceptance of multi-stakeholder governance. 
 
Figure 17: Active Chinese Participation at APNIC Conferences by Stakeholder 
Group 1999 - 2014 
 
Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 5)4 
 
Despite vastly outnumbering other stakeholder groups in total membership, the 
Chinese private sector has not been particularly active at APNIC conferences, as 
Figure 17 above demonstrates. Available records do suggest, however, that 
private sector representatives have consistently attended APNIC meetings in 
relatively small numbers (Appendix 5). Chinese corporations have also sponsored 
                                                          
4 Note that ‘active participation’, for the purpose of Figure 17, refers to: recorded attendance at – 
or the chairing of - specific sessions at APNIC conferences, presentations given by Chinese 
actors, and comments made at specific sessions by Chinese actors. 
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a few APNIC meetings (Appendix 5). China Mobile sponsored APNIC 10, China 
Telecom sponsored APNIC 11 and 14, while China Netcom sponsored APNIC 
18. APNIC 28, held in Beijing, was sponsored by China Mobile, China Telecom, 
China Unicom, ChinaMotion Telecom, Shocom, the Great Wall Broadband 
Network and BJEnet. No further private sector sponsorship then occurs until the 
next APNIC conference held in China, APNIC 36 in Xi’an, where the Beijing 
Internet Institute was a co-host, while China Mobile, China Unicom and China 
Telecom were sponsors. Two Chinese companies, the China ISP Union and 
21Vianet, sponsored APNIC 38. Chinese private sector representatives have not 
made any comments at APNIC conferences that relate to core internet governance 
norms (see Appendix 5). 
 
Relative to other stakeholders, Chinese civil society has been very active in 
APNIC meetings, with available records indicating consistent attendance in small 
numbers but relative active participation in conference sessions (Appendix 5). 
The CNNIC has been an active sponsor and host of APNIC conferences 
(Appendix 5), sponsoring APNIC 10, 12, 15 and, from APNIC 18 onwards, 
consistently sponsoring every APNIC conference save for APNIC 22, 25 and 28. 
While not sponsoring APNIC 28, the CNNIC was its host and was also co-host of 
APNIC 36. At APNIC conferences, a few specific civil society-affiliated 
individuals have been particularly active. Li Xing from CERNET was very active 
in APNIC’s earlier days, Pan Guangliang from APNIC has also been very active 
since 2004. Beyond these two, both Li Xiaodong and Zhao Wei from the CNNIC 
have been active in recent meetings. 
 
The first recorded Chinese civil society participation in APNIC conferences was 
at APNIC 9 in 2000, where Li Xing gave a presentation on the IPS in China 
(APNIC 2000b). APNIC conferences then record consistent but low levels 
participation on technical discussions by Li Xing and intermittent participation by 
other Chinese civil society actors until APNIC 16 in 2003 – when transcripts 
begin to be provided in APNIC's archives. After APNIC 16 the depth of Chinese 
civil society participation in APNIC conference activity gradually increases, with 
the CNNIC in particular becoming progressively more active. The vast majority 
of Chinese civil society participation does not directly touch upon core internet 
governance norms, instead focused on technical issues. Only two comments 
directly touch upon these norms. At APNIC 21, Qian Hualin commented on 
Chinese IDNs being outside the global root, stressing that this was not an attempt 
to create an alternative root but simply to provide IDN service to China. By 
stating this, Qian acknowledges China’s ongoing conformity to the US authority 
norm and the privatized governance norm. At APNIC 28, Li Xiaodong gave a 
presentation on the benefits of multi-stakeholder governance in the IGF, 
illustrating support for this governance. Overall, the sustained participation of 
Chinese civil society actors in APNIC conference activity, and the leadership 
positions taken by some, suggest a high level of acceptance and support for both 
non-state actor authority and multi-stakeholder governance within APNIC. 
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8. Chinese Engagement with Policy Organizations 
 
China’s engagement with administrative organizations provides considerable 
insight into China’s relationship with core internet governance norms, but it 
occurs directly in the course of the internet’s administration and addresses 
specific policies. As a result, Chinese actors’ statements aren’t always self-
consciously related to the appropriateness of internet governance norms or 
focused on consideration of how the regime, overall, should evolve.  
Discussion within policy organizations, however, is more focused on these issues, 
and thus this chapter analyses Chinese government, private sector and civil 
society engagement with those that are the most significant for internet 
governance. It first considers China’s involvement in the WSIS, followed by 
Chinese participation in the IGF, and finally concludes with analysis of Chinese 
engagement with internet-governance related activity in the UN, ITU and in the 
NETMundial meeting. As with the previous chapter, it aims to provide a loosely 
chronological account but, due to the regime’s fragmented nature, continuity is 
not maintained across analysis of different organizations. 
 
a. The WSIS 
 
The WSIS, as noted in chapter 4, was a global, UN-sponsored process of two 
formal Summits considering the implications of the emerging information 
society. It was proposed by the ITU shortly after ICANN’s formation, but wasn’t 
exclusively focused on internet governance (ITU 1998b). However, the WSIS’ 
agenda clearly indicated that internet governance was a key factor contributing to 
its occurrence (ITU 1998a; WSIS 2005b). The WSIS is widely viewed as the first 
international attempt to reform the internet governance regime, following the 
failure of the IAHC to prevent the US government’s consolidation of power over 
the internet (Collins 2007; Mueller 2004, ch. 7; Rogers 2007). The Chinese 
government's support for the establishment of WSIS at the ITU and in the UNGA 
constitute its earliest moves to reform the internet governance regime (UNGA 
2001, 2002). The language of the ITU’s WSIS proposal does not specifically call 
for it to be a multi-stakeholder process, but it does call for the inclusion of all 
partners and consideration of appropriate roles for various partners (ITU 1998a, 
1998b). Given the ITU has always involved non-state actors in an advisory 
capacity, Beijing’s support for the WSIS proposal indicates at least some tacit 
support for multi-stakeholder governance. 
 
A stronger indication of Chinese support for multi-stakeholder governance comes 
from the UNGA resolution endorsing the creation of the WSIS, which explicitly 
stated that the UN “encourages other intergovernmental organizations, including 
international and regional institutions, non-governmental organizations, civil 
society and the private sector to contribute to, and actively participate in, the 
intergovernmental preparatory process of the Summit and the Summit itself.” 
(UNGA 2002, cl. 5). Such a statement clearly reflects a diplomatic balancing act, 
but it does support the appropriateness of multi-stakeholder governance and 
indicates acceptance of this norm by those that acquiesced to its passage, 
including China. However, the WSIS’ form of multi-stakeholder governance 
more closely resembled traditional state-centric approaches that relegated non-
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state actors to peripheral roles (Hintz 2007, p. 251; Kummer 2007, p. 6). 
Indicative of the Chinese government’s qualified acceptance of this form of 
multi-stakeholder governance, it requested during both WSIS Summits that non-
state actors be excluded from working groups considering policy (Collins 2007, 
p. 23, 24).  
 
In the first phase of the WSIS, the Chinese government attended all Preparatory 
Committees, the Asia-Pacific regional preparatory conference, and the actual 
Summit itself – sending 17 delegates (ITU 2004). Beijing was not yet focused on 
internet governance in this first phase, however. The Chinese government had 
two contributions to the first preparatory committee, in the form of two letters – 
one sent by Brunei on behalf of the ‘Group of 77 and China’, the other sent by the 
Chinese delegation’s head (ITU 2002a, 2002b). Both focused on developing state 
needs in the information society, but China’s own letter did comment on the 
WSIS’ multi-stakeholder character, also indicating its resistance to non-state actor 
authority. It stated that: “the private sector and the civil society do make a 
difference in the development of the information society. Their participation and 
inputs are important for both the preparatory work and the Summit itself. 
However, it should be also noted that since policy directions and goals for global 
information society development will be defined during the Summit, governments 
obviously should play the leading role in the preparatory process” (ITU 2002a, p. 
4). 
 
Aside from these letters, the Chinese government’s remaining contributions to 
this preparatory process was a statement on the need for public-private 
partnerships in infrastructure development, and two amendments to human rights-
related proposals (ITU 2003b, 2003c, 2003d). At the Asia-Pacific regional 
preparatory conference, the media reported that the Chinese government 
demanded the expulsion of Taiwanese non-state actors, but this was likely due to 
Beijing’s desire to avoid international legal personality accruing to Taiwan, rather 
than opposition to non-state actor involvement in the WSIS itself (ICANN 2008d; 
ITWorld.com 2003). At the actual Summit, the Chinese government only made a 
statement in the first plenary session, where a Minister of the (now) MIIT stated 
the private sector and civil society should strengthen cooperation in the 
development of the information society, but specifically noted that inter-
governmental organizations should be more involved in internet governance (ITU 
2003a). 
 
The first WSIS Summit resulted in a ‘Declaration of Principles’, an international 
agreement on the basic principles guiding development of the information 
society, which devoted three specific clauses to internet governance. These 
clauses reflect diplomatic compromise on beliefs about internet governance and 
thus are vague, aspirational and partially contradictory. This is most evident in 
parts relevant to both the privatized governance and state authority norms, where 
the text can be read as providing support for both norms, to some extent – 
depending on what the terms ‘internet-related’, ‘public policy’ and ‘technical 
issues’ mean. They state that (WSIS 2003, cl. 48, 49): “The international 
management of the Internet should be multilateral, transparent and democratic, 
with the full involvement of governments, the private sector, civil society and 
international organizations”. They then state that internet governance 
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“encompasses both technical and public policy issues and should involve all 
stakeholders”, and that “Policy authority for Internet-related public policy issues 
is the sovereign right of States”, but the “private sector has had and should 
continue to have an important role in the development of the Internet, both in the 
technical and economic fields”, and that “International organizations … should 
continue to have an important role in the development of Internet-related 
technical standards.”  
 
These clauses are much clearer on the US authority and multi-stakeholder 
governance norms. While US government authority isn’t directly mentioned, the 
text does clearly support equal state authority over internet governance when it 
notes that governance should be multilateral, and include full involvement of 
governments. They are also clearly supportive of multi-stakeholder governance, 
with the roles of five stakeholders explicitly recognized, including those of states, 
the private sector and international organizations noted above, but also 
recognizing that (WSIS 2003, cl. 49): “Civil society has also played an important 
role on Internet matters, especially at community level, and should continue to 
play such a role”, and “Intergovernmental organizations have had and should 
continue to have a facilitating role in the coordination of Internet-related public 
policy issues”. Overall, because it reflects diplomatic compromise, Beijing’s 
status as a signatory to the Declaration of Principles only clearly indicates that it 
is supportive of multi-stakeholder governance itself and for the state authority 
norm to replace US government authority. 
 
Following this first WSIS Summit, characterized by Beijing's relatively cautious 
criticism of internet governance, the Chinese government became much more 
vocal in voicing opposition to both the US authority and privatized governance 
norms, and in stating its support for the state authority norm. In the WGIG, which 
occurred between the first and second WSIS Summits, the Chinese governmental 
delegation clearly asserted its preferences, arguing that the US government 
should not have unilateral authority over the technical internet, and that ICANN 
should not have penultimate authority over the IPS and DNS but rather be 
subordinate to intergovernmental authority. Initially, Chinese government 
statements at the WGIG simply referred to the need for greater intergovernmental 
authority in this area and the lack of any existing legitimate governance entity. 
However, eventually the Chinese government delegation flatly asserted the 
injustice of one country having authority over internet governance, but did not 
mention the US by name, even though it eventually named ICANN as a target of 
its criticism. 
 
The first statement of the Chinese delegation to the WGIG was provided in a 
preliminary consultation on the WGIG’s establishment. It noted several times that 
states should hold the leadership position within internet governance, and tacitly 
disputed the US government’s and ICANN's authority, commenting that “the 
current biggest problem facing Internet is the absence of legitimate entity of the 
international Internet governance” (WGIG 2004b). Subsequently, in comments on 
draft working papers for the WGIG, the Chinese delegation reiterated its desire 
for the WGIG to focus on internet governance reform by empowering 
governments and intergovernmental organizations, noting that “WGIG’s mission 
is to promote the equal participation rights of all the sovereign governments in the 
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decision-making process regarding the Internet public policies” (WGIG 2005a). 
As this illustrates, Chinese government statements were initially oblique in their 
criticism of US government and non-state actor authority, if not in the advocacy 
for the state authority norm. This remained the case for the second meeting of the 
WGIG. In this meeting, the Chinese government’s WSIS delegation head, 
Ambassador Sha Zukang, reiterated China’s desire for governments to lead in 
internet governance policy-setting, but also noted that the private sector and civil 
society had “positive roles to play in the development of the Internet” (WGIG 
2005d).  
 
Comments by the Chinese government delegate at WGIG's third meeting, 
however, were much more forceful with respect to the US authority and 
privatized governance norms, arguing that “the position and role of governments 
have been ignored even in the danger of being marginalized, rather than being 
strengthened ... China believes the current Internet governance situation is 
dominated by the private sector and a single country. This is unjust and harmful 
to the long-term development of Internet … China opposes the view that a single-
party stakeholder dominates internet governance while excluding others … China 
also opposes the viewpoint that the roles of different stakeholders should not be 
differentiated, but mixed together” (WGIG 2005c). This delegate’s contribution 
went on to propose an intergovernmental organization under the UN to replace 
existing arrangements, strongly criticized privatized governance in the internet 
governance regime, and rejected the concept of ‘trilateralism’ – being the equal 
sharing of power between governments, the private sector and civil society 
(Collins 2007).  
 
The Chinese government’s statement at the third WGIG meeting clearly indicates 
opposition to both US government authority – the ‘single country’ – and to 
privatized governance, while also advocating for the state authority norm to 
replace these norms. It also touched upon multi-stakeholder governance, 
however, expressing support for it: “We believe that it [internet governance] 
should be multi – should have multiple participation. It should – the governments 
of sovereign states representing common interests of stakeholders, including 
private sector, civil society and mass Internet users should play a leader role in 
global Internet-policy making, while private sector, civil society and other 
stakeholders will continue to play an active and promoting role in this process” 
(WGIG 2005c). The statement went on to argue that existing private sector and 
civil society actors involved in internet governance are drawn heavily from 
developed states, and thus developing states are at a disadvantage.  
 
In the WGIG's fourth substantive meeting, the Chinese delegation again criticized 
the US government's and ICANN's role in internet governance, mentioning 
ICANN this time by name, and providing a more detailed explanation of its 
internet governance reform proposal that would see ICANN's authority 
transferred to an UN-supervised intergovernmental organization. The statement 
indicated support for multi-stakeholder governance. The statement also included a 
proposal that the (then) proposed IGF be supplemented with a separate 
intergovernmental body authoritatively addressing internet governance reform 
(WGIG 2005b). The element of the Chinese delegation's statement relevant to the 
regime's core norms is:  
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“to the situation where Internet resources now is managed by one 
government, in future it should be jointly managed by all governments in 
terms of its public policy. We suggest that the Working Group consider 
the establishment under the U.N framework, new specialized 
intergovernmental lightweight Internet resources policy management 
agency as highest level of decision-making body of Internet resources. It 
should have three functions: policy management, supervision and 
authorization, and international coordination. On the composition of such 
an agency, each state should, based on its own condition, designate a 
stakeholder as its representative; however, in decision-making, each state 
should have one vote. Private sector and the civil society and other 
stakeholders could widely participate in the discussion and express their 
advisory role. However, based on the above-mentioned principle of 
division of labor by different stakeholders, they should have no decision-
making power and right to vote on public policy issues. Secondly, the 
supervision and authorization by ICANN should be transferred to this 
agency. The specific operation of Internet resources, in principle, could be 
mandated to ICANN; however, ICANN should be supervised and 
managed by the agency under the United Nations, the relevant public 
policy issues should be approved by this agency” (WGIG 2005b). 
 
A final WGIG meeting occurred in which its formal report was presented to the 
WSIS, but it included no further Chinese government statements. When WGIG 
completed its deliberations it produced a report with four separate 
recommendations for reforming the internet governance regime (WGIG 2005f, 
pp. 13-6). In addition, a separate book was produced from submissions by WGIG 
members, and the Chinese delegation head, Hu Qiheng, wrote an essay outlining 
her position that, of the four reform options, Model One headed by a ‘Global 
Internet council’ was the most appropriate (Hu 2005, pp. 200-1). It is reproduced 
below in Figure 18. This option most closely resembled the Chinese proposal 
during the WGIG, and it is provided below. Hu argued that this model – situating 
an inter-governmental body above ICANN – was necessary and just, allowing 
extensive participation by non-state actors in internet governance, and being 
unlikely to damage the existing benefits of ICANN’s multi-stakeholder 
governance model (Hu 2005, pp. 187-92).  
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Figure 18: Model One Of the WGIG’s Four Proposed Reforms 
 
Source: WGIG (2005f, p. 13) 
 
Hu's essay also makes a series of further comments with respect to multi-
stakeholder governance and non-state actor authority. Firstly, she notes that the 
original and current multi-stakeholder character of the regime “is the most 
valuable ‘Internet Culture’ that provides an encouraging and stimulating 
environment for the fostering of innovation in technology and business and 
further serves as the essential source of the dramatic development of the 
worldwide Internet” (Hu 2005, p. 186). Hu went on to state, however, that the 
regime’s current privatized governance model disadvantages developing states 
and governments generally, while also causing suspicion that policies are made 
primarily to benefit the private sector. Hu argued in favor of multi-stakeholder 
governance, but argued that governments are the most legitimate authorities for 
internet governance. Her essay represented her beliefs regarding internet 
governance reform, but given her position as head of the Chinese government’s 
WGIG delegation, it seems reasonable to conclude that Beijing’s policy is similar 
to that of Hu’s own personal views – particularly given Chinese government 
statements in the WSIS and WGIG largely conform to her viewpoint. 
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In the second WSIS Summit, the Chinese governmental delegation was much less 
active, although the delegation itself was much larger at 59 delegates in total (ITU 
2005b). The Chinese government refrained from repeating its more forceful 
WGIG position, with only a single statement provided at the second preparatory 
committee, advocating intergovernmental authority over the technical internet 
and pointing out the injustice of internet governance being “monopolized by one 
state” (WGIG 2005d). A Chinese official also made a wide-ranging but 
uncontroversial statement at the actual Summit touching upon the digital divide, 
international cooperation, respect for different cultures and strengthening internet 
security (ITU 2005c). The second WSIS Summit concluded with agreement on 
the ‘Tunis Agenda on the Information Society’, which devoted almost a third of 
its contents to internet governance, technical and non-technical (WSIS 2005b, pp. 
6-12).  
 
The internet governance section summarized existing information from the 
Declaration of Principles and the WGIG report, but it also included further 
substantive statements related to core internet governance norms, which:  
x State that internet governance should be multi-stakeholder at all levels 
where possible. 
x Call for all stakeholders to have the opportunity to participate in policy 
decision-making related to internet governance.  
x Acknowledge that the internet has thus far been successfully run by a 
private sector-led governance system.  
x State that no country should be involved in decisions about another 
country’s ccTLD. Call for all governments to have an equal role and 
responsibility for internet governance. 
x State that governments do not need to be involved in technical matters that 
do not impact upon international public policy issues (WSIS 2005b, cl. 
37, 52, 55, 63, 68, 69). 
As a signatory to this international agreement, China can be taken to have agreed 
to the Tunis Agenda’s provisions. This indicates Chinese acceptance of multi-
stakeholder governance, as this is not a controversy in the Tunis Agenda, and 
Chinese opposition to US government authority, as neither is this controversial. 
However, the Tunis Agenda is vague in its significance for the privatized 
governance and state authority norms, with its meaning dependent on how 
‘technical matters’, ‘equal role and responsibility’, and ‘international public 
policy issues’ are defined, which means it is not particularly useful in identifying 
Chinese government policy towards these norms. 
 
The Chinese private sector and civil society were also involved in the WSIS 
process, although not nearly as prominently as the government. Only one Chinese 
corporation, Huawei, attended the first Summit, but four attended the second and 
two – Huawei and ZTE – attended in large numbers (ITU 2004, 2005b). These 
two Chinese companies were major sponsors for the second Summit, and the ZTE 
President, at least, was engaged in discussion of the digital divide at the Summit 
(Huawei 2005; ITU 2005d; MacKinnon 2005; ZTE 2006). Chinese civil society 
organizations were also present at both Summits, with at least four attending in 
Geneva, and at least five attending in Tunis (ITU 2004, 2005b). Of these, the ISC 
was the most high profile, with a representative contributing to policy debate at 
the first WGIG meeting, arguing in favor of greater government authority over 
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IPS and DNS governance and, interestingly, over internet standards as well 
(WGIG 2004a, 2005e). In the third WGIG meeting, an ISC representative also 
supported stronger governance authority in internet governance (WGIG 2005c). 
These are notable as the first recorded comment by a Chinese non-state actor in 
support of the state authority norm in any of the regime’s administrative or policy 
organizations. Chinese non-state actors’ general involvement in the WSIS is also 
significant because it indicates the support of these actors for multi-stakeholder 
governance. 
 
After the initial WSIS Summits concluded, an annual WSIS Forum was 
established to follow up on the WSIS’ work. Their records are somewhat opaque, 
particularly for the years 2006 to 2008, when no outcome document was 
produced and no other documents provided sufficient detail for substantive 
analysis. However, participation records are partially available for the 2006 
Forum and indicate no Chinese involvement, but no such records exist for the 
next two years (WSIS 2013a, 2013c). The 2009 records are more detailed, but 
they similarly do not indicate Chinese engagement or lack thereof (WSIS 2009). 
The 2010, 2011 and 2012 records all indicate that the MIIT and China's 
permanent UN mission participated in these Forums (WSIS 2010; 2011, p. iv; 
2012, pp. x, xvi). They also indicate that Chinese non-state actors were not 
involved in 2010 and 2011, but that the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
(CASS) attended the 2012 Forum (WSIS 2012, p. xxxii).  
 
Two government representatives, one from the MIIT and one Chinese UN 
official, attended the 2013 WSIS Forum. Two civil society representatives also 
attended, one from the CNNIC and another from the Guangdong Academy of 
Social Sciences (WSIS 2013b, pp. xv, xxxii). None of the records for these WSIS 
Forums indicate what, if any, substantive comments the Chinese participants 
made. The 2014 WSIS Forum was attended by Chinese government 
representatives from the MIIT, in UN and World Economic Forum capacities, 
and from the Chinese Bureau of Statistics (WSIS 2014a; 2014c, p. 5) (WSIS 
2014c, p. 180). An MIIT Vice-President is recorded as giving a speech, but it did 
not relate to internet governance (WSIS 2014a). One Chinese private sector actor 
participated in this forum but didn’t comment on internet governance (WSIS 
2014b). Chinese civil society was represented at the 2014 Forum by the CNNIC, 
which organized a workshop on ICT capacity building (WSIS 2014c, p. 130, 
133). The WSIS Forums are not strictly related to internet governance, although 
they do consider the issue in small part. Chinese participation in the WSIS 
Forums does indicate Chinese acceptance of multi-stakeholder governance, but 
otherwise doesn’t reflect on other core internet governance norms. 
 
b. The IGF 
 
At the end of the WSIS, participants (including China) agreed to continue internet 
governance discussion within a newly created Internet Governance Forum (IGF 
2012b). This has been held annually since 2006 (UNGA 2011a, para. 17). Like 
WSIS, the IGF is explicitly a multi-stakeholder forum (see generally: IGF 2012d; 
IGF 2012l; Malcolm 2008, ch. 5). A Secretariat administers the Forum and 
initially decided upon its internal structure. Generally, however, the IGF’s 
substantive agenda is decided upon by the MAG – comprised of 40 to 60 
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representatives, with half from government, and a quarter each from the private 
sector and civil society. The MAG, and Secretariat, manage the IGF’s preparatory 
process and organizes the annual IGF itself. The preparatory process is structured 
around a period of open consultations, followed by MAG meetings, along with 
regional IGF meetings and further preparatory meetings. During the preparatory 
process, the IGF’s annual agenda is determined. The annual Forum itself is open 
to all stakeholders, and includes main sessions organized around annual primary 
themes, along with a range of workshops, ‘Dynamic Coalitions’ and other events. 
China has been actively engaged in the IGF, both in terms of attendance at the 
annual Forum and in terms of participation in various IGF processes. Figures 19, 
20 and 21 provide a graphical illustration of this below. 
 
Figure 19: Total Chinese Attendance at the IGF 2006 - 2014 
 
Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 6) 
 
Figure 20: Chinese Attendance at the IGF by Stakeholder Group 2006 - 2014 
 
Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 6) 
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Figure 21: Active Chinese Participation at the IGF by Stakeholder Group  
2006 - 2014 
 
Source: Author’s Own Research (Appendix 6)5 
 
 A Chinese government delegate from the (now) MIIT was appointed to the initial 
MAG, and an MIIT representative has been included within the MAG in all years 
up to 2012, save for 2010 (Appendix 6). In 2013, China’s UN representative 
became a MAG member, displacing the MIIT for the first time. The Chinese 
government has contributed broadly to discussion of the various issues arising in 
the context of internet governance, and has participated in a range of workshops 
and other events at the IGF across its lifetime (Appendix 6). However, the clear 
focus has been on advancing the role of governments in internet governance. 
Beijing’s first contribution to the IGF is indicative of this. During the inaugural 
2006 IGF’s preparatory process, the Group of 77 and China sent a letter 
requesting the IGF address ‘equitable and stable resource management’ – a 
reference to IPS and DNS governance (IGF 2006/2007). It was supportive of 
multi-stakeholder governance, but recommended that the MAG have 20 
government members, and 10 each from the private sector and civil society. The 
bloc was successful in establishing this MAG structure. A further letter from this 
bloc qualified their support for multi-stakeholder governance and non-state actor 
authority in the MAG, insisting that governments, the private sector and civil 
society all meet separately during the preparatory process – a proposal not 
adopted by the IGF (IGF 2006/2007). 
 
After the 2006 IGF’s preparatory process and during the actual 2006 forum, the 
Chinese government’s contribution was limited to technical issues and discussion 
                                                          
5 Note that ‘active participation’, for the purpose of Figure 21, refers to: recorded attendance at – 
or the chairing of - specific sessions, workshops or dynamic coalitions at the annual IGF and at 
preparatory sessions, presentations given by Chinese actors, and comments made at specific 
sessions by Chinese actors. The IGF 2009 records a large increase in ‘Unknown’ activity because 
dead links prevent an accurate determination of non-state actor involvement in workshops. Figure 
21 does not include active participation in the IGF 2015’s preparatory process.  
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of censorship (Appendix 6). Overall, the inaugural IGF failed to discuss the role 
of ICANN and the nature of core internet governance norms. Thus, during the 
2007 preparatory phase, China – along with others – successfully pushed for this 
to be remedied. During the preparatory process for the 2007 IGF, the Chinese 
government delegate also commented that they were supportive of multi-
stakeholder participation in the Forum, particularly within Dynamic Coalitions. 
At the end of this preparatory process, China expressed dissatisfaction that the 
IGF was not ‘results-oriented’, and indicated its preference for the IGF to produce 
recommendations on internet governance reform. At the actual forum, the 
Chinese government representative commented on the need for internet 
governance reform in favor of governments, and obliquely referred to US 
dominance over the present system. The Chinese government also participated in 
a variety of workshops on various internet governance issues (Appendix 6). 
 
The Chinese government was less active in the 2008 preparatory process, but it 
did state that governments should lead ICANN, then obliquely criticize the US 
authority norm, and praise the IGF’s efforts to enhance discussion amongst all 
stakeholders (Appendix 6). At the actual forum, the Chinese government 
discussed a range of technical issues and attended a variety of workshops, but it 
also commented in support of the Brazilian government’s call for greater 
government involvement in internet governance, and made a direct request that 
the IGF focus on the role of governments in internet governance – suggesting the 
need for an intergovernmental supervisory entity while also praising the multi-
stakeholder character of the IGF itself. At this IGF Beijing indicated that the 
IGF’s lack of progress was frustrating China, and tentatively recommended that 
the IGF, if it failed to suggest concrete reforms, be abandoned. Subsequently, in 
the 2009 preparatory process, the Chinese delegation stated its belief that the IGF 
had failed, suggesting its remit be passed to an intergovernmental organization 
under the UN which could address US government authority. At the actual 
Forum, the Chinese delegation acknowledged the IGF’s multi-stakeholder 
character in mildly positive terms, but asserted it had failed to reform internet 
governance, and should not have its mandate renewed – reiterating China’s 
support for an intergovernmental process to supplant the IGF (Appendix 6). 
 
Following the 2009 IGF, the process of reviewing the IGF’s mandate began 
within the UN. A Chinese diplomat, Sha Zukang, who represented Beijing during 
the WSIS and was subsequently promoted to Undersecretary of the UN’s 
Economic and Social Council, attempted to convert a renewed IGF into a more 
intergovernmental and outcome-oriented body (Mueller 2011, p. 185). 
Ultimately, this effort failed and the IGF continued as before (UNCTAD 2015). 
During the 2010 IGF preparatory process, the Chinese government’s involvement 
was muted, with a single cautious statement that the IGF’s activities should 
continue in ‘relevant UN meetings’ and a ‘relevant decision’ should be made on 
the IGF’s renewal (Appendix 6). Given majority support for renewal, Beijing’s 
lack of assertiveness is likely due simply to avoiding unnecessary conflict 
(ECOSOC 2010). At the actual IGF, the Chinese government made a single 
statement that internet governance was very important, and that China was fully 
cooperative with the world in its governance. However, perhaps as a sign of 
Beijing’s dissatisfaction, no MIIT representative was on the 2010 MAG, and no 
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Chinese government representatives participated in workshops or other events – 
something noted by other IGF participants (IGF 2010b, 2010e). 
 
Nevertheless, in 2011 the Chinese government resumed its active participation in 
the IGF (Appendix 6). An MIIT representative returned to the MAG, while 
Chinese government delegates participated in the preparatory process, a number 
of main sessions, and workshops. Discussion in the 2011 IGF included comments 
on an intergovernmental cybersecurity treaty China and others had proposed at 
the UN, which included providing committing signatories to developing 
intergovernmental internet governance (UNGA 2011b; IGF 2011i, 2011l). A 
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative acknowledged this proposed 
treaty, but his statement was largely limited to noting the agreement was non-
binding. The Chinese government remained on the MAG for 2012 and was active 
in both the 2012 preparatory process and Forum, commenting that developing 
states remained underrepresented in the IGF, and calling for more involvement 
from all stakeholders from such states (Appendix 6).  
 
In 2013, China’s permanent UN representative took over the MIIT’s position on 
the MAG, although an MIIT representative still attended preparatory meetings 
(Appendix 6). However, only the formal MAG member, Chen Hongbing, made 
substantive comments in the 2013 preparatory process. During the May meetings, 
he approved of the 2013 focus on enhancing multi-stakeholder governance, 
noting that such discussion should remain aware of WSIS’ outcomes and promote 
multi-stakeholder governance “which is multinational, democratic, and 
transparent” (IGF 2013e). Chen also commented that stakeholder roles in internet 
governance needed to be examined further, called for sovereignty to be a theme 
of the 2013 IGF, advocated for greater IGF participation from developing states, 
noted that multi-stakeholder governance shouldn’t be a theme more important 
than others, and argued that discussions should address the need “to change the 
current unreasonable situation of the governance of critical Internet resources” 
(IGF 2013h; Appendix 6). These comments reflect Beijing’s ongoing advocacy 
for the state authority norm, with a view to it abolishing the US authority norm 
and at least superseding the privatized governance norm. The comments also, 
however, indicate general support for multi-stakeholder governance. 
 
At the actual 2013 IGF, China was very active in main sessions, workshops and 
other events (Appendix 6). That year’s Forum was dominated by fallout from 
Edward Snowden’s revelations of US spying activity – resulting in mutual 
recriminations between Chinese and US officials over use of the technical 
internet for espionage and censorship, respectively. At the end of the 2013 IGF, 
the IGF provided a press release stating that the 2013 IGF had been 
overshadowed by surveillance concerns, quoting a Chinese Foreign Ministry 
representative stating that “some individual countries are carrying out large scale 
surveillance” (IGF 2013l). Chinese government representatives also commented 
on core internet governance norms at the Forum, stating that multi-stakeholder 
governance was a good thing but that excluding any stakeholder group was ill-
advised, and that internet governance should be multilateral, transparent, and 
needed to conform to WSIS Principles, and also that ICANN’s multi-stakeholder 
model was flawed for not incorporating the views of ordinary internet users and 
governments. 
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Beyond the Chinese government, the Chinese private sector and civil society have 
also been heavily involved in the IGF. The Chinese private sector has only had a 
limited degree of participation within the IGF, however (see Appendix 6). The 
first recorded involvement of Chinese private sector actors in the IGF is in a 
workshop in 2009, but this is followed by involvement by generally one or two 
corporate representatives in each subsequent IGF. All private sector involvement 
has been on technical issues that do not touch directly upon core internet 
governance norms. In contrast, Chinese civil society has been much more active 
in the IGF across its lifetime; indeed, one civil society organization, the Chinese 
Association of Science and Technology (CAST) has been involved in workshops 
in every IGF (see Appendix 6; IGF 2010j). A representative of the CASS was 
appointed to the MAG in 2012 and served through to 2014. In 2015 his position 
was replaced by Li Xiaodong from the CNNIC. The CNNIC itself has sponsored 
IGF 2013 and 2014 – the only two years for which sponsorship information is 
available, and possibly the only two years in which the IGF has been sponsored 
by organizations outside the host country and the UN. 
 
Most Chinese civil society involvement in the IGF has been related to technical 
issues, but some has been relevant to core internet governance norms (Appendix 
6). An ISC representative hosted a workshop at the 2006 IGF which proposed the 
‘World Internet Norm’, advocating in part for a greater government role in 
internet governance. In 2007, a representative from the ‘China Internet 
Emergency Response Group’ – a likely reference to quasi-governmental 
CNCERT/CC which addresses security issues related to the IPS and DNS – 
supported the Chinese government’s contention that ‘one state’ controlling 
internet governance was unjust. This is the most outspoken statement on the US 
authority norm by a Chinese non-state actor in any administrative or policy 
organization. In this same year the ISC’s Secretary-General stated in a security 
main session that government should be more involved in internet governance.  
 
Beyond this, a number of Chinese civil society actors have discussed the value of 
multi-stakeholder governance in the IGF (Appendix 6). In the 2012 preparatory 
process, the CASS MAG member called for greater developing state involvement 
in the IGF. At the Forum, Xue Hong, in her academic capacity, discussed the 
value and uniqueness of the multi-stakeholder governance norm in internet 
governance, and a Chinese attendee of unknown stakeholder affiliation queried 
how to improve developing state participation in internet governance. Beyond 
this, a number of Chinese civil society actors have discussed the value of multi-
stakeholder governance and the need for greater involvement of developing states 
in the IGF. In the preparatory process for the 2012 IGF, Guo Liang supported 
calls for greater developing state involvement in the IGF. In her academic 
capacity, Xue Hong discussed in clearly positive terms the uniqueness of multi-
stakeholder governance in internet governance in a workshop on politics and the 
internet. At the 2012 IGF the sole comment on core internet governance norms by 
an unknown Chinese attendee also occurred, with an attendee querying how the 
IGF could enhance developing state participation in internet governance in an 
open forum main session. 
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In 2013 Xue Hong discussed China’s domestic internet governance, explicitly 
noting the multi-stakeholder character of the CDNC. A CNNIC representative 
also noted this organization’s multi-stakeholder character. Likewise, another 
CNNIC representative noted that multi-stakeholder governance in China’s 
domestic governance could be improved, and that the concept itself was 
ambiguous. Li Xiaodong, also representing the CNNIC, commented in detail on 
the multi-stakeholder characteristics of the CNNIC. Each of these statements 
generally assumed that multi-stakeholder governance was a positive thing, 
although most simply discussed multi-stakeholder governance in purely 
functional terms (Appendix 6). Similarly, in 2014, comments related to the norm 
generally implied a high degree of acceptance and internalization of multi-
stakeholder governance by Chinese civil society actors. At this Forum, a CNNIC 
representative discussed the CNNIC's multi-stakeholder character. A CASS 
representative also commented on how non-English speakers and developing 
states could participate more in internet governance. 
 
i. The Asia-Pacific Regional IGF 
 
While the global IGF has operated since 2006, the Asia-Pacific region did not 
establish a regionally-focused IGF until 2010. China has engaged with this body 
– the Asia-Pacific Regional IGF – since its establishment. In fact, Zhang Jian, 
representing the APTLD, gave welcoming remarks at the inaugural meeting that 
welcomed the formation of a multi-stakeholder regional Forum (APrIGF 2010a, 
2010b). However, aside from one attendee of unknown stakeholder affiliation, all 
Chinese participation in the APrIGF has come from civil society actors, and there 
have been no recorded Chinese sponsors. The APrIGF’s peak body, the Multi-
stakeholder Steering Group, only provides records for 2013 and 2014, which 
indicate that both Zhang Jian and Xue Hong have been members for these years 
(APrIGF 2013d, 2015).   
 
Most of the Chinese participation in this regional Forum has been focused on 
technical issues, although consistent attendance by Chinese civil society actors – 
and a few comments from some of them – suggest support for multi-stakeholder 
governance. Two comments at the 2010 APrIGF also indicated qualified support 
for the privatized governance norm. At this inaugural Forum, aside from Zhang 
Jian’s welcoming remarks, Xue Hong gave a presentation for the CDNC, Zhang 
Jian presented on behalf of the APTLD, and an unknown attendee also gave a 
presentation on China’s IDN ccTLD (APrIGF 2010a, 2010f). Xue Hong 
discussed the value of multi-stakeholder governance while giving her 
presentation, stating that for internet governance there was “no other way for 
global policy making” and that all stakeholders should be included (APrIGF 
2010c). In one session, Xue Hong and another civil society actor, Isaac Mao, 
discussed the value of multi-stakeholder governance, with both noting that 
privatized governance was important but that including governments was as well 
(APrIGF 2010d). Isaac Mao also stated that domestic Chinese internet 
governance should include involvement by the government, private sector and 
civil society (APrIGF 2010e).  
 
At the 2011 APrIGF, three Chinese civil society actors – from the CNNIC, 
APTLD and academia – gave presentations on technical issues, and Xue Hong 
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chaired one main session (APrIGF 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). Xue Hong was 
particularly active in workshops at this regional Forum, and in one briefly noted 
the need for ICANN to internationalize further (APrIGF 2011d, 2011e, 2011f). 
Chinese participation in the 2012 APrIGF was decreased relative to the two 
earlier forums, with only Xue Hong speaking at the event. In addition to 
discussing technical issues, Xue Hong noted legal issues surrounding ICANN’s 
multi-stakeholder governance model (APrIGF 2012b, 2012c, 2012d). The 2013 
regional Forum did not provide any transcripts, so the details of Chinese 
involvement are not available. However, two Chinese academics, a CERNET 
representative, and a number of CNNIC representatives were active in the 
Forum’s sessions and workshops (APrIGF 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013f, 2013g). 
Similarly, transcripts for many of the 2014 sessions and workshops are not 
available, but existing records indicate participation by Xue Hong in her CDNC 
capacity, and by two CNNIC representatives (APrIGF 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 
2014d, 2014e). 
 
c. The UN, the ITU & NETMundial 
 
The Chinese government’s activities in the ITU and the UN in the lead-up to the 
WSIS, at the WSIS itself, and in the IGF post-WSIS, indicates a sustained effort 
to achieve international agreement on a norm of equal state authority over internet 
governance being recognized as dominant – with the effect of abolishing US 
government authority, and reducing or abolishing non-state actor authority. 
Beijing has clearly preferred for this to occur via the creation of an 
intergovernmental organization that either replaces ICANN outright, or replaces 
the US government’s current supervisory role over the internet’s global root. 
Equally clear, however, is the fact that China failed in this task in the WSIS and 
IGF. It has nevertheless continued these efforts in the UN and other policy 
organizations. As noted in discussion of the IGF, in 2011 China, Russia, 
Tajikstan and Uzbekistan called for an international code of conduct for 
cybersecurity that included a clause calling for the establishment of a multilateral 
technical internet management system (UNGA 2011b, p. 4). This clause is clearly 
directed at weakening US government authority and privatized governance, 
although it makes no mention of multi-stakeholder governance. 
 
Further Chinese government efforts at reform of internet governance regime has 
occurred at the 2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications 
(WCIT), held by the ITU in December 2012 (ITU 2012a).  The WCIT aimed to 
revise the International Telecommunications Regulations, the ITU’s primary 
global telecommunications treaty which had not been revised since 1988. Thus, 
the WCIT was the first opportunity for the ITU to incorporate internet governance 
into the ITRs. This led to speculation that the ITU, through the actions of its 
member states, would make a power grab for technical GIG authority (Kinderis 
2012), a power grab that did, in fact, eventuate at the WCIT. Much of the ITR 
negotiations at the WCIT were behind closed doors, but public pressure for the 
ITU to provide transparency, and the creation of a ‘WCITleaks’ website, led to 
certain information being made public (Dourado 2012). Ultimately, the WCIT 
resulted in a new version of the ITRs, but they were largely silent on internet 
governance, with a sole supporting resolution attached to them reiterating the 
WSIS Tunis Agenda’s statements (ITU 2012a; ITR, art. 10 (61); Resolution/Plen 
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3 (Dubai 2012)). Despite this, the US government and 54 other state governments 
refused to sign the new ITRs, for reasons including concern over their effect on 
state control of the internet (Dourado 2012; ITU 2012b).  
 
China's involvement in the WCIT appears to have followed the same path as its 
previous efforts in the UN, the ITU, the WSIS and the IGF, to have internet 
governance shifted towards a traditional multi-lateral, state-led governance 
model. Publicly available documents on Chinese contributions to WCIT include a 
request for new articles on cybercrime and cyber-security to be added to the ITRs, 
and two proposals submitted by China in conjunction with Russia and a range of 
African and Middle Eastern states which aimed to expand and entrench state 
governments' authority over internet governance, and provide an international 
legal basis for the divestment of the US government's and ICANN's existing 
authority (WCITleaks.org 2012a, 2012b, 2012c). When the first of these 
proposals was submitted, public outcry led to its withdrawal and, despite a second 
attempt at its inclusion by China and others, the language was not included in the 
final draft of the ITRs (Dourado 2012; ITU 2012a). As with Chinese and other 
states’ efforts in the WSIS, IGF and elsewhere, it appears that China failed in 
efforts to advance the state authority norm, abolish the US authority norm, and 
abolish or replace the privatized governance norm within the WCIT. 
 
Following the failure of the Chinese government and other governments to 
reform internet governance through the WCIT, the next development in this effort 
occurred in 2014, at a meeting on internet governance called NETMundial. 
NETMundial was organized and hosted by Brazil in response to global outrage 
over US government spying – including on Brazil's President (Lemos 2014, p. 6). 
Overall, Chinese attendance at the meeting was limited to two government 
officials and five civil society representatives (NETMundial 2014d). 
NETMundial’s peak body also included a Chinese UN official in its membership 
(NETMundial 2014b). Two submissions to NETMundial were made by Chinese 
government representatives: A Chinese UN official submitted a proposal for 
multi-stakeholder governance to be defined inclusively, with broad reference to 
multiple stakeholder classes (NETMundial 2014h), and the Chinese Foreign 
Affairs Ministry also submitted the ‘International Code of conduct for 
Information Security’ – the same document it submitted to the UN in 2011 and 
containing the same terms stipulating internet governance should be multilateral 
(NETMundial 2014c). One Chinese civil society actor submitted a suggestion on 
basic internet governance principles, which called for all actors to have the same 
rights in that governance (NETMundial 2014a).  
 
At the actual NETMundial meeting, two Chinese government representatives 
commented in sessions along with two civil society representatives. A Chinese 
UN official gave a welcoming statement at opening ceremony (NETMundial 
2014e). A Foreign Affairs Ministry official stated in one session that order was as 
important as human rights in internet governance, that internet governance should 
respect sovereignty, and that the world should ‘go with the UN resolution’ – a 
likely reference to the document submitted to NETMundial (NETMundial 2014f). 
A CNNIC representative commented at a session on internet governance 
principles that internet governance should respect the rights of states 
(NETMundial 2014g), while another CNNIC representative stated that internet 
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governance should be open to all stakeholders, but that different stakeholders 
should have different responsibilities (NETMundial 2014g). Thus, overall, 
Chinese participation in NETMundial illustrated continued advocacy for the state 
authority norm by the Chinese government and, interestingly, by CNNIC 
representatives. It also indicates continued acceptance of multi-stakeholder 
governance. 
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9. China & The US Authority Norm 
 
Building upon the last three chapters’ empirically-oriented analysis of Chinese 
engagement with administrative and policy organizations, the next four chapters 
engage in more theoretically-oriented analysis of this engagement. Specifically, 
each of these chapters assesses the overall roles that China has adopted towards 
each of the four core internet governance norms examined by the dissertation, and 
in doing so draws upon the norm lifecycle model and the dissertation’s suite of 
four potential political roles. These chapters also provide a theoretically-informed 
explanation for why China has adopted its various norm-maker, norm-taker and 
norm-entrepreneur roles towards these norms over their lifecycles, relying upon 
the dissertation’s multi-causal theoretical perspective to guide this explanation. 
This chapter examines the US authority norm, the next considers Chinese roles 
towards the privatized governance norm, followed by a chapter analyzing China 
and the multi-stakeholder governance norm and, finally, a chapter considering 
Chinese roles towards the state authority norm.  
 
With respect to US authority norm, this chapter argues that China has been a 
norm-taker towards US authority across its lifecycle, but has clearly become a 
dissatisfied norm-taker and has not internalized the norm within domestic 
Chinese internet governance. China’s norm-taker role is largely due to its initially 
passive acceptance of US government authority, and because Chinese actors were 
not actively involved in advancing the US authority norm to its global tipping 
point. China’s early acceptance of US government authority was motivated 
primarily by an interest in acquiring internet access, which also helped advance 
broader interests in technological progress, economic growth, and the promotion 
of the PRC’s and CCP’s internationalist image. Achieving internet connection 
explains China’s early norm-taker role, and partially explains why China 
continues to comply with US government authority despite Beijing’s eventual 
opposition to it. China remains a norm-taker, however, mainly because it doesn’t 
have sufficient material power – relative to the US – to abolish US government 
authority, or the ability to secure sufficient ideational support for an alternative to 
that authority. For Chinese non-state actors, in addition to these factors, they are 
constrained from efforts to oppose the US authority norm by interests in 
maintaining good relationships with non-Chinese counterparts. Despite 
complying with US government authority, China has not internalized this norm to 
any significant extent, instead rejecting its validity below the national level. This 
is because the norm threatens Chinese material interests and beliefs – it grants the 
US greater institutional power, and implies China is subordinate to the US. 
 
a. China’s Role During the Norm Emergence Phase 
 
China’s role during the US authority norm’s emergence cannot reasonably be 
described as that of a norm-entrepreneur, as no Chinese actors actively 
contributed to the norm’s emergence. China’s engagement with US government 
authority in this phase was mostly reactive and passive. No Chinese actors were 
part of the IAHC efforts to challenge the US government, and instead passively 
accepted the right of the US government to control the IPS and DNS. As argued 
in chapter 5, it was US government officials who acted as norm-entrepreneurs by 
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assuming authority over the nascent IPS and DNS and, in 1998, employing US 
material power to coercively trigger the norm’s global tipping point. Ironically, 
the unquestioning early acceptance by Chinese computer scientists and 
government officials of US government authority means that China could be 
regarded as playing a role in cementing the US authority norm’s position – given 
that China acknowledged this authority prior to the norm reaching its tipping 
point. However, this argument would ignore the passive role China played. As 
China did not actively contribute to the US authority norm reaching its tipping 
point, it cannot be described as a norm-entrepreneur. In addition, US government 
authority is generally only applicable at the global level – regulating final 
authority over the global internet root. Thus, it cannot be argued that China was a 
norm-entrepreneur at the regional or domestic levels. 
 
Instead, China is best described as having been a norm-taker, due to its largely 
passive acceptance of US government authority. Following early efforts by 
Chinese computer scientists to link China to the internet, Beijing and Washington 
negotiated a formal accord allowing Chinese interconnection with the IPS; the 
Chinese government directly acknowledged US authority in 1994. In addition, the 
.cn domain’s establishment in 1990 required a set of informal permissions from 
US government officials. Combined with Chinese non-state actor involvement in 
integrating China into the IPS, this illustrates early passive acceptance of US 
government authority amongst the Chinese technical internet community. In 1997 
the Leading Group on Informatization indicated China’s perception of the US 
authority norm’s limits, rejecting its applicability below the national level by 
asserting sovereign control of China’s IPS and DNS. Nevertheless, it was unable 
to prevent the norm from reaching its global tipping point and, because of this, 
and its early passivity towards US government authority, it is best seen as a norm-
taker. 
 
Initially, China’s passive norm-taker role arose because acceptance of US 
government authority was in the material interests of both the Chinese 
government and Chinese civil society computer scientists. This is because the US 
government was, and formally still is, the gatekeeper for internet access, as it has 
ultimate control over the global internet root (NTIA 2012a, 2015). Securing 
internet access was in Beijing’s material interests for a range of reasons. China 
clearly benefited materially from Chinese internet interconnection, as this 
advanced China’s general scientific and technological development. As former 
leader Jiang Zemin noted in the late Nineties: “Each of the four modernizations 
(of agriculture, industry, education and the military) has to depend on 
informatization” (Qiu 2004, p. 101). Strategically, internet access thus had great 
potential to enhance China’s longer-term relative power. In addition, internet 
access had potential to fuel economic growth, and thereby reduce the chance that 
China would continue to lag behind US and Western development levels (Zhao 
2010, p. 269). In 1994, when China gained internet access, the internet’s 
economic potential was gradually becoming apparent (Gordon 2002, p. 4). It was 
reasonable to conclude it would enhance Chinese economic growth, which it 
eventually did (Jiang 2010, p. 77, 78; Qiang 2007, p. 16). For Chinese computer 
scientists, internet interconnection allowed access to the world’s largest network 
and easy communication with foreign counterparts, helping advance China’s 
research (Komaitis 2009, p. 137). Chinese private sector actors were not active in 
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early Chinese efforts to secure internet access, but their early involvement in 
APNIC suggests they shared similar material interests as the rest of Chinese 
society. 
 
For less material reasons, Chinese interconnection with the internet helped to 
bolster China’s international image as a modern state that had abandoned earlier 
iconoclastic policies and hostility towards the Western world order (Kalathil & 
Boas 2010, p. 24; Medeiros & Fravel 2003, p. 24). Fostering a more 
internationalist image had strategic and diplomatic benefits for Beijing, increasing 
the willingness of liberal states to engage with China and accept China’s rise 
(Wang & Rosenau 2009, p. 23, 30). Domestically, this image also helped shore 
up the CCP’s domestic legitimacy, which is predicated in part on its ability to 
return China to a position of greatness, and in part on providing prosperity for the 
Chinese people. (Hachigian 2001, pp. 120-2; Wang 2005). Collectively, the 
pursuit of these interests outweighed any material or ideational concerns the 
Chinese government had over US internet hegemony. It was also necessary for 
Beijing to ignore these concerns, as Washington was unsure of granting China 
internet access due to the potential gains China could make from access to US 
networks (Hughes & Ermert 2003, p. 132; Tai 2013, pp. 244, 245). It also seems 
likely that Chinese computer scientists at least shared the ideal of open access to 
information with Western computer scientists – a goal best served by access to 
the TCP/IP network (Hu 2005, p. 186). 
 
China’s relative structural position also contributed to its initially passive norm-
taker role. In the early Nineties, US material power placed it in a commanding 
position in the international system generally and, in the context of the internet, 
rendered the US network the largest and most sophisticated in terms of both size 
of the user base and quality of emerging online services (Mowery & Simcoe 
2002; Saich 2004, p. 311). The legacy of centuries of Western economic and 
technological strength also meant that the underlying telecommunications 
network on which the internet relies was also dominated by the US and Europe – 
and, despite declining Western hegemony, is still predominantly controlled by 
Western states or US allies (Harvey 2013, p. 148; Malecki & Wei 2009). In 
addition, by 1994 most of the developed world had begun incorporating itself into 
the US TCP/IP network (Mowery & Simcoe 2002). Thus, any Chinese attempt to 
develop a competing global computer network would have been practically 
difficult given US material advantages and China’s relative lack of capabilities in 
global telecommunications. This material power disparity mean that Beijing, and 
Chinese non-state actors, had little choice but to passively accept US government 
authority. 
 
Ideationally, the international community's perception of China also acted as a 
barrier to any Chinese visions of an internet outside of US control. In the early 
Nineties, shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union and the occurrence of the 
Tiananmen Square incident, China's government was in an isolated political 
position – subject to sanctions from Western states as a result of the Tiananmen 
Square incident and reeling from the global retreat of communism, which 
jeopardized the CCP's domestic position in China (Larson & Shevchenko 2010, p. 
77; Saich 2004, p. 75). In this environment, beyond any material structural 
barriers, it would have been difficult for China to persuade other states to join an 
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international computer inter-network with a more equitable authority structure, 
and virtually impossible to convince liberal states. Such action would also likely 
have damaged Chinese efforts to advance its global reputation as an accepted 
member of international society – an important element of the Chinese 
government's general economic and political strategy (Ross & Zhu 2008, ch. 2).  
 
b. China’s Roles During the Norm Cascade Phase 
 
By 1998 the norm had reached its tipping point and, as argued, China had no 
active role in its emergence. China’s role, therefore, remained that of a norm-
taker in the US authority norm’s norm cascade phase. However, the Chinese 
government clearly transitioned during this phase from an apparently satisfied 
norm-taker into a much more vocally dissatisfied one. Despite limited rejection of 
the norm’s reach into the domestic sphere in 1997, Beijing did not begin actively 
contesting US government authority over the global internet root until 2001 – 
halfway through the norm’s cascade phase. In that year, China left ICANN’s 
GAC and gradually began advocating for the state authority norm as a 
replacement for the US authority norm. Nevertheless, it remained a norm-taker 
because it was unable to replace US government authority, and has continued to 
comply with that authority. Conversely, Chinese non-state actors have remained 
apparently satisfied norm-takers. Beijing continued to operate China’s domestic 
IPS and DNS in conformity with the global system during this cascade phase, 
with domestic law directing the CNNIC and other actors to conform to the US-
government supervised global regime – directions which the CNNIC largely 
complied with. While independently created and operated Chinese IDNs emerged 
in this phase, the CNNIC actively reassured ICANN that it was not seeking to 
operate outside of the global internet root. Compliance with the US-controlled 
system is also evident in Chinese private sector acceptance of ICANN’s authority, 
along with substantial and growing Chinese non-state actor engagement with 
ICANN, APNIC and various other administrative organizations during this time. 
 
China’s continued acquiescence to US government authority is largely due to the 
ongoing interest China has in remaining part of the US-controlled internet, which 
is stronger than its interest in protesting US authority. China also did not have the 
requisite material power or ideational support to coerce the US government into 
abandoning its authority, or to persuade others to circumvent it. That Beijing’s 
behavior changed in 2001 is largely due to changing calculations over advancing 
Chinese interests, given changing circumstances and greater Chinese knowledge 
of other states’ preferences. Likewise, changes in the material and ideational 
structure of global politics, and the Chinese government’s perception of this, had 
occurred by 2001. All of these factors contributed to China’s shift to overt 
dissatisfaction with the US authority norm and active resistance to it during its 
norm cascade phase. 
 
The interests China advanced by initially recognizing US government authority 
had largely been achieved by 2001, although some – such as broad interests in 
technological progression, economic development and maintaining an 
international image – could have been damaged by disconnection from the US-
controlled root. Nevertheless, because China’s more immediate interests had been 
achieved, Beijing had more freedom to oppose US government authority. 
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Because the Chinese state has a clear material interest in divesting the US 
government of its authority, as this would strengthen China’s relative power, it 
commenced advocating for the replacement of the US authority norm with the 
state authority norm. Similarly, the Chinese government’s assessment of its more 
ideational interests had changed by 2001. The domestic benefits accruing to the 
CCP by facilitating Chinese internet access had largely been achieved, as had the 
promise of economic growth from the internet (Qiang 2007, p. 16). Thus, Beijing 
considerations surrounding the merits of passive acquiescence to US government 
authority had arguably changed. Beijing now stood, and stands, to gain more 
domestically by opposing this authority as it helps paint the CCP as an advocate 
for a more equal world order that enhances the Chinese state’s global position 
(Gries et al. 2011; Yan 2001, p. 16, 17).  
 
The changing material and ideational structure of world politics also altered the 
Chinese government’s perception of its interests and its freedom to pursue them. 
Materially, China from 2001 onwards has become progressively stronger in 
relative material power. Its share of global GDP, and economic interdependence 
between other states and China, has grown dramatically since 1994 (Lin 2011, pp. 
1-3). By contrast, the US and wider Western world's material structural 
dominance has shrunk (Cox 2012). This has granted China greater freedom to be 
more forceful in its pursuit of its interests, as other states now have a stronger 
interest in avoiding tension with the PRC in order to protect their strategic 
position and economic relationships (Ross & Zhu 2008, p. 242). Nevertheless, 
relative to the West, it remains the case that China remains at a disadvantage in 
terms of general material power and control of global telecommunications 
infrastructure (Acharya 2014, p. 167; National Science Foundation 2014, pp. 4-
13). Thus, the Chinese government has more space to push for equal state 
authority to replace US government authority, but it is not in a dominant enough 
position to unilaterally impose its preferences in the manner in which the US 
government was able to do in the mid-Nineties.  
 
Ideationally, China’s position has also changed since 1994. China’s growing 
material power has enabled it to dampen or marginalize any ideational pressure 
the Wwest can exert on China (Ross & Zhu 2008, pp. 242, 243). China’s 
vulnerability, from the Tiananmen Square incident and communism’s global 
retreat, has also seemingly ended, and left the CCP largely unscathed (Sutter 
2012, p. 18, 139, 284; Zhu 2011, p. 124). These trends have further enhanced 
China’s freedom to pursue interests incompatible with those of the US, including 
advocacy for the US authority norm’s replacement. Beijing’s awareness of global 
beliefs on the appropriateness of US government authority has also grown. The 
ITU’s WSIS proposal provided a platform for states to coordinate a response to 
US government authority, and by 2001 the Chinese government arguably had a 
clearer indication of how widespread opposition to it was. Nevertheless, during 
the norm’s cascade phase, this resulted only in China's withdrawal from ICANN's 
GAC and muted criticism of the US authority norm in the first phase of the WSIS 
in 2003. 
 
While it seems reasonable to assume that Chinese non-state actors would also 
prefer some alternative to the US authority norm, they did not express opposition 
to it during its norm cascade phase – instead remaining passive norm-takers. This 
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is likely due to these actors having stronger interests in maintaining good 
relations with non-Chinese internet governance participants, in maintaining good 
relations with the Chinese government, and due to a lack of material power. Both 
Chinese civil society and private sector actors arguably prioritize maintaining 
good relations with internet governance organizations, businesses and other actors 
over abolishing US government authority, because Chinese participation in 
internet governance and technical internet-related business will be facilitated 
through such relationships. Given the justifications for the US authority norm – 
safeguarding free expression and a privatized governance model – and the 
illiberal reputation of China, public support for the norm’s replacement could 
damage Chinese non-state actors’ relationships (Mueller 2010, p. 217).  
 
Similarly, Beijing’s own clear preference for the state authority norm to replace 
the US authority norm explains why Chinese non-state actors do not actively 
support a different alternative, such as the privatized governance norm; doing so 
would likely anger the Chinese government and jeopardize Chinese non-state 
actors relationship with their own government. In addition, Chinese non-state 
actors simply do not have the material power necessary to effect any realistic 
change in global acceptance of US government authority, rendering active 
opposition to it futile. Conceivably, Beijing could encourage this opposition, but 
doing so would impose costs on these actors without any clear advantage 
accruing to the Chinese government. Thus, while it is likely that Chinese non-
state actors are dissatisfied with US government authority, their interests and lack 
of power resulted in their ongoing passivity during the US authority norm’s 
cascade phase. 
 
c. China’s Roles During the Norm Internalization Phase 
 
China’s norm-taker role towards the US authority norm has continued since 2004 
as it has been unable to engineer the norm’s replacement. During this phase of the 
norm’s lifecycle, the Chinese government has both reaffirmed its substantive 
compliance with US government authority and much more actively advocated for 
its replacement, both in policy organizations and within ICANN itself. 
Nevertheless, Beijing’s GAC return in 2009 indicates its continuing compliance 
with US government authority, given continuing US authority over the global 
root. Similarly, China’s domestic law still directs the CNNIC and other domestic 
internet governance actors to operate within the global internet root. Unlike the 
Chinese government, Chinese non-state actors have generally maintained their 
passive norm-taker role, although some limited resistance to US government 
authority is evident in civil society actors’ statements in policy organizations. 
These actors continue to comply with US government authority by operating 
China’s internet within the global root. Overall, China has not internalized the US 
authority norm to any significant extent. Beijing’s statements and behavior 
indicate clear rejection of the norm’s appropriateness and, to a lesser extent, so 
does that of Chinese non-state actors.  
 
The Chinese government’s continuing norm-taker role during the internalization 
phase is due to the same constellation of material and ideational interests – and 
similar material and ideation structural constraints – as those that shaped China’s 
role in the US authority norm’s cascade phase. Material constraints on Beijing 
    120 
 
have gradually lessened since 2004 as Chinese material power has grown, 
particularly since the Global Financial Crisis in 2009 (Ikenberry 2011; Xinbo 
2010, p. 159). In addition, the Chinese government’s perception of other states’ 
preferences has arguably enhanced its perceived freedom to oppose US 
government authority. In addition, the US invasion of Iraq also weakened the 
international reputation of the US (Brzezinski 2013, p. 70). Thus, based on these 
ideational shifts in world politics and Beijing’s perception of them, the Chinese 
government subsequently engaged in much more forceful opposition to the US 
authority norm in the WGIG.  
 
Post-WSIS, Beijing has continued its opposition to the US authority norm in the 
IGF, UN and ITU. The revelations Edward Snowden provided of widespread US 
foreign espionage also significantly damaged the US government’s reputation in 
internet governance and, as noted, led to increased Chinese hostility at the 2013 
IGF and directly to Brazil’s hosting of the NETMundial meeting in 2014 
(Almeida 2014, p. 65, 66). These spying revelations may even have triggered the 
US government’s policy shift from the Bush administration’s indefinite retention 
of US government authority over the internet’s global root to the 2014 
announcement that the US would transfer its authority to the 'global multi-
stakeholder community' in 2015 – thereby replacing US government authority 
with the privatized governance norm (Mueller & Kuerbis 2014, p. 2; NTIA 
2014b). China is thus likely to partially achieve its goal of abolishing the US 
authority norm, having been part of a coalition that successfully pressured the US 
government, although it is unlikely to see it replaced by China’s preferred 
alternative. 
 
Since 2004, the only direct statement by Chinese non-state actors against US 
government authority was by a CNCERT/CC representative in the IGF, who 
stated that ‘one government’ controlling internet governance was unjust. 
Otherwise, a few statements have been made by Chinese civil society actors in 
other policy organizations, in particularly the ISC in the WGIG, in favor of a 
stronger government role in internet governance. These could be interpreted as 
objections to the US authority norm rather than the privatized governance norm, 
but such statements have nevertheless been minimal, and Chinese non-state actors 
continue to passively comply with US government authority for the same reasons 
motivating this behavior during the norm’s cascade phase. 
 
Despite Chinese non-state actors’ passivity and the Chinese government’s failure 
to abolish the US authority norm, it is also apparent that China does not genuinely 
accept the legitimacy of US government authority. Beijing has clearly set limits 
on the extent of its acceptance, refusing to recognize its effect below the national 
level in 1997 via the Leading Group of Informatization’s asserting of sovereign 
Chinese authority over the Chinese IPS and DNS, and the establishment of legal 
supervision of Chinese technical internet operators. Chinese government policy 
statements also indicate a clear rejection of this norm, and Beijing’s behavior and 
statements in the regime’s administrative and policy organizations clearly 
demonstrate its ideational rejection of US government authority.  
 
While Chinese non-state actors have not asserted their rejection of the US 
authority norm’s appropriateness so overtly, they have also not expressed any 
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support for it. It is beyond the scope of the dissertation to examine domestic 
Chinese society in detail, but it does appear that Chinese non-state actors reject 
US government authority and would prefer to see it replaced, as indicated in 
statements made in Chinese academic journals and newspaper articles (see, for 
example: Cai 2012; Guo 2012; Huang 2007; Jiang 2011; Li 2002; Wang 2011; 
Xie 2005; Yu 2004). Given the broad rejection of the US authority norm by 
Chinese actors, it is clear that there has been no internalization of this norm. No 
Chinese actors express genuine ideational support for it, and it has not been 
localized within the domestic Chinese internet governance regime. China has 
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10. China & The Privatized Governance Norm 
 
Relative to the US authority norm, China has had a much more complex set of 
roles towards the privatized governance norm, with its roles varying across 
different governance levels and across different internet governance issues. In 
internet standards governance across the global, regional and domestic levels, 
China was not a norm-entrepreneur, as it was not actively involved in the 
emergence of non-state actor authority in this area. It has thus been a norm-taker, 
but an apparently satisfied one, throughout the privatized governance norm’s 
lifecycle. This is largely due to Beijing’s lack of any strong preference over how 
internet standards governance is conducted, and because the privatized 
governance norm in this area is in the material interests of Chinese non-state 
actors – granting them authority over this governance issue. China appears to 
have internalized the norm in this context, given its operation in domestic 
Chinese internet standards development, the extent of Chinese conformity to it, 
and the lack of any clear Chinese dissatisfaction with non-state actor authority in 
this context.  
 
In global IPS and DNS governance, China was also not a norm-entrepreneur 
because it was not active in the emergence of the privatized governance model at 
the global level, and has thus been a norm-taker across the privatized governance 
norm’s lifecycle. The Chinese government, similarly to the US authority norm, 
has clearly become a dissatisfied norm-taker in this context since 2001. It has 
remained a norm-taker, however, for largely the same reasons that it has in 
relation to US government authority, with the major difference being the greater 
ideational resistance Beijing faces in its efforts to abolish or weaken non-state 
actor authority. Conversely, Chinese non-state actors appear to have remained 
relatively satisfied norm-takers. This is because the norm is in these actors’ 
material interests, granting them rights to exercise authority. Growing Chinese 
non-state actors’ involvement in global IPS and DNS governance also suggests 
that these actors have internalized this norm, genuinely agreeing with its 
appropriateness in this context, even if the Chinese government has not. 
 
At the regional level of IPS and DNS governance, China was a norm-
entrepreneur in regional IPS governance because it actively contributed to the 
establishment of non-state actor authority in this context, and has thus become a 
norm-maker following the privatized governance norm reaching its global tipping 
point. However, China was not a norm-entrepreneur in regional DNS governance, 
primarily because this did not exist before the norm reached its global tipping 
point, and has therefore been a norm-taker across the privatized governance 
norm’s lifecycle in this context. The Chinese government and Chinese non-state 
actors appear to be satisfied with privatized governance at the regional level. This 
is likely because Beijing doesn’t have a strong preference towards the norm’s 
operation at this level, and because structural factors constrain it from challenging 
non-state actor authority at the regional level. For Chinese non-state actors, their 
satisfaction is likely due to the norm being in their material interests, and that the 
norm is arguably genuinely regarded as appropriate. Thus, it appears that Beijing 
may have internalized the norm’s appropriateness in regional IPS and DNS 
governance, and that Chinese non-state actors have internalized it in this context. 
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In domestic Chinese IPS and DNS governance, China was a norm-entrepreneur 
because its non-state actor authority over the Chinese IPS and DNS was 
established much before the privatized governance norm reached its global 
tipping point, and it has therefore been a norm-maker across the rest of the 
norm’s lifecycle. For the Chinese government, its acceptance of the norm at the 
domestic level is due to the same factors that shaped its response to the norm at 
the global level, but also because domestic privatized governance is arguably in 
Beijing’s material interests, and genuinely regarded as appropriate so long as non-
state actor authority remains subordinate to the Chinese government. For Chinese 
non-state actors, the privatized governance norm in domestic IPS and DNS 
governance is in their material interests and arguably genuinely agreed with by 
them. Thus, counter-intuitively, it appears that Beijing is relatively satisfied with 
non-state actor authority in domestic Chinese internet governance, and has 
internalized it in this context. However, it is more accurate to describe this as an 
instance of norm localization, as the Chinese government has ensured that the 
privatized governance norm in domestic IPS and DNS governance grants non-
state actors authority, but not authority equal to, or greater than, that of the 
Chinese government. 
 
a. China’s Roles During the Norm Emergence Phase 
 
With the privatized governance norm in internet standards governance – across 
the global, regional and domestic levels – China can’t be described as a norm-
entrepreneur because Chinese actors were generally not engaged in this 
governance until after the norm reached its global tipping point, and because no 
Chinese actors actively contributed to the norm’s emergence. As argued in 
chapter 5, the privatized governance norm in internet standards governance 
reached its global tipping point in 1992, six years earlier than it did in global IPS 
and DNS governance. It was individual computer scientists from the US who 
acted as norm-entrepreneurs in this context, triggering a quiet cascade of the 
norm when they formalized the IETF’s governance processes in 1992. There is no 
record of Chinese actors being involved in the establishment of the IETF’s 
internal governance procedures. Chinese government-affiliated individuals did 
not attend an IETF meeting until 1994, and individuals affiliated with other 
stakeholder groups are not recorded attending IETF meetings until 1995. 
Similarly, the first Chinese authored RFC was published in 1995. Therefore, due 
to the earlier tipping point of the norm in internet standards governance and 
China’s limited involvement in the early IETF community, China is best 
described as a norm-taker in this context. 
 
Similarly, there was no regional internet standards development in the Asia-
Pacific, at least that China was a part of, until the Joint Engineering Taskforce 
was established in 2000. Thus, Chinese engagement with regional internet 
standards governance only occurred after the privatized governance norm had 
reached its general global tipping point. For that reason, China cannot be regarded 
as a norm-entrepreneur at the regional level, and is instead better described as a 
norm-taker. Likewise, domestic internet standards governance in China appears 
to have begun with the CNNIC’s development of Chinese IDNs in 1997. Here, 
Chinese civil society did engage in standards development before the norm of 
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non-state actor authority reached its general global tipping point. However, given 
the earlier establishment of the norm in this issue area, and the relatively late 
commencement of domestic Chinese standards development, it is arguably more 
accurate to describe China as having been a norm-taker rather than a norm-
entrepreneur. 
 
Given the lack of any early Chinese government involvement in internet 
standards governance, and its lack of any attempt at regulating this issue area, it 
appears that Beijing’s passive norm-taker status towards the privatized 
governance norm in internet standards governance is due simply to it not having a 
strong preference for how this activity was conducted. This seems probable given 
that internet standards are explicitly designed to be freely available and to only 
address technical issues – there aren’t, therefore, any commercial or political 
concerns inherent within this governance issue. For Chinese non-state actors, the 
norm’s existence in internet standards governance is in their material interests, as 
it justifies their right to exercise authority within this governance area. This 
explains why Chinese civil society actors willingly accepted the emergence of 
non-state actor authority over internet standards governance.  
 
Much like with US government authority, Chinese involvement with the 
privatized governance norm’s emergence in global level IPS and DNS 
governance was mostly reactive, and China cannot be described as having been a 
norm-entrepreneur during the norm’s emergence. Prior to ICANN's formation, no 
Chinese actors were involved in the global governance of the IPS and DNS, with 
both of these activities conducted by the US government and predominantly US 
private sector and civil society actors. Instead, Chinese efforts to establish the .cn 
domain and interconnect with the IPS simply accepted the right of non-state 
actors to wield authority over the global IPS and DNS. Chinese actors were also 
not involved in the IAHC attempt to divest the US government of its authority 
over the global root, and no Chinese actors were involved in the US government's 
orchestration of ICANN's creation. Thus the establishment of non-state actor 
authority in global IPS and DNS governance occurred without any active 
involvement of China. For that reason, China is best described as a norm-taker 
during the emergence of the privatized governance norm in global IPS and DNS 
governance. 
 
Beijing likely adopted its initial norm-taking role towards the norm in global IPS 
and DNS governance for the same reasons it passively accepted the US authority 
norm, and the same is true for Chinese civil society actors. That is, acceptance of 
the privatized governance norm helped secure enhanced research opportunities 
for Chinese computer scientists, potentially enhanced China's strategic position 
by improving its technological and scientific expertise, increased prospects for 
economic growth and for China to catch up to Western levels of development, 
and granted reputation benefits to the Chinese state internationally and the CCP 
domestically. Similarly, the same material and ideational structural barriers 
prevented the Chinese government from actively contesting this norm in its early 
lifecycle, namely China's lack of material power over global telecommunications 
infrastructure, the physical location of the internet's global root in US territory, 
growing global interconnection with the US TCP/IP-based internet, and the 
Chinese government's sensitive political position following the fall of the Soviet 
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Union and the occurrence of the Tiananmen Square incident. One final ideational 
barrier also likely further constrained Beijing's early willingness to contest the 
norm in this area. Unlike the US authority norm, there were and are much broader 
levels of genuine agreement with the appropriateness of privatized governance 
amongst liberal states and amongst non-state actors (Kleinwachter 2004, p. 233; 
Rogers 2007, p. 7, 8).  
 
With regional IPS governance, however, China can be argued to have acted as a 
norm-entrepreneur. All three Chinese stakeholder classes were founding members 
of APNIC – which was established in 1995, three years prior to the privatized 
governance norm's global tipping point. While the Chinese government’s early 
involvement with APNIC was limited mostly to its membership of the 
organization, it was nevertheless involved in APNIC’s founding and contributed, 
therefore, to the establishment of its privatized governance model. The Chinese 
private sector has a similar level of engagement, but five businesses were 
founding APNIC members. Conversely, Chinese civil society was a much more 
active stakeholder group in APNIC’s early years. As noted in chapter 7, Li Xing 
from CERNET was a significant contributor to APNIC’s establishment and was 
elected to APNIC’s EC in 1996. Since APNIC’s establishment, Chinese civil 
society actors have been active participants within the organization. They, in 
particular, can be argued to have acted as norm-entrepreneurs in establishing non-
state actor authority in regional IPS governance, although this arguably extends to 
Chinese actors from all three stakeholder groups.  
 
China cannot be regarded as a norm-entrepreneur in regional DNS governance, 
however, because the pre-ICANN regime largely glossed over regional DNS 
governance. After ICANN’s establishment, the only regional level administrative 
organization dedicated to regional DNS governance in the Asia-Pacific is the 
APTLD. While Chinese civil society actors were involved in the APTLD’s 
establishment, the organization was only founded in 1998, and thus not until after 
the privatized governance norm had reached its global tipping point. Thus, there 
was no Chinese engagement with privatized governance in regional DNS 
governance during the norm’s emergence phase, because such governance did not 
exist at this time. 
 
Beijing’s norm-maker role with respect to regional IPS governance is arguably 
due to the Chinese government lacking any strong preference about how regional 
level internet governance is conducted. Aside from inferences about its 
preference towards the privatized governance norm in global level IPS 
governance, Beijing has given no indication of its preferences at the regional 
level. Arguably it has no strong preferences, because modification of regional IPS 
governance would not change the character of the global regime, would damage 
China’s reputation with no clear benefit, and would be effectively as difficult to 
achieve as reform of global IPS and DNS governance. In essence, the Chinese 
government has bigger fish to fry at the global level. Conversely, it is in the 
material interests of Chinese non-state actors for the norm to regulate regional 
IPS governance, as this justifies the right to authority over this governance issue. 
Chinese non-state actors’ extensive early engagement with APNIC has also 
arguably socialized Chinese civil society and – to a lesser extent private sector – 
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actors into genuinely internalizing beliefs about the value and appropriateness of 
privatized governance in this context. 
 
Structural factors would also constrain any Chinese government efforts to replace 
the privatized governance norm in regional IPS or DNS governance. Despite 
growing Chinese material power, Beijing does not have the material power at the 
regional level to impose a state-led governance model – in part because it does 
not have dominant control over regional telecommunications infrastructure 
(Malecki & Wei 2009, pp. 372-4). Additionally, APNIC and the APTLD are 
legally incorporated and physically located in Australia and Malaysia, 
respectively (APNIC 2015; APTLD 2015a). Beijing cannot, therefore, exert legal 
and physical control over regional administrative organizations the way 
Washington could at the global level. Even if it could, regional changes would 
have no effect on the global regime, and could jeopardize China’s global 
reputation. Ideationally, Beijing is also constrained from pursuing reform at the 
regional level because liberal states – such as Australia or Japan – would likely 
oppose efforts to establish state authority over regional IPS and DNS governance. 
 
In domestic Chinese IPS and DNS governance, China can be described as a 
norm-entrepreneur in the privatized governance norm’s emergence phase. While 
it took a formal Sino-American intergovernmental agreement to incorporate 
China into the IPS, its domestic governance was conducted by the nominally civil 
society CAS from 1994 until 1997. In 1997, Beijing itself formally authorized the 
establishment of the CNNIC as China’s peak IPS body, which grants authority to 
both civil society and private sector actors. Because the development of China's 
domestic IPS occurred prior to the norm reaching its global tipping point, it is 
arguably the case that China was a norm-entrepreneur at the domestic level. 
Similarly, domestic DNS governance in China was initially conducted by Chinese 
civil society computer scientists, and upon China’s incorporation into the global 
root in 1994, authority over the .cn domain was vested in the CAS. It was not 
until 1997 that the Chinese government intervened, formalizing current 
arrangements by authorizing the CAS’ subsidiary body, the CNNIC, to operate 
the .cn domain. Thus, as with the IPS in China, the DNS in China has a long and 
sustained history of non-state actor authority over its daily administration and 
policy development prior to the privatized governance norm reaching its global 
tipping point. Therefore, China can be described as a norm-entrepreneur in 
relation to domestic DNS governance. 
 
The Chinese government seems to have initially accepted the privatized 
governance norm in domestic IPS and DNS governance because of the various 
benefits this granted the Chinese state. By allowing civil society computer 
scientists to take an early leading role, Beijing maximized the chances of China 
securing permission to interconnect with the US TCP/IP network and reap the 
potential rewards, namely: enhanced research opportunities, technological 
progress and economic growth, and the reputation benefits internet access 
provided the PRC internationally and the CCP domestically. Beyond these 
factors, Beijing had begun experimenting with privatization in the Chinese 
economy in the Eighties and this ramped up in the Nineties, concomitant with the 
internet's emergence (Harwit & Clark 2001, pp. 384-7; Saich 2004, pp. 282-5). 
Arguably, therefore, Beijing already had an emerging preference for privatized 
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governance which rendered it more open to accepting the appropriateness of 
privatized governance of China’s IPS and DNS – so long as this authority is 
subordinate to that of the Chinese government.  
 
For Chinese civil society computer scientists, their early assumption of 
responsibility likely occurred because it was in their material interest to do so. It 
was necessary for someone to manage China’s nascent IPS and DNS, and given 
computer internetworking was initially a predominantly academic activity, these 
computer scientists were naturally placed to govern these systems. In addition, 
Chinese computer scientists were arguably socialized into accepting the 
privatized governance norm through interaction with the nascent technical 
internet community; most internet governance in the US was at this time 
conducted by civil society computer scientists, and most global collaboration 
occurred between academics. It is likely that this exposed Chinese computer 
scientists to US cyber-libertarian beliefs, and may have influenced their 
perception of privatized governance’s legitimacy. After the formalization of 
China's domestic regime in 1997, it clearly continues to be in the interests of 
Chinese civil society actors – and now those of the Chinese private sector – to 
have authority over China’s IPS and DNS, as this grants them power they 
otherwise would not have. 
 
b. China’s Roles During the Norm Cascade Phase 
 
China’s role towards the privatized governance norm during the cascade phase of 
its lifecycle have remained largely similar to those it adopted during the norm’s 
emergence phase, although, once the norm reached its global tipping point, 
China’s status as a norm-entrepreneur in regional IPS governance and domestic 
IPS and DNS governance means that it can subsequently be described as a norm-
maker in these contexts. In relation to internet standards governance across the 
global, regional and domestic levels, China has remained a norm-taker and 
appears to be a relatively satisfied one. As noted, Chinese engagement with the 
IETF was limited until 2005, but individuals affiliated with each stakeholder 
group did participate in IETF meetings in limited numbers between from 1992 to 
2004, and two RFCs were published during this time (Appendix 2; IETF 2004a). 
Because of this ongoing engagement, and because there is no evidence of Chinese 
dissatisfaction with non-state actor authority in this context, China can be 
described as a satisfied norm-taker.  
 
This also appears the case in regional and domestic internet standards 
governance. The Joint Engineering Taskforce, establishing in 2000, facilitated 
Chinese non-state actor participation in internet standards development at the 
regional level, while the CNNIC engaged in standards development related to 
Chinese IDNs within China from approximately 1997 onwards, and contributed 
to the creation of the CDNC. There has been no indication by the Chinese 
government that it disapproves of these arrangements, and non-state actor 
involvement in regional and domestic standards development implies that the 
Chinese government is genuinely willing for such actors to exercise authority in 
this context. The reasons for China’s ongoing satisfied norm-taker role in this 
area are likely the same as in the norm emergence phase – Beijing has no strong 
preference in this issue area, and the privatized governance norm serves non-state 
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actors’ material interests. It is also arguably the case that China had already come 
to genuinely accept the appropriateness of the norm in this context, and thus 
internalized it. 
 
In regards to global IPS and DNS governance, as with US government authority, 
the Chinese government gradually transitioned to a more dissatisfied norm-taker 
role during the privatized governance norm’s cascade phase. Beijing has 
nevertheless remained a norm-taker in this context, because it has been unable to 
engineer the replacement of the norm with the state authority norm. Continued 
Chinese government acquiescence to the privatized governance norm in global 
IPS and DNS governance is evident in Beijing’s early participation in ICANN’s 
GAC, which involved direct acknowledgement of the advisory role of 
governments, a role explicitly recognized by the Chinese government in its 
agreement with the GAC’s initial Operating Principles, which affirmed support 
for ICANN’s privatized governance model. This illustrates Beijing’s passive 
acceptance of non-state actor authority up until its withdrawal from the GAC in 
2001. Following this, however, the Chinese government gradually began to 
advocate for the state authority norm to replace – or at least weaken – the 
privatized governance norm in global IPS and DNS governance. While Beijing 
subtly indicated this in the first phase of the WSIS, it continued to tacitly accept 
the participation of Chinese non-state actors in ICANN’s governance processes – 
including acceptance of an ICANN meeting occurring in China in 2002. 
 
The Chinese government’s transition to a dissatisfied norm-taker in this context is 
due to the Chinese government’s changing perception of its interests and 
structural position. These were discussed in detail in the previous chapter, but in 
summary are that the Chinese government continued to have an interest in 
interconnection with the internet as it advanced broader interests in technological 
progression, economic development, and maintaining China's internationalist 
image. This meant that Beijing was unwilling to cease compliance with the 
privatized governance norm by severing connections with the global internet root. 
Nevertheless, The Chinese government had greater freedom to promote its 
preference for stronger state authority over global IPS and DNS governance 
because, so long as it complied with the privatized governance norm by 
remaining within the global internet root, it would not jeopardize its material and 
ideational interests. In addition, China’s relative material power had increased 
since the Nineties, and the Chinese government's perception of its relative 
position within the material structure of the international system had changed. 
Likewise, its political vulnerability in global politics had decreased, and its 
awareness of other states’ preferences towards internet governance had increased. 
All of this combined to make Beijing more willing to actively contest non-state 
actor authority in global IPS and DNS governance. 
 
Unlike the Chinese government, Chinese non-state actors seem to have remained 
relatively satisfied norm-takers towards the privatized governance norm in global 
IPS and DNS governance during the cascade phase of its lifecycle. As chapter 7 
and 8 illustrated, the Chinese private sector had limited but sustained participation 
in administrative organizations between 1998 and 2004, and made no clear 
comments indicating disagreement with the norm in any policy organizations. 
Similarly, Chinese civil society had limited, sustained but far more active 
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involvement than the private sector in administrative organizations during this 
time, and likewise made no clear statements indicating disagreement with the 
privatized governance norm until 2004. The continued satisfaction of Chinese 
non-state actors with privatized governance in global IPS and DNS governance 
appears to be because the norm is in their material interests, granting them the 
right to participate in governance. For Chinese civil society, there is also arguably 
a substantial degree of ideational acceptance of this norm, given the high levels of 
sustained engagement by these actors across all internet governance 
organizations.  
 
With regional IPS governance, China can be described as having shifted from a 
norm-entrepreneur into a norm-maker, due to its active role establishing the norm 
in this governance. In regional DNS governance, however, China can only be 
described as a norm-taker, because the APTLD was only formed after the 
privatized governance norm reached its global tipping point. Nevertheless, in both 
roles China appears to be satisfied with its status across all three stakeholder 
groups. The Chinese government has, as noted, had limited engagement with 
APNIC, but it remained a member of the organization and made no statements 
indicating dissatisfaction with privatized governance of the regional IPS during 
the norm’s cascade phase. The Chinese private sector was similarly inactive in 
APNIC, although two companies sponsored APNIC conferences during this time. 
Chinese civil society actors, in contrast, were active in and sponsored APNIC 
conferences during this time, and held high-level positions within APNIC in the 
norm’s cascade phase. APNIC itself also hosted or participated in a range of 
events in China during this time. In regional DNS governance, Chinese 
acceptance of the privatized governance norm during its cascade phase is evident 
in the role Chinese civil society representatives played in the formation of the 
APTLD, in the high-level positions held by one representative within APTLD, 
and in the active participation within APTLD conferences by Chinese civil 
society representatives. As with the Chinese government, no Chinese non-state 
actors made any comments at policy organizations indicating disapproval of the 
norm in regional IPS or DNS governance. 
 
The reason for China’s continuing satisfaction with its norm-maker and norm-
taker roles at the regional level is likely the same as those that explained these 
roles in the privatized governance norm’s emergence phase. The Chinese 
government lacks any strong preference towards regional IPS and DNS 
governance as it doesn’t change how the global regime operates, and interfering 
with it would damage China’s reputation, and because China lacks the material 
power to effect any significant change. For Chinese non-state actors, the reason 
for their continuing satisfaction is likely because the norm in regional IPS and 
DNS governance is in their material interests, granting them power over this 
governance. The high levels of Chinese involvement, at least in terms of Chinese 
civil society, within regional internet governance organizations also suggests 
genuine acceptance of non-state actor authority at the regional level.  
 
Similarly to regional IPS governance, China’s initial norm-entrepreneur roles in 
domestic IPS and DNS governance means that it can be described as a norm-
maker in this context. It also appears to be a satisfied norm-maker. Since the 
privatized governance norm reached its global tipping point, the Chinese 
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government has signaled its continuing acceptance of privatized governance in 
China’s domestic regime by allowing the CNNIC to remain the peak domestic 
body, allowing non-state actor-operated DNS dispute resolution schemes within 
China, and allowing gTLD registrars to wield administrative authority. In 
addition, it has allowed Chinese non-state actors to maintain direct relationships 
with APNIC, ICANN and foreign gTLD registries and registrars. The fact that 
non-state actors continued to wield authority over China’s IPS and DNS during 
the privatized governance norm’s cascade phase, even as the Chinese government 
was gearing up to challenge it at the global level, indicates that China is relatively 
satisfied with the norm at the domestic level – albeit with non-state actor 
authority clearly subordinate to that of the Chinese government. 
 
Beijing’s apparent satisfaction with non-state actor authority in domestic Chinese 
IPS and DNS governance is likely due to the same reasons it initially accepted 
this norm in domestic Chinese internet governance. It maximizes the benefits of 
Chinese internet access by facilitating Chinese non-state actor contact with the 
internet governance regime, and preserves some of the image benefits of Chinese 
conformity to the privatized governance norm. Simple path dependence – as the 
Leading Group on Informatization had already organized China’s domestic 
regime – and a Chinese governmental preference for some level of (tightly 
supervised) privatized governance because of its perceived efficiency, are also 
likely reasons (Harwit & Clark 2001, pp. 384-7; Saich 2004, pp. 282-5). The 
history of China's partial privatization of domestic telecommunications 
governance does suggest it is at least somewhat supportive of privatized 
governance models (Fu & Mou 2010). Given that the Chinese government can 
intervene in the domestic regime when necessary, has subordinated non-state 
actor authority to its own authority, and can infiltrate domestic organizations with 
CCP cells, it seems likely that Beijing genuinely believes a limited form of 
privatized governance is appropriate in its domestic IPS and DNS governance 
(Saich 2000, p. 133; Shao 2012, ch. 2). For Chinese non-state actors, their 
continuing satisfaction with the norm in this context is due to it being in their 
material interest, while it is also likely these actors genuinely believe in its 
legitimacy. 
 
c. China’s Roles During the Internalization Phase 
 
Since 2004, China’s various roles towards the privatized governance norm at 
different levels, and across different governance issues, have remained identical 
to those it had during the norm’s cascade phase – China remained a norm-taker 
towards the norm at the global level, in internet standards governance and in 
regional DNS governance, while it remained a norm-maker in regard to regional 
IPS governance and domestic Chinese IPS and DNS governance. The reasons for 
these ongoing roles, and the various levels of Chinese satisfaction, are also 
identical to those in the norm cascade phase of the privatized governance norm’s 
lifecycle. The only major difference is that the intensity of Chinese government 
dissatisfaction with non-state actor authority in global IPS and DNS governance 
has waxed, waned, and waxed again during this phase of the norm’s lifecycle. 
Nevertheless, China has remained satisfied with the norm in all areas save in 
global IPS and DNS governance, and Chinese actors across all three stakeholder 
groups appear to have internalized the norm to a significant degree in internet 
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standards governance, regional IPS and DNS governance, and in the localized 
form of the norm in domestic IPS and DNS governance. The Chinese government 
has clearly not accepted the legitimacy of privatized governance in global IPS and 
DNS governance – although it has moderated its efforts from seeking 
abolishment of non-state actor authority in ICANN to seeking it being weakened. 
However, Chinese non-state actors – particularly from Chinese civil society – 
appear to genuinely accept the legitimacy of the norm in global IPS and DNS 
governance. 
 
China has remained a norm-taker towards the privatized governance norm in 
internet standards governance, and it appears to be very satisfied with the norm in 
this context to the point, arguably, of having internalized it – taking it for granted 
in this issue area. Chinese engagement with internet standards governance has 
strengthened during the norm’s internalization phase. Chinese government-
affiliated individuals have become consistent attendees at IETF meetings since 
2009, and have gradually increased their contribution to RFC development. There 
is also some limited support for the IETF in the Chinese White Paper on the 
Internet, which describes the IETF in positive terms. Overall, the small but 
growing level of Chinese government-affiliated individuals’ engagement with the 
IETF, the lack of any criticism of it by Beijing, and Chinese government 
acceptance of Chinese non-state actor engagement with the IETF suggests that 
the Chinese government has internalized the privatized governance norm in this 
context, accepting its legitimacy in global level internet standards governance. 
This is also arguably the case with respect to regional and domestic internet 
standards governance, where there has been no indication of Chinese government 
opposition to non-state actor development of internet standards governance, and 
some indication of Chinese government participation in the CDNC and Joint 
Engineering Taskforce. 
 
Compared with the Chinese government, Chinese individuals affiliated with the 
private sector and civil society – and particularly those affiliated with private 
sector – have increased their participation with the IETF dramatically since 2004, 
with consistent and growing attendance at IETF meetings since 2005, growing 
levels of responsibility within the IETF itself, and increased contributions to RFC 
development. Chinese corporations, and some civil society organizations, have 
become regular sponsors of IETF meetings since 2007. This increasing 
participation in the IETF suggests a high degree of acceptance of privatized 
governance in internet standards governance amongst Chinese non-state actors, 
and a significant degree of internalization of the norm. The fact that Chinese non-
state actors have largely not commented on the IETF’s governance model in 
administrative or policy organizations supports this analysis, the sole exception 
being a single comment at the WGIG in 2004 by an ISC representative, who 
argued in favor of a primary role for governments in this area. This comment, 
however, occurred prior to the significant increase in Chinese engagement with 
the IETF, and it is also contradicted by subsequent Chinese approaches to internet 
standards governance at the regional and domestic levels, where non-state actors 
have taken active roles in development. 
 
However, the Chinese government has clearly not internalized the privatized 
governance norm in relation to global IPS and DNS governance. Here, Beijing’s 
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dissatisfaction with the norm has been variable, but throughout the norm’s 
internalization phase it has attempted to either replace this norm with the state 
authority norm or – later in this phase – weaken it within ICANN. Beijing’s 
dissatisfaction with privatized governance of the global IPS and DNS was 
strongest in 2004 at the WGIG, where Chinese government representatives 
argued forcefully for state actors to enjoy exclusive authority over the internet’s 
global root. These efforts continued, less forcefully, in the second phase of the 
WSIS and in the IGF, UN, ITU and NETMundial. Conversely, however, Beijing 
returned to its subordinate position in ICANN’s GAC in 2009 and increased its 
engagement with ICANN. China has also conformed to the privatized governance 
norm by remaining within the global internet root, and its opposition to privatized 
governance has moderated slightly, with Chinese government representatives 
arguing in later ICANN meetings that the IANA transition should result in 
governments being granted equal power relative to non-state actors within 
ICANN, rather than that they should have greater power. Beijing has also 
continued to tacitly accept the participation of Chinese non-state actors within 
ICANN and related bodies, and within policy organizations. It seems unlikely 
that the Chinese government has come to genuinely accept the legitimacy of non-
state actor authority over the global IPS and DNS, however, despite its varying 
dissatisfaction. Rather, it is more likely that it simply does not have the material 
power or ideational support to engineer the norm’s replacement in this area. 
 
Chinese non-state actors have arguably deepened the degree of their acceptance 
of the privatized governance norm during its internalization phase, however, as 
growing non-state actor participation in global level regime organizations 
suggests. Chinese private sector actors, despite their relatively low levels of 
engagement with ICANN and related bodies, have nevertheless sustained their 
participation within these organizations, continued to operate within the global 
root, and have made no clear statements opposing non-state actor authority in 
global IPS and DNS governance in either administrative or policy organizations. 
Relative to the private sector, Chinese civil society involvement in administrative 
organizations indicates a deeper level of acceptance of the privatized governance 
norm, as demonstrated by more active involvement (including sponsorship and 
increased attendance levels) at ICANN meetings, increased participation in policy 
development within ICANN’s subsidiary bodies, and more significant positions 
being held by Chinese civil society representatives in ICANN’s internal 
bureaucracy. Chinese civil society organizations continue to operate China’s IPS 
and DNS within the global root – save for the apparently temporary external 
operation of Chinese IDNs. This suggests that Chinese non-state actors, particular 
Chinese civil society actors, have increasingly internalized the norm in global IPS 
and DNS governance, genuinely accepting its appropriateness in this context. 
 
Chinese non-state actor engagement with policy organizations in the privatized 
governance norm’s internalization phase has also been sustained, and civil society 
representatives have assumed positions within the IGF’s MAG. Nevertheless, 
comments by Chinese non-state actors in policy organizations have tended to 
either be ambivalent about privatized governance, or critical of it. Criticism of 
non-state actor authority is evident in the ISC representatives’ statements in the 
WGIG and the IGF, and by civil society actors at the NETMundial meeting – 
which in all instances called for governments to have a greater role in internet 
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governance. Despite such occasional comments, however, the pattern of Chinese 
non-state actor engagement with global IPS and DNS governance has illustrated 
increased participation and generally implicit support for privatized governance. 
Arguably, Chinese non-state actors have come to genuinely accept the 
appropriateness of non-state actor authority in this context. 
 
Unlike global IPS and DNS governance, the Chinese government has not 
indicated any dissatisfaction towards the privatized governance norm in regional 
IPS and DNS governance during the norm’s internalization phase. In fact, 
Beijing’s engagement with APNIC has slightly increased during this time, 
although the low level of engagement suggests that it remains largely 
unconcerned with privatized governance at the regional level. This lack of 
concern suggests, perhaps, that Beijing has internalized the norm’s 
appropriateness at the regional level to some extent. However, the degree of 
support for this norm in regional IPS and DNS governance is stronger with 
Chinese non-state actors. They have remained active in regional IPS and DNS 
governance during the privatized governance norm’s internalization phase, 
particularly with respect to Chinese civil society participation within APNIC and 
the APTLD. Chinese civil society has also been active in the APrIGF since this 
organization was founded. The fact that Chinese non-state actor engagement with 
regional level IPS and DNS organizations, and with the APrIGF, has been 
increasing over time suggests a high degree of acceptance and internalization 
within the Chinese private sector and Chinese civil society of the norm's 
appropriateness in this area.  
 
Continuing Chinese acceptance of the privatized governance norm in domestic 
IPS and DNS governance is also evident in the norm’s internalization phase. 
China’s domestic regime remains centered in the CNNIC, and the Chinese 
government has extended non-state actor authority by authorizing CONAC to 
govern some of China’s IDNs. This suggests that the Chinese government 
continues to support privatized governance in domestic IPS and DNS governance, 
at least in its localized form with non-state actor authority clearly subordinate to 
that of the Chinese government. However, as noted above, Beijing’s support for a 
significant degree of non-state actor authority in its domestic regime may simply 
be because it can so readily influence the domestic internet governance through 
law, a coercive state apparatus, and CCP influence over non-state actors within 
domestic internet governance organizations. For Chinese non-state actors, it 
seems clear that they continue to genuinely accept their own rights to some 
authority within China’s domestic internet governance regime. 
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11. China & The Multi-Stakeholder Governance Norm 
 
China’s roles towards the multi-stakeholder governance norm have varied across 
governance levels and some issue areas, but solely due to when Chinese 
engagement commenced, and the underlying reasons for China’s roles are 
relatively simple. As noted in chapter 5, internet standards governance is not 
multi-stakeholder at the global level, therefore this chapter focuses only on IPS 
and DNS governance. At the global level, China was not a norm-entrepreneur 
because it did not actively contribute to the multi-stakeholder governance norm 
reaching its global tipping point. Thus, it has been a norm-taker across the multi-
stakeholder governance norm’s lifecycle, but a satisfied one. In regional IPS 
governance, China was a norm-entrepreneur because of its founding role in 
APNIC, and has since been a satisfied norm-maker. It wasn’t a norm-
entrepreneur in regional DNS governance, however, because this governance 
wasn’t clearly established prior to the multi-stakeholder governance norm’s 
global tipping point. China has therefore been a norm-taker in this context, but a 
satisfied one. Domestically, China’s early establishment of a multi-stakeholder 
regime has resulted in it being a norm-entrepreneur and consequently a satisfied 
norm-maker.  
 
The underlying factors behind China’s various roles are straightforward. For that 
reason, they are stated here at the beginning of the chapter because they explain 
Chinese behavior towards the multi-stakeholder governance norm across its 
lifecycle and across various different governance levels. Multi-stakeholder 
governance is in the material interests of the Chinese government, private sector, 
and civil society because it justifies their right to participate in internet 
governance and enhances the quality of administration and policy development. 
Similarly, it is in each of these stakeholder group’s ideational interest, as they all 
believe in the underlying justification for multi-stakeholder governance – that it 
improves the quality and legitimacy of governance. Because multi-stakeholder 
governance is in the interests of the Chinese government, material and ideational 
structural factors do not play a large role in the dissertation's explanation for 
China's roles towards the norm. It should be noted, however, that the same 
structural factors that apply to the privatized governance norm also relate to the 
multi-stakeholder governance norm. The sole exception is that global ideational 
structure is more in supportive of multi-stakeholder governance than it is towards 
non-state actor authority, as indicated by broad acceptance of the concept within 
the more state-centric UN and ITU and across other global governance issue areas 
(UNGA 2002; Hemmati, Dodds & Enayati 2002; ITU 1998b; Vallejo & 
Hauselmann 2004) 
 
a. China’s Roles During the Norm Emergence Phase 
 
In global IPS and DNS governance, China cannot be regarded as a norm-
entrepreneur because it was not active in the establishment of early IPS and DNS 
governance. As noted in the previous two chapters, no Chinese actors were 
involved in early global level IPS and DNS governance, or in the IAHC attempt 
to relocate the global root, or in the establishment of ICANN. Instead, it was 
primarily US stakeholders, particularly the US government, which acted as norm-
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entrepreneurs by actively developing a multi-stakeholder regime – even if it was 
not initially described explicitly in those terms. China is best described as a norm-
taker because it wasn’t an active contributor to the emergence of multi-
stakeholder governance in global IPS and DNS governance. In that respect, China 
had very little engagement with multi-stakeholder governance prior to the norm 
reaching its global tipping point in 1998. Chinese actors were not involved in 
global level IPS or DNS governance prior to ICANN’s establishment, beyond 
their interaction with the US actors that governed these systems before ICANN’s 
establishment.  
 
At the regional level, China can, however, be argued to be a norm-entrepreneur 
with regional IPS governance because of its founding role with APNIC. APNIC 
was founded in 1995 with its implicitly multi-stakeholder governance model and, 
in fact, the organization’s founding members included Chinese government, 
private sector and civil society actors. The involvement of Chinese actors in 
APNIC’s founding is the first clear indication of Chinese government, private 
sector or civil society support for the multi-stakeholder governance norm, as even 
domestic Chinese internet governance did not acquire an explicitly multi-
stakeholder character until 1997. That said, beyond membership in APNIC there 
is limited further evidence of Chinese engagement with APNIC’s multi-
stakeholder governance processes prior to the norm reaching its global tipping 
point. China cannot be regarded as a norm-entrepreneur in regional DNS 
governance, however, as the APTLD was only established in 1998 – after the 
multi-stakeholder governance norm’s tipping point – and in any event it is not 
expressly constituted as a multi-stakeholder body.  
 
With China’s domestic IPS and DNS governance regime, China can be described 
as having been a norm-entrepreneur because the multi-stakeholder character of 
the CNNIC was established just before the multi-stakeholder governance norm 
reached its global tipping point. Prior to the CNNIC’s formation, the IPS and 
DNS in China were only governed by a single stakeholder group – the nominally 
civil society CAS. Presumably the Chinese government was involved in this 
process, and possibly some private sector actors, but not in any formal or 
publicly-recorded manner. That said, it is almost certain that actors from these 
two groups were engaged in IPS and DNS administration in the sense of 
managing their own networks or domain name allocation businesses. In any 
event, it was only when the Leading Group on Informatization authorized the 
CAS to formally establish the CNNIC that China’s IPS and DNS governance 
regime acquired an overtly multi-stakeholder character – incorporating Chinese 
government, private sector and civil society representatives into the CNNIC's 
highest organs, namely its Steering Committee and Expert Committee. Because 
the CNNIC was formed in 1997, and the multi-stakeholder governance norm 
reached its global tipping point in 1998, it can be argued by the barest of margins 
that China was a thus a norm-entrepreneur with respect to multi-stakeholder 
governance at the domestic level.  
 
b. China’s Roles During the Norm Cascade Phase 
 
Because China was not actively involved in the multi-stakeholder governance 
norm’s emergence in global IPS and DNS governance, it became a norm-taker 
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when the norm reached its global tipping point in 1998. Throughout the norm’s 
cascade phase it appears to have been a relatively satisfied norm-taker. When 
ICANN was established in 1998, the Chinese government's participation in the 
GAC from then until 2001 implicitly indicated its acceptance of multi-stakeholder 
governance, as did Chinese government attendance at earlier ICANN meetings. 
Beijing’s GAC withdrawal in 2001 could be construed as occurring in protest of 
multi-stakeholder governance, but the reasons for China’s withdrawal are more 
likely due to the Chinese government’s dissatisfaction with the US authority and 
privatized governance norms, rather than with multi-stakeholder governance. 
Beijing’s willingness for an ICANN meeting to take place in China during this 
phase of the norm’s lifecycle, and for Chinese non-state actors to continue to 
engage with ICANN following China’s GAC withdrawal, also indicates tacit 
acceptance of ICANN’s multi-stakeholder processes. 
 
Although not exclusively focused on internet governance, the ITU’s WSIS 
proposal called for ‘all partners’ to be included in the eventual Summits, and the 
UNGA resolution on the WSIS expressly called for different stakeholder classes 
to participate. As China was a party to these resolutions, they can be regarded as 
indirect indications of Chinese government support for multi-stakeholder internet 
governance. That said, Chinese government representatives did request for non-
state actors to be excluded from working groups at the first WSIS Summit. Yet 
prior to this, in the preparatory phase of the first Summit, a Chinese government 
delegate stated that private sector and civil society actors were important 
participants in the WSIS, but also argued that policy issues should be addressed 
by governments. Thus, China’s hostility to non-state actors in WSIS working 
groups is most likely a reflection of its opposition to the privatized governance 
norm rather than multi-stakeholder governance itself. The Chinese government 
was also a signatory to the WSIS Declaration of Principles, which included 
explicit support for multi-stakeholder internet governance. 
 
Chinese non-state actor involvement in global IPS and DNS governance during 
the multi-stakeholder governance norm’s cascade phase also indicates support for 
multi-stakeholder governance. During this time, private sector and civil society 
actors had limited but sustained participation in ICANN and its related bodies 
and, in the case of Chinese civil society, relatively active involvement in ICANN 
meetings and in the bureaucracy of ICANN and its subsidiary bodies. This 
engagement with global level administrative organizations indicates implicit 
acceptance of multi-stakeholder governance. Nevertheless, Chinese non-state 
actors did not directly comment on the norm during its cascade phase in ICANN 
or its related bodies. This is also true with respect to Chinese non-state actor 
involvement in the first phase of the WSIS. Although a few private sector and 
civil society representatives attended this first phase, none of them made any 
direct comments on multi-stakeholder governance.  
 
In regional IPS governance, because China was a norm-entrepreneur in the norm 
emergence phase, it can be described as subsequently becoming a norm-maker, 
and appears to be a relatively satisfied one. Chinese stakeholders from all three 
groups remained members of APNIC during this time, and both private sector and 
civil society representatives were active in small numbers in APNIC conferences 
at this time, discussing policy issues and competing for internal APNIC positions. 
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In addition, both Chinese businesses and civil society organizations sponsored 
APNIC conferences between 1998 and 2004 – collectively providing sponsorship 
of almost every conference held during this period. Chinese civil society actors 
retained positions on APNIC’s peak body across the multi-stakeholder 
governance norm’s cascade phase. The involvement of Chinese non-state actors 
in APNIC’s activities suggests both ongoing conformity to the norm in regional 
IPS governance, and a substantial level of acceptance of it. This acceptance does 
not appear to be particularly enthusiastic in the case of the Chinese government, 
but nor are there any clear indications of dissatisfaction with multi-stakeholder 
governance in this context from it or any Chinese non-state actors.  
 
In the multi-stakeholder governance norm’s cascade phase, China cannot be 
regarded as either a norm-maker or a norm-taker in regional DNS governance, as 
the only regional level organization of which China is a part is the APTLD – 
which was only established in 1998 and is not expressly constituted as a multi-
stakeholder body. Thus, multi-stakeholder governance largely does not apply in 
this context. Domestically, China’s early status as a norm-entrepreneur in Chinese 
IPS and DNS governance means that it can be described as a norm-maker after 
1998. China appears to be satisfied with multi-stakeholder governance at the 
domestic level, as domestic IPS and DNS governance continues to be operated by 
the multi-stakeholder CNNIC, and during this phase of the norm’s lifecycle, the 
ISC was created as an expressly multi-stakeholder body. 
 
c. China’s Roles During the Norm Internalization Phase 
 
Since 2004, China has retained its various norm-taker and norm-maker roles 
towards the multi-stakeholder governance norm, and it has remained reasonably 
satisfied in these roles. The extent of Chinese acceptance of multi-stakeholder 
governance in internet governance, and the statements made by Chinese actors in 
administrative and policy organizations, suggests that China genuinely accepts 
the legitimacy of multi-stakeholder governance, and has arguably internalized it 
to a substantial extent. At the global level, Beijing’s return to ICANN’s GAC and 
its subsequently heightened level of engagement with high-level ICANN officials 
suggests its ongoing acceptance of multi-stakeholder governance. In addition, 
Chinese government representatives’ consistent attendance at ICANN meetings 
further indicates Beijing’s satisfaction with the multi-stakeholder elements of 
ICANN’s governance model. In that respect, the statements that Chinese 
government representatives began to make at ICANN meetings after the US 
announcement of the IANA transition clearly indicate Chinese government 
support for multi-stakeholder governance. In these comments, as noted, Chinese 
government calls for stronger government roles within ICANN were justified by 
reference to the need to enhance the multi-stakeholder character of ICANN. This 
strongly suggests that Beijing has internalized the multi-stakeholder governance 
norm, genuinely accepting its appropriateness in global IPS and DNS governance.  
 
In policy organizations, Beijing’s acceptance of multi-stakeholder governance has 
similarly been illustrated. The Chinese government’s forceful advocacy of the 
state authority norm in the WGIG also carried with it frequent acknowledgement 
that non-state actors had important – if not decision-making – roles to play in 
internet governance. Similarly, the Tunis Agenda reached at the end of the second 
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WSIS phase acknowledged the need and value of multi-stakeholder internet 
governance. That Chinese private sector and civil society actors also participated 
in both the WSIS and its follow-up process in limited numbers also indicate a 
degree of tacit Chinese government support for multi-stakeholder governance. As 
a signatory to the Tunis Agenda, Beijing also agreed on the need for further 
multi-stakeholder discussion of internet governance in the IGF, and it has itself 
participated in the IGF for almost every year or its existence.  
 
Chinese government support for multi-stakeholder governance, however, is 
qualified by the facts that it pushed for non-state actor roles to be minimized in 
the IGF’s MAG, and that it stated the IGF’s mandate should not be renewed, in 
favor of an intergovernmental body continuing discussions of internet governance 
reform. While this indicates a degree of disapproval of the multi-stakeholder 
governance norm, Beijing’s attitude was mostly a response to non-state actor 
authority. Even in its calls for the IGF to be dissolved, Chinese government 
representatives stated their support for multi-stakeholder governance. Similarly, 
in 2012, a delegate called for increased participation from all stakeholders from 
the developing world, and in 2013 a series of statements by Chinese government 
delegates indicated support for multi-stakeholder governance itself. The partial 
ambivalence Beijing has expressed towards multi-stakeholder governance is also 
evident in its calls at the UN and ITU for internet governance to become a 
multilateral affair, which implies that it would be restricted to state actors, while 
continuing to support multi-stakeholder governance at the IGF and NETMundial. 
 
Overall, however, the Chinese government has been a relatively consistent 
supporter of multi-stakeholder governance within administrative and policy 
organizations, and its statements indicating disapproval of non-state actors are 
largely directed at these actors having authority over internet governance, rather 
than having participatory rights in that governance. In addition to this, Beijing has 
not sought to limit the degree of involvement by Chinese non-state actors with 
global multi-stakeholder internet governance processes. That China so 
consistently conforms to multi-stakeholder governance, and that that governance 
is almost always singled out as a beneficial mechanism in criticisms of the 
privatized governance norm, suggests that the norm has been internalized to a 
significant extent within the Chinese state. 
 
The Chinese private sector and civil society also appear to be relatively satisfied 
norm-takers with respect to this norm. There has been a strong and increasing 
level of engagement by Chinese non-state actors in ICANN’s meetings, in terms 
of attendance levels, sponsorship by Chinese organizations, and the level of 
active participation in these meetings. Similarly, Chinese non-state actor 
involvement in ICANN’s bureaucracy and in subsidiary bodies suggests that the 
Chinese private sector and civil society are supportive of multi-stakeholder 
governance. Few Chinese non-state actors have commented on multi-stakeholder 
governance in administrative organizations, however. That said, those that have 
commented are generally supportive of the norm. Chinese private sector and civil 
society representatives were also participants in the second phase of the WSIS 
and to a limited extent in WSIS follow up activities. They have been very active 
participants within the IGF and, in the case of civil society, in the APrIGF as 
well, Likewise, Chinese civil society actors were participants within the 
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NETMundial meetings. While most of this participation has not provided direct 
evidence of support for multi-stakeholder governance, a few comments by 
Chinese civil society actors at the IGF, APrIGF and at NETMundial indicate 
support for the multi-stakeholder governance norm, and the pattern of 
engagement indirectly indicates this. Overall, it seems highly likely that Chinese 
non-state actors, particularly Chinese civil society actors, genuinely agree with 
the legitimacy of multi-stakeholder governance, and have internalized the norm’s 
appropriateness at the global level. 
 
At the regional level, Chinese conformity with the multi-stakeholder governance 
norm in APNIC has continued, and there is no indication that China is dissatisfied 
with multi-stakeholder governance within this organization. The fact that Chinese 
actors from each stakeholder group remain members of APNIC illustrates China’s 
ongoing conformity to, and acceptance of, multi-stakeholder governance. This 
acceptance does not appear enthusiastic on the part of the Chinese government 
and private sector, however, given their relatively limited participation in APNIC. 
Conversely, Chinese civil society has had a consistently high level of 
participation within APNIC, being active in APNIC's Executive Committee 
throughout the multi-stakeholder governance norm’s internalization phase, and 
active participants in APNIC’s policy development processes and at APNIC 
conferences. Aside from this indirect evidence of continued Chinese conformity 
to and support for the norm in APNIC, one Chinese civil society representative 
has commented directly on multi-stakeholder governance in the organization. Li 
Xiaodong, representing the CNNIC, gave a detailed statement at APNIC 28 about 
the benefits of the IGF's multi-stakeholder governance model. Overall, this 
suggests that China has genuinely accepted the appropriateness of multi-
stakeholder governance in regional IPS governance. 
 
Likewise, China appears to remain a satisfied norm-maker at the domestic level 
during the norm internalization phase of the multi-stakeholder governance norm. 
China’s domestic regime continues to be multi-stakeholder in character and, since 
the ISC was founded, a range of further provincial and municipal level Internet 
Societies have been established with governance structures that are multi-
stakeholder in character. With the exception of CONAC's establishment as an 
exclusively civil society body, there have been no domestic actions taken by the 
Chinese government or other actors that have diminished the operation of multi-
stakeholder governance in China's domestic regime. That said, the Chinese White 
Paper on the Internet fails to mention multi-stakeholder governance directly, 
despite stating that China's domestic regime is consistent with 'international 
practices', and commenting on the ISC's role in internet industry self-regulation in 
China. Nevertheless, it remains the case that at the domestic level China has not 
altered its role, and remains a norm-maker in relation to the multi-stakeholder 
governance norm. Arguably, the extent of multi-stakeholder internet governance 
activities within China, and the duration of Chinese acceptance of the norm at the 
domestic level, means that China genuinely accepts the appropriateness of multi-
stakeholder governance and has internalized it to a significant degree within its 
domestic regime. 
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12. China & The State Authority Norm 
 
The final norm the dissertation analyses Chinese engagement with is the state 
authority norm. This chapter argues that China has been a norm-entrepreneur in 
relation to this norm by establishing Beijing’s ultimate authority over domestic 
IPS and DNS governance within China, by advocating for state authority to 
replace the US authority norm as the regulator of ultimate authority over the 
global internet root, and by advocating for state authority to either replace the 
privatized governance norm or at least to weaken it by granting state actors equal 
or greater authority in internet governance. China has not advocated for the state 
authority norm at the regional level. Unlike the other norms analysed by the 
dissertation, the state authority norm has not been established in internet 
governance and remains in its norm emergence phase. Thus, China has remained 
a norm-entrepreneur even though it has established the norm in its domestic 
internet governance regime. It is largely the Chinese government that has actively 
advocated for greater government authority – Chinese non-state actors have 
generally not done so, save for a few isolated comments in policy organizations. 
Given the nature of the state authority norm, China’s advocacy for it is 
intertwined with its opposition to both US government authority and non-state 
actor authority. For that reason, much of this chapter’s content is similar to that 
within chapters 9 and 10. To avoid unnecessary repetition, this chapter refers 
back to the more detailed analysis in these earlier chapters where possible.  
 
The Chinese government's adoption of a norm-entrepreneur role towards the state 
authority norm is due to its material interest in greater power over internet 
governance, and its ideational interest in advancing state equality and primacy in 
global governance. At the global level, China’s commencement of its norm-
entrepreneur role towards the state authority norm in 2001 is argued to have 
occurred due to Beijing's changing interest assessments and changing structural 
circumstances, which were illustrated in detail in the previous chapter on the US 
authority norm. China has remained a norm-entrepreneur with the state authority 
norm for the same reasons it has been unable to replace US government authority 
or weaken the privatized governance norm, that is, due to Beijing’s lack of 
material power and insufficient ideational support amongst other actors in world 
politics. Given these circumstances, and assuming the US government does 
transition its authority in 2015, it will likely become more difficult for China in 
the future to establish greater government authority in global IPS and DNS 
governance.  
 
That China has not advocated for the state authority norm at the regional level is 
arguably due to the same reasons it is indifferent to privatized governance at that 
level – it has no strong preference over regional internet governance, and 
structural constraints render it incapable of achieving its goals at this level. China 
commenced its domestic norm-entrepreneur role in 1997, when the Leading 
Group on Informatization asserted Beijing’s ultimate authority over domestic IPS 
and DNS governance, and did so because the state authority norm is in the 
Chinese government’s material and ideational interests for the same reason it is at 
global level – it grants Beijing greater authority, and it arguably conforms to 
Chinese government’s beliefs in the appropriateness of state control of domestic 
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governance. It has since retained this role as the state authority norm has not 
reached its global tipping point. For Chinese non-state actors, they have passively 
accepted strong government authority in domestic Chinese government because it 
is not in their material interest to oppose their government, as this could 
jeopardize their role in domestic internet governance, and domestic non-state 
actors do not have sufficient material power to resist Beijing. 
 
a. China’s Roles During the Norm Emergence Phase 
 
Prior to 2001, the Chinese government was not an active proponent of the state 
authority norm at the global level. However, since then Beijing has been an active 
norm-entrepreneur through its advocacy for the privatized governance norm's 
replacement with exclusive government authority, or at the very least for non-
state actor authority to be weakened by strengthening the role of governments in 
global IPS and DNS governance. This norm-entrepreneur role can only be 
ascribed to the Chinese government from 2001 onwards, because – as noted in 
relation to the US authority and privatized governance norms – Beijing expressed 
no dissatisfaction towards existing norms until that year. The withdrawal of the 
Chinese government from ICANN’s GAC thus indicates the commencement of 
China’s norm-entrepreneur role towards the state authority norm. Since the 
Chinese government's withdrawal from the GAC, it has sustained its advocacy for 
greater government authority, but has largely done so without the support of the 
Chinese private sector or civil society, despite a few comments by from ISC 
representatives at the WGIG and IGF, and a few comments by CNNIC 
representatives and a Chinese lawyer at NETMundial, made in support of greater 
government involvement in internet governance. 
 
Beijing’s commencement of advocacy for the state authority norm in 2001 likely 
began because stronger state authority over internet governance was in the 
Chinese government’s material interest, as it would grant them greater power 
over the technical internet. This was also likely in Beijing’s ideational interest as 
well, due to Chinese beliefs in the sovereignty equality of states and beliefs that 
governments are entitled to greater authority than non-state actors in global 
governance (Ginsburg 2010, p. 33, 34; Wang & Rosenau 2009, p. 13, 14). As 
noted in previous chapters, Beijing began to advance its preference for stronger 
state authority over internet governance due to its changing interest assessments 
towards global level IPS and DNS governance as its engagement with the 
technical internet deepened, as the structure of the international system and 
international society changed, and as the Chinese government’s awareness of 
both these changes and other states’ preferences towards internet governance 
became clearer. 
 
The various interests advanced by passive Chinese government acquiescence to 
the US authority and privatized governance norms had already largely been 
achieved by 2001, and other interests could be better served by a more actively 
oppositional stance towards these norms. Similarly, China’s relatively stronger 
material power position in the international system by 2001 facilitated its 
commencement of a norm-entrepreneur role towards the state authority norm, and 
its ideational vulnerability had lessened dramatically since the early post-Cold 
War years. Beijing’s awareness of the extent of other states’ resistance to US 
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government authority and, to a lesser extent, the privatized governance norm, had 
also risen by 2001 due to Chinese involvement in ICANN and in the ITU, and the 
UN’s efforts to establish the WSIS. These factors combined to grant Beijing 
greater freedom to advance its material interest in stronger state authority over the 
technical internet, and ideational interest in state equality and supremacy within 
global politics.  
 
Chinese non-state actors have not, however, similarly contested the US authority 
norm in favor of equal state authority – despite a few isolated statements to the 
contrary. As noted previously, this is largely because privatized governance is in 
Chinese non-state actors' material interests, and they also appear to genuinely 
accept its appropriateness. Thus, the state authority norm is not in their material 
or ideational interests. In addition, the relative passivity of Chinese non-state 
actors towards both US government authority and general state authority is 
explicable on the grounds that competing interests in maintaining good relations 
with various internet governance participants results in avoidance of overt 
opposition to both the US authority and state authority norms being the wisest 
choice of action. 
 
Although Beijing indicated its dissatisfaction with US government authority and 
privatized governance by leaving the GAC, and similarly indicated its preference 
for a stronger government role in internet governance in the first WSIS phase, it 
wasn’t until the WGIG that the Chinese government began to fully express its 
opposition to the US authority and privatized governance norms, and to outline its 
preference for greater authority for state actors in internet governance. As the 
WGIG progressed, the Chinese government delegation gradually increased the 
intensity with which it advocated for greater government roles in internet 
governance. In the fourth and final substantive WGIG meeting, Beijing most 
directly expressed its preference, and did so in the strongest terms it had done to 
date. The Chinese delegation put forward its proposal for the global IPS and DNS 
to be governed by a UN agency and explicitly stated that: “Internet resources ... 
should be jointly managed by all governments ... each state should have one vote. 
Private sector and the civil society and other stakeholders could widely 
participate in the discussion and express their advisory role. However ... they 
should have no decision-making power and right to vote on public policy issues” 
(WGIG 2005b). In the WGIG, therefore, the Chinese government clearly 
articulated not only that the US authority norm should be abolished and replaced 
with equal state authority over the internet’s global root, but also that non-state 
actor authority should be abolished almost entirely – forcefully arguing that only 
governments should be allowed to engage in policy-setting for the technical 
internet. 
 
The forceful behavior of the Chinese government in the WGIG is likely because 
the first phase of the WSIS provided China with its clearest indication of broad 
support for the abolishment of US government authority, and relatively 
widespread support for the replacement or weakening of the privatized 
governance norm. Knowing this, Beijing thus had greater freedom to advance its 
preferences. In addition to this, the US government's decision to invade Iraq had 
recently weakened its general international reputation (Brzezinski 2013, p. 70). 
The WGIG was also the first international forum in which the internet governance 
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regime’s future was directly addressed, so it therefore provided the Chinese 
government with an excellent opportunity to press for its preferences to be 
recognized in internet governance. 
 
Interestingly, however, the Chinese government’s advocacy for the state authority 
norm has gradually moderated. At first this was mostly terms of the forcefulness 
with which it argues in favor of an exclusive government role in policy-setting 
within internet governance and against unilateral government authority. Beijing 
never repeated its preferences in such stark and forceful terms as it did at the 
WGIG. This is likely because Beijing has calculated that further aggressive 
advocacy is unlikely to result in equal state authority displacing the US authority 
and privatized governance norms, given that this strategy failed at the WSIS; 
continued aggressiveness would also likely have been counter-productive, 
unnecessarily alienating states and other actors with differing preferences in a 
context where the Chinese government did not have the material power to 
coercively impose its preferences. As noted in previous chapters, while Beijing’s 
growing material power has grown since the early Nineties, it hasn’t grown 
sufficiently to enable China to forcibly restructure the internet governance 
regime. Similarly, the Chinese government does not have sufficient ideational 
support amongst other states to engineer a coordinated replacement of US 
government and non-state actor authority. 
 
Following the WGIG, the Chinese delegation to the second WSIS Summit 
provided additional, but much less forceful, statements of Chinese opposition to 
the US authority norm. No direct Chinese government statements related to 
advocacy for the state authority norm to replace the privatized governance norm 
were made in the second Tunis Summit. After the WSIS, the Chinese government 
has made clear that it is committed to contesting the validity of US government 
authority and advocating for its replacement with the state authority norm, while 
similarly contesting the validity of non-state actor authority and advocating for its 
replacement or weakening. Beijing has frequently stated its desire for the US 
authority norm to be abolished in the IGF, even suggesting that the IGF had failed 
because it hadn't produced recommendations for this change in internet 
governance once its initial five-year mandate had ended. Despite China's return to 
the GAC in 2009, its government has continued to advocate for greater 
government authority at the IGF.  
 
Similarly, the White Paper on the Internet published by the Chinese government 
in 2010 indicates its continuing preference for greater government authority over 
the technical internet. The White Paper states that the Chinese government adopts 
the leading role within China's domestic regime which, in a supervisory sense, it 
does. However, as indicated in previous chapters, the Chinese government 
appears to be reasonably comfortable with the idea of non-state actors wielding 
penultimate authority over China’s domestic IPS and DNS, as well as in regional 
IPS and DNS governance. With respect to the global regime, the White Paper 
does reiterate China's stance that the UN should assume responsibility over the 
technical internet through a multilateral organ, and notes that governments should 
resolve policy issues related to the technical internet. Beijing has also sustained 
its advocacy for global IPS and DNS governance to be reformed in favor of state 
governments within the UN, ITU and at NETMundial. The Chinese government 
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jointly submitted to the UNGA – alongside Russia, Tajikistan and others – a 
resolution related to internet security issues which included a clause calling for 
multilateral internet governance mechanisms. China also resubmitted this 
resolution to the ITU's WCIT in 2012. In 2014 it again proposed this resolution at 
the NETMundial meeting in Brazil, and made further statements arguing for a 
stronger government role in internet governance. 
 
However, over time it has moderated its argument that non-state actors should 
have no decision-making power over policy for the technical internet, arguing 
instead that governments should have greater or equal power relative to non-state 
actors, rather than that governments should have exclusive power. This is most 
evident in Chinese government statements in ICANN meetings occurring in 2014, 
after the US announcement of the impending IANA transition, where the Chinese 
government argued instead that governments should have a greater role within 
ICANN, but not greater authority than non-state actors or exclusive decision-
making authority within ICANN. This, and the fact that non-state actors do have 
some decision-making power within China's domestic regime, may suggest that 
China's preference to traditional, exclusively state-centric authority is at least 
amenable to some non-state actor authority, if not equality with state actors' 
authority. Nevertheless, it is most likely that at the global level, Beijing continues 
to prefer non-state actors being granted authority only to engage in administrative 
and policy input capacities.  
 
It appears unlikely that China’s advocacy for the state authority norm will result 
in it displacing the US authority norm, although Beijing’s efforts can arguably be 
regarded as having put additional pressure on the US government to relinquish its 
authority over the technical internet. Instead, it looks like the US government will 
once again be able to leverage its remaining institutional power into achieving its 
preference for global IPS and DNS governance to be governed by a non-state 
actor-led regime. That said, given the Chinese government’s sustained pattern of 
advocacy for the state authority norm, it also seems likely that Beijing will 
continue to advocate for greater government authority once US government 
authority has been abolished. It appears unlikely, however, that the Chinese 
government will be able to successfully engineer the replacement of the 
privatized governance norm with the state authority norm, and fairly unlikely that 
it will be able to weaken non-state actor authority by establishing stronger 
government authority over global IPS and DNS governance. 
 
There is broader support for the privatized governance norm in the international 
community, and this means that China faces an uphill battle in its attempts to 
have this norm replaced or weakened. While beyond the scope of the dissertation 
to analyse in detail, it appears that illiberal states, and liberal states with a 
pluralist conception of sovereignty, support greater state authority in internet 
governance, but a coalition of liberal states with solidarist conceptions of 
sovereignty and a large number of non-state actors support privatized governance 
(Collins 2007; Mueller 2010, ch. 11). In particular there is deep resistance within 
the US and many other Western states to the idea that state governments should 
govern the internet (Mueller 2010, p. 217; NTIA 2014a; Rogers 2007, p. 6). Thus, 
there is much less support for China’s preferences amongst other state and non-
state actors and a significant amount of opposition. China’s moderation of its 
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argument regarding state authority within ICANN may, perhaps, reflect Beijing’s 
awareness of this.  
 
In addition to this, US and Western material power, and the combined material 
power of states that prefer a privatized internet governance system, precludes 
China from imposing its preferences in global IPS and DNS governance. 
Similarly, broader ideational structural factors do not favor Beijing. China's 
illiberal domestic political structure likely damages its credibility in advocating 
for the replacement or weakening of the privatized governance norm – at least 
amongst liberal states (MacKinnon 2011, p. 32; Rogers 2007, p. 6). China's 
gradual implementation and sustained development of the Great Firewall has also 
likely further damaged its credibility amongst these states (Diamond & Plattner 
2012, pp. 166-70). Claims by predominantly US actors that a 'UN takeover' of the 
Internet would jeopardize its free and open character are rendered more 
persuasive by these attributes of China, even as the US government's own 
credibility has been weakened over the 21st Century and following the US spying 
revelations (Pfanner 2012). The US government's early-mover advantage in 
entrenching non-state actor authority, the resultant path dependence this has 
granted the privatized governance norm, the broad levels of support for this norm, 
and the ongoing weaknesses in China's relative material power and ideational 
support have been sufficient to constrain China from successfully implementing 
its preferences for stronger state authority over internet governance. In the future, 
if the US government does transition its authority to the ICANN community, 
these factors will probably make Chinese efforts to establish greater government 
authority even more difficult. 
 
Beijing has not advocated for the state authority norm at the regional level, and 
this is arguably for the same reasons that it has not advocated against the 
privatized governance norm at the regional level – it does not have any strong 
preferences towards regional internet governance, and it is structurally 
constrained from achieving its goals at this level due to a lack of material power 
over regional internet governance organizations and telecommunications 
infrastructure, and due ideational opposition from more liberal states in the Asia-
Pacific. Chinese non-state actors, similarly to at the global level, do not have an 
interest in greater government authority at the regional level. Domestically, the 
Chinese government became an advocate for the state authority norm in 1997, 
when the Leading Group on Informatization asserted Chinese government 
authority over domestic Chinese IPS and DNS governance. Since that time it has 
remained a norm-entrepreneur, maintaining Beijing’s ultimate authority over 
China’s domestic internet. The Chinese government has not become a norm-
maker, however, because the state authority norm has not reached its global 
tipping point. As with its behavior at the global level, Beijing’s support for the 
state authority norm at the domestic level is due to it being in its material 
interests, and because it likely genuinely believes that governments are the most 
appropriate authorities in internet governance. For Chinese non-state actors, while 
it is not in their material interest for Beijing to wield ultimate authority over the 
IPS and DNS in China, neither is it in their material interest to oppose the 
Chinese government – Beijing could easily divest these actors of their roles in 
domestic Chinese internet governance. 





This dissertation has aimed to answer the questions of whether China has been a 
norm-taker or a norm-maker in technical internet governance, and whether it is 
able to change the normative structure of the internet governance regime. 
Specifically, it examined the roles that China has adopted towards four core 
internet governance norms: the norm of US government authority, the privatized 
governance norm, the multi-stakeholder governance norm, and the emerging 
norm of equal state authority. It also analysed the factors shaping China’s roles, 
to determine whether China wanted to, or could, change the dominant norms in 
internet governance. Ultimately, the dissertation argued that China had largely 
been a norm-taker at the global level of internet governance, but more of a norm-
maker at the regional and domestic levels. It has also attempted to establish a 
norm of greater government authority within internet governance at the global 
level. The roles China has adopted suggests that it does want to change some 
aspects of the current internet governance regime, seeking to remove US 
government authority and limit non-state actor authority over the technical 
internet, but is otherwise satisfied with the multi-stakeholder character of internet 
governance and the authority of non-state actors below the global level. China is 
nevertheless unable to implement the changes that it wishes to make, because 
other states and non-state actors do not share its interests sufficiently, and because 
China does not have the material power or ideational appeal necessary to impose 
its preferences in this area. 
 
The issue of Chinese engagement with internet governance was the focus of the 
dissertation for a few key reasons. As one element of contemporary global 
governance, understanding China’s involvement in internet governance is 
important because it helps to build a comprehensive understanding of China’s 
approach to global governance and its engagement with contemporary 
international society. This is significant because China is a rising power, growing 
in relative material power within the international system and therefore more able 
to influence the conduct of global governance and the evolution of international 
relations. Understanding Chinese engagement with technical internet governance 
is important because the internet is a highly significant technology, which 
influences global politics and human interaction across virtually every issue area 
and at almost every level of activity. Its technical governance is therefore an 
important component of contemporary global governance. It is also an area where 
a range of unusual governance practices occur. Analyzing Chinese engagement 
with these practices therefore helps contribute to our understanding of Chinese 
preferences towards emerging forms of global governance. In addition, our 
understanding of China’s involvement in the global governance issue area of 
technical internet governance is limited, with existing literature not examining the 
issue in sufficient empirical detail, nor expressly considering Chinese engagement 
with its broader, overarching normative structure.  
 
To build an answer to the dissertation's research questions, the dissertation 
developed a methodology grounded in a multi-causal theoretical perspective, 
which guided the dissertation’s explanation of state and other actors’ behavior, in 
terms of both their underlying motivations and the factors that constrain or 
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facilitate their actions. The dissertation then drew upon Finnemore and Sikkink's 
norm lifecycle model to describe how core internet governance norms have 
evolved, and to help guide analysis of Chinese engagement with these norms as 
they developed. A definitional suite of four potential state roles towards global 
governance norms was also synthesized from a review of existing approaches in 
the norm-maker/taker literature and related studies, which enabled the roles China 
has adopted towards core internet governance norms to be accurately described at 
each phase of these norms’ lifecycles. Finally, the dissertation outlined its 
methods, describing how it employed a structured approach to identifying which 
facts were relevant to answering its primary research questions that was based on 
methods within the norm-maker/taker and compliance literatures, as well as how 
it acquired these facts – by adopting the use of qualitative documentary analysis 
to generate data from existing documents and by employing some basic 
quantitative methods to collate some of the data drawn from existing documents. 
 
Following this, the dissertation provided some background information on the 
technical internet, its governance and its history – along with an overview of the 
contemporary technical internet governance regime. It defined technical internet 
governance as comprised of three more specific sub-issues – internet-specific 
technical standards, the internet protocol allocation system, and the domain name 
allocation system. The US-centric history of the technical internet and its early 
governance was outlined to illustrate how contemporary internet governance 
came to exist, and indicate how its core norms arose. The internet governance 
regime’s structure was then analysed, with the regime divided into two broad 
groups of administrative organizations and policy organizations, which 
administer and set policy for the technical internet, or contribute to policy 
development and debate the regime’s future, respectively.  
 
Drawing upon the preceding review of technical internet governance and existing 
studies of internet governance norms, the dissertation identified three core 
internet governance norms that regulate how authority over internet governance is 
allocated, and which justify which actors may participate in that governance. 
Similarly, background information, existing studies, and the dissertation’s own 
research also contributed to the identification of a fourth emerging norm that 
challenges existing norms, seeking to reorient how authority is allocated in 
internet governance. These four norms were the norm of US government 
authority over the technical internet, the norm of privatized internet governance, 
the multi-stakeholder governance norm, and the equal state authority norm – this 
last norm was identified as an emerging norm that some actors, including the 
Chinese government, have sought to have replace the US authority norm, and 
replace or weaken the privatized governance norm.  
 
China’s engagement with the internet governance regime was then analysed, with 
a focus on how this engagement shed light on Chinese relationships towards core 
internet governance norms. To deepen its analysis of China’s involvement with 
internet governance, and to ensure it highlighted Chinese relationships towards its 
core norms, Chinese actors were analysed as belonging to one of three broad 
stakeholder groups – the government, private sector and civil society. As noted in 
the introduction, however, the independence of Chinese non-state actors – 
particularly civil society actors – is uncertain given the Chinese government’s 
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strict controls on domestic Chinese society. Thus, the dissertation recognizes that 
some Chinese non-state actor behavior may not genuinely reflect these actors’ 
preferences, and that there is a degree of uncertainty in its related arguments and 
conclusions. These qualifications aside, Chinese stakeholders’ engagement with 
internet governance was analysed across three broad areas, examining Chinese 
behavior and statements within domestic Chinese internet governance, within 
administrative organizations at global and regional levels, and within key policy 
organizations at global and regional levels. The roles Chinese actors had adopted 
towards core internet governance norms was then explicitly examined, along with 
the factors that shaped these roles. 
 
Overall, this dissertation argued that China has been more of a norm-taker in 
technical global internet governance than it has been a norm-maker, but it has 
also highlighted the complex and dynamic nature of Chinese engagement with 
core internet governance norms. At the global level, China played no active role 
in the emergence of US government authority, privatized governance or multi-
stakeholder governance norms in the internet governance regime, and was 
therefore not a norm-entrepreneur towards them. Instead China adopted a passive, 
and initially a satisfied, norm-taker role towards these norms. China initially 
accepted the US government’s authority over the technical internet without 
complaint because it had a strong interest in acquiring access to the US-based 
internet, as this helped to advance broader material interests in technological 
progress and economic growth, as well as ideational interests in improving 
China’s internationalist image and maintaining the Chinese government’s 
domestic legitimacy. In addition, structural constraints, in the form of material 
power weaknesses relative to the US and the PRC’s ideational vulnerability in the 
immediate post-Cold War era, meant that China had little choice but to accept US 
government authority over the technical internet.  
 
The same factors shaped China’s early and passive norm-taker role towards the 
privatized governance norm in global IPS and DNS governance, although in the 
case of Chinese non-state actors this norm was also in their own material interest, 
granting them the right to authority over internet governance, and was arguably 
ideationally supported by them due to socialization pressures from engagement 
with the US and transnational technical internet community. Conversely, China’s 
early, passive norm-taker role towards non-state actor authority in internet 
standards governance is due to Beijing having no strong preference over how this 
governance activity is conducted, while Chinese non-state actors have a clear 
material interest in the norm in this context as it justifies their right to authority. 
For the multi-stakeholder governance norm, China’s early, passive norm-taker 
role is due simply to multi-stakeholder governance being in the material interests 
of Chinese actors, as it justifies their right to participate in internet governance, 
and it is arguably the case that Chinese actors genuinely believe in the value of 
multi-stakeholder governance as a quality-enhancer for administration and policy 
development. 
 
Since the US authority, privatized governance and multi-stakeholder governance 
norms reached their global tipping points in 1998, China has retained its norm-
taker status towards them at the global level, and continued to conform to each of 
them during their norm cascade phases – from 1998 to 2004. However, the 
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Chinese government gradually transformed from a passive, and apparently 
satisfied, norm-taker of the US authority norm and the privatized governance 
norm in global IPS and DNS governance into a dissatisfied norm-taker in 2001. 
This shift in attitude was accompanied by the Chinese government becoming a 
norm-entrepreneur in relation to the emerging state authority norm, seeking to 
have it replace US government authority and either replace or weaken privatized 
governance in global IPS and DNS governance. Conversely, Chinese non-state 
actors continued to be relatively passive norm-takers towards the US authority 
and privatized governance norms, and both the Chinese government and Chinese 
non-state actors remained passively norm-takers towards non-state actor authority 
in internet standards governance and multi-stakeholder governance. 
 
The reasons Beijing shifted from a satisfied to a dissatisfied norm-taker in these 
contexts, and became a norm-entrepreneur in favor of the emerging state 
authority norm, are because its initial interests in securing internet access – as 
well as the broader interests this served – had largely been achieved by 2001. As 
a result, so long as China continued to remain within the global internet root, it 
had greater freedom to pursue other interests. The Chinese government’s 
subsequent behavior and statements suggest that it has a strong material interest 
in securing greater power over global IPS and DNS governance, and arguably an 
ideational interest in preserving state equality and supremacy within global 
governance. These interests came to the fore in Beijing's interest assessments 
after 2001. In addition to this, China's growing relative material power and 
acceptance within the international community have strengthened its ability to 
pursue its preferences in global governance, while Beijing’s heightened 
awareness of other actors’ preferences towards internet governance encouraged it 
to pursue the abolishment of US government authority, and the replacement or 
weakening of the privatized governance norm in global IPS and DNS governance. 
As a result, the Chinese government gradually began to oppose these norms at the 
global level during the norm cascade phase of their lifecycles, and to gradually 
begin active support of the emerging state authority norm. 
 
Chinese non-state actors did not join the Chinese government in gradually 
transitioning to dissatisfied norm-takers towards the US authority norm and the 
privatized governance norm in global IPS and DNS governance during these 
norm’s cascade phase, however. In regard to US government authority, it seems 
likely that Chinese non-state actors would prefer an alternative to it, but they 
haven’t expressed any opposition due to stronger interests in maintaining good 
relations with US actors and internet governance organizations, with the Chinese 
government itself, and because of their lack of material power. With privatized 
governance in global IPS and DNS governance, Chinese non-state actors’ 
apparent satisfaction with the norm in this context is likely due to the norm being 
in their material interests – granting them the right to authority over this 
governance. Arguably, privatized governance in this context is in Chinese non-
state actors’ ideational interests as well – they likely genuinely believe it is an 
appropriate form of structuring internet governance. The fact that Chinese non-
state actors, and particularly Chinese civil society actors, have been actively 
engaged with internet governance organizations during the privatized governance 
norm’s cascade phase indicates that Chinese society is more satisfied with non-
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state actor authority than the Chinese government, at least in relation to global 
IPS and DNS governance. 
 
The Chinese government’s apparent satisfaction with the privatized governance 
norm in internet standards governance at the global level is for the same reason as 
its satisfaction in the norm’s emergence phase – Beijing doesn’t appear to have a 
strong preference over how internet standards governance is conducted. For 
Chinese non-state actors, the norm in this context serves their material interests. 
Arguably, all three Chinese stakeholder groups began to genuinely accept the 
appropriateness of non-state actor authority in internet standards governance 
during the norm’s cascade phase, if not earlier, given that there have been no 
clear indications of dissatisfaction, suggesting that it has acquired a ‘taken-for-
granted’ quality, and has been internalized by Chinese actors. Similarly, China’s 
continuing satisfaction with the multi-stakeholder governance norm at the global 
level is due to the norm being in the material and arguably ideational interests of 
all three of China’s stakeholder groups, and was likely internalized by China 
before or at least during this phase of the norm’s lifecycle. 
 
During the norm internalization phase of the US authority, privatized governance 
and multi-stakeholder governance norms at the global level, which began in 2004, 
China has retained its various satisfied and dissatisfied norm-taker roles – 
although the Chinese government has moderated the degree of its dissatisfaction 
with non-state actor authority in global IPS and DNS governance, and has done 
so for the same underlying reasons as drove Chinese behavior during these 
norm’s cascade phases. China has also remained a norm-entrepreneur in relation 
to the state authority norm. The Chinese government has much more actively 
opposed US government authority and the privatized governance norm in global 
IPS and DNS governance since 2004, forcefully registering its disapproval at the 
WGIG, and outlining its preference for state governments to collectively replace 
the US government as the ultimate authority over the internet’s global root, and 
for governments to assume exclusive authority over policy-setting for the global 
IPS and DNS – displacing non-state actors’ authority. Beijing has maintained this 
advocacy up until the present day, although it has moderated it opposition to 
privatized governance, changing its argument over time from the need for 
exclusive state authority over global IPS and DNS policy-setting to one of greater 
or at least equal state authority relative to non-state actors. 
 
The Chinese government has remained a norm-taker towards the US authority 
norm and the privatized governance norm in global IPS and DNS governance and 
a norm-entrepreneur in its efforts to establish greater government authority in 
internet governance. Despite being motivated by the same interest considerations 
that drove it to oppose these norms and advocate for the state authority norm, 
ongoing US and Western material advantages, broad support for non-state actor 
authority in the global community, and reputational concerns plaguing the 
Chinese government have all meant that it is structurally constrained from 
successfully coercing or persuading international society into accepting the state 
authority norm. The US government has announced it will transition its authority 
to the global multi-stakeholder community in 2015, however, and while Chinese 
government advocacy for the US authority norm’s replacement is unlikely the 
sole cause of this, it can arguably be regarded as having contributed to the 
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impending demise of US government authority. Chinese non-state actors have 
also maintained their passive norm-taker role towards the US authority norm 
during its internalization phase, for the same reasons as in the norm’s cascade 
phase of its lifecycle. Overall, China cannot be regarded as having internalized 
the US authority norm, because it is clear that neither the Chinese government nor 
Chinese non-state actors genuinely believe in the appropriateness of US 
government authority. 
 
With the privatized governance norm in global IPS and DNS governance, while 
Beijing has maintained its advocacy for the state authority norm to replace, or at 
least weaken, non-state actor authority in this context, and moderated its position 
towards privatized governance, it cannot be regarded as having genuinely come to 
accept the appropriateness of non-state actor authority in this governance. Instead, 
more moderate advocacy for the state authority norm to weaken this norm is 
likely more of a strategic move, and Beijing cannot reasonably be argued to have 
internalized the norm in this context. Chinese non-state actors, on the other hand, 
have arguably come to genuinely accept the appropriateness of privatized 
governance of the global IPS and DNS, given the relative lack of opposition from 
these actors and the sustained and increasingly levels of Chinese private sector 
and civil society involvement in this governance area. With the privatized 
governance norm in global internet standards governance, the continuing passive 
acceptance of the norm in this context, and the increasingly levels of Chinese 
participation in the IETF from individuals affiliated with all three stakeholder 
groups, suggests that privatized governance here has been genuinely internalized 
by China. Similarly, the continuing acceptance of the multi-stakeholder 
governance norm at the global level, increasing levels of participation by all three 
Chinese stakeholder groups in internet governance, and a number of statements 
indicating support for multi-stakeholder governance suggests it has also been 
internalized by China.  
 
At the regional level, China has had more of a proactive role in establishing the 
structure of internet governance. It has been a norm-entrepreneur and norm-
maker in regard to the privatized governance norm in regional IPS governance, 
but has been a norm-taker in regard to the privatized governance norm in regional 
internet standards and DNS governance. It has similarly been a norm-
entrepreneur and norm-maker with the multi-stakeholder governance norm in 
regional IPS governance. The multi-stakeholder governance norm does not apply 
to regional DNS governance, as this governance is underdeveloped at the regional 
level and conducted only by one stakeholder group – ccTLD operators within the 
APTLD; thus China has not engaged with it in this context. Likewise, multi-
stakeholder governance does not apply to internet standards governance, as this is 
conducted at the global level only by natural persons. The US authority norm 
does not apply below the global level, as it regulates authority over the internet’s 
global root, and thus there has been no Chinese engagement with this norm at the 
regional level. Similarly, Beijing has not advocated for the greater government 
authority at the regional level. 
 
China’s norm-entrepreneur roles towards the privatized governance and multi-
stakeholder governance norms in regional IPS governance is due to Chinese 
involvement – across all three stakeholder groups – in the founding of APNIC. 
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This occurred prior to either of these norms reaching its global tipping point and 
thus, once this point was reached in 1998, China has become a norm-maker in 
this context. Beijing’s willingness to accept non-state actor authority in regional 
IPS governance is likely because it doesn’t have a strong preference towards how 
regional internet governance is conducted, as its attention is focused on changing 
the global structure of the internet governance regime. In addition, the same 
structural factors that constrain its behavior at the global level operate at the 
regional level as well. For Chinese non-state actors, their role in establishing the 
privatized governance norm in regional IPS governance is due to the norm being 
in their material interest, and likely due to their ideational support for the norm. 
For all three Chinese stakeholder groups, multi-stakeholder governance at the 
regional level is in their material and ideational interests, as it grants them the 
right to participate in governance and they arguably genuinely believe it improves 
the quality and legitimacy of administration and policy development. In the 
privatized governance and multi-stakeholder governance norm’s emergence 
phases, regional internet standards or DNS governance were not yet established, 
and thus no Chinese actors were norm-entrepreneurs in these contexts. 
 
In the norm cascade phase, Chinese actors’ roles as norm-entrepreneurs in 
establishing non-state actor authority and multi-stakeholder governance in 
regional IPS governance means that they can be described as norm-makers. 
China, across all three stakeholder groups, appears to be satisfied in these roles. 
Similarly, when regional internet standards and DNS governance were 
established, China became a norm-taker regarding the privatized governance 
norm in these contexts, and has been a satisfied norm-taker across all three 
stakeholder groups. As with China’s regional behavior in these norms’ emergence 
phases, the Chinese government appears satisfied with its roles because it doesn’t 
have any strong preferences towards regional internet governance, particularly 
given its structural constraints at this level, while the multi-stakeholder 
governance norm is in its material and arguably ideational interests. These factors 
also explain why the Chinese government has not advocated for the state 
authority norm at the regional level. For Chinese non-state actors, both privatized 
governance and multi-stakeholder governance are in their material interests and, 
given the sustained, high-level engagement of these actors with regional internet 
governance, they arguably genuinely accept the appropriateness of the privatized 
governance and multi-stakeholder governance norms at the regional level. 
Chinese roles and satisfaction have not changed after 2004, and thus in the norm 
internalization phase China’s regional roles have remained unchanged. The 
increasing levels of Chinese participation in regional internet governance, 
particularly from Chinese civil society, and the lack of any stated opposition to 
non-state actor authority and multi-stakeholder governance at this level, suggest 
that China has genuinely internalized these norms in this context. 
 
Domestically, China has also had a more proactive role towards core internet 
governance norms. China was a norm-entrepreneur with the privatized 
governance and multi-stakeholder governance norms in domestic Chinese IPS 
and DNS governance and has, since these norms reached their global tipping 
point, become a norm-maker. However China was a norm-taker with respect to 
non-state actor authority in internet standards governance, because this norm 
reached its global tipping point earlier in relation to this governance issue. China 
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has also been a norm-entrepreneur with the state authority norm in domestic 
Chinese IPS and DNS governance, but as this norm remains in its emergence 
phase it has not become a norm-maker. The establishment of the CNNIC as a 
multi-stakeholder body that granted administrative and policy-setting authority 
for China’s IPS and DNS occurred prior to the privatized governance and multi-
stakeholder governance norms reaching their global tipping point, and thus the 
Chinese government and civil society can be regarded as norm-entrepreneurs in 
this context. When these norms’ reached their global tipping point in 1998, China 
can therefore be described as a norm-maker. China was not a norm-entrepreneur 
with domestic internet standards governance, however, because despite such 
governance activity occurring within the CNNIC by 1997, the earlier global 
tipping point for the privatized governance norm in this governance issue renders 
China a norm-taker. Similarly, despite Beijing asserting its authority over 
domestic Chinese internet governance in 1997, it remains a norm-entrepreneur 
because this norm has not reached its global tipping point. 
 
China appears to be satisfied with the operation of the privatized governance and 
multi-stakeholder governance norms in its domestic internet governance regime, 
and has arguably localized or internalized them, respectively. Acceptance of non-
state actor authority was initially in the material interests of the Chinese 
government to secure Chinese internet interconnection and thereby advance a 
range of related goals. Despite efforts at the global level to replace or weaken this 
norm, domestically Beijing appears to remain satisfied with the norm because it 
has been localized to ensure the government has ultimate, supervisory authority 
over Chinese internet governance – non-state actors’ authority is circumscribed 
by government supervision of, and roles within, the CNNIC and ISC, by Chinese 
legislation, and by the domestic political influence of the CCP. For Chinese non-
state actors, their satisfaction with its domestic operation is explicable on the 
simple grounds that the norm is in their material interest, justifying their 
participation in domestic internet governance – though they may also genuinely 
believe in the democratic ideals underpinning this norm. With respect to multi-
stakeholder governance, as with this norm at the global and regional levels, it is in 
the material and ideational interests of the Chinese government and Chinese non-
state actors, because it improves, or at least is believed to improve, the quality of 
administration and policy development, and it also justifies the rights of non-state 
actors to participate in internet governance. For the state authority norm within 
China, Beijing’s imposition of it is due to it being in its material interests and 
belief that governments are the most appropriate authorities in internet 
governance, while Chinese non-state actors are likely unwilling to challenge 
Chinese government authority as it could jeopardize their role in domestic 
internet governance.  
 
Overall, the dissertation’s findings on Chinese roles towards core internet 
governance norms are significant because they contribute to a deeper 
understanding of Chinese engagement with internet governance, illustrating that 
despite the clear aim of Beijing to reform this area of global governance in favor 
of state rights, China overall has conformed to existing core internet governance 
norms and to various extents localized or internalized the privatized governance 
and multi-stakeholder governance norms. The dissertation also illustrates that the 
preference for greater state rights in internet governance appears largely limited 
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to China's government, with Chinese non-state actors more enthusiastic 
supporters of non-state actor authority and multi-stakeholder governance. That 
the privatized governance norm has localized within China, and the multi-
stakeholder governance norm has internalized in China, also demonstrates that 
China has had a dynamic relationship with the norms regulating the technical 
internet's governance, integrating them where appropriate and altering them 
where possible. Thus, the dissertation's empirical examination of China and its 
more theoretical analysis of Chinese engagement with core internet governance 
norms helps to fill an existing gap in the literature on China and the internet.  
 
This knowledge also facilitates our ability to predict how China may respond to 
future changes in the structure of internet governance, or what changes it may try 
to make itself. In particular, the upcoming IANA transition and resulting 
abolishment of US government authority in September, 2015 will alter the 
context in which Beijing's advocacy for the state authority norm occurs. From the 
dissertation's analysis, however, it is clear that the abolition of the US authority 
norm will not result in the Chinese government abandoning its norm-
entrepreneurship, because China's preference is for stronger state authority in 
internet governance generally rather than just the removal of US government 
privileges. Nevertheless, China is likely to remain a norm-taker towards the 
privatized governance norm because it is unlikely in the near to mid-term future 
that Chinese material power will enable China to coerce global acceptance of this 
norm. Likewise, broad global support for non-state actor authority will continue 
to constrain China's state authority norm advocacy, and may become more 
constraining once US government authority is abolished. That said, the 
acceptance of the privatized governance and multi-stakeholder governance norms 
by China suggests that China will most likely seek to only weaken the privatized 
governance norm and will not attempt to reform multi-stakeholder governance. 
Beyond any structural factors constraining it from doing so, it seems unlikely that 
the Chinese government will try to exclude non-state actors from wielding any 
authority over the technical internet, but will be satisfied with states ultimately 
having greater authority than non-state actors – a preferred outcome that is likely 
to result in ongoing tension between the Chinese government and the internet 
governance regime.   
 
The dissertation's findings are also significant in a broader sense because they 
contribute to our understanding of what sort of great power China is likely to 
become. The findings provide evidence that Beijing will likely be rational and 
reasonably restrained in efforts to reform aspects of global governance it is 
unsatisfied with – firmly promoting its preferences, but not to the extent that it is 
unwilling to conform to existing norms or to compromise achievement of its 
goals. The dissertation also illustrates that despite its authoritarian tendencies, the 
Chinese government is partially open to Chinese non-state actors participating in 
global governance processes. Chinese non-state actors can and do participate in 
internet governance, and appear to have preferences towards its core norms that 
conflict with those of the Chinese government. That Beijing accepts this, and that 
Chinese non-state actors appear to genuinely believe in the appropriateness of 
non-state actor authority, indicates that China is willing to tolerate or adapt to the 
growing cosmopolitan trend in global governance (Wang & Rosenau 2009, p. 12; 
Weiss 2000, p. 796).  
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Ultimately, the contributions of the dissertation are that it helps fill an empirical 
gap in the literature on China's engagement with technical internet governance, 
and that it contributes to the broader literature on Chinese engagement with 
global governance. The dissertation also makes a modest contribution to the 
theoretical literature on state engagement with global governance, through its 
development of theoretically-informed classifications for state roles towards 
global governance norms. Hopefully, each of these three contributions will be of 
some benefit to other researchers. The dissertation has aimed to provide a 
reasonably comprehensive overview of China's engagement with internet 
governance and its core norms, but there are a number of limitations to its 
findings. The author’s incomplete knowledge of the Chinese language limits the 
dissertation’s analysis of domestic Chinese internet governance and Chinese 
language research, and the records of many internet governance organizations are 
either not publicly available or only partially reliable. These factors impact upon 
the depth of the dissertation’s analysis. Similarly, for reasons of space, the 
dissertation’s scope is narrowly focused on Chinese engagement with the most 
significant internet governance organizations and on four core internet 
governance norms it identifies, reducing the breadth of its findings.  
 
Reflecting these limitations, a range of possible avenues for further research exist 
which would complement the dissertation's findings. A more detailed 
examination of domestic Chinese perceptions of internet governance norms, for 
example, through analysis of Chinese language publications or interviews with 
Chinese participants in the internet governance regime would strengthen 
understanding of the differences between Chinese government and non-state 
actors’ preferences towards core internet governance norms. Broadening the 
scope of analysis to include consideration of more peripheral internet governance 
organizations would also advance the depth of our understanding of Chinese 
engagement with internet governance. Similarly, studies that explored Chinese 
engagement with other internet governance norms – such as those related to 
accountability or the end-to-end principle – or that examined China’s specific 
policy preferences towards technical internet governance issues, would 
supplement the dissertation’s findings. Expanding the scope of enquiry further to 
include Chinese engagement with technical global telecommunications 
governance or non-technical aspects of internet governance would also 
complement the dissertation's research, helping to build a more comprehensive 
view of China's engagement with the internet, global telecommunications and the 
governance of these systems. 
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1 1986 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1986 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 1986 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 1986 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5** 1987 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
6 1987 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7** 1987 0 NA NA NA NA NA 
8 1987 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 1988 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 1988 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 1988 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18 1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21 1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 
22 1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 
23 1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 
24 1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 
26 1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 
28 1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 
29 1994 0 0 0 0 0 0 
30 1994 0 0 0 0 0 0 
31 1994 0 9 9 0 0 0 
32 1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 
33 1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 
34 1995 0 3 0 2 1 0 
35** 1996 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
36 1996 0 0 0 0 0 0 
37** 1996 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
38 1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 
39 1997 0 1 1 0 0 0 
40 1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 
41 1998 0 0 0 0 0 0 
42 1998 0 0 0 0 0 0 
43 1998 0 2 0 0 2 0 
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44 1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 
45 1999 0 1 1 0 0 0 
46 1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 
47 2000 0 1 0 1 0 0 
48 2000 0 7 0 5 1 1 
49 2000 0 5 0 5 0 0 
50 2001 0 3 0 1 2 0 
51 2001 0 7 1 3 3 0 
52 2001 0 16 0 5 10 1 
53 2002 0 8 0 3 5 0 
54 2002 0 14 0 5 9 0 
55 2002 0 1 0 1 0 0 
56 2003 0 1 0 1 0 0 
57 2003 0 4 0 4 0 0 
58 2003 0 1 0 0 1 0 
59 2004 0 12 0 4 8 0 
60 2004 0 2 0 1 1 0 
61 2004 0 4 0 3 1 0 
62 2005 0 6 0 3 3 0 
63 2005 0 40 1 16 23 0 
64 2005 0 28 0 20 8 0 
65 2006 0 26 0 21 5 0 
66 2006 0 45 0 31 14 0 
67 2006 0 33 0 20 12 1 
68 2007 0 44 5 29 10 0 
69 2007 0 41 0 31 10 0 
70 2007 Huawei 
(Sponsor) 
46 0 35 9 2 
71 2008 0 22 0 17 5 0 
72 2008 0 63 8 43 10 2 
73 2008 0 28 0 18 2 8 
74 2009 0 89 4 52 15 18 
75 2009 0 133 8 69 26 30 
76 2009 0 87 3 63 21 0 
77 2010 0 127 5 61 24 37 
78 2010 0 130 9 63 30 28 












438 13 137 130 158 
80 2011 0 153 15 72 18 48 
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81 2011 0 149 10 78 18 43 
82 2011 0 150 7 82 21 40 
83 2012 Huawei 
(Sponsor) 
152 6 82 22 42 
84 2012 Huawei 
(Sponsor) 
146 11 65 30 40 






137 14 69 24 30 
86 2013 Huawei 
(Sponsor) 
109 6 52 20 31 
87 2013 Huawei 
(Sponsor) 
137 12 54 36 35 







107 7 55 15 30 
89 2014 0 103 6 57 21 19 
90 2014 0 115 2 59 25 29 
91 2014 0 120 2 74 26 18 
Source: Author's own research into IETF Meeting Records Archive (IETF 2015). 
* The appendix likely understates the actual level of Chinese participation. IETF 
meetings do not directly record attendees’ country affiliation until IETF 73. In addition, 
IETF meeting records are incomplete and attendee registration is voluntary. Prior to 
IETF 73, Chinese attendees are identified as PRC citizens if two corroborating pieces of 
evidence exist (i.e. Chinese (Mandarin) name and country affiliation, .cn email address, 
affiliation with PRC-based organization, etc.). Post-IETF 73, country affiliation is used 
to identify Chinese attendees, although corroboration is used in instances where no 
country affiliation is given. 
** No records exist for these meetings or records do not provide a corroborating piece of 
evidence (i.e. they only record name and no further information). 
*** IETF 79 is the only meeting held in China (Beijing). 
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Appendix 2: Chinese Authored RFCs & Chinese 
Contributors to IETF Documents 
 
a. Chinese Authored RFCs 
 
1842 5836 6423 6661 6909 7109 
1922 5852 6430 6696 6930 7110 
3743 5866 6431 6697 6934 7121 
4562 5919 6435 6705 6942 7123 
4564 5930 6436 6715 6956 7130 
4713 5949 6437 6723 6957 7136 
4925 5993 6439 6734 6958 7138 
5121 6023 6440 6737 6972 7139 
5142 6036 6456 6751 6974 7140 
5164 6041 6468 6769 6984 7148 
5210 6043 6474 6776 6990 7150 
5316 6052 6479 6777 7002 7152 
5336 6053 6531 6791 7003 7156 
5392 6098 6535 6792 7004 7172 
5425 6141 6558 6798 7005 7178 
5493 6144 6563 6828 7010 7179 
5495 6145 6566 6829 7025 7180 
5565 6159 6572 6843 7037 7227 
5729 6205 6608 6855 7039 7244 
5747 6219 6630 6856 7040 7269 
5790 6232 6636 6866 7045 7333 
5810 6264 6642 6867 7062 7349 
5814 6273 6644 6879 7069 7388 
5818 6279 6646 6883 7075 7411 
5833 6378 6653 6898 7096  
5834 6422 6654 6905 7098 Total: 154 
Source: Author's own research derived from IETF Tools list of Chinese IETF 
document contributors (IETF Tools 2015a). Data is inclusive till end of 2014. Note 
that the IETF's statistical data generator returns some erroneous results, omitting some 
authors and attributing others' erroneous Chinese nationality. Each RFCs in this 
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b. Chinese Contributors to IETF Documents 
 
Summary by Stakeholder Group 
 
Government Private Sector  Civil Society Unknown Total 
8 276 116 8 408 
 
Chinese Contributors by Stakeholder & Name* 
 
Government Private Sector Private Sector cont. Private Sector cont. 
    
Baohong He Aijun Wang Liang Xia Yuanbin Yin 
Fang Li Bill Huang Lianshu Zheng Yuanchen Ma 
Guoying Zhang Bin Gu Lianyuan Li Yuanjiao Liu 
Hui Tian Bin Liu Lingli Deng Yuanlong Jiang 
Shihui Duan Bin Wang Lixing Wang Yue Qin 
Shu Liu Bing Li Lizhong Jin Yungui Wang 
Yu Wang Bing Liu Lu Huang Yuqi Wang 
Yunbin Xu Bo Gao Ma SuAn Yuxiang Hu 
 Bo Wu Mach Chen Yuzhi Ma 
Civil Society Brandon Li Mao Yang Zhang Fei 
 Cathy Li Miao Lei Zhen Cao 
Baoping Yan Cathy Zhou Michael Yan Zhenbin Li 
Baoxian Zhang Chen Li Mike Cheng Zhenqiang Li 
Bingkun Zhou Chengbin Shen Min Ye Zhibo Hu 
Binyang Liu Chongfeng Xie Mingui Zhang Zhihua Liu 
Boxin Du Chu JunSheng Minpeng Qi Zhirong Zhang 
Ce Luo Chunju Shao Nan Wu Zhonghua Chen 
Changqiao Xu Chunshan Xiong Ning Zong Zhonghui Yao 
Changqing An Claire Bi Oliver Huang Zhongyu Gu 
Chuanhuang Li Cui Wang Peng Fan Zhu Lei 
Chunming Wu DaCheng Zhang Peng Liang Zitao Wang 
Cong Liu DaCheng Zhang Qi Chen Ziyao Cheng 
Congxiao Bao Dan Li Qian Wang  
Depeng Jin Danhua Wang Qiandeng Liang Unknown 
De-Yun Gao Danping He Qiang Wu  
Di Wu Dapeng Li Qiao Fu Diao Yongping 
Diao Yuping Dapeng Liu Qilei Wang Kui Huang 
Enhuan Dong Davey Song Qin Wu Liao Ming 
Fei Song Dayong Guo Qiong Sun Linjian Song 
Gang Ren Deng Lingli Qiuchao Yi Meng Yu 
Gengyu Wei Di Ma Rachel Huang Xiaohong Deng 
Guang Yao Dongnian Cheng Ran Chen Yi Bai 
Guangwu Hu Duoliang Fan Renhai Zhang Zhiming Wang 
Haikuo Zhang Emily Chen Renwei Li  
Hao Wang Emma Zhang Richard Li  
Hong Zhang Eric Wu River Huang  
Hongke Zhang Fan Shi Rong Gu  
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Hong-Ke Zhang Fang Wei Rong Zhang  
Hongtao Li Fangwei Hu Rongbo Zhang  
Hu Daoyuan Fatai Zhang Ruinan Sun  
Jiagui Xie Fei Zhang Ruiqian Jing  
Jiahai Yang Feng Guo Ruiquan Jing  
Jianfeng Guan Feng Huang Ruobin Zheng  
Jiang Dong Feng Zheng Sam (Zhongqi) Xia  
Jiankang Yao Fengyuan Zou Shanzhi Chen  
Jianping Wu Fortune Huang Shaowei Liu  
Jie Huang Frank Feng Sheng Jiang  
Jie Zhang Frank Xia Shi Fan  
Jin Zhao Frankey Feng Shi Li  
Jing Cheng Fu Qiao Shitao Li  
Jingguo Ge Fuyou Miao Shunwang Zhuang  
Juan Wei Gang Chen Sunshine Zhang  
Jun Bi Gang Yan Tao Chou  
Kai Gao Guangming Yang Tao Han  
Ke Xu Guangtao Zhou Tao Lin  
Li Su Guangying Zheng Tao Sun  
Lieguang Zeng Guoliang Han Tian Tian  
Ligang Dong Guozhen Cheng Tianfu Fu  
Lin Guo Haibin Song Tianle Yang  
Linlin Zhou Haibo Wang Tianran Zhou  
Lishan Li Haiyan Zhang Tieying Huang  
Long Zhang Han Li Tina Tsou  
Lu Sun Hao Chen Ting Ao  
Mao Wei Hao Long Ting Liao  
Mi Zhang Haomian Zheng Vic Liu  
Ming Gao Haoxing Shen Wang Weijun  
Mingchuan Zhang He Zekun Wang Zhiguan  
Mingwei Xu Hong Zhou Wei Cao  
Nan Hua Hongjun Zhai Wei Chen  
Nan Wang Hongyu Li Wei Huang  
Neng Geng Huang Hua Ye Wei Meng  
Neng Zhang Huafeng Wen Wei Song  
Ning Kong Huan Du Weibo Li  
Peng Wu Hui Deng Weiguo Hao  
Peng Zuo Hui Ji Weiping Xu  
Prof. Jianyong 
Chen Hui Liu Weiqiang Cheng  
Prof. Jun Zhang Hui Ni Weiwei Yang  
Qi Sun Hui Yang Wenhui Zhou  
Qian Hualin Huiying Xu Wenjing Cao  
Qin Wang Ian Foo 
Will (Shucheng) 
Liu  
Qin Zhao Jacni Qin Xia Chen  
Sean Shen James Huang Xiafeng Ji  
Shenghui Yan Jia He Xian Zhang  
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Shu Yang Jian Ding Xiangsong Cui  
Shuai Gao Jian Luo XianGuo Zhang  
Wangyang Liu Jian Yang Xiaodong Duan  
Wanying Jia Jiang Sheng Xiaohu Xu  
Wei Gong Jiang Xingfeng Xiaojun Zhuang  
Wei Mao Jiangang Tong Xiaoming Chen  
Wei Mi JiangTao Hao Xiaoran Guan  
Wei Quan Jianhua Gao Xihua Fu  
Wei Zhang Jianjie You Xin Li  
Wei-Cheng Zhao Jianning Liu Xin Yang  
Weimin Lei Jianrui Han Xingfeng Jiang  
Weiming Wang Jiao Kang Xingyue Zhou  
Weiqiang Sun Jie Dong Xinpeng Wei  
Wendong Wang Jie Hu Xin-ping Wang  
Wenhong Wang Jiehui Hu Xinxin Zhang  
Wentao Shang Jin Li Xinzong Zeng  
Xiali Yan Jin Peng Xiugang Wei  
Xiangyang Gong Jing Huang Xu Ye  
Xiaodong Lee Jing Zhao Xuan He  
Xiaohan Liu Jinwei Xia Xudong Zhang  
Xiaohong Huang Jishang Yang Xuehui Dai  
Xiaoping Zheng Jizhuang Zhao Xueqin Wei  
Xing Li Judy Zhu Xuewei Wang  
Xing Zhou Julong Lan Xuhong Song  
Xirong Que Jun Sun Yan Ding  
Yan Ma Junfang Wang Yang Bo  
Yan Zhang Junlin Zhang Yang Gao  
Yantao Sun Junru Lin Yang Shi  
Ye Zhou Kai Liu Yang Wang  
Yi Sun Ke Li Yangbo Lin  
Yichen Zhang Kepeng Li Yao Li  
Yong Cui Kepeng Li Yi Jiang  
Yong Li Kevin Yin Yi Lin  
Yongli Zhao Kunkun Lou Yifan Chen  
You Wang Lanshan Zhang Yihong Huang  
Yu Cao Le Tian Yinben Xia  
Yu Jiang Leaf Y. Yeh Ying Cheng  
Yu Zhai Lehong Niu Yisong Liu  
Yuchi Chen Lei Li Yiyong Zha  
Yuefeng Ji Lei Miao Yizhou Li  
Zesong Fei Lennard Xiao Yong Luo  
Zhiwei Yan Li Xue Yongbing Fan  
Zhu Haifeng Li Zhang Yu Fu  
Zilong Liu Liang Fang Yu Mao  
Source: Author's own research derived from IETF Tools List of Chinese IETF 
document contributors (IETF Tools 2015a). Data is inclusive till end of 2014. Note 
that the IETF's statistical data generator returns some erroneous results, including: 
failing to identify all Chinese contributors each time statistical data is generated, 
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duplicating others and attributing others' erroneous Chinese nationality. The Appendix 
has slightly more contributors than the number typically generated online, due to 
slightly different statistical data generated on multiple occasions. Each contributor is 
assumed to be a PRC citizen unless further information in their IETF profile indicates 
otherwise. Some duplicated authors and other erroneous results have been removed, 
see next section for list of removed contributors. 
* All names are as listed in the IETF Tools list, save that for duplicates of the same 
author one name has been selected over the other duplicates (which are illustrated in 
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c. Contributors Removed from Appendix Section b. 
Name Removal Reason Name Removal Reason 
    
Barry Leiba Not PRC Citizen NDSC 
Statistical 
Generator Error 




Duplicate of Yang 
Bo Qiong 




Generator Error Rajiv Papneja Not PRC Citizen 
Dhruv Dhoddy Not PRC Citizen Robins George  Not PRC Citizen 
Fank Xia 
Duplicate of Frank 
Xia Roni Even Not PRC Citizen 
Frank Liang Xia 
Duplicate of Frank 
Xia Sam Aldrin Not PRC Citizen 





Generator Error Sam K. Aldrin Not PRC Citizen 
Huub van Helvoort Not PRC Citizen Senthil Kumal S Not PRC Citizen 
Lee Xiaodong 
Duplicate of 
Xiaodong Lee ShangHai 
Statistical 
Generator Error 
Lei Wang Not PRC Citizen Shenzhen 
Statistical 
Generator Error 











Zhenbin Li Suresh BR Not PRC Citizen 
Liang 
Duplicate of Frank 
Xia Susan Hares Not PRC Citizen 
Liang Xia (Frank) 






Linda Dunbar Not PRC Citizen Will 
Duplicate of Will 
(Shucheng) Liu 
Maarten Vissers Not PRC Citizen Will Liu 




Duplicate of Mach 




Duplicate of Mach 
Chen Xiaodong Li 
Duplicate of 
Xiadong Lee 
Malcolm Betts Not PRC Citizen 
Yong (Oliver) 
Huang  
Duplicate of Oliver 
Huang 
Mark I. Williams Not PRC Citizen Young Lee Not PRC Citizen 
Milan Patel Not PRC Citizen   
Mishael Wexler Not PRC Citizen   
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te Sector/Civil Society/ 
Unknown 













0 0 0 0 0 0 Government 
GAC representative attendance 
at ICANN Board/GAC 
Meeting inferred in informal 
chat recordings (ICANN 
1999b). 
 
4 (1999) 0 4 1 2 1 0 Government 
Comments indicate Chinese 
government attendance at a 
GAC meeting (ICANN 1999a). 
 
5 (2000) 0 4 0 4 0 0 None 
 
6 (2000) 0 16 1 8 7 0 Private Sector 
An Eastern Communications 
Co. Ltd representative 
remotely participated in a 
meeting related to domain 
name policy (ICANN 2000f). 
 
Civil Society 
A representative of the CASS 
remotely participated in 
ICANN's Public Forum 
(ICANN 2000e). 
 
7 (2000) 0 9 1 5 3 0 None 
 
8 (2001) 0 15 1 8 6 0 None 
 




0 1 0 0 1 0 Civil Society 
A CNNIC representative 
remotely participated in an 
ICANN's Public Forum 
(ICANN 2001h). 
 





0 4 0 0 2 2 Civil Society 
A CNNIC representative 
remotely participated in a 
meeting related to internet 
security (ICANN 2001f). 
The same CNNIC 
representative remotely 
participated in another meeting 




































0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society 
A Chinese member of the 
ICANN Board, Qian Hualin, 
commented in an ICANN 
Board meeting about joint 
technical standards work 
between CNNIC and a range of 
other East Asian NICs 
(ICANN 2003a). 
Qian Hualin further 
participated in a meeting on 
WHOIS operations where he 
commented on WHOIS in 









0 NA NA NA NA NA Government 
Zhao Houlin, in his ITU 
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*** capacity, commented at a joint 




Qian Hualin, as an ICANN 
Board member, made brief 
comments on administrative 
matters at a public Board 
meeting (ICANN 2004b). 
Qian Hualian commented on 
IDN matters at a further Board 
meeting (ICANN 2004d). 
Two civil society 
representatives, one from At-
Large@ China and another 
from CNNIC, gave 
presentations on IDN customer 
feedback and IDN rollout in 






0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society 
Qian Hualin, as an ICANN 
Board member, wished a 
departing ICANN employee 
good luck during a Board 
meeting (ICANN 2004a). 
Two CNNIC representatives 
and a Chinese ALS 
representative gave 
presentations on IDNs in China 
and commented on IDN issues 
in a meeting on that topic 





0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society 
Qian Hualin, as an ICANN 
Board member, discussed IDN 
matters in a Board meeting 
(ICANN 2005c). 
Qian Hualin, as an ICANN 
Board member, discussed IDN 






0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society 
A CDNC member and Qian 
Hualin - as ICANN Board 
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member - both commented on 
IDN issues at an IDN 
workshop (ICANN 2005f). 
At an ICANN Board meeting, 
Qian Hualin discussed a range 
of issues including the ICANN 
budget and multi-lingualization 
of ICANN's online presence 
(ICANN 2005a). 
At a workshop on IDNs, a 
representative of At-
Large@China and Qian 
Hualin, representing the 






0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society 
Qian Hualin, as an ICANN 
Board member, and a CNNIC 
representative commented on 
IDNs at a workshop on that 
issue (ICANN 2005d). 
A CDNC representative 
chaired another IDN workshop 
(ICANN 2005h). 
Qian Hualin, as an ICANN 
Board member, seconded a 
motion on the appointment of 
ICANN staff at a Board 





0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society 
Qian Hualin, as an ICANN 
Board member, commented on 
IDN policy and recused 
himself from a vote on the .xxx 
domain due to a conflict of 
interest at a Board meeting 
(ICANN 2006n). 
A CNNIC representative gave 
a presentation on .cn to the 
ccNSO (ICANN 2006q). 
A CNNIC representative and 
an At-Large@China 
representative each gave 
presentations on IDNs in 
China, while Xue Hong 
representing the ALAC gave a 
presentation on ICANN's IDN 
activities and moderated the 
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overall ALAC meeting where 






0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society 
Qian Hualin, as an ICANN 
Board member, presented a 
resolution related to 
administrative matters at a 
Board meeting (ICANN 
2006n). 
Qian Hualin, as an ICANN 
Board member, attended an 






0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society 
Qian Hualin, as an ICANN 
Board member, gave a final 
farewell at an ICANN Board 
meeting and voted on 
resolutions related to 
expanding available gTLDs 
(ICANN 2006o). 
Xue Hong, representing the 
ALAC, also gave a 
presentation at an IDN 





0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society 
Xue Hong, as an ALAC 
member, discussed IDN policy 
in a GNSO Public forum 
(ICANN 2007b). 
Xue Hong, as an ALAC 
member, discussed IDN policy 
again at a workshop on that 





0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society 
Xue Hong, in her academic 
capacity, commented on IDN 





0 0 0 0 0 0 Civil Society 
A CNNIC representative gave 
a presentation on IDNs in 
China at a ccNSO meeting 













12 0 0 12 0 Civil Society 
Xue Hong commented on IDN 
policy at an IDN workshop 
(ICANN 2008f). 
In a ccNSO meeting, two 
CNNIC representatives 
commented on gTLD policy 
and one, Zhang Jian, gave a 
presentation on the CNNIC 
(ICANN 2008b). 
A third CNNIC representative 
commented on IPv6 policy in a 








NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society 
Qian Hualin, in his personal 
capacity, attended and 
commented on IDN issues at a 
workshop (ICANN 2008h). 
Zhang Jian from the CNNIC 
gave a presentation on the 
CNNIC at a ccNSO meeting 







NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society 
Xue Hong, in her APRALO 
capacity discussed IDN policy 
in an At-Large meeting 
(ICANN 2009f). 
Xue Hong participated in an 
APRALO meeting in her 
APRALO capacity (ICANN 
2009e). 
A CDNC representative 
commented on IDN policy in a 
meeting on that issue (ICANN 
2009c). 
A CNNIC representative 
commented on IDN issues in a 
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An unknown commented on 
DNSSEC issues in a meeting 








3 0 0 3 0 Government 
China's GAC representative 
briefly commented on China's 
application for Chinese 
language IDNs to be 
recognised by ICANN and 
incorporated into the global 
root (ICANN 2009j). 
China's GAC representative 
attended an ICANN 
Board/GAC meeting and 
China's return was welcomed 




A CNNIC representative 
commented on IDN policy at 
an IDN ccTLD workshop 
(ICANN 2009t). 
A CONAC representative 
attended a GNSO meeting 
(ICANN 2009n). 
The same CONAC 
representative attended a 
DNSO working group meeting 
(ICANN 2009o). 
Another CONAC 
representative commented on 
intellectual property rights at a 
new gTLD meeting (ICANN 
2009u). 
Four further CONAC 
representatives at the ICANN 
Public Forum commented on 
IDN issues along with a few 




An unknown commented on 
IDN policy in a ccNSO 
meeting (ICANN 2009p). 
An unknown commented on 
IDN issues in a public forum 










14 0 1 12 1 Government 
China's GAC representative 
commented in support of 
China's IDN ccTLD 




A representative of HiChina 
Ltd commented on IDN policy 




A CNNIC representative gave 
an update on CNNIC (ICANN 
2009h, 2009x). 
The same CNNIC 
representative commented on 
IDN policy in an IDN ccTLD 
workshop (ICANN 2009w). 
A CONAC representative 
commented on IDN policy in a 
'Get to know ICANN' meeting 
(ICANN 2009m). 
Xue Hong commented on 
trademarks issues at an 
APRALO meeting (ICANN 
2009d). 
Xue Hong commented on IDN 
policy at an ALAC Secretariat 
meeting (ICANN 2009b). 
Xue Hong commented on DNS 
abuse at a workshop (ICANN 
2009i). 
Three CONAC members 
commented on a range of 
technical issues including 
IDNs and trademarks at an 




Two unknowns commented on 
a range of technical issues at a 
public forum (ICANN 2009v). 
 








15 1 1 13 0 Government 
China's GAC representative 
briefly introduced himself at a 
joint ICANN Board/GAC 




Xue Hong commented on the 
ALAC's governance processes 
at an ALAC regional 
leadership meeting (ICANN 
2010g). 
Xue Hong remotely 
participated in an ALAC policy 
issue discussion and 
commented on WHOIS policy 
(ICANN 2010f, 2010o). 
Xue Hong commented on 
gender equality at ICANN at a 
Nominating Committee 
workshop (ICANN 2010w). 
A CNNIC representative 
commented on China's real 
name registration system for 




An unknown briefly 
commented on a chatroom 
related to a ccNSO Tech Day 







8 0 2 5 1 Government 
An MIIT representative 
discussed visa issues related to 
the potential holding of an 
ICANN meeting in China - 
subsequently occurring in 
Beijing at ICANN 46 - at an 
accountability and 




A CNNIC representative gave 
a presentation on Chinese 
IDNs (ICANN 2010y). 
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Xue Hong commented on 
general policy matters at an 
ALAC meeting (ICANN 
2010i). 
Xue Hong commented on the 
consensus appointment of an 
APRALO official, rather than 
resorting to a re-election 
(ICANN 2010p). 
Xue Hong briefly commented 
on remote chatservers at, and 
chaired, an At-Large Regional 
Secretariats Meeting (ICANN 
2010l, 2010m). 
Xue Hong also commented on 
gTLD policy at an ALAC 
Policy Discussion meeting 
(ICANN 2010e). 
Xue Hong commented in 
remote chat at an ALAC and 
Regional Leaders meeting 
(ICANN 2010d). 
Two CONAC members 
commented on gTLD policy at 







16 3 0 13 0 Civil Society 
Zhang Jian representing 
ICANN gave a presentation on 
IDNs at a joint ccNSO-GNSO 
meeting (ICANN 2010v). 
Zhang Jian representing 
APTLD gave an update on 
APTLD (ICANN 2010k). 
Two CONAC members 
commented on IDN issues at 
an ICANN Public Forum 
(ICANN 2010t). 
Li Xiaodong commented on 
IDN issues at an IDN ccTLD 
workshop (ICANN 2010u). 
Xue Hong chaired an 
APRALO meeting (ICANN 
2010j). 
Xue Hong commented 
numerous times on ALAC 
issues at an ALAC and 
Regional leadership working 
session (ICANN 2010h). 







19 2 4 13 0 Civil Society 
Li Xiaodong representing 
CNNIC gave a presentation on 
Chinese IDNs (ICANN 2011i, 
2011q). 
Zhang Jian representing 
APTLD gave an update on 
APTLD (ICANN 2011d). 
Li Xiaodong representing 
CDNC gave a presentation on 
Chinese IDNs (ICANN 
2011u). 
A CONAC member 
commented on IDN issues at 
an ICANN Public Forum 
(ICANN 2011n). 
Xue Hong commented on a 
range of issues at an At-Large 




An unknown introduced 
herself in a joint ccNSO/GNSO 







22 0 6 13 2 Civil Society 
Zhang Jian representing 
APTLD gave a presentation on 
IDNs at a ccNSO Council 
meeting (ICANN 2011r). 
Li Xiaodong representing 
CDNC commented on IDN 
policy at a workshop (ICANN 
2011p). 
Xue Hong commented on IDN 
issues at an ALAC Policy 
Discussion forum (ICANN 
2011c). 
A CONAC member 
commented on IDN policy at 
an ICANN public forum 
(ICANN 2011n). 
Li Xiaodong engaged in policy 
discussion related to root 
server policy (ICANN 2011v). 
Zhang Jian commented in a 
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workshop about the ccNSO not 
needing to follow GAC advice 
and advocating for a one 
member, one vote system for 






4 0 0 4 0 Civil Society 
Zhang Jian representing 
APTLD gave a presentation on 
regional TLD joint projects 
(ICANN 2011s). 
Xue Hong commented on IDN 
policy at a ccNSO members 
meeting (ICANN 2011h). 
Li Xiaodong, representing 
CNNIC, attended at a root 
server and security meeting 
(ICANN 2011x). 
Li Xiaodong, representing 
CNNIC, was heavily engaged 
in policy discussion at another 
root server and security 
meeting (ICANN 2011w). 
 
Unknown 
An unknown commented 
briefly in an ICANN Summit 










25 3 5 16 1 Government 
China's GAC representative 
briefly commented on the 




A Chinese private sector actor 
from an unknown company 
interested in registering new 
gTLDs commented on policy 
matters related to this issue at 
an At-Large meeting (ICANN 
2012j). 
A representative of the firm 
KNet commented in an 
ICANN Public Forum on IDN 
policy (ICANN 2012af). 
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Civil Society 
Zhang Jian representing 
APTLD gave a presentation on 
APTLD (ICANN 2012am). 
Xue Hong attended a ccNSO 
meeting in her capacity as 
ccNSO member (ICANN 
2012z). 
Xue Hong, in her ccNSO 
capacity, attended another 
ccNSO meeting (ICANN 
2012aa). 
Xue Hong discussed IDN 
policy at an At-Large meeting 
(ICANN 2012y). 
Li Xiaodong commented on 
.cn real name registration 
policy at a WHOIS workshop 
(ICANN 2012al). 
Xue Hong commented in detail 
on the Chinese government's 
role in relation to the .cn 
domain at a ccNSO meeting 
(ICANN 2012o). 
A CONAC member and a 
CDNC representative 
commented on IDN policy at 
an IDN workshop (ICANN 
2012ah). 
Xue Hong attended a meeting 
on intellectual property rights 
(ICANN 2012ao). 
A CNNIC representative 
commented on IDN policy at a 
TLD meeting (ICANN 
2012ap). 
A CNNIC representative 
attended an IDN policy 
development meeting (ICANN 
2012ag). 
Xue Hong attended an 








21 2 6 12 1 Government 
Brief technical policy remarks 
were made by a Chinese 
government representative at a 
GNSO non-commercial users 
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Zhang Jian gave an update on 
APTLD's joint activities with 
the GNSO (ICANN 2012e). 
Zhang Jian gave a general 
update on APTLD (ICANN 
2012f). 
Xue Hong representing 
APRALO and Li Xiaodong 
representing ICANN 
commented on IDN policy in 
an ALAC meeting (ICANN 
2012c). 
Xue Hong commented on IDN 
policy at an APRALO Monthly 
meeting (ICANN 2012d). 
Xue Hong commented at an 
At-Large meeting on IDN 
issues but also noted that 
multi-stakeholder governance 
approaches have their limit 
(ICANN 2012g). 
Li Xiaodong representing 
ICANN commented on his 
experience working with 
ICANN at a Fellowship 
meeting (ICANN 2012t). 
Xue Hong represented the 
ccNSO at an ICANN Academy 
meeting (ICANN 2012ad). 
A CNNIC representative 
commented on IDN policy at 










19 1 5 12 1 Government 
At a GAC high level meeting, 
China's GAC representative 
stated, during discussion of 
general policy issues, that 
governments should play a 
greater role in ICANN and that 
the IANA should be more 
accountable (ICANN 2012u). 
The Vice Minister of China's 
public sector reform 
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commission provided a pre-
recorded video to attendees at 
ICANN 45, which welcomed 
ICANN and its members to the 
forthcoming ICANN 46 in 
Beijing (ICANN 2012af). 
 
Civil Society 
A CNNIC representative gave 
a presentation on the .cn 
domain (ICANN 2012as). 
Zhang Jian gave an update on 
APTLD (ICANN 2012ab). 
A CNNIC representative gave 
a presentation on IDNs in 
China (ICANN 2012s). 
Xue Hong represented the 
ccNSO in a workshop that 
discussed policy related to the 
ccNSO (ICANN 2012b). 
Xue Hong commented on 
ALAC policy at an At-Large 
meeting (ICANN 2012h). 
Xue Hong commented on IDN 
policy at an At-Large 
workshop (ICANN 2012i). 
Xue Hong commented on 
trademark issues at an ALAC 
meeting (ICANN 2012k). 
Li Xiaodong commented on 
censorship in China in the 
context of the upcoming 
Beijing ICANN meeting at an 
At-Large meeting (ICANN 
2012l). 
Xue Hong commented on 
China's upcoming ICANN 
meeting at a ccNSO Council 
meeting (ICANN 2012m). 
Two CNNIC members 
commented on the upcoming 
China ICANN meeting at a 
ccNSO members meeting 
(ICANN 2012n). 
Xue Hong commented on 
ccTLD policy issues at a 
ccNSO members meeting 
(ICANN 2012p). 
A CNNIC member discussed 
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the upcoming China ICANN 
meeting and presented a video 
which included an address 
from CAS and ISC officials, 
while a CONAC member also 
stated that advancing multi-
stakeholder governance in 
China was their responsibility 
(ICANN 2012af). 
A CNNIC attendee commented 




An unknown commented on 
multi-stakeholder policy at a 
meeting of the GNSO's non-
commercial users’ 
constituency, but the transcript 
didn't accurately record the 


























An MIIT Vice Minister 
provided welcoming remarks 
at a welcome ceremony for this 
meeting (ICANN 2013bp). 
An MIIT representative 
discussed general policy issues 
at a high level meeting on 
internet architecture and 
ICANN's Asia-Pacific strategy 
(ICANN 2013ab ). 
A Chinese government 
representative briefly 
introduced themself at an 
accountability and 
transparency meeting (ICANN 
2013b). 
A CATR employee 
commented on technical 
matters at a DNS risk 




A representative from 
CoreEmail gave a presentation 
about their IDN-enhanced 
email business (ICANN 
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2013bc). 
A China Mobile representative 
gave a presentation on Ipv6 
deployment at China Mobile 
and commented on Ipv6 in 
China at an IPv6 workshop 
(ICANN 2013bf, 2013bh). 
A KNet representative 
commented in a workshop 
related to Internet development 
in developing countries 
(ICANN 2013k). 
A representative from Zodiac 
Group commented on 
contractual compliance issues 
with ICANN (ICANN 2013l). 
A China Unicom 
representative commented 
briefly on trademark issues at 
an ICANN Public Forum 
(ICANN 2013bb). 
A KNet representative briefly 
commented at an ALAC-
hosted meeting (ICANN 
2013bk). 
A BIA representative 
commented on IPv6 issues 
(ICANN 2013bm). 
In a High Level Meeting, 
representative from China 
Unicom commented on gTLD 
policy, a representative from 
Sina.com gave a presentation 
on Weibo (China's Twitter-like 
software), and a representative 
from Qihu 360 introduced their 




A CNNIC representative gave 
a presentation introducing 
CNNIC (ICANN 2013j). 
A CNNIC representative gave 
a presentation on DNSSEC 
(ICANN 2013n). 
Zhang Jian gave an APTLD 
update (ICANN 2013g). 
A CNNIC official gave a 
presentation on IDN in China 
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(ICANN 2013bj). 
A CNNIC official gave a 
presentation on IPv6 in China 
(ICANN 2013be). 
Xue Hong and another 
representative from At-
Large@China attended an 
APRALO meeting (ICANN 
2013d). 
Xue Hong and another 
representative from At-
Large@China commented on 
general issues at another 
APRALO meeting (ICANN 
2013f). 
A CDNC representative 
commented on Chinese IDNs 
at another APRALO meeting 
(ICANN 2013h). 
Xue Hong commented on 
trademark and IDN issues at an 
At-Large meeting (ICANN 
2013i). 
Four CNNIC representatives 
and one university professor 
commented on policy at a 
meeting on regional 
cooperation (ICANN 2013k). 
Five civil society attendees 
commented on general policy 
at a High Level meeting 
(ICANN 2013aa). 
Xue Hong commented briefly 
in an Academy workshop 
(ICANN 2013az). 
An individual Chinese Internet 
user commented on DNS 
policy at the ICANN Public 
Forum (ICANN 2013ba). 
An ISC representative 
discussed the value of the IGF 
in positive terms (ICANN 
2013bd). 
Two civil society attendees 
commented at an IPv6 
workshop (ICANN 2013bg). 
Xue Hong chaired a meeting 
on Chinese ALSes and local 
outreach in which many 
unidentified Chinese 
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participants spoke (ICANN 
2013bk). 
A civil society attendee briefly 
commented at a Tech Day 
workshop (ICANN 2013bn). 
Xue Hong attended a 
trademark workshop (ICANN 
2013bo). 
Zhang Jian representing 
APTLD commented at an IDN 
working group (ICANN 
2013bi). 
Hu Qiheng, a prominent 
Chinese computer scientist 
who helped established China's 
initial TCP/IP-based 
connection with the US, spoke 
at the welcome ceremony 
(ICANN 2013bp). 
A CONAC representative, at a 
meeting on NGOs and new 
gTLDs, commented on NGO 
status in China in the context 
of internet governance, noting 
that a range of Chinese NGOs 
have varying relationships with 
the Chinese government, all 
have some connection by 
means of NGO registration 
requirements, and that not all 
are funded by the government. 
The representative also noted 
the public administrative role 
some internet governance 
NGOs in China have and the 
need for greater transnational 






An unknown commented on 
DNSSEC issues at a meeting 




0 34 6 9 18 1 Government 
An MIIT representative 
introduced themselves during a 
GAC meeting (ICANN 
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2013ak). 
A GAC representative briefly 
commented on gTLD policy in 
the GAC Open Plenary 
(ICANN 2013al). 
A GAC representative briefly 
commented on general issues 




A Chinese ccNSO 
representative introduced 
themselves at an Academy 
working group session 
(ICANN 2013ae). 
Xue Hong commented on IDN 
variant and trademark issues in 
an APRALO monthly meeting 
(ICANN 2013af). 
Xue Hong commented on 
trademark and UDRP issues at 
an At-Large meeting (ICANN 
2013ag). 
Xue Hong, in her ccNSO 
Council member capacity, 
attended a ccNSO Council 
meeting (ICANN 2013ah). 
Zhang Jian had a few brief 
comments read out on her 
behalf at a ccNSO meeting, 
thanking the ccNSO as she left 
her position within it (ICANN 
2013ai). 
Xue Hong attended a ccNSO 




0 39 7 10 19 3 Government 
A GAC representative 
commented on new gTLD 
policy in a joint ICANN 
Board/GAC meeting (ICANN 
2013av). 
A GAC Representative 
introduced himself in one GAC 
plenary session (ICANN 
2013at).  
A GAC representative 
commented on gTLD policy in 
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Xue Hong commented on 
general policy issues at an 
Academy working group 
session (ICANN 2013an). 
Xue Hong, in her ccNSO 
capacity, introduced herself in 
a joint ALAC/ccNSO meeting 
(ICANN 2013aw). 
Xue Hong introduced herself 
as a representative of the 
CDNUA in an APRALO 
monthly meeting (ICANN 
2013ao). 
Xue Hong commented on 
ccNSO administrative issues in 
her ccNSO capacity at a 
ccNSO Council meeting 
(ICANN 2013ap). 
Xue Hong, in her ccNSO 
capacity, commented on 
various policy 
recommendations in a ccNSO 
members meeting (ICANN 
2013aq). 
A CONAC representative 
commented on DNSSEC issues 
in a DNSSEC workshop 
(ICANN 2013as). 
A CNNIC representative 
commented on new gTLD 
security issues in a meeting on 
that topic (ICANN 2013ar). 
Xue Hong, in her ccNSO 
capacity, commented on 
internal ccNSO administrative 
issues in a meeting on internal 
ccNSO issues (ICANN 
2013ax). 
Xue Hong attended a ccNSO 







60 3 26 20 11 Government 
A GAC representative made 
general comments on gTLD 
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policy in a GAC Communique 
Overview meeting (ICANN 
2014aa). 
A GAC representative made 
general comments on gTLD 
policy in a GAC Plenary 
meeting (ICANN 2014af). 
Two Chinese GAC 
representatives introduced 
themselves in the GAC 
Opening Plenary (ICANN 
2014ab). 
A GAC representative, in a 
GAC briefing by ICANN's 
CEO, commented that 
geographical diversity in 
ICANN should be improved to 
strengthen multi-stakeholder 
governance - noting that North 
America alone constitutes 75% 
of all participation in ICANN 
and Europe alone constitutes a 
further 15% (ICANN 2014z). 
At an ICANN Board/GAC 
meeting, a GAC representative 
stated that the upcoming IANA 
transition should result in 
governments having a 
decision-making, rather than 
just advisory, role in ICANN 
and that the lack of such a role 
renders ICANN illegitimate 
(ICANN 2014ah). 
In a preparatory meeting for 
the ICANN CEO's briefing of 
the GAC, China's 
representative called for greater 
government authority in 
ICANN, justifying this on the 
need for genuinely multi-
stakeholder governance 
(ICANN 2014ag). 
At a GAC plenary meeting, a 
GAC representative called for 
greater government power in 
internet governance, noting 
that the then upcoming 
NETMundial meeting should 
consider the issue and arguing 
that multi-stakeholder 
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governance should mean 
granting an equal voice for 
states in ICANN (ICANN 
2014ad). 
In another GAC plenary 
meeting China's GAC 
representative welcomed the 
announcement of the US 
government that it was 
planning to transfer ultimate 
authority for internet 
governance to ICANN 
(ICANN 2014ac). 
In another GAC plenary 
meeting a GAC representative 
reiterated China's call for 
greater government roles in 
ICANN, again referencing 
multi-stakeholder governance 
to justify equality amongst 
stakeholder groups in ICANN 
(ICANN 2014ae). 
A GAC representative also 
enquired in a joint 
GAC/RSSAC session whether 
the GAC could play a more 
active role in the RSSAC's 
activities and whether root 
servers could be more 
equitably distributed around 
the globe (ICANN 2014ai). 
 
Private Sector 
A Chinese lawyer commented 
briefly on participation in 
ICANN's legal work in a 
Fellowship meeting (ICANN 
2014y). 
A KNet employee also 
commented on a range of 
gTLD policy issues in a 




A CNNIC representative gave 
a presentation on the .cn 
domain at a ccNSO meeting 
(ICANN 2014q, 2014u). 
Another CNNIC representative 
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gave a presentation on 
DNSSEC deployment in the 
.cn domain at a DNSSEC 
workshop (ICANN 2014v, 
2014w). 
Xue Hong, in her ccNSO 
capacity, gave a presentation 
on DNS trademark issues in a 
ccNSO meeting (ICANN 
2014r). 
Xue Hong commented on 
ICANN's online learning 
resources development in an 
Academy Working Session 
(ICANN 2014ak). 
Xue Hong, in both her ALAC 
and ccNSO capacities, attended 
a joint ALAC/ccNSO meeting 
(ICANN 2014am). 
Xue Hong attended an 
APRALO monthly meeting in 
her CDNUA capacity (ICANN 
2014p). 
Xue Hong, representing 
Beijing Normal University, and 
a representative from ICANN's 
Beijing Engagement centre 
attended an APrIGF meeting 
and Xue Hong suggested the 
APrIGF discuss the IANA 
transition (ICANN 2014o). 
Xue Hong attended a ccNSO 
Council Meeting in her ccNSO 
capacity and briefly 
commented on ICANN 
Academy operations (ICANN 
2014s). 
Xue Hong attended a ccNSO 
members meeting and 
commented on the need for 
ICANN to expand its multi-
stakeholder character by 
engaging governments and the 
developing world more 
(ICANN 2014t). 
A CONAC representative 
introduced herself at an 
ICANN Fellowship meeting 
(ICANN 2014x). 
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The CNNIC CEO, Li 
Xiaodong, commented in 
support of multi-stakeholder 
governance and greater 
developing world participation 
in ICANN at a meeting on the 
IANA transition (ICANN 
2014aj) 
A CONAC representative 
discussed CONAC's activities 
in a new gTLD meeting 
(ICANN 2014aq). 
A CONAC representative 
remotely participated in a 
meeting on domain name 
collision (ICANN 2014an). 
A CONAC representative 
commented on their activities 
in China in a Public Forum 
meeting (ICANN 2014ao). 
Xue Hong in her ccNSO 
capacity attended a ccNSO 




An unknown commented on 
IDN work and Chinese 
language issues at an IDN 






54 3 25 22 4 Government 
In a GAC meeting on human 
rights law and ICANN, a GAC 
representative voiced concern 
over how such law would be 
reflected in ICANN policy and 
also stated China’s support for 
ICANN reconstituting itself as 
an entity not incorporated 
under Californian law (ICANN 
2014bd). 
Two GAC representatives 
introduced themselves in the 
GAC Opening Plenary 
(ICANN 2014bf). 
In a GAC meeting, a Chinese 
representative welcomed the 
upcoming IANA transition and 
inferred support for a stronger 
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government role within 
ICANN (ICANN 2014bc). 
In another GAC meeting a 
representative opined that the 
IANA transition should 
strengthen the role of 
government in ICANN while 
also commenting on a range of 
internal GAC policy issues 
(ICANN 2014be). 
In another GAC meeting 
China's representative 
welcomed moves to strengthen 
the GAC's position within 
ICANN (ICANN 2014bg). 
A Chinese Minister of 
Cyberspace Administration 
addressed a high level 
government meeting, 
commenting on a range of 
matters but noting both that 
governments should play a 
leading role in internet 
governance and that the private 
sector, civil society and other 
stakeholders all have legitimate 
roles to play in internet 
governance (ICANN 2014bi). 
A Chinese Minister of 
Cyberspace Administration 
gave a speech at the welcome 
ceremony for ICANN 50, 
making a series of general 
comments and also lauding the 
US government's decision to 
transition authority over the 




A KNet employee discussed 
KNet's new gTLD 
development and services in a 
gTLD meeting (ICANN 
2014bm). 
 
A Chinese domain registrar 
briefly participated in a 
NomCom meeting (ICANN 
2014as). 
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A representative from a 
Chinese new gTLD registry, 
ZDNS, commented on IDN 
issues in the ICANN Public 
Forum (ICANN 2014bj). 
Two new gTLD registrars 
commented on new gTLD 
policy in a Registrars 
Stakeholder Group meeting, 
with one of the registrars 
directly noting the differences 
in US and Chinese government 
approaches to regulating DNS 
governance (ICANN 2014bo). 
 
Civil Society 
A CNNIC representative gave 
a presentation on CNNIC at a 
ccNSO members meeting, 
where he explicitly outlined a 
Chinese conception of internet 
governance that was clearly 
multi-stakeholder (ICANN 
2014bl). 
Xue Hong engaged in detailed 
discussion of accountability 
within ICANN in a meeting on 
that issue (ICANN 2014aw). 
Xue Hong engaged in further 
detailed discussion of 
accountability at ICANN in 
another session of an 
accountability meeting 
(ICANN 2014ax). 
Xue Hong again engaged in 
further detailed discussion of 
accountability at ICANN in 
another session of an 
accountability meeting 
(ICANN 2014av). 
Xue Hong, in a fourth session 
of an accountability meeting, 
engaged in further detailed 
discussion of accountability 
within ICANN (ICANN 
2014ay). 
Xue Hong introduced herself at 
an At-Large meeting, 
representing APRALO 
(ICANN 2014az). 
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A Chinese employee of At-
Large introduced herself at an 
At-Large meeting (ICANN 
2014at). 
Xue Hong discussed 
accountability in an ATLAS II 
Plenary, stressing that she and 
other panelists were not 
pushing for an 'ITU-like' body 
(ICANN 2014au). 
A CNNIC representative 
commented on the CNNIC's 
role in China in a ccNSO 
members meeting (ICANN 
2014ba). 
Xue Hong, in her ccNSO 
capacity, commented at an 
Academy session on the value 
of leadership training and 
noted the importance of 
experience in multi-stakeholder 
communication (ICANN 
2014bb). 
Xue Hong gave a welcome 
speech to ICANN newcomers 
in this meeting for such 
newcomers (ICANN 2014bn). 
A CONAC representative 
commented on IDN policy 
issues in a Public Forum 
meeting (ICANN 2014bj). 
A Chinese employee of 
ICANN commented on a range 
of DNS policy issues in a 
Registrars Stakeholder Group 
meeting (ICANN 2014bo). 
A CONAC representative 
commented on translation 
issues in ICANN's policy 
development process in a 




An unknown asked a question 
about the relationship between 
the GAC and the rest of the 
ICANN organization in a 
Fellowship meeting (ICANN 
2015ad). 
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An unknown commented on 
the IANA transition in a 
meeting on that topic, calling 
for historically 
underrepresented groups to be 
better represented in the 
transition process (ICANN 
2015ae). 
An unknown commented on 
IDN issues in China at a 
meeting on IDN root zone 






33 5 19 9 0 Government 
At a GAC meeting the Chinese 
representative welcomed the 
GAC's active role in the IANA 
transition process, and queried 
whether the US government's 
contractual relationship with 
VeriSign - the .com registry 
and authoritative root zone file 
operator - would also be 
transferred to ICANN (ICANN 
2014bs). 
A GAC representative queried, 
in a preparatory meeting 
related to an ICANN 
Board/GAC meeting, where 
internet governance was 
headed following the 
conclusion of NETMundial 
(ICANN 2014by). 
A GAC representative also 
queried in a joint ICANN 
Board/GAC meeting where 
internet governance was 
heading following the 
conclusion of NETMundial 
(ICANN 2014by). 
A CATR employee 
commented on policy related to 
translation of ICANN websites 
into other languages in a 
meeting on that topic (ICANN 
2014ca). 
Another CATR employee 
made general comments on 
internet governance, 
welcoming the participation of 
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all stakeholders in ICANN and 
NETMundial, and noting that 
China was likely to increase its 
participation in internet 
governance in an ICANN 




Two Chinese new gTLD 
registry employees commented 
on general policy related to 
new gTLD policy in a gTLD 




Xue Hong in her CDNUA 
capacity commented on UDRP 
issues in an At-Large meeting 
(ICANN 2014bq). 
A Chinese member of 
ICANN's coordination group 
on the IANA transition 
commented in a meeting on 
that topic, stressing the need 
for ICANN to adopt a multi-
stakeholder process and 
querying what would happen if 
the US government refused 
ICANN's proposal (ICANN 
2014bu). 
A Chinese Internet Association 
member introduced themselves 
in an intellectual property 
constituency meeting (ICANN 
2014bx). 
A CONAC representative 
commented on IDNs in China 
at a registry and registrar 
meeting (ICANN 2014bz). 
A Chinese ICANN employee 
commented on registrar issues 
in a registrar meeting (ICANN 
2014cb). 
Xue Hong, in her ccNSO 
capacity, attended a ccNSO 
SOP meeting (ICANN 
2014cc). 
A CNNIC representative 
    195 
 
commented on IDN email 
issues at a meeting related to 
IDN issues (ICANN 2014cd). 
 
Unknown 
An unknown briefly introduced 
themselves in a working group 
on internet governance 
(ICANN 2014br). 
An unknown discussed general 
IDN policy in detail in an IDN 
root zone issue meeting 
(ICANN 2014bw). 
 
Source: Author's own research into ICANN Meetings archives (ICANN 2015ah). 
* Records of ICANN sponsors are unreliable until ICANN 29. Thus this list of 
Chinese sponsors/hosts may understate earlier Chinese sponsorship/hosting of 
ICANN meetings, particularly with respect to ICANN 14, which was held in China. 
** Details listed in this section are drawn from recorded details of each meeting. 
These details are generally from session/sub-meeting transcripts but, especially in the 
earlier ICANN meetings, are also drawn from recorded information about formal 
submissions to ICANN or recorded information about presentations given at ICANN 
meeting sessions/sub-meetings. Earlier ICANN meetings do not reliably provide 
transcripts for each session/sub-meeting in the general meeting; in some instances 
transcripts appear to be available but all links to them are now dead. It is not until 
ICANN 32 that session/meeting transcripts become consistently available. The 
unreliability of some ICANN records, particularly those from earlier ICANN 
meetings but also generally due to transcription errors, means that this Appendix 
likely understates the extent of Chinese involvement in ICANN meetings.   
*** ICANN meetings 1, 2 and 3 did not record attendance. Meeting 12 through to 
meeting 29 similarly did not record attendance. Meetings 31, 33, 34 do not provide 
publicly accessible attendance records. 
^ Meeting 11 was the first meeting to record the country affiliation of attendees. For 
the meetings prior to this, the status of apparently Chinese attendees as PRC nationals 
was determined by whether they had a Chinese name along with another piece of 
corroborating evidence (i.e. a .cn email address, affiliation with a PRC-based 
organization, etc.). Stakeholder affiliation was determined by the PRC-based 
organization with which attendees were associated. If no association was given, the 
attendee is listed as part of the unknown stakeholder group. 
^^ ICANN meetings 14 and 46 were held in the PRC, in Shanghai and Beijing 
respectively. 
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Appendix 4: Chinese Participation in APTLD Meetings 
Year Month Attendees* Sponsors/
Hosts** 
Details of Participation*** 
1998 February NA NA NA  
1998 July 1 Civil Society NA 
Qian Hualin noted as part of the 
taskforce that created the APTLD. 
 
1998 August 0 NA None  
1999 February 1 Civil Society NA 
Qian Hualin recorded as APTLD's 
GAC liaison. 
 
1999 May 0 NA None  
1999 June NA NA None  
1999 November 0 NA None  
2000 February 1 Civil Society NA 
Qian Hualin was made a Committee 
Chair. 
 
2000 July 1 Civil Society NA 
Qian Hualin was elected Chairman 
of APTLD. 
 
2000 October 1 Civil Society NA 
Qian Hualin recorded as Chair of 
Board meeting. 
 
2000 October NA NA NA  
2000 November NA NA None  
2001 February NA NA NA  
2001 February 3 Civil Society NA 
None 
 
2001 March NA NA None  
2001 May 6 Civil Society NA 
Qian Hualin recorded as Chair of 
Board meeting. 
 
2001 August 1 Civil Society NA 
Qian Hualin in his APTLD capacity 
gave an update on APTLD. 
 
2001 September 1 Civil Society NA 
A CNNIC representative gave a 
report on DNS dispute resolution 
issues. 
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2001 November 1 Civil Society NA 
A CNNIC representative gave a 
report on APTLD policy issues. 
 
2002 March NA NA None  
2002 June NA NA None  
2002 September NA NA None  
2002 September 1 Civil Society NA 
None 
 
2002^ October NA NA None  
2002 November NA NA None  
2003 January 2 Civil Society NA 
None 
 
2003 February NA NA None  
2003 May NA NA None  
2003 May NA NA None  
2003 August NA NA None  
2003 October 1 Civil Society NA 
None 
 
2003 November NA NA None  
2004 February NA NA None  
2004 February Some Civil Society* NA 
None 
 
2004 April NA NA None  
2004 July NA NA None  
2004 November NA NA None  
2005 February NA NA None  
2005 July NA NA None  
2005 October NA NA None  
2006 March 1 Civil Society NA 
Qian Hualin representing CNNIC 
gave an update on the .cn domain. 
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2006 June NA NA None  
2006 November NA NA None  
2007 February NA NA None  
2007 June 0 0 None  
2007 August NA NA NA  
2007 October NA 0 
A CNNIC representative gave a 
presentation on IDN policy issues. 
The same CNNIC representative 
gave a presentation on the .cn 
domain. 
 
2008 February 2 Civil Society 0 
A CDNC representative gave a 
presentation on IDN issues. 
 
2008 May 2 Civil Society 0 
None 
 
2008 December 1 Civil Society CNNIC 
A CNNIC representative gave a 
presentation on anti-phishing 
strategies in the .cn domain. 
 
2009 February 2 Civil Society CNNIC 
A CNNIC representative gave a 
presentation on anti-phishing 









Qian Hualin representing CNNIC 
gave a welcome speech as host.  
Zhang Jian, representing CNNIC, 
gave an update on CNNIC. 
An MIIT representative, Cui 
Shuitian, discussed internet 
development in China.*** 
A CDNC representative discussed 
IDN policy issues. 
A CNNIC representative discussed 
IDN policy issues. 
 
2010 March 2 Civil Society 0 
Zhang Jian representing the ccNSO 
gave a presentation on IDN policy 
issues. 
 
2010 June 3 Civil Society CNNIC 
Zhang Jian representing APTLD 
gave a welcome presentation. 
Xue Hong representing APRALO 
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gave a presentation on APRALO 
activities. 
A CNNIC representative discussed 
IDN policy issues. 
 
2010 October 2 Civil Society 0 
Zhang Jian representing APTLD 
gave a welcome presentation. 
Zhang Jian representing APTLD 
gave a presentation on APTLD's 
activities. 
A CNNIC representative discussed 
DNS abuse issues. 
 
2011 February 3 Civil Society 0 
Zhang Jian representing APTLD 
gave a welcome presentation. 
Zhang Jian representing APTLD 
gave multiple presentations on 
APTLD's activities. 
A CNNIC representative discussed 
IDN policy. 
 
2011 April 3 Civil Society NA 
Zhang Jian in her APTLD capacity 
introduced TLD organizations 
active in internet governance. 
 
2011 August 2 Civil Society 0 
Zhang Jian representing APTLD 
gave a welcome presentation. 
Zhang Jian representing APTLD 
gave a presentation on APTLD's 
activities. 
A CNNIC representative discussed 
IDN issues. 
 
2011 December 2 Civil Society 0 
Zhang Jian representing APTLD 
gave a welcome presentation. 
Zhang Jian representing APTLD 
gave a presentation on APTLD's 
activities. 
A CNNIC representative gave an 
update on .cn events. 
The same CNNIC representative 
discussed ccTLD policy issues. 
 
2012 February 3 Civil Society 0 
Zhang Jian representing APTLD 
gave a welcome presentation. 
Zhang Jian representing APTLD 
gave a presentation on APTLD's 
activities. 
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2012 June 3 Civil Society 0 
Zhang Jian representing APTLD 
gave a welcome presentation. 
Zhang Jian representing APTLD 
gave a presentation on APTLD's 
activities. 
A CNNIC representative gave a 
presentation on IPv6 issues. 
The same CNNIC representative 
gave a presentation on IDN issues. 
 
2012 November 3 Civil Society NA 
Zhang Jian representing APTLD 
gave a welcome presentation. 
Zhang Jian representing APTLD 
gave a presentation on APTLD's 
activities. 
A CNNIC representative gave a 
presentation on the .cn domain. 
Another CNNIC representative gave 
an anti-phishing presentation. 
 
2013 February 6 Civil Society 0 
Zhang Jian representing APTLD 
gave a welcome presentation. 
Zhang Jian representing APTLD 
gave a presentation on APTLD's 
activities. 
A CNNIC representative discussed 
ccTLD policy. 
Another CNNIC representative 









A CNNIC representative gave a 
welcome speech as host. 
A CNNIC representative gave a 
presentation on the .cn domain. 
Another CNNIC representative gave 
another presentation on the .cn 
domain. 
A Zodiac Corp. representative gave 
a presentation on gTLD issues.*** 
A China Telecom representative 
gave a presentation on anti-DNS 
hijacking.*** 
 
2014 February 0 NA NA  
2014 May 1 Civil Society 0 
A CNNIC representative spoke on 
IDN issues. 
 
2014 September 2 Civil 0 Zhang Jian representing the Macau 
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Society ccTLD gave a presentation on this 
domain. 
 
Source: Author's own research in APTLD Meeting archives (APTLD 2015c). 
* Attendance by Chinese citizens determined by records kept in APTLD Meeting 
Program/Agenda records, which intermittently record attendee affiliation. Where 
attendance is not recorded, the number of Chinese attendees is inferred from the 
number of distinct individuals active in a given APTLD meeting. Registration for 
attendance at APTLD meetings is not mandatory, thus the Appendix likely slightly 
understates the extent of Chinese participation. Note that for the February, 2004 
meeting no specific number was given for attendees from the CNNIC. 
** NA in the Sponsors/Hosts column refers to instances where the APTLD has not 
recorded sponsors/hosts. 
*** All participants are associated with civil society organizations unless specifically 
indicated by *** after the details of participant actions. There are only three instances 
of stakeholders outside of civil society participating in APTLD meetings: two private 
sector participants in the August, 2013 meeting; and, one government participant in 
the August, 2009 meeting. 
^ Three APTLD meetings have been held in China: the August, 2013 meeting in 
Xian; the August, 2009 meeting in Beijing; and, the October, 2002 meeting in 
Shanghai. 
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Details of Chinese 
Participation*** 
  
8 (1999) 0 3 0 3 0 0 None 
 
9 (2000) 0 10 0 5 5 0 Civil Society 
Li Xing from CERNET gave 
a presentation on Ipv6 in 
China at an IPv6 meeting 









13 NA NA NA NA Private Sector 
A China Mobile 
representative gave a 
presentation on the company 
at an address SIG meeting 
(APNIC 2000a). 
A China Telecom 
representative ran in an EC 










NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society 
Li Xing from CERNET 
chaired a meeting on database 







NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society 
Li Xing from CERNET gave 
a presentation on database 
issues in a meeting on that 
topic (APNIC 2001a). 
Wu Jianping, from Tsinghua 
University, ran for a position 
in APNIC's EC in an election 
but was not successful 





0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society 
Pan Guangliang representing 
APNIC gave a presentation 
on IPv6 in an IPv6 meeting 
(APNIC 2002b) 
Li Xing chaired a database 
policy meeting and presented 
on the topic with another 











NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society 
Li Xing from CERNET 
chaired a database meeting 







NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society 
Li Xing from CERNET 
chaired a database meeting 
and reported on it at the 
general APNIC member 






0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society 
Li Xing from CERNET 
chaired a database meeting 
and gave a report on the 
meeting at an APNIC general 
member meeting (APNIC 
2003d, 2003e, 2003g, 2003i). 
Pan Guangliang from APNIC 
gave a presentation on IPv6 at 
a meeting on that topic 
(APNIC 2003h, 2003j). 
A CNNIC representative 
running for the EC introduced 
himself in an APNIC general 
member meeting but 
subsequently lost an EC 
election run-off determined 






0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society 
Li Xing from CERNET 
chaired a database SIG and 
reported on it at the general 









11 0 3 8 0 Civil Society 
Li Xing from CERNET 
chaired and commented in the 
database SIG and reported on 
it to the general member 
meeting (APNIC 2004c, 
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NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society 
Li Xing from CERNET 
chaired and commented in the 
database SIG and reported it 
to the general member 
meeting (APNIC 2005a, 
2005b). 
A CNNIC representative 







16 0 7 9 0 Civil Society 
Qian Hualin briefly 
commented on intellectual 
property issues in the 
Opening Plenary (APNIC 
2005g). 
Li Xing from CERNET 
chaired a database meeting, 
commented on database 
issues and reported on his 
database meeting the general 
meeting (APNIC 2005d, 
2005f). 
A CNNIC representative 
attended the Policy SIG 
meeting (APNIC 2005h). 
A CNNIC representative co-
chaired an IPv6 SIG but 
wasn't present as he was 
attending a presentation in 







22 0 10 10 2 Civil Society 
Li Xing from CERNET 
chaired and commented in 
and then presented on his 
database meeting at the 
general members meeting 
(APNIC 2006a, 2006b). 
Qian Hualin commented at a 
general member meeting on 
China's IDN being outside the 
global root, noting that this 
was not in an attempt to 
create an alternative root but 
    205 
 
simply to provide IDN 
service to the Chinese people 
(APNIC 2006c). 
Ma Yan, an academic in 
Beijing, commented briefly at 
a general member meeting 
(APNIC 2006d). 
A CNNIC representative gave 
an update on CNNIC in the 





0 NA NA NA NA NA Private Sector 
A China Telecom 
representative participated in 




A CNNIC representative gave 
an update on CNNIC in the 
NIR SIG (APNIC 2006i). 
The same CNNIC 
representative chaired an 
IPv6 meeting (APNIC 
2006h). 
Li Xing from CERNET gave 
a presentation on IPv6 at a 








NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society 
A CNNIC representative 
chaired an IPv6 meeting and 




A CNNIC representative gave 
a CNNIC update at an NIR 
SIG (APNIC 2007c). 
Two CNNIC representatives 
gave a presentation on 
CNNIC at a general policy 
meeting (APNIC 2007d). 
Two CNNIC representatives 
and Pan Guangliang from 
APNIC commented on 
various issues at the general 
member meeting (APNIC 









NA NA NA NA NA Private Sector 
A China Telecom 
representative commented on 
profitability of broadband in 
an APOPS meeting (APNIC 
2007f). 
The same China Telecom 
representative commented on 
APNIC fees at an annual 




Pan Guangliang from APNIC 
commented briefly on general 
matters at an annual members 
meeting (APNIC 2007e). 
Two civil society actors, Pan 
Guangliang from APNIC and 
a CNNIC representative, 
commented on NIR issues 
(APNIC 2007g). 
Zhang Jian representing the 
CNNIC introduced herself at 






0 NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society 
Pan Guangliang from APNIC 
gave an update on APNIC's 
activities in the AMM 
(APNIC 2007i). 
A CNNIC representative 
commented on .cn issues in a 







22 0 5 13 4 Civil Society 
Li Xing from CERNET 
commented on IPv6 and v4 
issues in two IPv6 meetings 
(APNIC 2008b, 2008c). 
A CNNIC representative gave 
an update on CNNIC in an 
NIR meeting (APNIC 
2008d). 
Zhang Jian and Pan 
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Guangliang, in their APNIC 
capacities, commented on 
IPv4/v6 issues in a policy 
SIG (APNIC 2008e). 
Pan Guangliang from APNIC 
discussed internal APNIC 







16 0 1 15 0 Civil Society 
Pan Guangliang from APNIC 
briefly commented in the 
policy SIG (APNIC 2009c). 
Two CNNIC representatives 
commented on general 
matters in the AMM (APNIC 
2009a). 
Two CNNIC representatives 
commented on IP address 
issues at the NIR SIG 
(APNIC 2009b). 
Zhang Jian, as a CNNIC 
representative, commented on 
general policy issues at a 


























NA NA NA NA NA Government 
In a plenary meeting on the 
Internet in China, an MIIT 
representative stated that he 
welcomed involvement by all 
stakeholders in Internet 
governance (APNIC 2009j). 
 
Private Sector 
A China Mobile 
representative commented in 
a plenary meeting on the 
Internet in China on general 
issues (APNIC 2009j). 
Four private sector actors 
from China Telecom and 
China Mobile discussed IPv6 




Two civil society 
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representatives, both from the 
CNNIC, were elected to chair 
the Policy SIG and the NIR 
SIG (APNIC 2009g).   
The CNNIC signed an MOU 
on Internet development and 
cooperation with APNIC 
(APNIC 2009g). 
At a plenary meeting on the 
Internet in China, Hu Qiheng 
representing the ISC 
discussed her role in 
establishing China's 
connection to the TCP/IP 
Internet, and five CNNIC 
representatives also 
introduced facts about China's 
domestic internet 
development (APNIC 2009j). 
Li Xing from CERNET gave 
a presentation on IPv6 in 
China (APNIC 2009i). 
Pan Guangliang discussed 
IPv6 at APNIC in the AMM 
(APNIC 2009d). 
A CNNIC representative 
discussed IPv6 issues at the 
NIR SIG (APNIC 2009h). 
Three civil society 
representatives, two from 
CNNIC and Pan Guangliang 
from APNIC, commented on 
general issues at a Policy SIG 
meeting (APNIC 2009k). 
Five civil society actors - 
including: Xue Hong in her 
academic capacity, two 
CNNIC representatives, 
Zhang Jian in her ICANN 
capacity, and a CDNC 
representative - commented 
on Internet governance 
matters at an Internet 
governance meeting; 
including comments from Li 
Xiaodong from the CNNIC 
that gave a detailed statement 
about the benefits of the IGF's 
multi-stakeholder governance 
model (APNIC 2009f). 
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Zhang Jian gave a detailed 
account of APNIC's policy 
processes, acting as the 








NA NA NA NA NA Government 
A Chinese ITU official 
commented on an ITU 
proposal for IPv6 to be 
allocated on a country basis 
instead of through the usual 
process (APNIC 2010b). 
 
Civil Society 
Pan Guangliang gave a 
presentation representing 
APNIC at the AMM (APNIC 
2010a). 
Two CNNIC representatives 
commented on general policy 
issues at the Policy SIG 
(APNIC 2010c). 
Two civil society actors 
commented on general policy 
issues, including Ma Yan in 
his academic capacity who 
commented on general 
matters and Zhao Wei from 
the CNNIC, who discussed 
the CNNIC's use of mailing 
lists for internal discussion of 







18 0 5 12 1 Civil Society 
Pan Guangliang discussed 
IPv4 allocation as APNIC's 
representative (APNIC 
2010d). 
Ma Yan in his academic 
capacity and Zhang Jian in 
her APTLD capacity 
commented briefly on general 
issues at the AMM (APNIC 
2010f). 
Two CNNIC representatives 
commented on IPv6 and 
gTLD issues at the Policy 
SIG, one of whom chaired the 
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meeting (APNIC 2010h). 
Zhao Wei, CNNIC, co-
chaired and commented in the 
NIR SIG (APNIC 2010g). 
Li Xing from CERNET gave 







62 2 14 46 0 Private Sector 
A Chinese Microsoft 
representative commented on 
general issues in China's 
internet business at the 




Zhao Wei from the CNNIC 
commented on her role as a 
chair of the NIR SIG at the 
AMM (APNIC 2011a). 
Two civil society actors, Li 
Xing from CERNET and Ma 
Yan in his academic capacity, 
commented on IPv6 and 
network development in 
China in an IPv6 transition 
meeting (APNIC 2011d). 
Li Xiaodong from the 
CNNIC commented on 
various issues in the 
DNSSEC Executive Summit 
(APNIC 2011c). 
A CNNIC representative 
commented on various 
matters at the closing 
ceremony (APNIC 2011b). 
A CERNET representative 
commented on IPv6 issues at 
an IPv6 workshop (APNIC 
2011e). 
Wu Jianping in his capacity 
as a representative of an Asia-
Pacific networking group 
commented on general issues 
at the opening ceremony 
(APNIC 2011f). 
 
32 CNNIC NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society 




(Sponsor) A CERNET representative 
commented briefly in a 
general Panel discussion 
(APNIC 2011k). 
A CNNIC and a CERNET 
representative commented on 
general issues at a policy SIG 
(APNIC 2011h). 
Ma Yan commented on 
various policy issues at an 
IPv6 transition meeting 
(APNIC 2011g). 
A CNNIC representative 
commented briefly on issues 
at the NIR meeting (APNIC 
2011j). 
Ma Yan in his APNIC 
capacity commented on 
general internet issues in 







NA NA NA NA NA Civil Society 
A CNNIC representative and 
a CERNET representative 
gave two separate 
presentations each (APNIC 
2012e). 
A CNNIC representative gave 
an IPv6 presentation at the 
NIR SIG (APNIC 2012g). 
A CNNIC representative gave 
an IPv6 presentation at an 
IPv6 meeting (APNIC 
2012d). 
A CERNET representative 
gave a presentation at an 
IPv6-related meeting (APNIC 
2012c). 
A CNNIC representative and 
a CERNET representative 
commented on general policy 
in a policy SIG (APNIC 
2012h). 
Ma Yan in his academic 
capacity commented in the 
AMM on general matters 
(APNIC 2012f). 
 
34 CNNIC 23 0 10 9 4 Private Sector 
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(2012) (Sponsor) A China Mobile 
representative gave a 
presentation on mobile 




Two CNNIC representatives, 
a CERNET representative 
and a Chinese APNIC 
employee gave presentations 
on technical issues (APNIC 
2012l). 
A CNNIC representative co-
chaired an NIR SIG (APNIC 
2012k) 
Pan Guangliang in his 
APNIC capacity commented 
on general issues at a policy 
meeting, at a global reports 
meeting, and gave a 
presentation on APNIC 
services (APNIC 2012i, 
2012j, 2012q). 
A CNNIC representative gave 
a presentation on PKI issues 
at a PKI meeting (APNIC 
2012m). 
Li Xing gave a presentation 
on IPv6 issues at a lightning 
talk (APNIC 2012p). 
Two civil society 
representatives, a CNNIC and 
APNIC representative 
respectively, introduced 
themselves at the general 







33 5 8 13 7 Civil Society 
A CNNIC representative 
chaired and commented in the 
NIR SIG (APNIC 2013c). 
Another CNNIC 
representative gave a 
presentation at the WEIRDS 
BoF (APNIC 2013e). 
A CNNIC commented briefly 
on being part of APNIC in 
the AMM (APNIC 2013a). 
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Ma Yan and Zhao Wei 
commented on their roles in 
the APNIC EC at the AMM 
(APNIC 2013b). 
Zhao Wei introduced Xian, 
the next APNIC meeting 

















112 1 60 46 5 Private Sector 
A BII representative 
commented briefly in the 
APOPS Plenary 1 (APNIC 
2013j). 
Two China Telecom 
representatives commented 
on IPv6 issues in a meeting 
on that topic (APNIC 2013n). 
A BII representative 
commented on IPv6 issues at 
the Opening Ceremony 
(APNIC 2013q). 
A Chinese IDN registrar 
representative presented on 
IPv6 issues at an IPv6 
meeting (APNIC 2013h). 
 
Civil Society 
Li Xing chaired and 
commented in a Policy SIG 
(APNIC 2013r). 
Two Chinese APNIC 
representatives commented in 
the Policy SIG 2 (APNIC 
2013s). 
Two civil society 
representatives commented in 
the Opening Ceremony, 
including a CAS 
representative and Zhao Wei 
from the CNNIC who chaired 
the meeting (APNIC 2013q). 
A CNNIC representative 
commented on IPv6 in China 
in the NIR SIG (APNIC 
2013p). 
Pan Guangliang from APNIC 
commented on APNIC's 
general activities at the 
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APNIC Services meeting 
(APNIC 2013i). 
A CNNIC representative gave 
a presentation at a PKI 
workshop (APNIC 2013o). 
A Beijing academic spoke at 
a women leaders’ session 
(APNIC 2013l). 
Two CNNIC representatives 
commented on IPv6 issues 
(APNIC 2013n). 
A CONAC presented on DNS 
issues in an APOPS session 
(APNIC 2013k). 
Two Chinese APNIC 
representatives commented 
on election processes for the 
Policy SIG, one who helped 
facilitate the election process 
(APNIC 2013r, 2013s). 
A CERNET representative 
and a Beijing academic 
commented on general issues 
in an anniversary meeting 
(APNIC 2013f). 
Ma Yan in his academic 
capacity commented on 




An unknown attendee 
commented in an IPv6 
meeting on general issues 
(APNIC 2013m). 
An unknown attendee 
commented in an IPv6 







20 0 9 9 2 Civil Society 
Ma Yan in his academic 
capacity gave a presentation 
on IPv6 at an IPv6 BoF 
(APNIC 2014c). 
Two Chinese APNIC 
representatives briefly 
commented in the AMM 
(APNIC 2014b). 










15 1 6 8 0 Government 
Zhao Houlin, in his ITU 
capacity, was a keynote 
speaker at this conference. In 
his speech he noted the close 
collaboration between the 
ITU, APNIC and other 
internet governance 
organizations. He also noted 
that the ITU is not trying to 
take over internet governance 
and noted the value of multi-
stakeholder governance 
(APNIC 2014g, 2014i). 
 
Civil Society 
Ma Yan and Zhao Wei in 
their APNIC capacities 
commented briefly in the 
AMM (APNIC 2014d). 
A Chinese APNIC 
representative and a CNNIC 
representative briefly 
commented in another session 
of the AMM (APNIC 2014e). 
Pan Guangliang in his 
APNIC capacity gave a 
presentation on APNIC 
services (APNIC 2014f). 
Ma Yan in his APNIC 
capacity discussed EC 
elections in a policy meeting 
(APNIC 2014j) 
Two Chinese APNIC 
representatives discussed 
general policy issues at 
another session of a policy 
meeting (APNIC 2014k) 
A CNNIC representative gave 
a presentation on IPv6 in 
China and Another CNNIC 
representative commented in 
a NIR meeting (APNIC 
2014h). 
 
Source: Author's own research into APNIC conference archives (APNIC 2014l). 
* APNIC only commenced recording/archiving its general conferences at APNIC 8. 
** APNIC did not record country affiliation until APNIC 18, although APNIC 10 did 
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record country affiliation in graph form. For meetings 8 and 9, the status of 
apparently Chinese attendees as PRC nationals was determined by whether they had a 
Chinese name along with another piece of corroborating evidence (i.e. a .cn email 
address, affiliation with a PRC-based organization, etc.). Stakeholder affiliation for 
all meetings was determined by the PRC-based organization with which attendees 
were associated. If no association was given, the attendee is listed as part of the 
unknown stakeholder group. 
*** Details listed in this section are drawn from recorded details of each meeting. 
These details are generally from session/sub-meeting transcripts but, especially in the 
earlier APNIC conferences, are also drawn from recorded information about events 
or presentations given at APNIC conference sessions/sub-meetings. Transcripts did 
not begin to be provided for APNIC conferences until APNIC 16. The unreliability of 
some APNIC records, particularly those from earlier meetings but also generally due 
to transcription errors, means that this Appendix likely understates the extent of 
Chinese involvement in ANPIC conferences.   
^ APNIC 10 only indicated attendance by country via a graph, rendering this figure 
approximate. 
^^ APNIC's attendance records are incomplete or not publicly available. Meetings 11 
to 17 have no attendance records, while meetings 19, 22 to 25, 28, 29, 32 and 33 also 
do not have attendance records. 
^^^ APNIC 26 and 36 have been held in mainland China, in Beijing and Xian 
respectively.  
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Details of Chinese 
Participation*** 
 







An MIIT representative was on 
the inaugural IGF Advisory 
Group (which later became the 
MAG) (IGF 2007a). 
The 'Group of 77 & China' sent a 
letter to the UN Secretary-
General in relation to the IGF, 
which was supportive of multi-
stakeholder governance but 
advocated for governments to 
outnumber other stakeholder 
groups generally and equal them 
in the Advisory Group - 
suggesting 20 government, 10 
private sector and 10 civil 
society representatives for this 
body (IGF 2006/2007).  
A further letter sent by the 
Group of 77 & China insisted 
that governments, the private 
sector and civil society all meet 
separately during the IGF's 
preparatory phase (IGF 
2006/2007). 
An MIIT representative 
commented in the Setting the 
Scene main session, stating that 
it was important to safeguard 
state security online (IGF 
2006c). 
A government representative 
commented in an Openness main 
session, stating that there were 
no content restrictions on 
China's internet (IGF 2006e). 
 
Civil Society 
Hu Qiheng, a CNNIC and ISC 
representative, commented on 
IDN issues in a diversity main 
session (IGF 2006a). 
A CNCERT/CC representative 
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commented in a security panel 
on spam issues (IGF 2006b). 
ISC and CAST representatives 
organized a workshop on 
internet security (IGF 2006d). 
The ISC organized a workshop 
in which a 'World Internet Norm' 
was proposed, which advocated 
for a secure and 'trusty' internet 
and for government authority 
over internet governance 
(Winfield & Mendoza 2008, p. 
2, 10). 
 
2007 NA 35 19 0 16 0 Government 
An MIIT representative was a 
member of the renewed IGF 
Advisory Group (which later 
became the MAG) (IGF 2007a). 
A Chinese government 
representative commented on a 
range of matters in a preparatory 
meeting, stating that 
governments should have a 
greater role in internet 
governance, that critical internet 
resources should be a priority for 
discussion, that developing 
states should be better 
represented and noting support 
for multi-stakeholder 
governance (IGF 2007h). 
The Chinese government 
submitted a letter to the IGF 
stating that critical internet 
resources, development issues 
and the role of government 
should be a priority for 
discussion (IGF 2007b). 
A Chinese government 
representative commented in a 
preparatory meeting that critical 
internet resources should be part 
of the IGF's agenda (IGF 
2007g). 
A Chinese government 
representative in a critical 
internet resources main session 
commented on the need for 
internet governance reform in 
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favour of governments and 
obliquely referred to US 
dominance over the present 
system (IGF 2007f). 
A Ministry of Education 
representative commented in a 
workshop on internet 
governance principles support of 
a 'World Internet Norm' 
proposed by Chinese civil 
society representatives in IGF 
2006, which placed an emphasis 




In a critical internet resources 
main session, a delegate from 
the ‘China Internet Emergency 
Response Group’, a likely 
reference to CNCERT/CC, 
supported the government’s 
contention that ‘one state’ 
controlling internet governance 
was unjust (IGF 2007f). 
A CNNIC representative 
reported in the opening 
ceremony on China’s 
development of its own 
domestic DNS that the 
representative claimed does not 
rely on IP addresses (IGF 
2007d). 
The Secretary-General of the 
ISC commented in a security 
main session on spam and on the 
need for government 
involvement in internet 
governance (IGF 2007e). 
The ISC and CAST organized a 
workshop on development issues 
and the internet (IGF 2007i). 
 
2008 NA 14 6 0 8 0 Government 
An MIIT representative was a 
member of the MAG (IGF 
2008g) 
In a preparatory meeting, a 
Chinese government 
representative stated that 
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managing internet resources 
should be done in a multilateral 
and democratic way (IGF 
2008a). 
In a preparatory meeting the 
Chinese government stated that 
it supported the current agenda, 
which included critical internet 
resources (IGF 2008f). 
At an emerging issues main 
session, it was noted that the 
Chinese government 
representative had supported 
Brazil's call for greater 
government involvement in 
ICANN (IGF 2008c). 
At an open dialogue main 
session, a Chinese embassy 
representative stated that 
governments should have a 
greater role in internet 
governance while also briefly 
commenting on multi-
lingualization issues (IGF 
2008d). 
At a critical internet resources 
meeting, an MIIT representative 
made a direct request that the 
IGF focus on the need for 
discussion of the role of 
governments in internet 
governance, noted that 'one 
government' controls internet 
governance, suggested the need 
for an intergovernmental 
supervisory entity and praised 
the multi-stakeholder character 
of the IGF itself (IGF 2008b). 
The Chinese government was 
involved in workshops 
discussing development, 
cybersecurity and online dispute 
resolution within domain name 




An ISC representative in an 
open dialogue main session 
discussed spam issues and child 
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pornography regulation (IGF 
2008e). 
The ISC organized a workshop 
on the internet and people with 
disabilities (IGF 2008f) 
Xue Hong in her academic 
capacity was a panellist in a 
workshop on digital education 
issues (IGF 2008h). 
The ISC and CAST organized a 
workshop on cybersecurity, 
while a Beijing academic and 
CAS members were also 
panellists in this workshop. A 
third version of the 'World 
Internet Norm' was proposed in 
this workshop but is no longer 
accessible (IGF 2008i). 
The ISC and CAST organized a 
workshop on development issues 
in internet governance (IGF 
2008j). 
A Beijing academic organized 
and was a panellist in a 
workshop on online dispute 
resolution (IGF 2008k). 
 
2009 NA 42 18 0 24 0 Government 
An MIIT representative was a 
member of the MAG (IGF 
2009b). 
In a preparatory meeting, the 
Chinese government 
representative called for critical 
internet resources to be a focus 
of the IGF (IGF 2009c). 
In another preparatory meeting, 
the Chinese government 
representative stated that despite 
four years of the IGF, critical 
internet resources were still 
unilaterally controlled by one 
government, and stated that this 
issue should now be moved to 
an intergovernmental forum 
instead of the IGF (IGF 2009d). 
In a further preparatory meeting, 
the Chinese government 
delegate stated the IGF had 
failed to address the issue of 
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unilateral control of the internet, 
that an intergovernmental body 
should take over this task, and 
that the IGF's mandate should 
not be reviewed (IGF 2009g). 
A non-Chinese participant 
commented in a security and 
openness main session that a 
previous session had been 
disrupted the day before when 
the Chinese government 
delegation walked out after 
being criticised over the Great 
Firewall (IGF 2009e). 
At a critical internet resources 
main session, a Chinese 
government representative 
commented briefly on the 
importance of developing IPv6 
(IGF 2009a). 
At a taking stock and looking 
forward main session, a Chinese 
government representative again 
noted the IGF's failure to address 
unilateral control of the internet 
and outlined its proposal for 
transferring IGF activities to an 
intergovernmental body within 
the UN framework (IGF 2009h). 
An MIIT representative attended 
a workshop on IPv6 (IGF 
2009m). 
 
Private Sector/Civil Society 
A number of Chinese non-state 
actors were involved in 
workshops related to freedom of 
information, cloud computing, 
development, the digital divide 
and education, and people with 
disabilities on the Internet (IGF 




The ISC contributed in a taking 
stock main session where its 
Vice President stated the IGF 
should focus on transnational 
issues and respect national and 
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cultural differences (IGF 2009f). 
 
2010 NA 31 9 1 20 1 
** 
Government 
In a preparatory meeting, a 
Chinese government 
representative stated that the 
IGF’s activities should continue 
in ‘relevant UN meetings’ and a 
‘relevant decision’ should be 
made on renewing the IGF’s 
mandate (IGF 2010f). 
The Chinese government made a 
statement in a critical internet 
resources main session that 
internet governance was very 
important and that China was 
fully cooperative with the world 
in its governance (IGF 2010g). 
 
Private Sector 
A Qihoo 360 representative 
participated in a workshop on 
cloud computing (IGF 2010d). 
 
Civil Society 
The ISC and CAST both 
organized workshops at this IGF 
(IGF 2010a). 
A Chinese academic was a part 
of a dynamic coalition on 
internet rights and principles 
(IGF 2010c). 
An ISC member was part of a 
workshop on cloud computing 
(IGF 2010d) 
A representative of both the ISC 
and CAST organized and 
chaired a workshop on internet 
governance principles (IGF 
2010h). 
A Chinese academic was part of 
a workshop on international law 




An unknown participated in a 
workshop on development issues 
and internet governance (IGF 




2011 NA 22 8 1 7 6 
** 
Government 
An MIIT representative was a 
member of the MAG (IGF 
2011j). 
In a preparatory meeting a 
Chinese government 
representative commented on 
various issues related to the 
IGF's agenda, and also noted 
that critical internet resources 
were the most important issue 
(IGF 2011e). 
An MIIT representative attended 
a preparatory MAG meeting 
(IGF 2011j). 
A Chinese government 
representative commented on 
general IGF agenda issues in 
another preparatory meeting 
(IGF 2011g). 
In a security and openness main 
session, a Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs representative 
stated that China, Russia and 
other states had put forward a 
proposal on internet security to 
the UN and encouraged other 
states to approve it. He noted 
that it was a non-binding treaty 
(IGF 2011f). 
A Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
representative commented in a 
dynamic coalition meeting on 
freedom of expression, noting 
that protection of this right 
varied amongst issues and 
societies (IGF 2011b). 
A Chinese government 
representative participated in a 
workshop on copyright issues in 




Two private sector actors 
participated in a good practice 
forum on e-commerce issues 
(IGF 2011d) 




An ISC representative chaired a 
good practice forum on e-
commerce issues (IGF 2011d). 
A CNNIC representative 
participated in an IDN workshop 
(IGF 2011h). 
An ISC member chaired a 
workshop on open knowledge 
environments in developing 
countries, and a CAST 
representative and a Chinese 
academic contributed to 
discussions as well (IGF 2011k). 
 
Unknown 
An unknown participated in a 
workshop on strengthening 
ccTLDs in East Africa (IGF 
2011a). 
 
2012 NA 41 9 12 20 0 Government 
An MIIT representative was a 
member of the MAG (IGF 
2012i). 
An MIIT representative 
commented in a preparatory 
MAG meeting on the IGF's 
agenda, stressing the need to 
advance developing state 
participation (IGF 2012h). 
A Chinese government 
representative commented in a 
preparatory meeting on the IGF's 
agenda (IGF 2012j). 
A Chinese government 
representative commented in 
another preparatory meeting on 
the IGF's agenda (IGF 2012k). 
A Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
representative stated in an 
internet governance for 
development main session that 
he had attended a few 
workshops on this issue at this 
IGF and that there was much we 
could do to improve developing 
state access to the internet (IGF 





A China Telecom representative 
and a Baidu representative 
discussed mobile internet issues 




The first Chinese non-state 
actor, Guo Liang from the 
CASS, was appointed to the 
MAG in 2012 (IGF 2012i). 
Guo Liang, a MAG member, 
commented briefly on the IGF's 
agenda in a preparatory meeting 
(IGF 2012e). 
In a preparatory meeting Guo 
Liang supported calls for greater 
developing state involvement in 
the IGF (IGF 2012e). 
Xue Hong in her academic 
capacity commented on law 
enforcement use of IP addresses 
and domain names in a security 
main session (IGF 2012m). 
Xue Hong in her academic 
capacity commented on online 
dispute resolution issues in a 
workshop on that topic (IGF 
2012n). 
Xue Hong discussed IDN issues 
in a new gTLD workshop (IGF 
2012p). 
Xue Hong in her academic 
capacity discussed the 
uniqueness of multi-stakeholder 
governance in internet 
governance in a workshop on 
politics and the internet (IGF 
2012q). 
Xue Hong was the moderator in 
a workshop on law enforcement 
using domain names (IGF 
2012u). 
Xue Hong in her academic 
capacity discussed trademark 
issues in new gTLD's in a 
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meeting on gTLD issues (IGF 
2012v). 
A CNNIC representative 
discussed DNS blocking and 
censorship in China in a forum 
on internet filtering (IGF 
2012w). 
CERNET co-organized a 
meeting on internet 
communications in disaster 
situations (IGF 2012o). 
An ISC representative chaired a 
workshop on mobile internet 
(IGF 2012r). 
An ISC chaired a workshop 
organized by CAST on open 
knowledge environments in 
developing countries (IGF 
2012s). 
A CNNIC representative 
discussed new gTLD issues in a 
ccTLD workshop (IGF 2012t). 
 
Unknown 
An unknown Chinese attendee 
asked a question about 
enhancing developing state 
participation in internet 
governance in an open forum 
main session (IGF 2012c). 
 
2013 CNNIC 32 9 3 20 0 Government 
China's Permanent UN 
representative, Chen Hongbing, 
was a MAG member (IGF 
2013g). 
A Chinese UNDESA official, 
Wu Hongbo, selected Markus 
Kummer to act as the IGF's 
Interim Chair for the 2013 IGF 
(IGF 2013f). 
An MIIT representative was an 
observer at preparatory MAG 
meetings (IGF 2013d). 
China's government MAG 
member commented in a MAG 
meeting on the IGF's agenda 
(IGF 2013i). 
An MIIT representative in a 
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preparatory meeting commented 
on the IGF's agenda (IGF 
2013b).  
In a preparatory meeting, 
China's government MAG 
member approved of this year's 
focus on enhancing multi-
stakeholder governance, but also 
noted that such discussion 
should take note of WSIS' 
outcomes and consider 
promoting multi-stakeholder 
governance “which is 
multinational, democratic, and 
transparent” He also stated that 
stakeholder roles in internet 
governance was a divisive issue 
that needed to be examined 
further (IGF 2013e). 
China's government MAG 
member in a preparatory MAG 
meeting supported a call for the 
inclusion of sovereignty as an 
issue or theme for the 2013 IGF, 
noted that multi-stakeholder 
governance itself shouldn't be 
considered a theme more 
important than others, and 
argued that critical Internet 
resources needed to be discussed 
“to change the current 
unreasonable situation of the 
governance of critical Internet 
resources” (IGF 2013h). 
In a focus session on internet 
governance principles, a Chinese 
government delegate commented 
on the need for human rights to 
be recognized in Internet 
governance (IGF 0213). 
In a taking stock, emerging 
issues - internet surveillance 
meeting, a Chinese Foreign 
Ministry delegate stated that 
mass surveillance of foreign 
citizens was unacceptable, in a 
clear reference to the US spying 
program. The delegate also 
stated that human rights were 
important but needed to be 
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balanced against each other. The 
issue of surveillance led to 
mutual recrimination between 
this Chinese delegate and a US 
official The delegate also 
explicitly stated that multi-
stakeholder Internet governance 
was a good thing and that 
excluding any stakeholder group 
was ill-advised (IGF 2013m). 
In a high level leaders meeting, 
an MIIT representative 
discussed China's internet 
development and noted that 
technical GIG needed to be 
multilateral and conform to the 
WSIS Principles (IGF 2013c). 
A Chinese government delegate 
in an online oppression 
workshop stated the US had 
double standards in criticising 
other states' online human rights 
in light of US spying (IGF 
2013q). 
A Chinese UN representative 
commented briefly on women's 
issues in a workshop on 
protecting rights online (IGF 
2013s). 
A Chinese GAC representative 
attended a workshop on 
Enhanced Cooperation hosted by 
the CNNIC, and criticised the 
ICANN multi-stakeholder model 
as not incorporating the views of 
ordinary internet users and 
governments (IGF 2013w). 
At the end of the 2013 IGF, the 
IGF provided a press release 
stating that the end of the 2013 
IGF had been overshadowed by 
surveillance concerns which 
mentioned that a Chinese 
Foreign Ministry representative 
noted that "some individual 
countries are carrying out large 
scale surveillance" (IGF 2013l). 
 
Private Sector 
A Tencent representative 
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commented on mobile internet 
issues in a workshop on real-




Guo Liang, from CASS retained 
his position on the IGF's MAG 
(IGF 2013g). 
Guo Liang commented in a 
preparatory meeting on the 
difficulty of staging IGF 
workshops using Chinese 
language (IGF 2013k). 
Guo Liang attended the May 
preparatory process meetings but 
made no recorded comment 
(IGF 2013j). 
Xue Hong commented on 
privacy policy in China in a 
privacy workshop (IGF 2013n). 
Xue Hong commented on 
China's real name domain 
registration system in a 
workshop on online identity 
security (IGF 2013o). 
Xue Hong commented on 
China's Internet governance 
regime in an IDN workshop, 
noting in particular the multi-
stakeholder character of the 
CDNC (IGF 2013p). 
A CNNIC representative 
discussed China's IDN research, 
and noted the multi-stakeholder 
character of the CDNC (IGF 
2013v). 
A CNNIC representative 
discussed ccTLDs and IDNs in a 
workshop on ccTLDs (IGF 
2013r). 
An ISC representative chaired a 
workshop on real-time 
communications that was 
organized by the ISC and CAST, 
and a Beijing academic was a 
panellist in this workshop (IGF 
2013t). 
A CNNIC representative 
commented on China's internet 
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governance regime and the 
global one in a workshop on 
internet governance, noting that 
multi-stakeholder governance 
could be improved upon and that 
the term has many different 
meanings (IGF 2013u). 
Two CNNIC representatives 
moderated a workshop on 
Enhanced Cooperation, which 
was hosted by the CNNIC. One 
representative, Li Xiaodong, 
commented in detail on China's 
internet governance regime and 
the multi-stakeholder 
governance model of the CNNIC 
(IGF 2013w). 
In a dynamic coalition meeting 
on internet values Xue Hong 
commented on digital rights 
management issues (IGF 2013a). 
 
2014 CNNIC 37 11 7 19 0 Government 
China's Permanent UN 
representative was a member of 
the MAG (IGF 2014f, 2014y). 
A Chinese UNDESA official 
wrote a formal invitation to the 
IGF for various stakeholders 
(IGF 2014d). 
Zhao Houlin, representing the 
ITU, gave a speech at the 
welcoming ceremony, where he 
praised the cooperation between 
the ITU and internet governance 
organizations (IGF 2014c, 
2014g). 
Qian Bo, a Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs representative, in a main 
session on the evolution of the 
internet governance ecosystem 
and future of the IGF, stated that 
the IGF is too much of a 
talkshop and its proposals 
should be implemented, noted 
that multi-stakeholder 
governance was a good thing 
and supported by the Chinese 
government, and stated that 
governments should play a 
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dominant role in internet 
governance (IGF 2014e). 
A Chinese Foreign Ministry 
official, Qian Bo, gave a speech 
at the IGF’s 2014 closing 
ceremony and touched briefly on 
the digital divide (IGF 2014a, 
2014b). 
Zhao Houlin, representing the 
ITU, was a panellist in a side 
meeting on WSIS+10 (IGF 
2014i). 
An MIIT representative 
commented in an accountability 
workshop on the IANA 
transition, stressing that 
governments should be more 
involved in the process (IGF 
2014l). 
A CATR representative 
participated in a workshop on 
broadband access in developing 
countries (IGF 2014n). 
An MIIT representative 
commented on China-Africa 
cooperation in internet 
development in a workshop on 
the internet as an engine for 




A Chinese private sector 
representative participated in a 
workshop on cloud computing 
and mobile internet (IGF 
2014k). 
A China Telecom representative 
participated in a workshop on 
broadband access in developing 
countries (IGF 2014m). 
A Huawei representative 
participated in a workshop on 
open data issues (IGF 2014r). 
 
Civil Society 
Guo Liang retained his position 
on the 2014 MAG (IGF 2014y). 
Guo Liang was a panellist in a 
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main session on internet access, 
growth and development 
policies. He commented on the 
digital divide in China and 
Chinese internet development 
policies (IGF 2014h). 
A CAST representative was a 
remote moderator in a workshop 
on mobile cloud computing (IGF 
2014j). 
A CAST representative, an ISC 
representative, a Beijing 
academic, and a 'Chinese 
Institute of Electronics' 
representative participated in a 
workshop on cloud computing 
and mobile internet (IGF 
2014k).  
Two ISC representatives and a 
CAST representative 
participated in a workshop on 
broadband access in developing 
countries (IGF 2014m). 
Two CNNIC representatives 
participated in a workshop on 
future internet architecture (IGF 
2014o). 
A CAS representative 
participated in a workshop on 
small island developing states 
and the information society, 
discussing the role of the CAS in 
assisting these islands (IGF 
2014q). 
A CASS representative 
participated in a workshop on 
children's rights in the digital 
age (IGF 2014p). 
Two CAST representatives, two 
CAS representatives, an ISC 
representative and a Chinese 
academic participated in a 
workshop on open data issues 
(IGF 2014r). 
A CNNIC representative 
participated in a workshop on 
ccTLDs and internet governance 
literacy, commenting on the new 
cyberspace ministry in China, its 
relationship to the CNNIC and 
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the CNNIC's own multi-
stakeholder character (IGF 
2014s). 
A CASS representative 
commented on the need to 
expand past just English 
language usage at internet 
governance events and 
organizations in a workshop on 
developing country participation 




An unknown attendee 
participated in a workshop on 





NA NA NA NA NA NA Government 
China's Permanent UN 
representative was a member of 
the MAG (IGF 2015). 
China's government MAG 
member introduced himself in a 




Li Xiaodong from the CNNIC 
was a member of the 2015 MAG 
(IGF 2015). 
Guo Liang, representing the 
CAS, participated in the 
December 2014 MAG open 
consultations, part of the 
preparatory process for IGF 
2015 (IGF 2014x). 
Guo Liang commented in a 
preparatory meeting that no 
Chinese government 
representative had given a 
formal speech at the IGF (IGF 
2014v). 
Guo Liang introduced himself in 
another preparatory meeting 
(IGF 2014w). 
 
Source: Author's own research into IGF meeting archives (IGF 2012g). 
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* Sponsor information is indicated in the IGF's annual financial statements, which 
are only available for IGF 2013 and 2014 (IGF 2012g). 
** IGF attendance lists are voluntary, thus the number of recorded attendees may 
understate how many Chinese participants there were in the IGF. This is particularly 
evident in IGF 2006, which as the details column indicates did involve Chinese 
government and civil society participation. Chinese participants are identified by 
their Chinese language names and another piece of corroborating evidence (i.e. 
Chinese government body, Chinese corporation or Chinese civil society 
organization/university, etc.) IGF 2010 and IGF 2011 had apparently Chinese 
attendees with affiliations listed only as 'Others/Personal Capacity'. These attendees 
do not have further corroborating evidence beyond a Chinese language name - thus 
the attendance of unknown stakeholders may be overstated. 
*** Details listed in this section are drawn from recorded details of each IGF 
meeting. These details include session, workshop, dynamic coalition and other 
transcripts, as well as documents outlining core information about chairs and 
panellists in these various IGF events. Some details also include formal submissions 
made to the IGF. This is particularly the case with the first IGF in 2006 which 
included a number of letters sent to the UN Secretary-General prior to the IGF's 
establishment, which relate to its intended structure and organization. Transcripts 
for IGF events contain some transcription errors, meaning that this Appendix likely 
understates the extent of Chinese involvement in ICANN meetings.   
^ The links to some IGF records are now dead, thus claims made by the Appendix 
indicated with the ^ symbol can no longer be confirmed. Rather than leave the data 
out entirely, the Appendix retains it to provide the reader with the most information 
possible but indicates that the reliability of these claims is limited. 
^^ The IGF 2015's preparatory process commenced in December of 2014, thus these 
elements of the IGF 2015 are included in the Appendix. 
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